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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis has two aimss firstly, to provide a summary of 
Moroccan political history over the years 1659-1727, which saw
C w
the Alawi dynasty established; and secondly, by making use, for 
the most part, of contemporary source material, to provide a critique 
of indigenous tradition concerning the period, as summed up in the 
nineteenth century "Kitab al-Istiasa**.0 »
C
Contemporary material suggests that the Alawi dynasty was 
effectively launched from Fes, the metropolitan base of the 
parvenu sultan al-Rashrd* Thereafter came imperial emancipation 
from Fasi tutelage, and the inauguration of a deteriorating 
relationship between sultan and metropolis* Isma°il, al-Rashid*s 
successor, moved his capital to Meknes* There he fostered a 
personal military and magnate following, developed along 
culturally standard lines* This won him dynastic victory, and 
brief military ascendancy in the critical regions of the Sus 
and Algerine march, tricked out with easy gains from a prestige 
programme of muiahid warfare*
Isma il's tide turned in 1692, with Algerine invasion of 
his territory* The subsequent decade was characterised by renewed 
and strenuous efforts at maintaining territorial maxima* The 
empire was scoured for slave recruits to the standing army* This 
swollen army failed to save the sultan, in 1701, from the Algerine 
trouncing which precipitated his retirement from personal
■ n Q  d ,
campaigning* Thereafter, Isma il was a palace ruler of fluctuating 
territory, and the object of repeated filial challenge* Assets 
which shored up his central authority were: a link with the
commerce of a debilitated Fes; a continuing working relationship 
with tribute-bearing magnates, involving gross power-dolegation; 
and a force of troops held in reserve as a military deterrent* 
Contemporary evidence eliminates the view of Ismacil as a 
swingeing monarch who, by 1692, had reduced all his provinces to 
orderly submission* By emphasising his latter-day problems, it 
points to his longevity as the key to the establishment of the 
°AlawI dynasty*
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A NDTE UPON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLITERATION
These were tangled matters for decision. Proper names posed 
the greatest problems. It will be seen that I have adopted an 
“orthodox", diacritically marked format for the proper names of 
all Muslims, with the exception of modern writers in European 
tongues who have chosen for themselves a Roman spelling of their 
names* For toponyms I have adopted, in most cases, the European 
fprmat, whether French, English or Spanish, which I considered 
to be the most familiar and easily identifiable* Exceptions were 
made in the case of obscure toponyms without any well-known
European nomenclature (e#g# "3abal Fazzaz"), and in the case
of places which no longer exist (e*g* Dila* ; Dar ibn Mashcal)*
Far the names of indigenous groupings I have, in most cases, 
adopted a precise Arabic format, making exceptions in the case of the 
global Berber linguistic groups "Chleuh" and "Berabsr", and in the 
case of the Snassen (properly Banu Yisnasin), whose name denotes 
a well-known region as well as a people*
In transliteration, I have adopted the equivalence recommended 
by the Encyclopaedia of Islam, with tha following exceptions;
j (instead of *djf )
q (instead of *k* )
** lya (instead of the terminal ,**iyyal)
The fg* in the word "sharacm'1 is a rendering of the Maghribi 
* «
letter ( £  )*
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Anonymous but common eighteenth century English map of the 
Maghrib al-Aqsa, here reproduced from the frontispiece to 
3* Braithuaite,s "History of the Revolutions in the Empire 
° L  Morocco, upon the Death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" 
(London, 1929)
A PROLOGUE; THE SOURCE MATERIAL AND ITS PROBLEMS,
The period from 1659 to 1727 covers the years between the
political emergence of al«Rashid, first Alawi sultan of the Maghrib
al-Aqsa, and the death of his brother and successor, Isma il. Source
material for this period is unevenly distributed, both geographically
and chronologically* Geographically there is a marked bias towards the
affairs of the northerly part of the region. Within indigenous source
material, this bias is the product of interplay between a court and
a city* The affairs of the Alawi imperial capital, which was based
first at New Fes, and then at nearby Meknes, redounded upon the affairs
of the citizenry of metropolitan Old Fes* And the corporate intellectual
and literary tradition of this last-named metropolis has predominated
within the Maghrib al-Aqsa from the period until the present day (1 )*
A parallel northerly bias within European source material is the outcome
c
of European predilections; diplomacy, focused upon the Alawi capital? 
maritime commerce, for which Sale and Tetuan were the major Moroccan 
entrepots? and residual crusading fervour that was phasing into mercantile 
imperialism* This last-noted enthusiasm drew its mass of "copy*1 from matters 
bound up with the wrack of fifteenth and sixteenth century European 
expansionisms the affairs of the small and squalid European enclaves 
which studded the Atlantic and Mediterranean littorals of the far Maghribi 
north-west*
The chronological imbalance in source material divides the period 
at around the opening of the eighteenth century* Under this division,
M M i i W H i i i i m i m i i  ■!     n nm m tn  i |m »  *|ih »i« i ■ in  nr» * r r n y  lim n  mi n u n  h i iiiiih iiiu >>h  h im ai m u  mii   i ni 11 'i r iirrnn 11 r t ■ t t — r—  T— ‘ -r— - i■■ r 1 n "  —  ■ r 1   
(1 ) Fes dominates the CAlawi sections of E, Levi-Proven^al,s classic study 
of Moroccan historiography and biography; ”Les Historians des Chorfa” 
(Paris, 1922). Here the Murrakush? intellectual sphere figures_comparatively 
peripherally* It is only in the present century that Murrakushi^scholars 
have attempted to imitate the FasI in producing works of tabaaat 
literature designed to give a collective expression to the'MurrakushT 
contribution to the cultural life of the Maghrib al—Aqsa. (Levi-Provencal, 
op® 385-6 cf* M* Lakhdar; KLa vie litteralrB au Maroc sous la dvnastie 
Alawide*' (Rabat, 1971) pp* 5-6
the period falls into a primary span, for which political developments 
within the Maghrib al-Aqsa can be relatively well-documented, and a 
secondary span for which available evidence is considerably more 
tenuous* The imbalance is the result of a complex of accidents* It will 
be seen that, by an ill chance, the most valuable bodies of indigenous 
and of European source material fall into debility together, at around 
1700* Furthermore, in 1701, the ageing sultan IsmaCil entered a long 
period of retirement* He no longer conducted campaigns personally, and 
rarely even left his palace in Meknes* A number of his sons struggled 
with each other for pre-eminence. Their main sphere of activity lay 
within the south of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, beyond the immediate interests 
of Fes or of European commentators* For much of this period the north 
was a region of relative political quiescence, lightly percolated by 
vague and shocking rumour from the south.
The received version of the history of the Maghrib al-Aqsa within 
the early cAlawi period is dominated by an indigenous literary tradition*
This literary tradition has been summed up within the relevant section
of the “Kitab al-Istiasa***1* of al-Nasirl (2), the work which, during 
the Protectorate, gained acceptance as the consummate authority upon 
all but the final disorderly years of pre-Protectorate Moroccan 
history* The ^Kitab al-Istiqsa***H was written during the reign of Hasan I. 
Its author was a minor government official of Saletin birth, whose 
postings enabled him to gather material from throughout the country (3)*
Al-Nasiri,s work was remarkable in that it was the first known attempt
(2) AJjmad ibn Khalid al-Na|irX al-Slawi: uKitab al-istiosa li-akhbar 
duwal al-maohrib al-agsa” (Cairo, 1894* Second edition: Casablanca,
1956)* A French translation of part IV of this work, the section 
relevant to the Alawi sultans, was made by E* Fumey, and published
as "Chronique de la dynastie alaouie au. Maroc1’ in uArchives Marocaines** 
(henceforward A*M.) Volumes IX and X* (Paris, 1906 and 1907)
(3) Biographical and^bibliographical details concerning al-Nasiri and the 
tf Kitab al-Isfcjqaa* * *11 are contained within Levi-Provencal*s w Les
Historiens des" Chorfa” (pp. 350-368) *
by a Moroccan to write a national history* It is otherwise unsurprising?
a lengthy and painstaking but essentially traditional piece of Muslim
historiography* Its author largely repeated or conflated evidence from
established sources for each period* Early Alawi history was not this
author,s major concern0 For his liveliest sphere of interest was not the
dynasty, but the .ilhack the struggle with Christendom* The tormented
political viewpoint to which the jihad was central, is expressed very
clearly within al-Masiri’s final chapter, scratched to a finish upon
Hasan’s death in 1894* Its keynote was an atavistic nationalism, aligned 
•
with something approaching despair* The author regarded his country as 
the last repository of decent Muslim values and of relatively low prices 
(4)* Yet he was obsessed by its political weakness in the face of the 
military and technical ascendancy of Christian powers, and by the 
relentless inflation which he associated with the encroachment of the 
European economy# Circumspectly, he repudiated the road he knew to have 
been taken by the Sudanese Mahdi* and fell enthusiastically into agreement 
with Hasan’s policy of eschewing war with European powers* An unsolicited 
fatwa of his own composition defended at length the sultan’s placation of 
Christendom (5). Yet the author took an obvious and personal literary
,  . a fl , —  « _  _
(4) “...ahl^maqhrib aqall al-umam ikhtilatan bihim* fa-hum arkhas al—nas
as aran* wa arfaqahum ma ashan* wa ab adahum ziyyan wa ada min 
ha’ula’i al—franj* wa fit dhalika min salama dXnlhim* ma la vukhfa 
bi-khilafi misr wa 11-sham wa ohavrihima min al-amsar* fa-innahu
« n Q *  m  Q  m i  n> #
vabluohuna anhum ma yasammu an al-adhan.”
*
(**.**Among nations, the people of the Maghrib is that which has had the least 
social contact with them (the Europeans)* And this is the population with 
the lowest prices, and the easiest subsistence. The people have recoiled 
from the dress and the life-style of these Europeans* Herein lies the 
security of their religion* It is well-known that circumstances are quite 
different in Cairo, and in Damascus, and in other metropolitan cities 
besides these two* The information that reaches us concerning them* deafens 
the ears”) (MKitab al-lstiasa***”* Casablanca text, Uol, IX p. 208;
(5) “Kitab al-Istiosa***” tr* Fumey A.M. Vol. X pp* 343-356 cf* Casablanca
text Vol. IX ‘pp. 184-192
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compensation for the political humiliations of his own day, by 
recounting the past victories of Maghribx Muslims* In the context of
C ““
the author*s work as a whole, the entire Alawi period to date was 
thereby effectively diminished. For none of al-Nasiri*s eighteenth and 
nineteenth century sources could match, for example, the high 
mediaeval glories which studded the ” * *,R.aw.^ ,,.alr-.Qlr^ .as.** .81 (6)
But indeed it would have been impossible for al-Nasiri extensively 
to laud, or even to document the reigning cAlawi dynasty1® opening 
years, from the material he had to hand# For the period 1659- 
1727, the author made use of four major sources# In chronological 
rank, these were the “Nuzhat al-Hadi.**n of al—Ifrani (7), the HlMashr 
al-Mafchani*,*11 of Muhammad ibn al—Tayyib al—Qadiri (B), the 
“Bustan al-Zarlf*#*tl of al-ZayyanX (9), and the M3avsh al-Caramram*♦#"
(6) Ibn__Ahi ZarC; “Al-anis al~mu|rib bi rawd al-cirtas fi akhbar
muluk al—maohrib wa tarrkh madinat f asu " ed# C.-3# Tornberg as
“Annales regum Mauritanlae^'CUpDsalaVl843) and translated by
A, Beaumiar as “Histoire des souverains du l%ohreb et annales de 
la ville de Fes*1 (ParisV Tsfio'y ThTs"'^ work was
used as a major source for al-Nasiri*s history of the Almohade 
period ( “Kitab al-Istiqsa#*#*1. Casablanca text, Vol. II Part II 
cf, the French translation by IsmaBl Mamet in ^Archives Marocaines"
Vol. XXXII, Paris, 1927)
(7) “Nuzhat al-tjiadl fai-akhbar muluk al-garn al-hadlu* This work, issued
during the latter half of the reign of Isma il (Levi-Provencals pp* 
112—114 and 120—121) is today best known in the edition and companion 
French translation of 0* HoudasS “Nozhet el—hadiS Histoire de la
dvnastie saadienne au Maroc (1511-TSTO'y^  T  Paris’* 1B88 and 1889}
(8) “Nashr al-mathani 11—ahl al-qarn al-hadi Cashr wa f-thaniH This work,
issued in 1768 (Levi-ProvencalV p# 323) was lithographed in Fes in 
1310/l892-3, and issued in Iwo volumes, the division being made at 
the year 1080/1669-70# From the lithograph, a French translation 
was made of the part of the work covering the eleventh century A#H,
This was issued in two parts, as volumes of “Archives Marocaines"* 
under the title “Nachr al-Mathani de Mouhammad al-Qadiriu* The 
first part (A#M* Vol* XXI, Paris, 1913) covers the period 1000-1049 A#H, 
®>1591—2 to 1639—40, and was translated by A* Graulle and M*P* Maillard, 
The second part (A#M# Vol# XXIV, Paris, 1917) covers the period 
1050-1100 A#H* = 1640-41 to 1688-9), and was translated by E* Michaux- 
Ballaire*
(9) “Al-bustan al-zarif fi dawlat awlad mawlav Cali al-sharlf”# This work,
which draws to a conclusion in 1816, remains in MS form# The MS 
consulted was that numbered D. 1571, in the possession of the Archive 
of the Bibliotheque Gerierale in Rabat*
of Muhammad Akansus (i0 )* These are four diverse works* But they have
a common negative factor* None was written out of a primary devotion
to early cAlawi history* Within all four works, the formalities of
acknowledgement and interest were extended to the establishment of
the dynasty, under its first two sultans* But, in each case, the
relevant matter was recounted relatively briefly, by an author
fundamentally absorbed in the treatment of other business*
Thus the "Muzhat al-Hadl...1* is essentially an history of the SaGdi
sultans, who preceded the cAlawi line as the dynasty governing the
Maghrib al-Aqsa* Four final chapters, which trace the °Alawi genealogy
and rise to power, merely provide a brief coda to the work as a whole.
In such a context, the author*s assertion that the cAlawi sultan
Isma il ruled territories wider than those of the cynosure of latter-
day conquerors, Ahmad al-Dhahabi al—Mansur al~SaCdi (11) reads simply
as glib obeisance. Al-Ifrani*s disparity in concern for the Sacdi and 
c
Alawi dynasties is extraordinary for a work written during the rBign of
the cAlawi sultan Ismacil, and as such has aroused comment (12). It is
indeed possible that a secondary work by al-Ifrani, a short and thin
biography of IsmaCil (13), which grants greater detail to the safe topics
of Isma il*s ancestry, and to preliminary Alawi history, than to events
of the sultanrs own day, was tossed off as a form of insurance, to
counter the possibility that the author*s major work might bring him
into ill-favour at court* In this light, the 8tMuzhat al-Hadi...” itself
• '
may be seen as a work written for personal amusement. It exhibits a delight 
in folk-tales, word-play and chronogrammes* And its historical content 
obviously derives from its author*s sense of personal identification
(10) “Al-lavsh al-Caramram al-khuroasi fi dawlat awlad mawlana Cali
al-si,iilmasln Fes lithograph of 1336=1918
(11) "IMuzhat al-Hadi... ed./tr# Houdas p* 305 of the text, 505 of the
 4" ' ' translation*
(12) Levi-Provencal pp. 121-2
(13) Thisjuork, the "Zill al-warif f1 mafakhir mawlana ismaCil ibn ai- 
sharif“ was issued In Fes In 1133= 1720—21. When Levi-Provencal wrote, 
it was considered "lG&t" (**kBs Historians des Chorfa” P. 1 1 4 It has 
since been discovered and privately printed (Rabat, Imprimerie Royals, 
1962)*
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with Marrakesh* He was " If rani by cricyri. , but Marrakesh was his den** 
("al-wufrani al-ni.jar* al-murrakushi al-wi,iar” )(14)* And the "Muzhat al-
•u* *m 0  a *
Hadi*#*" can be seen to express the author's devotion to the Sa di, as a
dynasty based upon Marrakesh# Circumspectly, al-Ifranl virtually ignored
c ***
the fortunes of Marrakesh as an ex-capital, under the early Alawi rulers* 
His comment was confined to a subdued keening for one of the city's lost
Mb  ^  bb
architectural glories, the al-Badi palace of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa di, 
which the sultan IsmaCil ordered to be demolished (15)*
The "Mashr al-Mathani***” of al-Qadiri is essentially a work of 
biography rather than history* It is the major work of tabaoat literature 
to come from the eighteenth century Maghrib al-Aqsa, and has dominated 
subsequent compilations referring to its period (15)» Its author, an 
Hasanid sharTfa came from an established family of Fasi religious literati* 
His work was essentially Fasi hagiogrpahy, designed to cover the eleventh 
and twelfth Hegiran centuries chronologically, by an annual grouping of 
obituaries* For many individual years, the author rounded up the relevant 
tara.Urn by setting down events of the year* As one authority for his annal 
material, al—Qadiri cited Abu °Abd Allah al—Tayyib ibn Muhammad al—Fasi 
(17)* This scholar seems identifiable as a clan member of one of the 
leading religious communities of the city of Fes, the zawivat al-Fasi*
As he died In 1701 (18), this ual~Fasi chronicler” cannot have been the 
lone source writer of al-Qadirifs annals* Certain of these annals precurse 
his lifetime5 others post-date his death* But his hand may be traced 
within the notable expansion of al-Qadirx's annal—material evident for
(14)”Nuzhat al-Hadi*..H ed*/tr* Houdas p* 309 of the text, 511 of the
• translation*
(15) ibid* pp* 113-4 of the text, 193-4 of the translation*
(16) For biographical and bibliographical details referring to this author 
and the work in question, see Llvi-Provsncal pp* 319-325 and 
Lakhdar pp* 112-115 *
(17) “Nashr al-Mathani***” A*M* Vol# XXI (tr# Craulle and Halliard) 
pp. 387 and 390 cf* Vol, XXIV (tr* Michaux-Bellaire) b. 3
(18) For biographical details concerning this scholar, see Levi-Provencal 
(pp 242 and 283-4), who knew nothing of his connection’ with the * ~
"Nashr al-Mathani**#”, but was aware of his hand in other works*
the second half of the seventeenth century# The sparse eighteenth 
century annals of the “Nashr al-Mathani**,B may be attributed to 
a weak continuator# If strung together, these notes from an “al-Fasi 
chronicle*1 provide evidence for the existence of a “lost” seventeenth 
century source of major importances a bedrock of archaic material 
from which al-Qadiri, in the “Nashr al-Mathani#**“ made one of the major 
surviving selections*
This chronicle material has its limitations* It obviously
emanated from a prosperous but narrow milieu? the savant oligarchy of 
0 **
ulama1 associated with the Qarawiyyin, “queen“-mosque of Fes# The 
priorities of this circle are reflected within the annalist's 
“Barchester“-like obsession with religious politics# Its worldly 
comfort is illustrated by one telling detail? the annalist's summing up 
of the rigour of 1673 siege conditions with the note that, during 
that year, many were forced to invalidate the festivities of Id 
al-kabir by the immolation of a calf rather than a sheep (19)* The 
chronicle material is heavily biased towards Fes# Only rarely are 
events from other parts of the Maghrib, or the outer world, even 
noted. They appear occasionally, as events of high significance,
“news** brought in from outside* Further, the annals are clogged by 
a standard chronicler's pre-occupation with signs and portents, and 
with natural catastrophe, often as fleeting and localised as thunder 
and hailstorms*
However, the chronicle material has threB characteristics that 
give it peculiar value# Although not impeccably accurate, this 
material has some claim to chronological reliability, in so far as 
this can be judged by its dating of events well-known to general 
history# It gives a correct date for a major Ottoman campaign in the
(19) “Nashr al-Mathani.**“ ed*/tr# Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol# XXIV
pp* 225-6
Balkans (1094 A#H#/1683 A#D#) (20), for the abandoning of Tangier by 
the English (1095 A.H./1684 A*D*) (21), and for the opening of the 
siege of Ceuta (1106 A#H#/1694 A*D.) (22)# Further, for the tsxtually 
rich period of the latter seventeenth century, thB chronicle contains 
evidence of the varying economic fortunes of the city of Fes, as 
expressed in notes upon fluctuations within the relative values of 
silver and copper currencies, and within the price of city market 
grain# As a last virtue, there may be cited the chronicle's 
remarkable political inertia# The annals of the “Nashr al-Mathani..." 
are quite alien in tone from the laudatory formal taraiim of Alawi 
sultans included within the main text# They exhibit no compunction 
over the admission of a sultan's ill-success# The ruler's misfortunes 
would be recorded, because these had socio-economic repercussions 
upon the city# Thus, note upon a rumour that the sultan Isma0!! had 
bBsn defeated outside Tlemsen, during the famine year of 1680, was 
accompanied by information that the "black market" price of the 
11 sa° al-nabawl". or standard corn measure, had shot up to twics the 
officially appointed rate (23),
Al-Qadiri*s annals were obviously not constructed purBly from 
material takBn from this putative "al-Fasi chronicle". Occasionally 
the annals contain acknowledged interpolations from oral traditions 
current during al-Qadiri*s own lifetime. And there are certain trimmings 
by which the latter author showed his personal deference to the 
dynasty# Thus, clear "al-Fasi" information that the rising power of 
al-Rashld had, in 1664, aroused Fes to armed opposition, is followed in
(20) "Nashr al-Mathani*##11 ed#/tr. Michaux-Bellaire A#M# Vol. XXIV p. 357
(21) ibid. p. 371
(22) "Nashr al-Mathani.#*" Fes lithograph* Vol. II p# 159 of the first 
notation# (lha notation of this volume is irregular#)
(23) "Nashr al-Mathani.#." ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A#M# Vol. XXIV p# 338
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al-Qadiri*s text by the sugary assertion that Gad had ordained that
al-Rashid should obtain power, and that his reign would bB blessed by
the majority of the faithful (24)« But such hedging was unusual. For
the most part, al-QadirX would seem to have transmitted chronicle
material in a fashion that was straightforward, albeit, as will be
seen later, incomplete.
The “Bustan al—Zarif» « of al-Zayyani (25) was overwhelmingly
al-Nasirifs most important source for the early Alawi section of his
"Kitab al-Istiqsa...t;. The work can be seen to have provided al-Nasiri —  . *
with a framework for insets taken from the other three major sources, 
as well as from minor works of reference* Al—Zayyani was for half a 
century an high government servant to the CAlawI sultans Huhammad XXX 
(1757-1790) and Sulayman(1792-1822). He was also the chiBf architect
C »
of an historical tradition concerning Alawi rule within the Haghrib 
al-Aqsa, down to the days of his own retirement in Sulayman*s last 
years* The “Bustan al-Zarif...“ is al-Zayyani*s major work Df
ftlftateHT.ntr. ,*rmn^tr-rT T I
Q  .T*
Alawi history, and deals with the dynasty from its origins until 
1816* A second historical work by the same author, the “Turjuman 
al-lvluCrib*..u (26), is an universal history, of which the thirteenth 
and final chapter (27) contains a more succinct account of roughly 
the same period. A third work of al-Zayyani*s, the “Turjuroanat al- 
Kubra..." (28), is a compendium of geographical notes and personal
(24) “Nashr al-Mathani...** ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.PI. Vol. XXIV p. 165
(25) For additional biographical and bibliographical details concerning 
this author, see Levi-Provencal pp. 142-199 and Lakhdar p p . 319—26
(26) In fulls “Al-tur.iuman al-mu rib an duwal al-mashrici wa tl-maghribu
(27) This chapter, edited and translated by 0, Houdas as "Le Maroc de 
1631 a 1812“ (Paris, 1886), is comparatively well-known. It is to 
this work that the reference “Turjuman” will hereafter refer.
(28) uAl-turiumanat al-kubra allati iamaCat akhbar maCmur al-Calam barran
wa bahran**. This work was probably issued c. 1820. It contains notes 
on events from the latter end of the second decade of the nineteenth
century. The work has recently been published in an edition made by 
CAbd al-Karim al-Filali* (Casablanca, 1967)
memoirs, containing passages which illuminate the authorls general 
outlook,
u ca 0 M
Al-Zayyani*s Alawi history is focused upon thB years following
thB accession of Sayyidi Muhammad III* For the period from 1757 onwards,
the author's copious personal information, culled from a close association
with government, makes his writing of history akin to the writing of
memoirs* But the author had less of a close interest in the years
c *■*preceding 1757* And his record of the earliest Alawi history, that 
covering the years preceding the death of IsmaCIl, oan be seen to have 
its own peculiar purposes that of serving as a somewhat stylised 
prologue to the authorfs main matter*
The material from which this prologue was constructed may be 
divided into threes a skeletal framework of Fasi materials a body 
of Central Atlas traditions deriving from the author1s own ethnic 
inheritancej and items, both traditional and documentary, that would
C ***seem to have been inserted in support of the view of early Alawi 
history current at court during the author's own lifetime* The three 
strands of material are susceptible to differentiation on grounds of 
content and narrative style* Of the three corpora , the Fasi material 
will be seen to be relatively reliable* But the Atlas strand to al- 
Zayyani fs narrative is demonstrably an overblown will o' the wisp. 
Similarly, the author's "court" material can be shown to be misleading, 
even when it has documentary basis. The conclusory section to this 
thesis is designed to illustrate aspects of the mythology associated
C tw
with early Alawi history. The myths have all been derived from 
acceptance of al-Zayyani*s Atlas and court material at its face value, 
Al-Zayyani's Fasi material has clearly been derived from a source 
identifiable with the "al-Fasi chronicle” underlying the annals included 
in the "Nashr al-Mathani.**”* It includes a number of passages that are 
identical with passages within al-Qaciiri's annals. These are unlikely 
to have been simply derived from the "Nashr al-Mathani***"* the earlier
work® For there are other narrative points at which al-Zayyani 
gives an essentially Fes-oriented passage in more precise detail 
than is found within the “Nashr al—lYlathani»»»tt♦ Examples arB al- 
Zayyani^ notes upon al-Rashid*s currency reforms, and upon the 
campaign of IsmaCxl in 1677 against Ahmad ibn °Abd Allah al—Dila*i , 
which was followed by a Fasi triumph (29)* There are yet further 
passages, given by al-Zayyani alone, which seem to derive from the 
same Fasi body of material* They have the same terse style, and 
show a marked obsession with the concerns of Fes* This is evident
minutiae, such as the inclusion within the record of major campaigns, 
of the enumerated fatalities of the rum at fas, or citizen militia 
of musketeers (30)* To set al-Zayyani*s information upon Fes 
against his meagre notes for the period upon other major cities 
of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, is to demonstrate very clearly the Fas!
M  M * .  Q  * **
bias to al-Zayyani s early Alawi history* For this period, the affairs 
of Marrakesh and of Tarudant are noted only in connection with major 
crises in thB history Df the dynasty. Even less attention is 
granted to other urban centres* Thus, within the “Tur.iuman” version 
of the fifty-five year long reign of IsmaCil, Sale is not mentioned once 
Al-Zayyani*s Central Atlas material consists of a string of rural 
campaign stories recounted in a discursive manner, and with the 
misleading immediacy of folk-tale, All this material refers to peoples 
of one language groups the Atlas Sanhaja of tamazight—speakers * referred 
to by linguists as “Beraber” (31)« The inclusion of this material is 
a reflection of the authorfs complex cultural heritage* The Zayyanx
(29) "Tur.iuman” pp* 11 and 14 of the text, 22 and 27 of the translation
“Bustan al-Zarif, , MS, pp, 27 and 30
(30) “Tur.iuman” pp, 14 and 17 of the text, 27 and 33 of the translation
“Bustan al-Zarif,, *” MS* pp, 30 and 33
“*"n '    ■u‘
(31) E. Laousts *Mots et Choses Berberes” (Paris, 1920) Preface pp, ix
and xiii to xvi*
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Sketch to illustrate the three global Berber language 
blocs of Morocco: those of tashalhaft. tamazioht 
and zenativa-speakers.
The sketch is a modern outline, drawn up by the 
Laboratory of Physical Geography in Rabat, and 
reproduced on Page 45 of the “Geooraphie du Marocu 
of 3, Martin at, al. Its relation to linguistic 
boundaries over the period 1659-1727 must therefore 
be taken as only approximate.
□  La population parte arcoe
i HTTTTl Porter tachelhit
I
Parler zenatjya
La mqjorite de la population parie berbere
La majonte de la population est bUngue
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grouping of the author*s own day formed one branch of the Ayfc U Malu, 
a confederation of "Beraber" peoples from the region of the "Bahai 
Fazzaz", or hill-country rising above that stretch of terrain between 
Fes and Marrakesh that is called the Tadla. Al-Zayyani claimed that 
one of his forefathers, a rural imam from Argu, in the Adekhsan region 
of the Tadla, had been brought to the notice of the sultan Isma il, 
when that sultan was on campaign in the areaj subsequently the imam 
had been co-opted into the sultan*s home-bound following (32)* As Levi- 
Provencal has noted, al-Zayyani himself knew his ancestral region well, 
although he had been born and bred in Fess he traced his own rise in 
government, from the status of clerk, to that of trusted political 
advisor, to an incident in 1773, when his knowledge of the Adekhsan 
region saved an army of Sayyidi Muhammad III from ambush (33). Further, 
al-Zayyani maintained a sense of ethnic identity* In one autobiographical 
note, he claimed to be "no sharif* but a city-bred Berber" (34). And, 
by Berber, al—Zayyani meant "Beraber". For, although the author knew
q
the global usage of barbar , as a distinguishing term opposed to arab* 
he was accustomed to use barbar upon its own, exclusively to indicate 
members of his own language group* He employed a medley terminology 
of proper names to cover those groupings of Berbers, tashalhait or 
speakers (35) who were linguistically alien to him*
However, the ultimate determining factor In al-Zayyani*s approach
(32) 11 Bust an al-Zarif..." MS p* 36
' 1 V ■“*
(33) "Turluman" pp. 79—80 of the text, 145-6 of the translation cf* 
Levi-Provencal p£* 151-2. The French author relied here upon the 
"Kitab al-Istiqsa..." (Cairo text, Vol. IV pp* 108-9) for a fuller 
version of the incident. The original full text is^to be found upon 
pp. 109-10 of MS No. D. 1571 of the "Bustan al-Zarif..."
,  •
(34) LBvi-Provsncal p. 144 The quotation is based upon a note that he had
taken from S variant Saletin MS of the "Tur.juman al—Mucrib...” (f. li) 
to which he had access*
(35) Lack of source material prevents the construction of an adequate 
language map of Morocco for the period. For a twentieth century list 
of self-acknowledged Moroccan Berber groupings, as subdivided by 
language, s b g  the Preface to E* Laoust*s "Mots et Choses Berberes".
A modern language map is here reproduced. (See preceding page)
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to early cAlawi history, was his career as a government servant# As 
the Adekhsan incident indicates, the author was proud to note that 
service to the makhzan. the central imperial administration, had 
been of primary concern to him, even in his ancestral country. It 
is curious to note that both al-Qadiri and al-Nasiri were capable 
of expressing a sentimental nostalgia for Dila*, the great zawiya# 
or religious house, in the Tadla region (36), whose authority over 
Fes and the central Maghrib al-Aqsa was superseded by the rise of 
the CAlawi (3?)# There is no trace of such sentiment within the 
writings of al-Zayyanl.
The author*s bias towards the reigning dynasty led to the inclusion
Q  IMP
within his early Alawi ^prologue", of material reflecting dynastic 
priorities: a bloc of traditions concerning the political emergence 
of the cAlawJ; Information upon the origin of military forces 
associated with the dynasty; and architectural notes upon the 
construction of Meknes as an imperial capital* The bias led the 
author into standard paths of modification: reticence concerning 
defeat, and the occasional ennoblement of a suitan*s enemies to a 
rank which did not disgrace him# Thus the "al-Fasi chronicle" record 
of an encounter during the winter of 1678-9 between the army of the
v Q m r  Q  kH
sultan Isma il» and Ayt Atta Berbers from the Saharan flank of the' M
Anti—Atlas (38) was adapted by al—Zayyani into a notice of an hard- 
fought battle with three rebel brothers (39)#
But the major dynastic distortion imposed by al-Zayyani 
upon his material was not standard, but particular# It hinged
(36) See R# Henry: "Ou se trouvait la Zaouia de Dila*?" ("Hesperis"
Vol. XXXI, Paris, 1944 pp. 49-54) and M* Hajjl: "Al-Zawiya al- 
Dilafiva##.tt (Rabat, 1964) pp. 34-8. The latter author has suggested 
an identification of Dila* with the later "zawiyat Ishaq",
(37) "Nashr al-Mathani###" ed./tr# Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 224 
of# "Kitab al-Istiasa...". Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 37-8 of. 
Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 49-50
(38) "Nashr al—Mathani..." Volume cited above, p. 289
(39) "Turiuman" p. 17 of the text and 33 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 33
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upon the central position with which the author endowed the career 
and policies of Sayyidi Muhammad III* This was the sultan whom al- 
Zayyani served in various capacities throughout his reign, and for 
whom he felt an affection that survives within personal anecdotes.
By the time al*-Zayyani completed his major historical writings,
Muhammad III had been dead for more than a quarter of a century. Yet 
the author did not disguise his relative contempt for the reigning 
sultan Sulayman ibn Muhammad, whom he seems to have considered a 
weakling by comparison with his father. Even in his concluding 
panegyric to the "Turiuman al—Mu rib...". al-Zayyani felt bound to 
point out that Sulayman was not so great a ruler as his father had 
been, and that he had at times taken ill advice (40)* And, in al- 
Zayyani*s late work, the "Turjumanat al-Kubrsu#.«M« whose completion 
post-dated a period during which Sulayman had been the victim of 
intense internal unrest, the sultan was subjected by the author to 
deft criticism for his soft dealings with the Beraber (41)* The 
conclusory section of this thesis will illustrate al-Zayyani* s tailoring
Q
of early Alawi historical material with specific dynastic intent: 
that of ensuring that Sayyidi Muhammad III would not be overshadowed 
by his ancestry, any more than he was overshadowed by his son*
The "Baysh al—Caramram»..!> of Muhammad Akansus is the fourth, the 
latest, and quantitatively the least significant of al-NasirT's major
(40) "Turiuman" p, 107 of the text, 195 of the translation.
(41) "wa lamroa buvica waladahu amxr al-mu*minTn mawlana sulayman mulk.•*
mm w  kw m Q  Q
sasahum slvasa walidihi bi tI-rifci wa *1 hilm wa *1 ighda an
— *“ ^  c .hafawatihlm. fa—atfa*ahum^hilmihi wa afsadahum adlihi wa lam
varhuf lihim hadd."■inir-ifrmiTriT r T iTn'i—r ry---in
("And then authority was vested upon his son, our master Sulayman 
commander of the faithful. He governed them (the Beraber) 
according to his father*s government, with gentleness and 
kindness, averting his attention from their offences, Indeed he 
smothered them with kindness, and ruined them with fair dealing, 
and no sword was sharpened against them")
("Tur.iumanat al-Kubra. *." ed* al-Filali p. 71)
Q  tSMI
sources for the early Alawi period* Its author was by origin a “Chleuh" 
or tashalha£t—speaking Berber from the Sus, who became a well-known 
religious and literary figure of mid-nineteenth century Marrakesh 
(42). He claimed to have served in his youth as wazir to Sulayman* 
and was court poet to two subsequent sultans* He was led by court 
associations into an identification with the cAlawi dynasty as strong 
in its own way as that exhibited by al-Zayyani* Among his minor works 
were letters set into his “Rasa’il adabiva" , written in the name of 
the sultan Sulayman, and including ruminations upon the burden of the 
exercise of government (43), The "Day.sh al-Caramram*» was 
essentially an Alawi history down to the author’s own day* Akansus 
borrowed heavily from standard sources until the recounting of affairs 
with which he was personally acquainted# He was particularly dependent 
upon al—Zayyani. However, he could criticise al—Zayyani for being 
both careless and crudely outspoken. And he did make minor independent 
accretions to al-Zayyani’s texts pieces of tradition emanating from 
his own interests as a SusT, a man of letters, and a government servant, 
The literary tradition sewn together within the "Kitab al—Istjgsa.,
C *“
has largely framed the view of early Alawi indigenous history that is 
set forth within standard modern works (44). It has thus far been found 
impossible to comment upon the literary tradition with evidence fg?om an
(42) For biographical and bibliographical details concerning this 
author, see Levi Provencal pp. 200-217 cf. Lakhdar pp.342-351 
cf. R. Lourido Diaz: "Ei^ s’avo Historioorafico sobre^ el sultanato
de Sirii Muhammad bc CAbd Allal-i“ ^Tana'da,' T967 ) pp.'" 54-55
(43) Lakhdar pp. 348-9
(44) H, Terrasses “Histoire du Maroc. des oriqines a 1’etablissement 
du Protectorat francais^^oTTirTCasabl^n^aT^TgSoTTpTz^^Z^ 
cf* Ch.—A. Bulien eci* R* le Tourneaus "Histoire da^l’Afrique du 
Nord, Tunisie—Aloerie-MaroQ, de la conquete arabe a 1830“ (Paris, 
1952)pp* 223—240 cf. 3. Brignon et. al. “Histoire du Maroc" 
(Casablanca, 1967) pp* 239-253
indigenous archive. No central corpus of archives survives from
the early °Alawi period (45), And it will be ssen later that it is
improbable that government of the period was sufficiently sophisticated
administratively for the creation of an orderly archive at the centre
of makhzan affairs (46), However, there do exist three bodies of
evidence with the combined potential for a reformulation of the
"Istiqsa..«“-bound view. The first of these is the archaic skein of
Fasi material set into the "Nashr al-Mathanl..." and the works of
al-Zayyani. The second comprises contemporary and near—contemporary
indigenous sources extraneous to the main tradition, The third is
European material. Thus far, no recognition has been given to the
peculiar value of the FasI material within the main tradition. And
thus far extraneous sources from the two latter categories have been
used essentially to supplement rather than to criticise the “Istiqsa.,."
•
tradition. It is the aim of this thesis to go furthers to use the 
three corpora of "alternative evidence" firstly to reconstruct a
C n
modified outline of early Alawi political history, and secondly to
illuminate the major distortions which have been imposed upon that
history by the iron views of al-Zayyani,
Note will now be taken of some of the chief indigenous and European
itBms from the latter two corpora, of "alternative evidence". Additional .
sources from Fes are amid works of indigenous material that are extraneous 
to the "Istiqsa,.." tradition. Because no central archive exists, 
particular importance attaches to a published corpus of makhzan letters*
(45) The pre-Protectorate material within the palace archives of the 
Bibliotheque Royals In Rabat has now been classified, Recently, 
material dating from 1790 onwards has been set open to view.
According to M* Germain Ayache, who worked upon these archives until 
the mid 1960s, earlier material within this palace corpus is scanty 
and, for the early 'Alawi period under examination, non-existent.
Sees "La Question des Archives Historiques Marocaines" in "Hesperis- 
Tamuda" Vol. II ( Rabat, 1961) pp. 311-326 cf. personal conversation 
April, 1972.
(46) See Chapter IV pp. 164—167
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addressed to two successive shuvukh of the zawivat al-Fasi* whose
descendents kept them within the family (47). Roughly half these
letters are attributable to the sultan Istna il, on grounds of seal
or signature. Of the remainder, two at least were despatched on behalf
of Zaydan ibn Isma il, heir-presumptive over the central part of
IsmsPil^ reign? others cams from notable government officials*
The most striking among these letters are ten which concern IsmaCilfs 
c ■*
standing guard of abid or black slaves, and the vexed question of 
the legal recognition of their relationship to the sultan as his 
slaves or, at the very least, as his lawfully conscripted soldiers.
From the al-Fasi side of this correspondence, there survives one 
fatwa (48), tactful, but essentially a rebuttal of imperial demands.
A further Fas! record, from an unusual slant, is the Hebrew
C
chronicle begun by 5a dya ibn Danan, and continued by his transcriber 
and descendant, Samuel ibn Sabi ibn Danan* This chronicle, in the form 
worked upon by its editor and translator l/ajda (49), seems to date 
from the early eighteenth century* Its extracts recount, in an 
erratic and garbled form, events from 1646 onwards, as seen from the 
claustrophobic viewpoint of the Fasi millah or Dewrv.
There are two major sources which provide the nearest approach to 
an indigenous and provincial counter-weight to the periodfs prevailing Fasi 
bias* Together, they provide complementary evidence on the impingement, 
at the distant local level, of the early cAlawi makhzan. The first of
(47) Muhammad El-Fasis "Lettres Inedites de Moulay IsmaBl” in 11 Hasperis- 
Tamuda11 Special edition^ 1962, as issusd in honour of the tri­
centenary A.H* of Isma il*s accession (pp. 31-85). Hereafter this 
source will be referred to as uLettres Inedites...“
(48) Edited and published by Muhammad El-Fasi, as an appendix to his 
brief celebratory “Biographie dB Moulay Ismael**, which formed a 
companion article to tha edition of the letters noted above. 
(“Hespsris-Tamuda” Special edition, 1962 pp. 25-9)
(49) G. Vajdas uUn recueil ds tsxtas historiques judeo-marocainBs11 Texts 
Nos. XXI to XXVI in "Hesperia** l/ols XXX.V (Paris, 1948) pp. 352-8 
and XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 139-162
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these bodies of material is provided by texts relevant to the 
period to be found within the corpus of Tawatl documents upon which 
A#“G*“P* Hartin based much of his uQuatre Siecles dB I’Histoire 
Harocaine 15Q4’~1912il (50), Obvious caution must be exercised in the 
use of this material* Martin, an officer-interpreter in the TawatI 
region newly occupied by the French at the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries, was a cavalier historian*
He was accustomed to paraphrase rather than to translate the 
chronicle material of which he made use* Only vaguely did he 
indicate the whereabouts of original texts* Yet his transcribed 
administrative documents have a rarity value, as evidence as to the 
character of the leading reins which held a remote Saharan complex 
in some degree of peaceable fiscal subjection to sultans based 
within the Atlas arc* And one skein of the chronicle material 
used by Martin has some claim to individual respect. This is the 
material which the author footnoted as being derived from the 
eighteenth century chronicler !iSidi 8ahaian, otherwise Mawlay Hashim 
ibn Ahmad* A descendant of this scholar collaborated with the local 
French administration early in the twentieth century (51), and may be 
considered some guarantor for thB translation* And nSidi Bahaiatl 
himself may be seen to amplify notes upon Saharan affairs that are 
touched upon in material from the inner Maghrib al-Aqsa#
Orderly and even peaceful administration is the keynote to much 
of Martinfs Tawatf material* ^arfarB and intrigue create the face of
(50) Paris, 1924* A**»G*«-P* Martin had intended to publish much of the
evidence contained within this work as part of his 
earlier volume ”tes Oasis Sahariennes” (Paris, 1908)* However, the 
information was suppressed until after the establishment of a French 
Protectorate over Morocco, because it contained data as to the 
authority which Moroccan sultans had established over Tuat at 
intervals from the late sixteenth century onwards, and thus went 
to support Moroccan claims to the region, as against those of 
France in Algeria*
(51) Martins "Quatre Siecles*,,11 p, 62 (Note 4) It is to the 
nQuatre Siecles.*«l> that the reference Martin will hereafter refer*
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government shown within the "Rihla du Marabout de Tasaft" (52), the
translation of an unusual rustic composition which spotlights the
confusion wrought by a central government assault upon the Tagoundaft
region of the High Atlas, during a short period in the early eighteenth
century* The work is a product of filial piety. It tells of the reaction
of local political leaders, and particularly of the author's father,
the “marabout11 of the title, to the stresses of two government
expeditions, The second of these, which brought troops and artillery
into high mountain reaches, induced clusters of mountain "Chleuh" who
were customarily regarded as inaccessible to plains government, to make
c *•*
an obeisance to the Alawi sultan. The author's father, however, 
maintained a dogged resist,soce to all government approaches*
The peculiarly quaint character of this composition arouses a 
certain unease as to its authenticity* But its rambling style, together 
with its narrative focus upon the minutiae Df a political crisis as it 
affected one family, make it unlikely that any but its first person 
author would have wished to fabricate a work quite so personal In Its 
untidiness. Furthermore, the existence of one of its central characters, 
its “villain", CAbd al-Karim, Basha of Marrakesh, unknown to the main­
stream of source material, is vouched for by one obscure note in which 
an English consul recorded his death (53)*
Two keen students of this work, Bustinard the translator, and 
Robert Montagne, the sociologist of High Atlas Berberdom (54), saw in it 
essentially a precious record of local history, and in particular, a source
(52) Muhammad ibn al-Hajj Ibrahim al-Zarhunis "Rihlat al-wafid fi akhbar 
hilrat al-walid" translated under the above title, and annotated by 
Col* F* Bustinard (Paris, 1940)
(53) S*P* 71. (16) f, 563 Memo* of Anthony Hatfield , Tetuan , 11/8/1718
(54) R« Montagues "lln episode de la "siba" Berbers au 18e siscle" in 
"Hesperis" Vol* XXVIII (Paris, 1941) pp* 85-97
of evidence for the depth in time of the mechanics of High Atlas 
ulaffsu or checkerboard systems of alliance (55). Montagne was 
also concerned to stress the alien culture of the mountain* He seized 
upon an isolated incident, the pre-campaign consultation of mountain 
jinn by an agricultural grouping, as their acknowledgement of the "true 
gods” of the mountain (56)* He thereby set aside the stolid provincial 
piety which pervades the text as a whole, and ignored the role of the 
author’s father as an uncompromisingly Muslim and well-respected local 
imam • Such an approach distorts the tone of al-ZarhunT1s work, which 
is not a cliche in Berber separatism. Its author was separatist in 
that, like al-Zayyani, he knew a cultural identity defined by 
languages his home country, in its widest ssnse, was the Sus, seen as 
the land of the “Chleuh" or tashalhaSt speakers (57)* But hB and his 
rural compatriots saw in the cAlawi makhzan a fact of life, and in its 
doings a source of varied fascination. Further, the intransigence of 
the author’s father was singular. His co-equals and friends knew, in 
appropriate circumstances, how to capitalise upon the opportunities a 
central government provided, using the web-lines of bribery and 
marriage alliance by which that government had infiltrated their 
mountain country.
To pass from the rural Tasaft narrative to a discussion of 
contemporary European material is violently to cross cultures. 
Quantitatively, European material has been of great significance to 
this study* It has the predictable deficiencies of approach and
(55) For the most lengthy exposition of the ’'laff" system, see R.
Montaqnes t;Les Berberes et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc”, ■ n lir t  11  I I fcll^ l l» I. I I ■ I jllfr IIHTIIIIIWIIHWI IHT "I I llBI ■IHllll HHl »l IIWIII ■! ■ HBnHai—l HIHWmWIIIMIMII TTIWHn
(Paris, 1930) pp. 182-216
(56) Montagnas ”Un episode de la ’siba*'...” p. 90
(57) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Oustinard pp. 139-140
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cover inseparable from alien commentary, but the advantage of 
contemporaneity* However, its most valuable corpus, the French, 
parallels indigenous material by faltering at around the same 
chronological point: the end of the seventeenth century. Renewed 
wealth, to be found within English material, dates only from the
D m
very end of the early Alawi period.
European material chiefly details European interests marginal 
to the internal politics of the Maghrib al-Aqsa* For the most part 
this material was the by-product of two inter-twined concerns: firstly, 
the inroads into European shipping made by Moroccan corsairs; and 
secondly, the affairs of European nationals who were held captive in 
Morocco, largely as a result of these corsair degradations. These 
captives formed a group of limited size (58) which pride and ideology 
madB the object of acute diplomatic and religious concern. In Catholic 
Europe there were religious orders entirely devoted to the ransom of 
Catholic captives held in uBarbaryH. Protestant governments took the 
initiative on behalf of their own nationals* The twin priorities of 
shipping and ransom dominate published "Barbary” literature in 
particular. The books were normally a by-product of diplomatic missions, 
or of the activities of ransom pressure-groups. Frequently they were, 
nominally or in truth, the work of grateful ransomees, and written to 
a formula, with the obvious aim of arousing a generous pity for Christian 
sufferings at the hands of the infidel. Only a small proportion of this 
litBraturB holds value for the student of internal Moroccan political 
history. The most outstanding of the individual authors who lend spice 
to the dough will be noted within the following brief and eclectic 
account of European source material for the period.
(58) See H* Koehler: "Quelques points d*histoire sur les captifs 
chretiens au Maroc*1 in “Hesperia” Vol. VIII (Paris, 1928)
pp. 177—187, for the view that it was rare during this period 
for Christian captives in Morocco, of all nationalities combined, 
to number more than a thousand.
This European source material is best classified by language*
For the product of diplomacy, commerce and religious interest is 
inter-related* And even the formal distinction between archival and 
published sources has been blurred by the massive serial publication 
of archives, bound up with re-editions of early published texts , that 
was inaugurated by de Castries (59). The archival surveys of 3«L.
Miege suggest that* for many languages, the Italian, the Spanish, 
the Portuguese and the Scandinavian, surviving material for the 
period, relevant to Morocco, is thin to non-existent (60)0 Geographical 
proximity makes the Spanish lacuna particularly tantalising* But, for 
the source-starved latter half of the period which corresponded with 
the ravaged early years of Felipe V (1700—1746), the documentation of 
the Archivo General de Simancaa is known to be in a state of acute 
general debility (61)* And the mass of known documentation upon 
relations between Morocco and Spain dates only from 1766, the year 
which saw Muhammad III*s somersault into friendship with the ancient 
Spanish enemy (62).
It remains true that, for the period, the only unbroken line of 
free Christian Europeans resident within the Moroccan interior was 
Spanish* Its men were friars, representing a medical mission founded
Q  m  _
in Sa di times, and financed by the Spanish government, its aim was 
to maintain the Christian morale of Spanish captives in Morocco, The
(59) H, de Castries et* al* s "Les Sources Inedites ds 1*Histoire du 
Marocs Premiere Serie (Dynastie Saadienne)g Deuxieme Serier.Tii r'.‘ • — T —"i~ ig—g rni mu—■ tr - r ninr tr'i irrtif iTi nm ana m ir *i iiium 1 h i b i i i  ' ' '-t—’trim ■ jji
(Dynastie Filalienne). (Paris, from 1905 and in progress. 
Henceforward S,I. 1 or 2 together with Volume number and 
details.
(60) Mieges "Le Maroc et 1*Europe (1830-94)” Vol. 1 (Paris, 1961)' • —' ■! ,n i.tifjui m mm i . i i h n,n »i »*■!* mu imrfi t aiini % * 9
pp. 34-7
(61), H, Kamens "The War of Succession in Spain” (London, 1969) pc 422
(62) M, Arribas Palaus "Documentos sobre Marruecos en el Archivo
Historico Nacional de Madrid" in "Hesperis-Tamuda” Vol. IX 
(Rabat, 1968) pp. 65—72
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mother-house of the mission followed the capital* During the period 
it shifted from Marrakesh to Fes and thence to Meknes* For all but 
the years 1674^*80, its personnel was Franciscan* Documents of the 
Franciscan order provided the basis for the early eighteenth century 
“Mission Historial de Marruecos1* (63). This is an ecclesisatically 
authorised work of monumental length, but relatively limited historical 
value* Its approach to infidel politics and society is myopic and 
hostile, and it contains only dispersed jottings upon matters 
unrelated to the “cure of souls'*. Surviving Franciscan archives held 
within the later Tangier mission have been examined by the Franciscan 
authors Castellanos (64), Rosende (65) and Koehler (66), The records 
are quite literally parochial, and for the most part, post-date the 
period.
There is voluminous surviving material in French for the second 
half of the seventeenth century. Flurries of writing were provoked 
by the exchange of embassies. Two important diplomatic ventures from 
France to Morocco were those of St. Amans in 1682-3, and of Pidou de 
St, Dion in 1693, Two Frenchmen, Germain Mouitte and Dean-Baptiste 
Estelle, dominate European comment upon Morocco for this first half 
of the period,
MouKtte was an individual captive, taken at sea by a "Sallee-man11
in 1670, and ransomed in 1681, after successive periods of residence
within Sale, Fes and Meknes. Two works attach to his name. The 
“Relation. (67) is an hasty and racy piece, typical of fund-raising
puimm ■■ii»iuii>> mm »i*imnpiiwi  ......... ..........................mu .......  iinHnanrrirnrm
(63) Fray Francisco Oesus Maria Del Puerto! “Mission Historial de 
MarruBcos** (Seville, 1708)
(64) M.P. Castellanos! “Apostolado Serafico en Marruecos" (Madrid and 
Santiago, 1896). Only part one of this mission history was ever 
written, It ends at 1704*
(65) P. Rosendes “Los Franciscanos y los cautivos en Marruecos” in
“Archivo-Ibero-Americano18 (Madrid, Vol. I. Oan-Feb* 1914)
(66) H, Koehlers “L^qlise chretienne du Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine. 
1221-1790° (Paris 1934) A piece of sentimental hagiography, countered 
W  the sober and generous article cited above (P. 33 Note (58))
(67) G. MDuettes “Relation de la captlvite du sieur Mouette dans les
Royaumes de Fez et de Maroc11 (Paris, 1683).
ransom literature. But the uHistoire,,,ft (68) is a serious work.
It was drafted while the author was still resident in Morocco (69)
and purports faithfully to recount the fortunes of the reigning 
c ***
Alawi dynasty from its origins, up to the year of the author's
departure for France, It is the most detailed* as well as the
earliest account of its period. Culturally it is oddly hybrid*
swerving from a Christian to a Muslim bias* Far, together with his
own journal, and information taken from fellow-captives, Mouitte
made use of a mass of material taken from a single Muslim informant,
a Fasi talib whose name he transliterated as "Bougiman0. This talib 
• •
was katib to one of al-Rashid's generals, and subsequently an
b i Q m
employee of Isma il's, whom Mouitte assisted in his calligraphic 
work upon palace buildings (70), The ensuing friendship captured 
the devout Catholic Mouitte into the orbit of FeTsT’ reporting. At 
many points the “Histoire.. parallels indigenous “al—Fasi chronicle11 
material. For onB event, the murder of the general who had been 
l!Bougimanlf *s master, the two sources give an identical date (71),
And it is possible to see Fasi, or at least northerly weakness in 
MouBtte's occasional collapse from relatively sober narration into 
the transmission of tall tales of the military glory and wealth to 
be won in remote Saharan regions (72), These are likely to be echoes
(68) G, Mouitte% “Histoire des conquestes de Mouley Archy0 connu sous 
le nom de roy de Tafilet0 et de Mouley IsmaBl ou Semein0 son 
fr&re at -son successeur a present regnant, tous deux rois de Fez, 
da Maroc, de Tafilet. de Sus etc., contenant unei description de 
oes royaumes,,,11 (Paris, 1683) A re-edition of this work, to be 
cited hereafter, is contained within S.I. 2S France Vol, II
pp, 1-201
(69) ibid, pp, 9-13
(7°) ibid, pp. 8-9
(71) “Nashr al-Mathani, e d . / t r ,  Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol, XXIV p,
cf, Mouittes “Histoire...11 p. 67
(72) Mouittes “Histoire,“ pp, 43-4 and 135-7
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of the trans-Saharan expeditions which had taken place during the
mm Q M
reign of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa di#e o
France maintained consuls in Sale and in Tetuan from 1683 until 
1716* Among these consuls, the outstanding personality was Oean- 
Baptiste Estelle, representative of France in Sale between 1690 and 
1698 (73)# He conducted a dense diplomatic correspondence (74)# And 
his information may be traced within much of the material set into 
the published work of the ambassador Pidou de St# Olon (75), whom 
Estelle accompanied from Tetuan to Meknes# Estellefs reports have 
the limitations imposed by their being made most usually from Sale, 
an hispanophone town (76) at the periphery of Moroccan politics. But 
their vigour and intelligence is unquestionable# Their author was 
perhaps over-wily for his own good# It is not impossible that, with 
the aid of forged correspondence, he engineered the very embassy of 
1693 with which he was associated? a diplomatic abortion which set 
Franco-Moroccan relations for the period upon a downward track (77)#
He was apparently ousted from Sale by local authorities, in the dealings
(73) 3-B# Estelle should not be confused with hi© father, Pierre 
Estelle, established as French consul in Tetuan in 1686 (S#I. 2e 
France Vol# II No# LXXX pp# 486-7 "Provisions de consul pour 
Pierre Estelle". Versailles, 11/4/1685 cf# ibid, pp# 486-7 
Footnotes (1) and (3)#
(74) See S#I# 20 France Vols# III and IV passim#
(75) F# Pidou de St# Olons "L'estat present de l'empire de Maroc" (Paris,
1694) tr# Peter Motteux as "The Present State of the EmpirB of 
Morocco" (London, 1695)# Future references are to the Motteux 
translation#
(76) MouBttes "Relation###" Preface p# iii
(77) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. XXII pp. 159-211 Memo# of Pidou de
St. Dion dated Toulon, 7/11/1693. This memorandum includes a
translation of a letter from Isma il to the ambassador, insisting 
that the sultan had requested Dean-Baptiste Estelle merely to 
further the import of French goods, and not to arrange an embassy# 
The allegation would explain the puzzled and cool reception which 
the French ambassador received# Bogus diplomacy, with the aid of 
forged correspondence, was characteristic of the period# Over the 
years 1710-1713, Ventura de Zari, a "Moroccan ambassador1' to Queen 
Anne was maintained in London at varying degrees of formality, 
before finally being unmasked as a "broken Greek" sent to England 
to purchase spotted deer for the sultan's park (S.P# 71 (15) f# 237 
to (16) f# 204 passim#)
which preceded a similarly futile embassy from Morocco to Versailles
(78)* His tame successors were to be decreasingly informative®
It has been noted previously that European material upon Morocco 
in the early eighteenth century is thin* It is dominated by two parallel 
works of French ransom literature, written in the aftermath of three 
separate missions undertaken by Trinitarian and Mercedarian fathers 
in unison* The expeditions were made in 1704, 1708 and 1712, Their 
grand total of success was the liberation of forty—three slaves from 
captivity in Meknes* The earlier and more Informative work is that of 
the Trinitarian Dominique Busnot (79) whorr/^enier, French consul at 
Mogador in Muhammad Ill's day, and the first European to write a 
general history of Morocco (80)? used "faute de mieux", as a continuator 
to Mouitte* Busnot was not writing as an historian* He used a captive's 
eye view of episodes In recent Moroccan political history, along with 
atrocity and escape stories, to pad out the meagre details of his 
thwarted personal experiences overseas* The result was "Grand Guignol"*
Its avowed aim was to give "une vive idee du Genie des Maures" (81)*
Yet Busnot*s work is not valueless as a source® It Includes snippets of 
information which can be checked against alternative material, including 
the author's own correspondence from Morocco (82.)* The companion work,
MrtftT-r—rf—firtmftrantrfTnriti-ratnnritimnminn*  « m m i r i fnif r t iwmp—nT«i|p<umM »r>) iP H f i^ ^ in i . i i M n i i n n n n rn iin n i* * !!  im *■■■■■ m i n u n  m i   hi ii i h m m u h it th
'(78) Sol* 20 France Vol* V® No* LXXIII p0 473 3.-B. Estelle to
Pontchartrain , Marseille, 6/11/1699* The letter indicates that the 
consul was afraid to return to the Saletin post, from which he had 
come on "leave" the previous year*
(79) D® Busnot% "Histoire du Regno de Moulay Ismael" (Rouen, 1714)
™  — r u m  1 nnnimin»iii«i in inri i n  HTnfcii rif i » i timiiri i * # '
(SO) L.-S* de Cheniers "Rech.erches Historiques sur les Maures et 1'Histoire 
de 1*Empire du Maroc" (Paris, 1787) translated into English as "TheI I I H I I I  ■  i ! ■  I I »  f i i j l m u  I n >  n p i  I M  I I I I  i F f i l  r r t i i M  r n i i i . n i i ,  p  i T T ' J  1 f  *  M *  f c r t — *
Present State of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1788; two volumes, 
of which the second is the "History"*) Future references are to this
(81) Busnot p® 60 translation.
(82) This has been partly reproduced within S,I* 29 France Vol. VI*
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the "Relation.*.de la Mercy" (83) was produced a decade later.
n *» « a rtaae« ■  *ii mfrm ■> * *
apparently as a Mercedarian fund-raiser to counter the earlier 
Trinitarian work, whose content it follows very closely. The 
Mercedarian piece has a disarming flow which suggests "ghosting" 
and, although it contains details alien to Busnot's text, was 
clearly written with an eye upon the earlier composition.
Much of the original material in English contemporary with the 
period falls into two chronologically riven categories. The first is 
associated with the English possession of Tangier between 1662 and 1684. 
The second post-dates the English capture of Gibraltar in 1704. "Tangier" 
material is voluminous, but rarely touches upon events vital to the 
internal politics of Morocco (84). Its most valuable items are the 
correspondence and pamphlets associated with the inept Howard mission 
from Tangier to Fes in 1669, and with the final period of the English 
possession, dating from governor Kirks1s visit to Meknes in 1681, until 
the port's evacuation*. The latter-day "Gibraltar" material is of more 
value, particularly for the last decade of the period, during which 
Great Britain was becoming the Christian power with which Morocco had 
closest relations. Symbolically, the termination of the French consulates 
in 1716 was succeeded, in the following year, by the appointment of 
Anthony Hatfield, a Titwani merchant, as the first English consul to 
Morocco since the days of Charles I
Embassies were most productive of information. Two luckless naval
s i n i i w u m ,  j u ib i
(83) Anons "Relation de ce qui s'est passe dans les trois voyages que les 
Reliqieux de I'Ordre de i\lotre-Dame dB la Mercy ont faits dans les 
Etats du Roy de Maroc pour la redemption des captifs en 1704. 1708 
et 1712. par un des Peres Deputez pour la RedernptionVT7"(Paris*■ n anranm w rnf i n fcwuw n»nj«* w - s i m m m  Jwniwiinmrtfcu f rw * w .in < n n ,;w ir tn iw w u m iiw ^ n  i ■ mu m^um v *
1724) The mass of this work has been reproduced in an edition 
contained within S.I. 2e France Vol. VI (pp. 613-812)
(84) This material has already been the object of a bland study written 
from the English imperial viewpoint? E.M.G. Routh's "T<
England's lost Atlantic Outpost" (London. 1912)
(85) S0P. 71 (16) f. 490 J. Addison to Admiral Cornwall , Whitehall, 
6/5/1717 cf* G* Fishers "Barbery Legends War. Trade and Piracy 
in North Africa 1415-183D"“"rL^ndon^ 1957) Appendix I p. 324
missions to Meknes in 1713-14 and 1718 were followed by the highly 
successful 1721 embassy of Commodore Stewart, of which a by-product 
was the publication of John Windus's compendium of first and second-hand 
materials "A Journey to M e q u i n e z * . (86). Among the sources acknowledged 
by the author, particular importance appertains to unpublished material 
taken from a "Mr* Corbiere", said to have lived in Morocco, and known the 
court at Meknes (87). Corbiere is otherwise known from a passing note in 
Busnot's work, referring to the first decade of the eighteenth century
(88), and an English archival note from 1713 (89). No direct acknowledge­
ments to Corbiere are made within Windus's text* But his contributions 
are tentatively identifiable by style* bJindus, as narrator of the events 
of 1721, wrote in a beguilingly light vein* But his text is periodically 
interspersed by ponderous and disdainful notes upon the MiknasI court 
and episodes in its recent history* These read like the work of another 
hand*
Braithwaite!s book (90) emerged from a further and far less 
satisfactory embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes, undertaken in 1727-8, in
I W l Q
the months following the death of the sultan Isma il* It is a sardonic 
and for the most part independent work* Its author, a young army captain 
from the Gibraltar garrison, was perhaps the most acute of all the 
European commentators noted so far* He was certainly the only author 
who refused to discuss the Christian captives of Meknes within the usual 
conventions of martyrology (91)* Unfortunately, the scope of Braithwaite's
(86) 3* tilinduss "A Journey to Meguinez etc" (London, 1721 )
(87) op* cit Preface p* ii
(88) Busnot p* 239
(89) SeP. 71 (16) f« 93 Memo * of "Mr* Corbiere" dated 12/5/1713, detailing
the current fighting strength of Moroccan corsair vessels*
(90) g* Braithwaite* "The History of the Revolutions if
Morocco upon the Death of the late Empert 
(London, 1729)
(91) ibid* pp. 352-4
work is limited, and merely grazes the period under direct examination* 
English bibliography has its share of ransom literature. The 
memoirs of Francis Brooks, and the anonymous autobiography edited by 
Simon Ockley (92) form perhaps the most valuable items from this weak 
collection* As a maverick to such literature comes the problematic 
"autobiography" of Thomas Pellow (93), supposedly the first-hand 
reminiscences of an English renegade who, as court page and then army 
officer, lived in Morocco for twenty-three years between 1715 and 1738, 
before making his escape and returning in peace to Cornwall and the 
Anglican church* Since its resurrection in 1890 by the bibliographer 
Brown (94), the work has been variously estimated. Its most recent 
student, Mme* Morsy—Patchett, is willing to discount its more overt 
borrowings, and to treat the work as fundamentally an whole, recounting 
the experiences of a single individual (95). The renegade Pellow certainly 
existed (96)* And there is equally no doubt that the author of the auto­
biography as it stands was acquainted with one or more informants who 
knew contemporary Morocco well. But to equate this author with an 
individual "Pb IIq u", even via the mediation of a "ghost writer", is to 
belie the nature of the work* The book is patch-work, thrown together to 
create a picaresque novel of the Defoe school* It is possible to identify 
much of the published material which, as text or inspiration, went to 
create it. The "lees" not otherwise accounted for, amount to banal
(92) F* Brookss "Barbarian Cruelty" (London, 1693). Anon: "An aeoount 
of South-West Barbarv" ed, S* Ockley B.D* Henceforward to be cited 
as "Ockley"*
(93) "The history of the Long Captivity and Adventures of Thomas Pellow
in South Barbarv" written bv Himself (London, no date).
(94) "ThB Adventures of Thomas Pellow of Penrvn, Mariners three and
twenty years in captivity among the Moors" ed* R* Brown 
(London* 1890)
(95) M* Morsy-Patchett: "La longue captivity et les aventures do Thomas 
Pellow" in "Heso^ris-Tamuda" Vol. IV (Rabat, 1963) pp. 289-311
(96) Braithwaite p. 192 cf. 5.P. 71 (16) ff. 583-8 A list of English 
captives at Meknes, dated 29/9/1719 and including, in the listed 
crew of the "Frances" of Falmouth, one "Tho. Pellow: Boy Turn*d 
Moor"*
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and undated campaign records, accompanied by a profusion of personal 
and place names that are frequently verisimilitudinous in their 
outlandish spelling. But these mean little within an obviously 
fictional nontext*
Certain fundamental cautions should be applied to the appreciation
of European material for the period. The material is not always simple
contemporary commentary. Published work, and even some archival
reporting, forms part of a loose tradition at the head of which
stands the monumental "Descrittione dell1Africa***18 of Leo Africanus
(97), which dates from the early 1520s* Either directly, or by way 
of Marmol Carvajal (98) this work continued to serve as a standard 
mine of supplementary information to seventeenth and eighteenth 
century European authors attempting to give a general account of 
Morocco* The "Descrittione*.*" is a work of unrivalled value. It 
includes thB only extensive survey of the Maghrib al—Aqsa made prior 
to the nineteenth century. And this survey is unique, as the work of 
a "Floor** deliberately attempting to interpret his homeland for the 
benefit of aliens. Much of its information may indeed be treated as 
static, recording circumstances known still to have prevailed in the 
nineteenth century and later? these may include many of the details 
of life in Fb s, Leo’s beloved home city (99)* But some of the notes 
cannibalised by later authors are likely to have been erroneous for
D
the early Alawi period* A striking example is Leo’s account of Marrakesh*
(97) After stylistic polishing, this work was published within the 
compendium of Giovanni Battista Ramusios "Delle navigation! et 
vlaQQi" ff* 1-95 inclusive (Venice, 1550) as "Delia descrittione 
dell’Africa et dBlle cose notabili che quivi sono". Its most 
recent edition has been a French "Description de 1’Afrique"., 
edited and translated by A. Epaulard et* al* (Paris, 1956)
(98) Luis/^armol Carvajals "Descripcion general de Africa" (Granada and 
Flalaga, 1573 and 1599) The author of this work used vast tracts of 
Leo’s "Descrittione**." to pad out evidence culled from his own 
crusading experiences within Morocco, In 1667 his work was 
seminally translated into French by N* Perrot d'Ablancourt as
"De i’Afrique Vols* I and II (Paris publication).
(99) See R. le Tourneap? "Fes avant le Protectorat" (Casablanca, 1949)
pp. 76-7 and 292
His plangent and antiquarian notes upon the ruined former capital 
of the Almoravides and Almohades re-emerged in writings that post­
dated the spectacular building programme of Ahmad al~Mansur al~Sa°di (1Q0).
* •
The existence of Leo*s master-text was peculiarly convenient in 
that the horizons of contemporary first-hand European knowledge of
C
Morocco were, during the early Alawi period, usually limited. Merchants 
were for the most part confined to the ports. With rare exceptions, 
diplomatic and religious envoys knew only the road from coast to 
capital. And from 1680 onwards, European captives were congregated in 
Meknes as servants to the palace community (101)s their only opportunity 
for wide geographical experience was co-option into the train of a 
military expedition.
Intellectually, European horizons were similarly constrained,
European commerce was a natural and prevailing obsession. Its importance 
for the country at large may be sBt into perspective by notes upon the 
size of coastal merchant communities (102), Captives, and the ransom 
missionaries they spoke to were fascinated by imperial palace politics.
But the fascination was customarily expressed in the lurid terms of 
backstairs gossip, MouStte was the only captive-turned-author capable of 
extensive literary elevation above this level.
Sympathy is indeed a rare factor in European comment upon Moroccan 
society and politics of the period. Hostility prevails. According to 
Simon Ockley, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge in the early eighteenth
(100) For an Bxample, comparison may be made between the Murrakushi 
notes of Leo (ed, Ramusio ff, 17-18) and those of Pidou de St, Olon 
(tr, Motteux pp. 15—17)"
(101) MouSttes "Histoire, , p »  125
(102) The privateer Doublet who visited Agadir in 1683 found that its 
"Doane" where European merchants were housed, contained two 
individuals besides himself (S,I, 28 France Vol, 1 no, CXCII p, 596 
Extract from the Journal of 3eah Doublets Exact dating obscure) 
Braithwaite listed the entire expatriate community of Tetuan for 
1727* It was made up of five English or Irish merchants, one French 
merchant, one Greek merchant and two Spanish friars ( p, 59),
QBntury, and heavy-handed editor of an afore-mentioned piece of 
ransom—literature, Morocco was a land ins
"••♦Temper, Genius and Breeding#••as much inferior to that 
of the Polite Asiaticks (amongst which the Persians do 
most deservedly claim the Preference) as can be conceived,
Such an opinion was an abstraction from persistent cultural tensions 
expressed most succinctly in the alley-way jihad of the inland towns, 
where Europeans were subjected to hooting and stone-shying (104)#
These tensions seem to have been particularly acute within the 
Maghrib al-Aqsa# Braithwaite echoed Ockley in exempting from 
condemnation "they of Algier, Tripoli, Tunis'* and "the Turks" as 
comparatively "polished and civilised" (105)# This polarisation of 
European sympathies in relation to North Africa is well-expressed by 
reaction to one event# In 1692, an Algerine expeditionary force 
triumphed over °AlawX defending forces, upon cAlawX territory# 3ean— 
Baptiste Estelle expressed the hope that the sultan’s disgrace 
"devroit luy abattre un peu de sa fierte" (106)# Meanwhile, his 
English and French counterparts in Algiers rejoiced in gleeful 
fellowship with the Algerines: "Our Dey" (107), "notre invincible 
monarque" (108) had been victorious#
O 03) 11 Ockley" Preface p# xix
(104) Pidou de St# Olon tr# Motteux pp# 49—50 cf# Braithwaite pp* 214-15
(105) Braithwaite p# 351 cf# "Ockley" loc# cit#
(106) S.I# 2® France Vol* III No# CLXVI1 3-B# Estelle to Pontchartrain
Sale, 12/9/1692 p.' 515
(107) S#P# 71 (3) f# 499 Memo# of consul Baker# Algiers, 18/7/1692
(108) S#I# 2e France Vol# III No# CXLV Consul Lemaire to the
"echevins" of Marseille, Algiers, 13/8/1692
CHAPTER I : THE CALAUI CAPTURE OF FES
Leo, in his division of Africa, split the northernmost reaches 
of the continent into "Barbary", the maritime region of rationality 
and law, and "Numidia", across the Atlas, the land of the palm-groves, 
and first of the regions beyond the pale of civilisation. For the 
Maghrib al-Aqsa* the distinction is certainly valid geomorphically: 
rigorous relief all but divides the area today known as Morocco into 
a green sweep of interior land, and an outer world of steppe, desert 
and oasis. Yet, in human terms, this division should be seen as a 
two-way filter. The Atlas requires a deep respect in winter, but has 
nevertheless been in one sense a spur to communication. The ecological 
diversity of its inner and outer flanks has promoted a trading pattern 
dominated by the counter-change of dates for grain. For the north of 
the green interior, a land corresponding to Leo*s "kingdom of Fes", 
the prime date country is the oasean complex of Tafilelt, spanning 
the valleys of the Ziz and Rheris. A more southerly sphere, Leo’s 
"kingdom of Marrakesh" has a corresponding bond with the great oasis 
of the DarCa valley.
The interior lands present their own linguistic and cultural 
patchwork. Athwart this diversity there is one major cleft. It is 
enshrined in the "Chleuh" parlance that would divide the land from the 
Anti-Atlas to the Mediterranean into a "Sus" or familiar, mountain- 
hedged south, and a "Gharb", paradoxically the "north": the land 
beyond Marrakesh (1). These regions are a "greater Sus" and "greater 
Gharb", englobing far more territory than their lesser namesakes, the 
riverain plains of the Uadi Sus and Sebu.
Before the present century, government within the Maghrib al- 
Aqsa oscillated between two centres* Periodically it was based at 
or near to Fes, economic hub of the Maghrib al-Aqsa1s most fertile grain
(1) See, for example, the customs and beliefs cited in fit* Uestermarck: 
"Ritual and Belief in Morocco" (London, 1926) Vol. I pp. 178 and 179
country? and periodically at Marrakesh, a city built upon arid 
and stony ground, but nevertheless, a capital strategically better 
planed for challenging the fiscally tantalising lands of "greater 
Sus", which combined a prosperous and multi-faceted economy, with 
a grimly defensible terrain* The sixteenth century had seen the 
re-establishment of government at Marrakesh, under the SaCdi princes,
Q«*» m
a dynasty of Dar i origin and "sharifian" claims* But the years
which followed the death of its most notable ruler, Ahmad al-Mansur.
* • * *
c **in 1603, saw the disintegration of the comprehensive Sa di state*
The mid-seventeenth century can be seen as an hiatus between the 
dissolution of a Murrakushi centre of political gravity, and the 
re-establishment of a wide-ranging government, to be based this 
time within the "greater Gharb", firstly at Fes, and then at Meknes, 
an half-day’s journey away, across the plain of SaSls*
C **
From around 1640, the authority of Sa di sultans shrivelled 
dramatically, to cover little beyond Marrakesh and its Hawz , or 
surrounding plain (2), home of the Shabbanat, and of other Arabic-
C
speaking peoples with whom the Sa di rulBrs were closely associated. 
Elsewhere within the Maghrib al-Aqsa, there had developed scattered 
nodes of political and military authority. This was most commonly 
exercised by leaders who were endowed with the grace of religious 
prestige, but whom it might be best to follow al-Qadiri in describing 
as "ru’asa*". or "chieftains". The bases of all four major chieftains 
of the 1650s were associated with route—ways rather than great urban 
centres, thus the southernmost of these strongholds, Illigh, was a 
mountain zawiya sited in the coastal reaches of the Anti-Atlas. It 
overlooked the Atlantic route from the "Qibla" or western Sahara.
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(2) In the terminology of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, hawz may cover the 
rural skirt of any city. However, the unqualified usage of thB 
tBrm indicates the environs of Marrakesh* This last, usage will be 
followed within this thesis.
But it was distant by nearly an hundred rugged miles from the city 
of Tarudant, an the Wadi Sus, which was the southernmost of the 
Flaghrib al-Aqsa’s major commercial centres. The northernmost base, 
Alcazarquivir, capital of the mujahid chieftain al-Khadir Ghaylan, 
was a moderate market town of the far north west, set midway between 
Sale and Tetuan, the country’s two chief marts for maritime trade, 
Dila*, a second mountain zawiya was sited beneath the southermost 
range of the Middle Atlas, in the Tadla region (3), overlooking the 
most direct route between Fes and Marrakesh. Sills of Dila’i suzerainty 
seeped across the Atlas into Tafilelt. Here, and across the hills 
dividing the oasean region from Fes, there was political confrontation 
between Dila’ and a fourth chieftaincy, this last being based within 
Tafilelt itself.
This last Filali chieftaincy was the perquisite of certain members 
of a clan of local shurafa1* the Alawi, In Tafilelt, as elsewhere, 
shurafa* were literally nobles, in that they claimed descent from the 
Prophet, and consequential privilege and respect. However, in Filali 
society, nobility was spread wide and thin. In terms of real social 
ascendancy, the significance of "sharifian" status was minimal* Arabs, 
Berbers and shurafa’ were simply three broad categories into which the 
population could be divided (4). The society of the Filali plain was 
dispersed among qusur, the characteristic mud-fortresses which the 
region had known for centuries (5). Within such a society, it was
(3) SeB Prologue P. 25 (Note 36)
(4) MouBtte wrote, by hearsay, of "Tafilet": "Les peuples de cet Etat 
sont de trois sortes, et sont composes de cherifs, d’Arabes et de 
Barbares* Les premiers sont descendus de l’imposteur Mahomet..." 
("Histoire..." p. 195)
(5) In translation, Idrisi’s description of "Sijilmasa", a section of 
Tafilelt, runs, "...elle n’a point de citadelle, mais elle consiste 
d’une serie de palais (qusur). de maisons (divar) et de champs 
cultives le long des bords d’un fleuve..."
R. Dozy & M.3. de Goejes "Description de l'Afrique et de l’Espaqne
isi" (Leyden, 1866) p. 60 of the text, 69 of the translation,
difficult for a political leader to rise above the status of primus
inter pares* master of his home-qasr* Even in the 1690s, the puzzled
«
Bean—Baptists Estelle was, by hearsay, to describe the capital city 
of Tafilelt as a singlB "castle” flanked by wattle and daub huts (6)* 
During the 1630s, al-Sharif, known to dynastic history as the founder 
of Alawi political fortunes, would seem to have been notably unsuccess­
ful in his bid for extensive suzerainty* His political career, 
which combined the inter-qusur raiding endemic to the region, with an 
attempt to play off against each other two powerful chieftains, the 
murabitan of Dila* and of Illigh, ended with a period of captivity inmumjafti —' r I * *
the hands of the latter* Fluhammad, the eldest of al—Sharif*s more 
prominent sons, was thus able to come to prominence during his fatherrs 
lifetime* He knew greater success as a raiding leader, and became 
known as "amir" of Tafilelt (7)« Undoubtedly his political ambitions 
spread beyond that region* But the most important extensions to his 
suzerainty would seem to have been oasean, possibly westwards into the 
DarCa (8), and certainly south-eastwards, into the TauKifc! knot of 
settlements, whither he led armies in 1645 and again in 1652, and 
whither he was able to send his quwwad (9). He is likely to have been 
the amir al-bilad of Sijilmasa who, in 1662, granted letters of
0  U  . -***
introduction to the pilgrim al- Ayyashi, to cover a journey to Tuat, 
and who was then accepted as suzerain as far to the east as Aougrout (10)* 
At this period, the social and economic links between Fes and 
Tafilelt arB likely to have been such as to give the city firmly the
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(6) S.I* 2e France Vol* IV No* SXLIV p. 704 Flemo* of 3*-B. Estelle
putatively dated to October, 1698*
(7) "Nashr al-Flathani*«*ft ed*/tr* Flichaux-Bellaire A«F). Vol* XXIV p* 38
(8) "Nuzhat al-Hadj**." ed./tr* Houdas p* 301 of the text, 498 of the
translation*
(9') Chronicle of "5idi Bahaia" quoted Flartin pp* 51 and 52-3
(10) al-cAyyashIs "Rihla***u, as partially translated by A* Berbrugger in 
"Voyages dans le sud de lfAlqerie et des Etats barbaresques*«*tE 
("Exploration Scientifique de ltAlqgrieti Vol* IX Part I Paris, 1846)
pp* 11 and 26—7
edge over the oasis* The city had attracted a resident Filali 
community which represented a cross-section of society* It included 
acknowledged shurafa* * and a prosperous care sufficiently numerous 
to be transferred willy-nilly, later in the century, to inhabit 
houses evacuated by the entire Dewish community of Meknes (11)* 
Probably, however, it was dominated by needy migrants, the "vil 
popolo" of south-eastern oaseans, noted by Leo as willing to 
undertake menial tasks around Fes (12). Tafilelt is unlikely to 
have had a reciprocal attraction for the Fasi* The Filali economic 
heart of Sijilmasa along the lower Ziz, should not be equated 
commercially with the high mediaeval Sijilmasa, major desert port 
of the Maghrib al-Aqsa* Contemporary evidence for the mid-seventeenth 
century points to a maritime route, by way of the coastal Sus, as the 
most significant path for the direct import into the inner Maghrib 
al-Aqsa of the vital long-range commodity, trans-Saharan gold*
Details from thB narrative of the pilgrim al-CAyyashi, show that 
Tafilelt did have links with the Saharan gold markets southern 
merchants might travel out from Tafilelt as far as Tuat, to profit 
from a bi-metallic rate of exchange that stood at twenty—four silver 
muzunat to the gold mithcal* an improvement over the standard Filali 
rate of forty (13). But this did not deprive Tafilelt itself of a 
Fasi reputation as a poverty-stricken region (14), source only of its 
own typical products? dates, mutton, and the bolts of peculiarly fine 
woollen cloth that were known to Europeans as "filleris". In her 
demand for these commodities, Fes was a "buyer's market", for Fes was
(11) "Nashr al-Mathanl***" ed*/tr« Michaux-Bellaire A*M« Vol. XXIV
pp* 144 and 349
(12) Leo ed* Ramusio f« 74
(13) al-°Ayyashi ed*/tr« Berbruooer pp* 22-23
(14) MouBttes "Histoire* **" p* 195
a source of grain* And for grain* the inhabitants of Tafilelt would 
bring their goods up to the metropolis (15)*
Seventeenth century Fes was ,!the general Store-House of all 
Barbary51 (16)s
"***grandement riche* d*autant que cfest ou se fait tout lo 
trafic du pays, et oTest elle qui fournit Tafilet et les 
autres provinces eloignees de tout ce qu*elles ont de 
besoin,"
From Leo1s notes, it may fairly bB assumed that the traffic of Fasi 
daily life, including the provision of foodstuffs, timber, charcoal, 
and the raw materials for industry, involved not only peoples from the 
cityfs immediate environs, and from the nearby dir or "piedmont" of the 
Middle Atlas,*but also groupings from the landward slopes of the Rif, 
from as far to the north-east as Tetuan* In the early eighteenth 
century it would be recorded that, under peaceable conditions, weekly 
caravans passed between Tetuan and Fes (18)# Other routeways had 
periodic significance# These included the upland way from Tafilelt, 
which came into its own after the autumn date harvest (19), More 
important was the route which led eastwards from Fes into the "Cherg" 
or march-country dividing the northern Maghrib al-Aqsa from thQ Ottoman 
Regency of Algiers# For the most highly developed complex of Fasi export 
trade was that associated with Muslim lands to the east* A major enterprise 
was that associated with the overland pilgrimage from the northern
(15) S*I# 2b France Vol. IV No* CXLIV Memo* of D«-B* Estelle putatively
dated to October 1698 p# 704
(16) Pidou de St* Olon tr* Motteux p# 140
(17) MouUttes "Histoire* # p *  183
(18) Braithwaite p, 66
(19) Leo ed* Ramusio f# 8* In the final days of the caravan trade, it
would be noted that, during the date season, 
the caravan traffic between Tafilelt and Fes multiplied eight^fold# See 
E. Aubins "Le Maroc dfAuiourdfthui" ('PaaM^ , T904) p* 297
Maghrib al-Aqsa, as much a mercantile as a religious expedition (20).
The making-up of the pilgrimage caravan was, ideally, an annual event 
(21). Customarily it congregated around Fes (22), and passed by way 
of thB Taza corridor into Ottoman territory, one tributary to the 
grand stream that would eventually travel from Cairo to Mecca*
Access to valid military sanctions was of vital significance to 
the security of the Fasi pattern of trade and supply. The citizenry 
was thus caught up in a standard dilemma, expressed in an ambivalent 
relationship between "Fas al—Bali", and "Fas al—OadTd", the "old" 
and "new" cities of the metropolis# Fas al-Bali was the citizens* town*
Fas a1—3adid had been, since its construction in Marinid days, the 
site of palace and "government presence"# The society of Fas al—Bali
I
was dominated by an urban aristocracy of men of high religious standing, 
including Idrissid shurafa* who claimed descent from the city*s founder 
(23)# According to its genealogical heritage, this aristocracy had 
seen a number of reigning dynasties come and go# And in Wattasid days,
Leo had noted a contemptuous reluctance on the part of such "huomini 
di riputatione e di bonta" for any personal association with Fas al- 
Badid (24)* Yet, in the absence of strong imperial government, it was 
upon the urban aristocracy that there fell the responsibility for 
ensuring the external order necessary to the equable conduct of Fasx 
life# Incidents from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
(20) Developed, if late accounts of the pattern of trade associated with 
this caravan are contained within W# Lempriere,s "A Tour from 
Gibraltar**#" (London, 1791) pp* 343—353 and R# Thomassy*s
"Lb Maroc et ses Caravanes ou Relation de la France avec cet Empire" 
(Paris, 1845) pp. 30-64
(21) S.I. 26 France Uol# III No# CXIII Memo* of CJ-B# Estelle, directed
via Marseille, 19/7/1690 p# 316
(22) In 172B, Braithwaite saw the pilgrimage caravan being made up outside 
MeknBs, as Fes, its customary starting point, was under siege* He
was told that the caravan was only half the customary size (pp. 256-7)*
(23) For studies of Fasi shurafa* based upon a seventeenth century source, 
see the twin articles by G« Salmons "Las Chorfa idrisides de Fas" 
and "Les Chorfa Filala et Djilala de Fes" in A.M. Vols I (Paris.
1904) pp* 425 ff* and III (Paris, 1905) pp.97—158, respectively#
(24) Leo ed* Ramusio f# 43
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suggest that it was religious leaders who were accustomed to lead the
civic militia* So it may be assumed that these city fathers knew the
pragmatic advantages of recognising a political authority that proved
capable in the field*
Early in the 1640s there had been established within Fas al-Oadld
a governor and garrison loyal to Muhammad al-Hajj, the murabit of Dila1,
• * ”T 1 ’•
who was then paramount within the central Maghrib al-Aqsa. Dila* was
militarily most notable for its command of rural contingents of
tamazioht-speakinQ Berbers from the Central Atlas region* However, the
Dila*r garrison within Fas al-3adid would seem to have been made up of
Filali troops (25), presumably drawn from the factions said to have
rallied to Dila* during a period of overt confrontation in Tafilelt
between Muhammad al—Hajj and the cAlawi leader al—Sharif(26)* A brawl
between this garrison and the old city disturbed the summer of 1650 (27)*
The most notable consequence of this brawl was the summons into Fas
al-Bali of Muhammad ibn al-Sharif of Tafilelt, and his proclamation as
the city,s sultan (28)* The move is likely to have resulted from civic 
V
defiance of Dila , rather than from any specific desire to woo the Alawi* 
For the new sultan*s credit was brief. Ten weeks after his entry into 
the city, following defeat by Dila1! troops from the Central Atlas, 
Muhammad was summarily ejected from Fas al-Bali (29), as a military 
inadequate. After some months, the "old city" returned to a peaceable 
relationship with Dila*, with civic honour saved by the appointment of 
a new governor, son to Muhammad al-Hajj himself (30). Two years later
(25) "Nashr al-Mathani**.11 ed./tr* Michaux-Beliaire A.M. Vol. XXXV p* 39
(26) "Tur iuman" p* 2 of the text and 4 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif••*" MS p* 9 .. . t-1
(27) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above* p. 38 cf*
"TurIuman" pp* 5 of the text and 9-10 of the translation*
(28) "Nashr al-Mathani**." loc* cit* cf*_"Tur iuman" p* 5 of the text
and 10 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 19
(29) "Nashr al-MathanX***"^ Volume cited above, p* 39 cf* 11 Turiuman"
loc. cit* cf* 11 Bus tan al-Zarif..." MS loc* cit*
1 ,r 1 — —  #
(30) "Nashr al-Mathani*.." Volume cited above* p. 40 cf. "Tur.iuman"
loc* cit* cf* "Bustan al-Zarif».," MS loc. cit*— * ..
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the city profited from its rB-recognition of Dila** Fasi religious 
leaders (fuaaha*) travelled to Dila1 itself* and were able successfully 
to negotiate the aid of Muhammad al-Hajj and the zawlva forces in 
the punishment of the M&yayna, a grouping from the city environs 
who had been pillaging citizens* property (31 )•
But such aid from a centre over one hundred miles distant from 
Fes was ponderous of access, and is not known ever to have been 
obtained again# The city annals of subsequent years are shot through 
with the flicker of economic uncertainty# Three times over the 
years 1653-6, the civic currency required adjusting, once because 
the fals or standard petty bronze coin for daily transactions had 
lost all credence in the market (32)# These fluctuations may signify 
interruptions in the pattern of supply to the city* Concurrently the
Fasi were, apparently of their own initiative, sending harakat. punitive
'• " ""
military expeditions, into regions economically vital to themselves#
In 1655 the aim was punishment of the Banu Zarwal (33) “Oaball11, or 
“hill-men" from the south-western Rif, whose territory verged upon 
the route from Fes to Tetuan, and who, in Leo*s day, had been subject 
to the Islattasid sultans of Fes (34)# In the following year, military 
aid was sent to Taza, first town along the eastward trunk-route (35)#
The season of this attack co-incided with the season of date-caravans 
which, according to Leo could, in the Ta2a region, all too easily 
devolve into skirmishes (36)*
The period from 1653 onwards saw, also, expansion of the chief­
taincy at the westerly edge of the Fasi political horizon* Al-Khadir
(31)uNashr al-Mathani*#.11 ed*/tr* Michaux-Beliaire A.M* Vol. XXIV p. 57
(32) “Nashr al-Mathahr**.1* Volume cited above, pp. 62, 81 and 86
(33) ibid* p. 73
(34) Leo ed* Ramusio ff* 51-2
(35) “Nashr al-Mathani#.*" Volume cited above* pp# 86-7
(36) Leo ed. Ramusio f* 54
Ghaylan, the roulahld (37 ), extended his authority over the peoples 
of the north-western flood-plains which fanned out "even as a 
Bowling-green" (38) from the Sebu crossing, north of Fes, to the 
Atlantic* Demographically this region was unpromising as a sphere for 
the flexing of political ambition0 Seventeenth and eighteenth century 
European eyewitnesses re-iterated that its itinerant Arabic-speaking 
population was notably scanty* The "douars** or tent-crescents which 
excited the commentators* disgusted fascination, were rare objects 
(39)* However, Ghaylan is likely to have had relatively easy access, 
if not to men, at least to European munitions* The sleazy Christian 
enclaves strung out along the coastal edge of his domain, were 
typically centres for arms trading (40).
Thred deaths of political significance to the Maghrib al-Aqsa 
occurred in 1659. In Fes there died Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Hajj, 
second and last of the cityTs governors from the house of Dila*. The 
succession of a zawiya nominee was barred by the usurpation of one 
al*»DuraydI, allegedly an insubordinate garrison officer from Fas 
al—Badid (41). At around the same time, Marrakesh saw the end of 
Ahmad al-CAbbas(42), thB last titular 5aCdi sultan. He was 
treacherously assassinated by his khal or "kinsman-on-the-motherfs
*  * ■ I* I . I
(37) For further information upon this warrior, see A. Pereties 
"Le Rais El—Khadir Ghailan" in A.M. (Vol. XVIII, Paris, 1912) 
pp. 1-186. This is a copious study, based partly upon English 
Tangier material.
(38) liJindus p. 82
(39) See, for example, Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 21 cf. 
failndus pp. 82-3 and 205-6 cf* Braithwaite pp. 136 and 138-9
(40) For arms-smuggling in Tangier under the English, sees Anon*
"A discourse concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 28
(4*0 KNashr al—Mathani. e d . / t r .  MichauX-Bellaire A0M. Vol. XXIV p. 106 
of. 11 Bus tan al-Jtarif..." MS p. 24
(42) "Nuzhat al-Hadi.. ed,/tr. Houdas pp, 207-8 of the text and 340
of the translation cf. Pel Puerto Vol. V Ch.XXVIII pp. 543-4
side (43)^ Karum al-Hajj, chieftain of the Shabbanat from the Hawz*
Karum al-Hajj thenceforward became master of Marrakesh* Meanwhile, in 
Tafilelt, the death of the cAlawI founding-father al-Sharif had, 
according to tradition, driven one of his younger sons, al-Rashid, 
into flight from hi3 mistrustful brother Muhammad (44)
Memory of the early period of al-Rashid^ travels survives only 
within a medley of dateless folk-weavs* Two relatively early and 
elaborate accounts of the prince*s progress are given by MouBtte in 
his "Histoire"* and by al-Qadirl in the "Nashr al-Mathani.*."*(45)^ They 
seem to represent successive stages in Fasi tradition concerning 
the GAlawi* Both would have it that the prince left Tafilelt 
virtually alone, and that he subsequently travelled between centres 
of contemporary authority, incognito until his inevitable unmasking* 
Slaves figure in both versions of the story* According to ^ouBtte*s 
complicated tale, there was a "black* involved in al-Rashld*s two bids 
at escaping from his brother (46)* And al-Qadiri passed on a legend, 
at once racy and sentimental, which told how the prince, after 
discovery and flight from Oila*, proved himself, along the road, 
worthy both of his ancestors, and of his political futurB, by rescuing 
a caravan from rural ambush* In this he was aided by two black slaves, 
who alternately loaded the two muskets with which he demonstrated a 
sultan*s marksmanship (47:)* In Moufitte*s version of the story, al- 
Rashld had offered his services to Dila* as a mercenary* The bedrock
(43) The term khal (pi* akhwal) signifying "maternal uncle",was employed 
by authors of the period to cover a member of the grouping 
identified with a man*s mother* Ideally the relationship between a 
man and his akhwal should have been peculiarly close*
(44) "Nuzhat al-Hadi* . e d . / t r *  Houdas p« 301 of the text, 499 of the
translation cf* "Tur.iuman" p* 7 of the text, 12 of the translation
of* "Bustan al-g&rif***" MS pi* 21
(45) MouBtte: "Histoire*.*" pp* 15-19 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani. . e d * / t r *
Michaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol* XXIV pp* 97-101
(46) MouBtte: "Histoire.**" pp* 15-16
(47) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above* pp* 98-9
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beneath these tales could be the memory of a period during which al- 
Rashid had acted, not quite as a lone adventurer, but as a condottiere 
upon a small-scale: the master of a petty force of black slave-
Q M n
soldiers or abid* Such soldiers were noted to be in al-Rashid*e 
company, by an eyewitness, at an early stage in his career when he 
was still an adventurer (48)*
All accounts of al-Rashid*s travels would agree that, at some point 
prior to 1664, they brought him into the "Cherg" or eastern march- 
country* The "Cherg" is a complex of widely variant peoples, and 
regions* It includes the Angad desert, a necessary obstacle to travellers 
moving eastwards from Taza* This blaak region provides the Maghrib al- 
Aqsa with a natural eastern frontier: a grey wilderness of sandy earth, 
terebinths and wandering pastoralists* Reporters from either side of 
the period dwell both upon the hostility, and upon the elusive 
character of the Angad peoples, many of whom would seem to have 
followed a transhumance pattern of enormous sweep that could take 
them seasonally as far as the oasis of Flguig (49)*
Other "Chergl" groupings were sedentary and thronging* The hill- 
peoples whose territories flanked the Angad were zenativa-speakino 
Berbers* Probably, as today, they were unusually numerous for rural 
populations (50)* Leo had noted that the Snassen hills, which lie
(48) S*I* 28 Franca Vol. I No* XLI R. Frejus: "Relation d*un 
Vovaae fait dans la Mauritania***" (hereafterf Fre.ius ) d * 154
(49) Early reporters on the Angad and its peoples include Leo (ed* 
Ramusio f* 58) and the eighteenth century L*R* Desfontaines 
(ed* M* Dureau de la Malle, as "Fratamens d*un Voyaoe dans les 
Reoences dB Tunis et d1Aloer fait de 1783 & 1786" in "Voyages 
dans les R6oences de Tunis et d^AloBr11 (Paris* 1838 p* 177) 
Further data is given by the nineteenth century commentator 
M*E* Gazette in VDu commerce de 1*Algeria aveo l*Africue 
centrale et les Etats barbaresQues" (Paris* 1844) quoted 
Thomassv pp* 66-7*
(50) A population map of contemporary Morocco, prepared by the 
Laboratory of Physical Geography in Rabat, notes Snassen 
country in particular as an area of extraordinary density in 
rural population, inexplicable in terms of natural circum­
stances alone (3.Martin et* al: "Geographic du Maroc"
Paris, 1964 p* 59) ........
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between the Angad town of Gujda and the lower Moulouya were, 
although harsh and difficult of access, densely populated and 
capable of furnishing ten thousand fighting men (51)* In the 
eighteenth century, Shaw was to re-lterate his judgements, adding 
a note upon the difficulty of subjecting these "Beni Zenessel*** 
Kabyles" to “Tingitanian” taxation (52)* In Leo’s day, the wide 
bay to the west of the Moulouya mouth, and the north of the Snassen 
hills, had been one customary anchorage for Venetian galleys trading 
with Fes (53)* During the mid-seventeenth century, the region seems 
still to have supported a Mediterranean trade in wax (54) and in 
foodstuffs (55)* A cornucopian capacity to supply comestibles 
cheaply was ons of the northern Maghrib al-Aqsa’s moat notable 
economic propensities (56)* It seems clear that the populations 
adjoining this northern stretch of coast willingly exploited the 
propensity, and ignored the Islamic legal ban upon supplying 
Christian traders with goods vital to subsistence* This attracted 
the French who, during the 1660s, reconnoitred the nearby offshore 
Shafarina islands, with a view to the establishment of a naval and 
trading base which might encroach upon the existing Italian 
connection (57)*
The “Sebk&a“ or salt-flat between Tlemsen and Oran was alien
(51) Leo ed* Ramusio f*’ 62
(52) T* Shaw: “Travels and Discoveries relating to several Parts of 
Barbarv11 (Oxford, 1738) p* 17
(53) Leo ed* Ramusio f* 52
(54) Frelus p* 183
(55) MouBtte: “Histoire***» p* 179
(56) S*P* 71 (13) f* 789 Memo* of Lord Howard on the question of 
victualling Tangier, dated Tangier,14/12/1669
(57) S.I* 2B France Vol* I No, XIX pp* 49-50 Francois de Beaufort to
Colbert* Majorcan waters, 24/4/1662*
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from Angad plain and hill-country alike* This was the country of the 
Banu cAmir, a settled Arabic-speaking people who were noted by Marmol 
Carvajal in the sixteenth century for their ability to defy the Turks 
(58), and who later continued to be “numerous and warlike” (59)* During 
the seventeenth century, the Banu cAmir lived effectively under the 
suzerainty of the Spaniards of the presidio of Oran, to whom they 
paid protection money (60)* It was by way of these people that there 
was funnelled a profitable trade in grain, between "Qranie" and 
southern Spain (61 )*
From the landward Muslim viewpoint, the entire rural ”Cherg" would 
seem to have been, in the mid-seventeenth century, politically “no-man's 
land'1* Its economic centre was the city of Tlemsen* But Tlemsen, the 
capital of an independent mediaeval kingdom, had fallen into the 
shadow of Algiers, headquarters of the Ottoman Regency into which 
Tlemsen itself had been absorbed as an Ottoman outpost* The one-time 
capital is likely already to have collapsed into a fraction of the 
space enclosed by its own walls (62)* Allegedly it could be held by 
a garrison of fifty or sixty janissaries (63)* Such a force was of a 
size to police a town, but not a march*
It was within this march that al-Rashid was able to raise the 
popular following that would hoist him to power* There is a tradition 
that al-Rashid's success within the “Gherg” had been prefaced by an
(58) Marmol Carvajal tr* Parrot d'Ablancourt Vol. I p* 80
(59) Shaw p. 52
(60) “Oakley” p* 23
(61) S.I* 28 France Vol* III No* XXII Memo* of Pidou de St* Olon 
dated Toulon, 23/8/1693 p* 201
(62) In the mid-1730s, Shaw had noted that* ”***There is not above one 
sixth part remaining of the old Tlemsan* which, as I compute, might 
have been above four Miles in Circuit*”* He attributed this decline 
to a Turkish sack of 1670 ( op* cit* p* 49)* However, 3. Ogilby's 
version of 0* Dapper's “Africa”* published in London in 1670, already 
pointed to a notable diminution in the economy and size of Tlemsen* (#)
(63) S*I* 2e Franee Vol* I* No* XXIX p* 84 Memo* of Admiral Trubert
from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/11/1664
(*) p. 208
expansionist "Chergi" episode in the career of his eider brother 
Muhammad (64)* This tradition must be discounted* It will be seen to 
rest solely upon the evidence of an undated and textualiy dubious 
letter from an unknown "Dey of Algiers'* to an unnamed "sharif". This 
was incorporated into the dynastic tradition by al-Zayyani, upon 
Muhammad's behalf (65)*‘ Al-RashXd's own real venture into the "Cherg" 
must therefore be recognised as the acceptance, within the march9 of 
a total alien as military commander*
It was the teeming sedentaries rather than the thieving pastoraliats, 
with whom al-Rashid*s ties were crucial* Snassen and Banu cAmir alike 
were to be among the groupings associated with his name* It seems to 
have been within Snassen country that al-ftashTd, the future sultan, 
was first accepted as a political leader in his own right* A spectrum 
of accounts would all suggest that the key to this acceptance was 
al-Rashid*s capture, by "c o u p  de theatre1*« of a point named Dar ibn 
MashCal.
Par ibn Mashcal as a town or fortress no longer exists* Byt its 
existence, and indeed its strategic importance in the seventeenth 
century seem unquestionable* It appears to have been a stronghold, 
and also a centre around which local forces could be recruited* In 
1609, it had been used as a base from which two SacdX princes in 
flight from a third had gathered an army of shoraoa* or "easterners", 
with which they went on to take Fes (66), as al-RashXd was to do* After 
al-Rashid*s death, the place was to be used again, as one centre for the
(64) “TurIuman" pp* 3-5 of the text, 5-9 of the translation cf*?
"Bustan al-JTarTf*.-" MS pp* 10-13
(65) Sees Epilogue Part II Pp. 322-327
(66) "Nuzhat al-HadX***tt ed*/tr. Houdas pp* 197 of the text, and
317—8 of tfie translation cf*
S*I* 1re Pavs-Bas Vol. I* No. CLII Memo* of P.M. Coy to the 
States-General. dating from 1609 pp* 463-4
operations of his nephew, Ahmad ibn Muhriz, a contender for the 
succession (67)* The site of Dar ibn Mashcal can now be assessed 
only approximately* There seems little doubt that it lay within or 
adjoining Snassen territory, as was remembered in eighteenth 
century Snassen tradition (68)* A number of maps of Morocco 
standard in Europe during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries include the toponym* Of these maps, possibly the most 
reliable ie the crude sketch drawn up by MouBtte, with the help 
of his chief informant "Bougiman" (69)* This inserted Dar ibn Mashcal 
as a fortress at the edge of the Snassen hill-country, to the east 
of the Moulouya, well inland, and overlooking the Angad routeway from 
Taza to Oujda* Here a stronghold would have been well-poised both to 
command the main route from Fes into the Regency, and to make contact, 
by way of the Moulouya, with trading points on the Mediterranean
C m
coast* In the eighteenth century, the Alawi makhzan would maintain
a pair of major fortresses within this region (70)* In the mid-
c
seventeenth century, an independent master of Dar ibn Mash al would 
have been finely sited to agglomerate, for his own benefit, the profits 
of tribute and commerce alike*
w  —  Q
Al-Rashid*s venture against Dar ibn Mash al can only tentatively 
be reconstructed from beneath a mass of coralline legend* No date can 
be attached to this venture* The relatively late author al-ZayyanX is 
alone in suggesting that mass force was involved, and in associating 
this storming with the aftermath of al-RashXd*s victory over his
(67) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p* 73
(68) "Nashr al-MathanX*V." ed*/tr* Michaux-BBllaire A*M* Vol* XXIV 
p*f 101* This was one of two variant traditions concerning the site 
of Dar ibn Mashcal, reported by bt-Qadirl*
(69) MouBtte: "Histoire*.*" p* 9 * The relevant section of this map, 
here reproduced, is taken from the frontispiece to the second 
volume of S*I* 2e France*
(70) Shaw p* 16 One of these fortresses, "Borg el Wed", is marked upon
this author*s frontispiece map*
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The Germain MouBtte — ”Bougiman” map of the Maghrib al- 
Aqsa, as reproduced in the frontispiece to " Les Sources 
Inedites de l'Histolre du Maroc” s Deuxieme Serie 
France, Volume II
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brother Muhammad (71)* Possibly he extrapolated from the earlier 
suggestion that it was at Dar ibn Mashcal that Muhammad was buried 
(72), Earlier source-writers (73) set the attack upon Dar ibn Mashcal 
into the haze of al-Rashid*s primal association with the "Cherg", 
and imply that the place was taken by stealth and trickeryt a 
successful guerrilla exploit. This is a credible version of events.
And it can be believed that al-ilashld^ attack upon Dar ibn MashCal 
was made with the connivance of a local rural chieftain "Shaykh al- 
Lawati (74), apparently an acknowledged leader among the Snassen (75)
Dar ibn MashCal could have been a focu3 for the envy of his followers, 
Despite early suggestions to the contrary, Gaught even by 
Europeans on the fringe of Maghribi politics, it is unlikely that 
"Darbinmeshaai" was, in aX-Rashid*s day, actively "commanded" by the 
Dswish "petty Prince" (76), who, in one or another "avatar" is set 
into all standard Arabic sources. As B*A« Mojuetan has pointed out 
in a recent thesis (77), Maghribi society of this date is unlikely 
to have been sufficiently flexible to encompass an independent Jewish 
ruler, Mojuetan takes the extreme view that the Dew of Dar ibn MashCal 
never existed, but was instead a fabrication of early cAlawl 
propaganda, designed to win over to the parvenu sultan al-Rashid a 
gullible populace nurtured upon an age-old corpus of Maghribi legends
(71) "TurIuman" pp, 7-8 of the text, 15 of the translation cf^
"Bustan al-Ikrjf,,." MS p, 22
(72) "Nashr al-Mathani^,," ed,/tr, Michaux-Bellaire A,M, Vol* XXXV p, 164
(73) MouBtte: "Histoire,,," pp* 17—18 cf, al-Ifranll "Nuzhat al-Hadl,,," 
ed, Houdas pp, 301—2 of the text, 499 of the translation cf, 
al-Qadirl: "Naahr al-Mathani,, V o l u m e  cited above, pp, 100-101
(74) "Nashr al-Mathanl,,W" Volume cited above, p, 100
(75) MouBtte: "Histoire,,," p* 19
(76) Anon, (initialled S,L*) "A letter from a gentleman of the Lord
Ambassador HOWARDS Retinue" (London* 1670) d , 2 , (hereafter, S,L,)
The letter is dated at Fes, Nov* 1st, 1669,
(77) "The Rise of the cAlawi dynasty in Morocco 1631—1672" Ph, D,
(London, 1969) Chapter IV
in which Dewish princes figure* Certainly the tales of al-Rashid*s 
assassination of the Dew of Dar ibn Mashcal read like anti-Semitic 
versions of the tale of Aladdin*s cave* Yet it seems unnecessary 
to eliminate the Dew altogether* MouBtte set two figures within 
the "castle" of "Dar-Michal", a governor, and a Dew who had dominated 
the local trade* It was standard practise for Dewish financiers to 
be associated with Maghribi magnates of the dayte parallel figures 
to the “king*s Dews11, bound for their own security, and a specialised 
complex of financial purposes, to European mediaeval monarchs (78)* 
Even at the zawiva of Dila1, where political authority was associated 
with Islamic intellectualism, there was a Dewish community established
(79)* And the contemporary provincial population of the Maghrib al- 
Aqsa *s northern fringe had its Dewish element, The merchant adventurer 
Frejus, on his journey of 1666 through the Middle Rif, gave "Moors and 
Dews" as the typical description of populations he by-passed*
A wealthy Dew associated with the fortress of Dar ibn Mashcal 
could have been an arms trader, Within the 1669 account of the 
"gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard*s retinue", which is 
decidedly hostile towards al-Rashid personally, there lie two 
accounts of the disposal of individual prominent Dews by "Muley 
Archeid", The two accounts are suspiciously parallel* The first 
involves the "petty prince" of WDarbinmeshaal" as noted above* It is 
a tale of vicious treachery towards a Deuish host, excused by "a 
small provocation culled from the Law of Mahomet" (60), The second
(78) For further information see Parkes: "The Dew in the Mediaeval 
Community" (London, 1938) " ' '
(79) Chronicle of Sa°dya ibn Danain* Text no* XXI as ecjited and translated 
by Va Ida in "Un Recueil de textes historiques judeo-marocaines" in 
"Hesp&ris" Vol* XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p, 140
(80) S,L. p* 2
is a more sober and detailed account of judicial murder:
"Another Dew named Doseph Ben-Simon* a very great 
Trader, and one that had Correspondents in many 
Places, did run the same Fortune* He supplyed 
the Moors with many Commodities, especially with 
Powder and Shot, Guns and other Weapons, which 
he conveyed out of Spain by stealth* At last 
his Wealth made him guilty of Death, for he was 
accused of Adultery, and although common report 
pronounced him Innocent, he lost his Life and 
had his Estate seized for the Kings Use*"
This reads like a second version of the same incident, and is 
credible* The Dewish gun-runner, with widespread commercial 
contacts and particularly close links with the Peninsula, fits well 
into the context of Dudeo-Moroccan trade of the period* Like most 
of the maritime commerce of the Maghrib al-Aqsa , the arms-trade, 
both open and clandestine, was dominated by Dews (32)* The sordid 
elimination of a local arms-trader could well have been a touch- 
piece for the transformation of al-BashId*s relations with the 
Snassen and neighbouring groupings, providing him perhaps with a 
cache of arms, as well as the wealth with which rumour would accredit 
the capture of Dar ibn Maah°al*
The acquisition of a strategic base, together with the 
flamboyant*, distribution of booty can account for al-Rashid*s 
metamorphosis from alien mercenary into raiding leader* It was 
part of dynastic tradition that al-Rashid bought himself the loyalty 
of a rural following (83)* MouBtte suggests that the capture of Dar 
ibn Mashcal was followed up by the acclamation of al-Rashid as "king" 
by Shaykh al-LawatX and his allies (84)* But the anonymous English
(81) S*L* p* 3
(82) MouBtte? "Histoire***" p. 177 cf* "Ocklev" p* 122 cf* 
Braithwaite pp* 88, 90, 106, 168
(83) "Nuzhat al—jjadi***" ed,/tr* Houdas p* 301 of the text and 499
of the translation cf* "Tur1uman"_ p* 8 of the text, and 15 of
the translation cf* "Bustan al^ferif**." MS p* 22
*
(84) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p* 19
statement that al«RashTd was not yet “king or Emperor" but "General
or Great Moukadem" (85) seems to pinpoint the truth# The FXlali
alien became a local war—leader of increasing geographic range# His
first move away from Dar ibn Mashcal is said to have involved
leading al-Lawati*s men against their neighbours of "QuivianB"
(86)# But his most notable Victories seem to have lain in his
"wonderful success against the East Arabs" (87). Even al-Zayyanl,
c
who was cautious in his treatment of Alawi ventures in the border 
region (88), allowed that raiding in Snassen company took al-Rashid 
as far as Oujda (89), And ventures further east are implied by this
mm Q mm
author*s analysis of al-Rashid*s askar of "easterners" or sharaoa; 
a ravel of Arab and Berber recruits from the Regency (min wilavat 
al—1turk) (90), including Banu cAmir from "Oranie" and Banu Snus, 
zenativa-speakino hill-farmers from the south of Tlemsen (91 )# In 
order to sweep up such a following, al-Rashid the muoaddam is 
likely, during the early 1660s, to have directed activities far 
into territory that, in Algiers, would have been regarded as Ottoman# 
The rise of a war-lord with a nexus of power within the "Cherg" 
was bound to threaten the security of Fasi-Tilimsani traffic# But, in 
the early 1660s, Fes was in no fit state politically to cope with 
any external military threat# In the aftermath of al-Duraydi's coup 
within Fas al—Dadld, the old city dissolved into faction-fighting, 
with the Andalus quarter supporting and the Qarawiyyin quarter
(85) 5,L# p# 28
(86) MouBtte: "Histoire###" pp# 19-21
(87) S#L# loc# cit#
(88) See: Epilogue Part II pp# 327-8
(89) "Tur iuman" pp# 7 and 8 of the text, and 14 and 15 of the translation
(90) "Bustan al-Zarif#.#» MS p# 22
(91) ibid# pp. 22 and 27 cf# (for the topographical
information)
Shaw pp# 47 and 51-2
apposing al-DuraydX*s authority (92)* Meanwhile the military power 
of the once-sovereign Dila1 was disintegrating* In 1660, at thB end of 
a duel with al-Khadir Ghaylan for the mutual definition of rural 
territory, Dila*X forces had been dramatically worsted* A Fasi note 
that from this point the power of Dila1 was tottering (93) has 
European corroboration: a renegade Spaniard who took part in the 
major battle reported to the "gentleman" of Howard*s entourage that, 
after this battle, there had been mass defection towards Ghaylan by 
former subjects of the Dila*X "Santo" (94)* Over the years 1662—3, 
Dila*X efforts to have al-DuraydX ejected from Fas al—DadXd werB made 
in the shadow of this defeat, and against a backdrop of severe 
famine* When, in 1663, Muhammad Ibn al-SharXf descended upon the 
environs of Fes as a marauder, leading his hungry FXlalX following 
in a raid upon gayayna territory, Dila* refused the FasX 
military aid* It was an Hasanid sharXf from Tafilelt, resident 
within Fes, who led the civic expedition which expelled his "kinsman", 
the one-time sultan, from thB city*s environs (95)* Subsequently, 
in the autumn of 1663, Muhammad al-Hajj ventured as far as Azrou, 
half-way from Dila* to Fes* Circumspectly the city*s religious 
leaders entered into negotiations with him* 6ut, once he and thBy had
(92) Chronicle of Sacdya ibn Danan * Text no* XXI ed#/tr* Vaida 
in "Un recueil de textes historiques judeo-marocaines" in 
"Hesperia" Vol* XXXV (Paris, 1948) p. 357 cf*
"Nuzhat al-HadX***" ed*/tr* Houdas p* 303j3f the text and 501 of 
the translation cf* "Nashr al-Mathani***" ed*/tr* Michaux-
Bellaire A.M* Vol* XXIV p* 106
(93) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above* p* 107
(94) S*L* p* 22 This European account of the battle has a different
chronology from that of the "Nashr al-Mathanl***". but 
its close alignment with the latter in topography makes it clear 
that the same encounter is under discussion* The context of events 
into which the indigenous dating is set, gives it the greater 
reliability*
(95) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above* p* 144 cf*
"Turiuman" p* 6 of the text and 13 of the translation*
returned to home territory, their oath to him was broken (96)#
During the following summer of 1664, the military renown of 
al-RashXd escalated dramatically* Muhammad ibn al-SharXf, presumably 
alarmed at his brother*s expansionist moves, took an army up to meet 
that brother upon the Angad plain (97)* Al-RashXd was the victor* He 
is said to have scooped up his elder brother's following (98)* 
Delicate-minded indigenous authors insist that Muhammad was neatly 
eliminated during the fighting* Al-IfranX would have him felled by 
the battle,s first shot (99). But earlier European reporters suggest 
that there was fratricide after the encounter (100)*
Fes took acute alarm* The encounter on the Angad plain precipitated 
a marshalling of the defences of the city, and of its immediate 
environs* Citizens were ordered to purchase guns and horses* And, in 
a meeting with representatives of surrounding rural groupings, a common
(96) "Bustan al-Zarlf***" MS p. 22 Both the Michaux-Bellaire
translation of the "Nashr al- 
MathanX***"_(A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 158) and the Houdas edition of 
the "TurIuman" (p* 7 of the text and 14 of the translation), 
seem to give garbled accounts of this incident* The manuscript 
version reads:
"balacha muhammad al hall azru* wa nazala bihi* wa tawa.i laha lihi 
ah1-fas* wa culama*uhim wa shurafa*uhum* wa bavacunm» wa. r&lafu 
wa baaa hunalika ft la fasi al-shita** wa raiaCa* thuroma halafa
«. " " c ""  ... ""■-""'V ■....  1 •
ahl-fas ma a al-duravdX"
("Muhammad al-Hajj reached Azrou and pitched his camp there* The 
people of Fes together with their culama* and shurafa* went out 
to him, swore an oath of allegiance to him and returned home* He 
remained there until the rains broke, then returned home himself#
Thereupon the people of Fes went into alliance with al-DuraydX")
(97) "Nashr al-MathanX* * *" Volume cited above p* 164 cf#
"TurlumSn" pp* 7 of the text and 14-15 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-garlf**." MS p* 22
(98) "Nuzhat al-Hadi».." ed#/tr* Houdas p* 302 of the text.and 500
* of the translation
(99) ibid* loc* cit*
(100) S*L* p* 28 cf* S.P* 71(13) f* 121 Memo* of Captain Fitzcerald
dated Sale, 8/11/1664 
MouBtte*s more extreme suggestion ("Histoire* . p .  23) that 
Muhammad was pursued as far as Tafilelt before his death, seems 
contradicted by these earlier accounts*
decision was taken that a stand should be made against al-Rashid 
(101 )• But there was to be no attack upon the metropolis ae yet*
Instead, al-Rashid moved into Tafilelt, where he spent nine months 
in establishing his suzerainty, ousting his nephews, the sons of 
Muhammad, and gaining the allegiance of Shurafa* from its patch­
work of ausur (102)* As an historian of the dynasty, al-Zayyani 
was at a loss to account for this deviation from the straight road 
to Fes, except in terms of an arcane strategy or "caql" (103)*
It could indeed be argued that, by adding Filali to "Chergi" power, 
al-Rashid was developing the capacity to impose a pincer threat 
upon Fee* But al-Rashid's moves over the period 1664-6 seem better 
understood in terms of escalating opportunism than of all- 
encompassing strategy* And there is no evidence that Filali power
C 7was of particular significance to the Alawr raider's ultimate 
capture of the metropolis*
In the spring of 1665, al-Rashid made a move in the direction 
of Fes, by establishing a military base at Taza* The Fasi militia, 
together with Hayayna levies, went out to challenge him, to their 
own disgrace* They did not join battle, but were pursued in disorder 
as far as the Sebu river (104)* However, a subsequent skirmish outside 
the walls of Fes was inconclusive (105)* So, presumably with the
(1Q1) "Nashr a1-Mathanl.*W" ed*/tr* Miohaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 164 
"TurIuman" p* 8 of the text and 15 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-garlf..." MS p* 24
(102) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above* loc* cit. cf*
MouBtte: "Histoire.**" p* 23
(103) "fa-balaoha al—rashld amruhum* acrada canhum li-kamal saolihi* wa
»  —  * 
tawaiiaha min taza li-aiiilmasa
("News of their doings (i*e* the Fasi defence preparations) reached 
al-Rashid* With an absolute cunning he turned his back upon them, 
and set off from Taza towards Sijilroasa*") "Turiuman" p£ 8
(104) "Nashr al-Mathani***" VolumB cited above* pp* 164-5 cf*
"Turiuman" p* 8 of the text and 16 of the translation*
(105) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume^citsd above* p* 177 cf*
"furiuman" loc* cit*
aim of maintaining his following in rewarding employment, al-Rashid
turned to his old activity of rural raiding* The chosen sphere was
the Middle Rif, the hinterland of Alhucemas, and of the little
Spanish presidio of Penan de Velez* This was a zenatlva-speakino
area, and a region of sedentary agriculture and Mediterranean
trade (1G6) that had economic links with Taza (1G7)* The area had
certain parallels with Snassen country* And here al-Rashid seems
to have conducted something of a replay of the pattern of events 
«■ IK *■associated with Dar ibn Mash-al* From two garbled European accounts 
it seems possible to gather that al-Rashid allied with local enemies 
of the major regional clan, the A ras; that he picked a personal 
quarrel with the shavkh of this clanf and that he captured both 
Alhucemas and the shavkh*s own personal fortress and treasure (108)*
The Acras were driven en masse into exile in the oresidio (109)*
One justification for the attack may have been the very existence 
of friendly relations between the Acras and the presidios a
c
possible parallel to the earlier association between Dar ibn Mash al 
and Oewry* From around this time, al-Rashid is known to have laid 
a veto upon the formerly free and open Muslim provisioning of the 
Christian enclaves at the edge of his sphere of influence*
Skirmishing replaced trade (110)* The veto added to al-Rashid, the 
bandit muaaddam* a touch of the mulahid * It also inaugurated, in 
embryo, the standard early cAlawI policy of forbidding a trade with 
Christendom in provisions, and particularly in grain*(111)♦
(106) S.I. 2e France Vol* I* No* XXIX p« 84 Memo* of Admiral Trubert.
from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/1l/l664
(107) Fre.lus p* 183
(108) Frelus pp* 12S-8 cf* MouBtte$ "Histoire" pp* 23-4 and 27-8
(109) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p* 23
(110) Freius p* 129
(111) Pidou de St* Olon tfcr* Motteux pp* 21 and 76 cf* Uindus p* 2Q7
However, religious scruples did not veto the negotiations which
led to al-Rashid*s entry into Fes^the next year* MouBtte *.s record of crucial
dealings between the Jewish communities of Taza and Fes (112) prefaces
information aligning with Arabic and with Jewish material# All three
agree that al-Rashid*s entry into Fes* in June 1666, was made
secretly, at night, by way cf the Jewry (113)# Al-Zayyani was
sufficiently embarrassed by this record to refer to the millah or
«
Jewry concerned, as an anodyne piece of nowhere: the “millah-al-
*
muslimin" or "Jewry-of-the-Muslims" (114)# But the chronicle of
Q M
Sa dya ibn Danan, supported by MouBtte, counters this muffling with
notes upon the specific plight of the Fasi millah in 1666# The Jewry,
sited between Fas al-Bali and Fas al-Jadld, had suffered particularly 
from the disorder which had followed al-Duraydi's coup# Caught in the 
cross-fire between Fas al-Jadld and the Qarawiyyin quarter of the 
old city, the millah had had its traffic with the two subjected 
alternately to pillage and to total interruption# The Jewish 
community had known hunger and emigration, punctuated by demands from 
al-OuraydT, the "persecutor", for heavy contributions (115)# Muhammad 
al-Hajj al-Oila*i was no attractive alternative as master of the city* 
ttfe is said once to have ordered his governor of Fes to destroy synagoguest-
(116)# But the newcomer al-Rashid promised the Jewish community peace#
He kept his word# His days would be remembered within the Fasi millah
(112) MouBttes "Histoire#**" p# 24
(113) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p# 25 cf* Chronicle of Sa°dya ibn Danan
ed#/tr# Vaida fext* No* XXI (Part II) in "Un rocueil de textes#.#"
in "Hespfiris" Vol* XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p* 139 cf.
"Nashr al-Mathani***" ed#/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A#M* Vol# XXIV p# 177
(114) "TurIuman" p# 8 of the text and 17 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al*4terlf**." MS p# 24
(115) Chronicle of Sa°dya ibn Danan ed#/tr# Vaida Text No* XXI (Part I) 
from "Un recueil de textes##*" in "HespBris" Vol# XXXV (Paris,
1948) pp# 357-8 cf# MouBtte: "Histoire***" p# 25
(116) Chronicle of Sacdya ibn Danan loc* cit#
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as an age in which "the lord restored his people Israel1* (117J0
A quaint legend came to allow for the annual election of a 11 Lord 
of Misrule" by students of the Qarawiyyin university. This legend, a
^ Q
late and extreme piece from the Oar ibn Mash al corpus, told how 
al-Rashid took the "house1* of the 3ew "ibn F!ashcal" with the aid of 
the tullab of Fes (118)* The actuality of al-Rashid1s capture of Fes 
with the aid of its Jews, provides a striking inversion of this 
legend*
Following entry by way of the CJewry wall, in the company of a
small assault force (119), al-Rashid was able, militarily speaking,
to become master of Fes within two days* He took first the "new" and
then the "old” city* Al-DuraydT and the two citizen leaders
representing the Qarawiyyin and Andalua communities of Fas al-Bali
all fled, but were variously recaptured and put to death within the
fortnight (120)* But oapture of the city cannot be equated with
c
acknowledgement as its sultan* For such acknowledgement, a bay a
cwas necessary* A civic bay a was a formal declaration of allegiance, 
signed by citizens of known standing and intellectual worth* °nce 
a dynasty was established, a bay a would automatically be drawn up
on behalf of a dynastic claimant to power who could pull local
political weight* But when the Maghrib al-Aqsa had no widely 
acknowledged dynasty, the grant of a bavca was not a "douceur" 
automatically granted to the nearest man capable of exercising
(117) Chronicle of SaCdya ibn Danan ed*/tr* Vaida Text no* XXI
(Part II) from "Un recueil de textes***" in "Hesperia" Vol* XXXVI
(Paris, 1949) p. 139
(118) See P* de Cenivals "La legende du 3uif ibn MBchCal et la fete du
Sultan des Tolba a Fes" in "HesgSris" Vol. V* (Paris, 1925)
pp* 137-210
(119) MouBttes "Histoire*..11 p. 25
(120) "Nashr al-Mathani***" ed./tr* Michaux-Ballaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p. 177
cf* "Tur.iuman" p* 9 of the text and 17 of the translation*
military power around Fes# Muhammad al-Hajj of Dila*, a murabit 
whose authority was, in its best days, wielded with sufficient 
grace and geographical extension for his partisans to think of him 
as "possessor'1 of the Maghrib (121), seems to have been granted the 
Fasi oath of allegiance. But al-Duraydl, a petty military dictator 
with only localised power, seems not to have received the honour;
"hilf", or "confederation" had beBn considered the apposite term 
for moments of truce between the religious leaders of Fas al-Bali, 
and this particular master of Fas al-Oadid (122).
It seems clear that the city fathers were not at first disposed 
towards an extension of the bavca to al-Rashid. Eighteenth century 
tradition was driven to exonerate shurafa1 and funaha* for their 
lack of initial support for the invader. The claim arose that, at 
the time of al-RashIdfs entry into Fes, these eminent citizens, 
although staunch partisans of the intruder, were all incapable of 
acting on his behalf, as they were prisoners in al-DuraydI*s house (123). 
This earnest and transparent piece of folklore does not account for 
the delay of three months which intervened between al—Rashid*s 
capture of Fes, and the formal reading out in his presence of the bay a 
by which citizens proclaimed him sultan (124). However, the delay 
is understandable# For two years, since the victory of the Angad plain, 
al-Rashid had been regarded as a threat to Fes: a brigand, with a mass
(121) "wa kana ra*is muhammad al-hall malaka al-maghrib.*." ("And the
*  mm *  —  —
chieftain Muhammad al-Hajj had possessed the Maghrib...") al-Yusi:
"A1-Muhadarat" quoted al-Zayyani: "Tur.Iuman" p. 9 of the text and 19
• of the translation*
(122) See P* 68 (Note (96)) for a juxtaposition of two relevant verbs:
baya.°€t and halafa.
(123) "Nashr al-Mathani***" ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV
pp# 178-9 Here the author is citing traditions current in his 
own day among the Fasi intelligentsia#
(124) According to "a1-Fasi chronicle" material, the date of al-Rashid*s 
entry into Fes was 3/Dhu *1-Hi j j a/10766/6/1666. The date of the
formal reading of^the bay°a was 18/RabiC 1/1077 = 18/9/1666.
("Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above, pp. 177 and 185)
following of rural "easterners", his shoraoa • Now he had taken the 
city by stealth, with the aid of its socially degraded Jewish 
community* Against this, apart from the factor of brute military 
power, there stood only al-Rashid*s claim to "sharifian" birth* This, 
since the days of Sacdi power, may have been commonly regarded as 
essential to the status of a sultan. Al-Rashid could and did exploit 
the advantage of his birth, in accordance with this doctrine (125)*
But "sharlfian" birth was hardly unusual*
Al-Rashid, however, combined this birth with pragmatic military 
ascendancy* And, in the three months following his capture of Fes, 
the conqueror was able to consolidate the rural basis to this 
ascendancy* He secured his connections with two populous regions 
where he had been a successful raider, by entering into marriage 
alliances* Al-Lawatl of the Snassen was established in Fes as
m m  *  Q  *
al-Rashid a father-in-law, with his own palace, and a guard of abid 
(126)* The father-in-law developed a further, somewhat stylised role, 
that of "good genius" with a recognised licence to plead with al- 
Rashid for the lives of others1*-' Selectivity within one of these pleas, 
which obtained mercy for a number of Christian nonentities, but sent 
a former captain-general of Melilla to his death (127), seems to 
indicate that al-Lawatl maintained his ties with Snassen country, which 
was within easy reach of Melilla* Parallel to the Snassen link was al- 
Rashid* s developed association with the Middle Rif# Hare al-Rashid 
adopted a policy of rapprochement with the A°ras* The clan was
(125) n*V*and that he might oblige the PeoplB to a greater obedience,
and more fidelity, he hath given out that he is of the Race of
their Prophet Mahomet, and that according to that Law none ought
to command in Chief, but one lineally descended from Mahomet*"
(S.L. p. 28)
(126) MouBtte: "Histoire**." pp* 26-7
(127) MouBtte: "Relation***" p. 56
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restored to its Middle Rif influencet and one of its daughters, whom
al-Rashid had first taken to wife in the dealings of the previous year,
brought into Fes (128).
Al-RashXd went on to prove that, unlike his elder brother Muhammad,
the one-time ten-uieeks sultan of Fes, he could act efficaciously in the
open field. In the late summer of 1666, in an expedition mounted from
Fes, al-RashXd went out to defeat al-Khadir Ghaylan, near to that
chieftaints home-base of Alcazarquivir (129). To Fes, the victory meant
the removal of one potential menace* For Ghaylan had once, during his
tussle with Dila*, come raiding as far as the cityfs environs*(130)* It
is possible that the victory was accepted within the city as clear
validation of the potential usefulness of al-Rashid*s martial
capacities* Gn this point, understanding between al-RashXd and Fes
could have been mutual* Following the battle, the victor made no
immediate attempt to winkle the defeated Ghaylan out of his coastal
refuge in Arzilla, or to establish personal authority over the bare
regions which Ghaylan had dominated* Instead, he returned to Fes,
c
and was swiftly granted a bay a. formal acceptance as sultan (131)*
The metropolis had fully accepted the “poacher" at last* He was 
willing to turn "gamekeeper".
X1 X X X X X X X X X X XOt ft-X-X -X-XXX X X X X X' x -x x  x
(128) Frejus p* 125 and MouBttej "Hi8toirB«.«" pp. 27-8
(129) "Hashr al-MathanX*»." ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol. XXIV p* 185 
cf* "Tur.iuman" p* 9 of the text and 18 of the translation
(130) "Nashr al-MathanX.««H Volume cited above* p* 106 
(!31) ibid* p* 185
CHAPTER IX: A, SULTANATE OF FES BE COWES A, SULTANATE OF WEKNES
Al-Rashid*s government within Fes began as the token rein of an 
alliances in its “sultan” the city had a military champion rather than 
a potent sovBrsign* Subsequently relations tautened* As al-Rashid*s 
territorial reach fanned out over the Maghrib al-Aq^a until “only some 
Petty Lords of the Craggy Mountains” did "resist his Power" (l). he 
increased his scope for subordinating the knightly to the regal aspects 
of his government* But his interlock with the metropolis endured* 
Quintessentially al-Rashid was always the "sultan of Fes"* He continued 
to consult the interests of his capital, and to return therB, as to 
his home base* Never, after the bay a of 1666, did he set eyes upon 
the "Cherg" or Tafilelt*
In his first months, the new sultan secured control of Meknes (2), 
the nearest town to Fes of any independent significance (3)* He outrode 
a feeble challenge from Dila* % a Berber forcB, mounted within the 
Central Atlas for an attck upon Fes, dissolved before making any impact 
upon the city*s rural environs (4)« The hispanophone magnates of Sale 
freely acknowledged al-Rashid*s authority* To MouBtte, this was craven 
behaviour for the citizenry of a "free town" (5)* But, in its recent 
history, Sale had been noted more for turbulence than genuine political 
freedom (6)* Moreover, it was, topographically, an estuary population cluster 
with an hinterland that contained only the forest of Mamora, and an area of
(1) S.L. p. 29
(2) "Nashr al-Mathani***" ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol. XX11/ p* 185
(3) Leo ed* Ramusio f* 31
(4) "Nashr al-Mathanl***" Volume cited above, loc* cit* cf*
MouBtte! "Histoire***" pp* 30-31
(5) "*.*et Salle, qui estoit une ville libra, aima mieux implorer sa
clamence et sa soumettra a luy quB d*attendre qu*il l*allast 
visiter*" (MouBttes "Histoire***" p* 29)
(6) See the thesis of B*A* Mojuetan Chapter XII passim
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thinly populated downland (7), Therefore it was a town whose prosperity 
depended upon the seas upon privateering and upon maritime trade, and 
consequently upon the long-distance communications that were feeders 
to this trade* Al-Rashid1s defeat of Ghaylan, former master of the 
Saletin hinterland, and protector to thB town*s most recent pair of 
aaf.ldan (8), imposed upon Sale the necessity for a swift obeisance to 
the victor*
Tetuan, like Sale, was a town with a significant cosmopolitan trade* 
Like Sale, it contained an high proportion of inhabitants of "Morisco" 
descent (9)* But whereas Sale faced the ocean from a bleak strand,
Tetuan was embedded wiifc a bustling rural economy and society* The 
interweave of Tetuan with its surrounding hill-country is clearly 
apparent from Braithwaite*s Titwan! notes, particularly those which 
describe a concerted rebellion of townsmen and hill—folk against attack 
by a former governor (10)# Tetuan^ refusal of immediate capitulation 
to al-Rashid in 1666 is therefore comprehensible* But, as noted 
previously (11), Tetuan and its environs were economically important 
to Fes* Further, Martil, the port of Tetuan, carried maritime pilgrims 
from thB metropolis (12)# Therefore, as "sultan of Fes", al-RashId*s 
first task was to draw Tetuan and the route thither back into the FasI 
economic orbit#
Early in 1667, al-Rashid returned to Taza, possibly to round up
(7) Busnot p# 12
(8) S*I# 1re Pavs-Bas Vol* V* Introduction p, xxvii Note based upon an
unpublished Dutch record,
(9) Sees 3*D* Lathams "The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuans the 
period of Andalusian Immigration" in "Arabic and Islamic Studies in 
Honour of Hamilton Gibb" ed# G* Makdisi (Leiden, 1965) pp# 387-400
(10) Braithwaits pp* 9-10 and 110
(11) See Chapter I pp. 50 and 53
(12) S*I* 1rs France Vol* III No# CXXIX "Lettre escrite en reoonse de 
diverses questions curieuses sur les Parties de l^ffrioue ou rlone 
auToife~*huv Muley Arxid* rov deTafllets" (Paris* 1670)* Herein 
reproduced and edited as "Relation de Thomas la Gendre***" p. 712
a rural following from the Riddle Rif, aliens to the so-called "DabalX" 
domiciled to their west* After a spring return to Fes, he departed 
for the Western Rif, on what was effectively a Fas! errand* first 
attacked the Banu Zarwal, the "OabalX" grouping who, during the previous 
decade, had been the object of independent EasX punitive action* The 
local chieftain was sent back a prisoner to Fes (13)* Two months 
later came al-RashXd*s capture of the town of Tetuan, and the arrest 
of leading members of its dominant clan, the NaqsXs (14)* A campaign 
which seems to have taken place in the Taza region (15), and was 
perhaps ancillary to the demobilisation of a rural following, rounded 
off the military year*
Thus far, the new sultan had simply set his talents as a muoaddam 
to employment within thB Fasi economic orbit, to the benefit of the 
city as well as himself* His expedition of 1668 against Dila* was 
politically a more sophisticated scheme* Fes had indeed shrugged off 
the DilatX administrative yoke* But the eighteenth century nostalgia 
of thB Fasi author of the "Nashr al-RathanX***"« previously referred to 
(16), is clear indication that the zawiva of Dila* long retained a 
lingering religious prestige within Fes* Elimination of Dila* therefore 
set al-RashXd the hair-line task of crushing a centre of political power, 
while avoiding the manufacture of martyrs. Adroitly, the sultan 
evaded the slur of impiety by nominating, as city governor for the 
period of the campaign, a civic religious leader who epitomised an
(13) "Nashr al-RathanX..." ed./tr* Richaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185 
cf. RouBttei "Histoire***" pp* 31-2
(14) "Nashr al-RathanX*.»" loo* cit* cf. "Turluman" p. 9 of the text
and 18 of the translation.
(15) Hare the "Turiuman" in its Houdas edition (loc* cit*) contains what 
appears to be a misreading, indicating, most improbably, a campaign 
against the Snassen (Banu Yisnasin). A parallel passage within the 
"Bustan al-Zarif.««" (RS p. 24) reads "Banu Yisnaga", and may thus 
refer to rural groupings of "Sanhaja", domiciled between Taza and 
the Riddle Rif proper.
(16) See Prologue P* 25
urbane fusion of fiah and wirds Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Fasi, a faaih
from the city’s own most noted religious community, the OazulX zawiya
of the al-FasI (17)* This institution was affiliated to the same
tarXaa as was Dila* itself. But, as Gellner has recently pointed out,
•
an urban setting gives to a religious fraternity functions and 
overtones quite alien from those pertaining within a rural setting (18), 
even today, when no zawiva is an independent political power* In 1668, 
after the political tensions of the previous two decades, members of the 
zawivat al—Fasi may well have looked upon Dila* with more rivalry than 
brotherhood*
According to RouBtte’s informant, the Dila’X following within the 
Central Atlas had, since al-Rashid*a accession, been divided to the 
point of incapacitation (19), But something of a Dila’i force was 
gathered to oppose al-Rashid*s approaching army, only to be defeated 
in the Tadla in the Oune of 1668, Subsequently, the Dila’X religious 
community and its immediate dependents, including its Clews, were 
evacuated from the zawiva buildings, and escorted with a studied 
chivalry, into Fes (20), The buildings were then razed to the ground*
A succession of embarrassed authors, reporting this event, took refuge 
in a respect for both victor and vanquished (21), The prevailing tone
(17) "Nashr al-RathanX*W  ed,/tr, Richaux-Bellaire A*R, Vol* XXIV p. 191 
cf* ''TurjumSn" p. 9 of the text and 19 of the translation*
Further information bpon the al-FasI clan, together with a relevant 
family tree, is to be found within E. Levi-Provencal’s "Les Historiens 
dBS Chorfa" pp. 240-247 S
(18) E* Gellnert "Saints of the Atlas" London, 1969 p* 8
(19) RouBtte;"Histoire*.*" pp* 30-31
(20) "Nashr al-Rathani**." Volume cited above* p* 200 cf*
"Tur.iuman" PP* 9-1.0 of the text and 19-20 of the translation cf*
Chronicle of Sa dya ibn Danan ed,/tr, Va.ida Text* no. XXI (Part II) 
from "Un recueil de textes,.*" in "Hesperia" Vol. XXXVI pp. 139-40
(21) Two eloquent proponents of this generous viewpoint were al-QadirTj in his 
"Nashr al-Rathani** * *" (Volume cited above* pV 200) and al—NasirX 
("KitSb al-Istiasa.**" Casablanca text, Vol, VII pp, 36-8 cf, *
Fumev translation, A*R* Vol. IX pp* 49-51)
A chivalrous exchange emanating from this literary theme is quoted
by the contemporary Roroccan scholar Lakhdar *. It epitomises regret
that an imperfect world had^thrust al-Rashid and the Dila’i into 
mutual enmity ("La vie litteraire.**" p* 50 )
was set by a re-iterated quotation from the "Mphadarat" of the
• •
shavkh al—YusX, the Maghrib al-Aqsa's most famous seventeenth century 
man of letters (22)*' He was resident in the zawiva at the time of Its 
fall, and later wrote of the event in terms that had less to do with 
Central Atlas politics, than with setting up his master Muhammad al- 
Hajj as an Islamic type of the philosopher kings an old man calming 
his anguished kinsmen with his understanding that God had decreed the 
end of their era (23)*
This literary set-piece has drawn attention away from the 
pragmatic consequences of the fall of Dila1* Among these was a hasty 
scattering by al—Rashid*s other political opponents* Al—Khsdir Ghaylan, 
who had been skulking in Arzilla, took to the sea and retreated first 
to English Tangier (24) and then to Algiers (25)* Muhammad ibn Muhammad 
al—SharXf, most prominent of the sultan's truculent nephews, withdrew 
from Tafilelt, apparently into the hills to its north (26)* During
the following months it was possible for al-Rashid to send a qa'id
out beyond Tafilelt to Tuat (27)* And, still upon his crest of prestige, 
it was possible for the sultan, in the February of 1669, to exile the 
Dila'i to Tlemsen (28)* Clearly his absentee hold over the "Cherg" was 
sufficiently sure for him to trust that this holy family would be 
incapable of becoming a focus for "Chargi" disaffection*
(22) For further information upon al-YusX, see Levi-Provsncalt "Les 
Historians des Chorfa***" pp* 269-72 cf* 3* Berques
f>Al-Yousi: problemes de la culture marocaine au XVII siecle"
(Paris, 1958)
(23) al-Yusi quoted al-Qadirl8 "Nashr al-Mathanl***w ed*/tr* Michaux- 
Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 200 cf* al-ZayyanX: "Bustan al-Zarif*** 
MS p* 25 inter alia* *
(24) Rouths "Tangier***11 pp* 94-6
(25) "Nashr al-MathanX* * *11 Volume cited above* p. 201 cf* Routh p* 96
(26) "Nashr al-MathanX***" loc* cit* cf* MoutSttej "Histoire**.11 p, 48
(27) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p« 60
(28) "Nashr al-MathanX***" loc* cit* of* "Turiuman" p* 10 of the text
and 20 of the translation*
No Fasi source is so indelicate as to associate booty with the 
fall of Dila*. But the extirpation of the great zawiya was followed 
by a period during which silver was readily available within Fes.
The metal was usBd to the mutual advantage of city and sultan.
Al-Rashid borrowed fifty-two quintals of silver from Fasi merchants, 
as capital to finance the reconstruction of the Sebu bridge, which 
lay on the main route between Fes and Tetuan (29). And, in the May 
of 1669, there was minted a new silver currency, the Rashidiya muzuna 
(30). Its circulation seems to have put an end to the currency crises 
which had marked the previous decade.
Along with financial stability came stronger government* The sultan's 
next major military expedition was his bid for Marrakesh. In his 
absence, Fes would have, instead of a prominent civic faaih. an 
CAlawi khalifa as governor. This khalifa, first of a pair of recognised 
and parallel lieutenants established by al-Rashid, is virtually certain 
to have been Isma il, the future sultan, and a prince known to the 
English of Tangier as "the king’s onely brother,,," (31)* Ismacil was 
by no means al-Rashid*s only brother by blood. MouStte listed eight such
brothers sufficiently prominent to be known to him by name (32). Further,
disparity In age makes full-brotherhood unlikely. In 1669, al-Rashid
(29) "Nashr al-MathanX*.." ed*/tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201
cf. "Tur iuman" p, 11 of the text and 21 of the translation.
During 1669, an English Tetuan merchant noted that construction 
work for a bridge was actively underway, commanding the labour of
masons and horses from towns in northern Morocco. (S.P. 71 (13)
f. 196 Memo, of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669)
(30) "Nashr al-Mathani..." loc* cit. cf. "TurIuman" loc* cit.
The Rashldfya coinage was still a prominent currency in Tuat,
in the early twentieth century (Martin: "Quatre siecles..." pp. 13-14)
(31) S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo, of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669
(32) Mou&tte: "Histoire..." pp. 14-15
was approaching forty (33)f while Isma il was in his early twenties
(34). Ismacil roust be seen as an “only brother*’ by designation, a 
distinguished cadet, singled out from a plethora of agnatic kinsmen 
because he was able and also young enough to be believed dependable*
He had already been granted MBknes as a personal appanage (35)* This 
in itself may have been a distinction* In Leo*s day, Meknes had been 
granted to a favourite brother of the reigning Wattasid sultan (36)* 
The extension of al-Rashid*s authority over Marrakesh and its 
Hauiz is an enterprise which indigenous authors slide into the months 
immediately following the fall of Dila* (37)* The event indeed poses 
an acute problem of chronology* But it seems most likely to have taken 
up the summer and autumn of 1669 (38),
C M
It has been noted that, with the withering of Sa di government, 
Marrakesh had fallen to the domination of thB Shabbanat (39): an Hawz 
people of remarkable warrior panache , who had been bound to Sacdi 
sultans by a series of marriage alliances spanning the period between
(33) MouBtte: “Histoire*«.“ p* 58 for the note that al-Rashid was in his
fortieth year when he died*
(34) al-Ifranl: “Zill al-warif***“ p* 32 for the note that Ismacil was
• born in 1056 e 1646-7
(35) MouBtte: “Histoire***“ p* 28
(36) Leo ed* Ramusio f# 31 cf** (for the identification of the prince) 
Leo ed* fjpaulard et* al* Vol* I p* 176 (Note 91)
(37) The “al-Fasi chronicle“ seems to have recorded that Marrakesh had 
fallen to al-RashXd by the beginning of September 1668^ less than 
three months after the fall of Dila* (“Nashr al-Mathani *.*“ ed«/tr# 
Michaux-Bellaire A*M. Vol* XXIV 200 cf* (for a more 
impressionistic chronology) “Turiuman" p* 10 of the text and 20 of the 
translation*)
(38) This is the chronology of MouBtte ("Histoire* * p p *  33-6) and, less 
precisely, of contemporary English evidence (S*P* 71 (13) ff* 196 
and 260-263 Memo* of R* Ffarindaill dated Tetuan, 19/8/1669 and 
Letter of Lord Howard to Charles II dated Tangier 13/11/1669 )• As 
well as conflicting with the "al-FiaX chronicle" as noted above 
(Note (37)), this chronology conflicts with the Spanish text of
S}b1 Puerto , which also dates al—Rashid*s capture of Marrakesh to 1668* 
However, the latter text is internally suspect* It associates the 
capture with negotiations said to have taken place in Fes during thB 
months of 1668 when al-Rashid was pre-occupied with Dila* (Bk* V;
Ch XXXIXj p* 595)
(39) See Chapter I Pp * 54-5
the reign of Ahmad al-Mansur and the regicide of 1659 (40). In 
al-Zayyani^ day, the Shabbanat would be classed, along with 
associated Arabic-speaking peoples, as qil‘*» supposedly the 
descendents of immigrants from the south, or "Qibla", who had 
come to serve the SaCdi rulers in a military capacity (41). But, 
in the seventeenth century, the Shabbanat had their own peculiar 
myth of origin, which may have served to heighten amongst them 
a sense of “nous autros", by setting them apart even from Arabic- 
speaking neighbours* It was claimed that their ancestors were 
European captives, brought from Spain by the Almohade , Ya,qub 
al-Mansur (42).
The Murrakushi government of Karum al-Hajj, the usurping 
Shabbanat chieftain, was variously estimated. Al-Ifrani allowed him 
a sketchy note of approval (43), but European commentators reported 
that his rule was unpopular (44). Hb died during the months before 
al-Rashid moved upon Marrakesh (45) and was briefly succeeded by 
his son Abu Bakr* Dal Puerto alleged that the death of Karum al—Hajj 
actually precipitated a Murrakushi civic invitation to the "sultan of 
Fes'1 (46). Such collusion would explain the remarkable ease with which
(40) S.I* 1re Anoleterre Vol. Ill No. XLII Extract from the anonymous 
"Traoicall life and death of Mulev Abdala Melek..." (Delft, 1633) 
p. 193 cf. "Nuzhat al-Hadi..." ed./trT Houdas pp. 257-8 of the
text, and 428 of the translation.
(41) "wa amma hs^ula*! zirara wa tl-shabbanat wa awlad iirar wa awlad mtac- - —  —  *-
fa-innahum kanu lundiva ma a muluk al-sa diva**
("As for the Zirara and the Shabbanat and thB Awlad Birar and the 
Awlad Mta , they were the military force of the Sa di kings")
* ("Bustan al-j&rXf..." MS p. 30)
(42) MouBtte: "Histoire..." pp. 39-40 cf* S.I. 2e France Vol* II
No* XXXVI Anon: "Voyage de M. le Baron de St. Amant"(Paris, 1698), 
reproduced as "Journal du Vovaoe de St* Amans" pp. 337-8
(43) "Nuzhat al-Hadl**." ed./tr* Houdas p* 287 of the text and 477 of the
translation.
(44) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 34 cf. Pel Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595
(45) "Nuzhat al-Hadi.«." loc. cit.
•" ' 1 ' — —
(46) Del Puerto loc. cit.
al-RashXd took the "red city". After conducting a casual lateral 
campaign into the "Jabal CAyyaishX" (47), a north western cheek of the 
High Atlas, the northern column was able swiftly to enter the southern 
capital and there obliterate the authority of Abu Bakr ibn Karum al- 
Hajj* This acceptance of a "sultan of Fes" within Marrakesh "sin 
correr mucha sangre" (48), could have had an economic undertow* Al- 
Ifrani associated the rule of Karum al—Hajj with a Murrakushi 
famine (49). And it is known to have been customary during the period 
far the region of Marrakesh to import grain from its north (50). During 
a period of unusual food-shortage, al-RashXd*s army could have taken 
on the guise of a relisf-column. A gaggle of merchants typically 
accompanied any haraka (51). On this occasion, such merchants, bringing 
with them the comestible spoils of a lateral raid, could well have 
been taken into Marrakesh as welcome visitors.
Lack of Murrakushi civic opposition provided al-RashXd with scope 
for a political purge which offered a sharp contrast to the gloved 
treatment he had meted out to the DilafX. Abu Bakr and a number of 
other living members of the family of Karum al-Hajj were executed. And, 
with gruesome symbolism, the body of the dead chieftain himself was
C mm \exhumed from its place within the Sa di tombs and burned (52). Hbre it
would seem that al-RashXd was exaggerating his own honour with a pageant
c — v ^
of concern for the defunct Sa di, implying that it was lese ma.ieste
(47) "Nashr al-MathanX..." ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201
(48) Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595
(49) "Nuzhat al-HadX..." ed./tr* Houdas p. 287 of the text and 477 of the
translation*
(50) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo, of J-B. Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 p. 700
(51) Chronicle of Sacdya ibn Danan ed./tr* Vaida Text no* XXI (Part II)
from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXVI p. 141
cf* al-Zarhunl of Tasaft ed. Justlnard p. 51
(52) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 35 cf* "Nuzhat al-HadX..." loc. cita
Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 596 #
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for Karum al-Hajj# a simple warlord# to have put a "sharifianH sultan 
to death*
*p /V
In its metropolitan role# Marrakesh was entrepot to a widB segment 
of the inward-facing Atlas* This made it appropriate for the conqueror 
to forge his way from the biddable "red city” into the less biddable 
mountains. In an extension of his summer campaign# al-Rashid took 
mountain fortresses (53), and seems to have been able to cross the Atlas 
into inner Sue (54)* But he was drawn back from thB Sus by northerly 
concerns* A group of his dissident kinsmen, headed by sons of his 
brother Muhammad, had infiltrated the mountains above Taza (55) at a 
season when, for this particular year# the pilgrimage caravan might be 
threatened. So al-Rashid prepared to withdraw to Fes. He appointed a 
second khalifa, a nephew, Ahmad ibn Muhriz# to be keeper of the city 
of Marrakesh*
The role of Ahmad ibn Muhriz did not exactly counter-balance the 
role of lama il within Fb s* The lad was less than twenty years of age 
(56) and his command# absolute in formality, may be interpreted as the 
installation of a figurehead to cAlawi forces* Although established 
"pour califfe ou uice-roy du royaume, avec une authorite absolue" he 
had ”pres de luy des capitaines experimentez" (57)* Associated with 
elevation to office was the khal?fa,s marriage with Lalla Maryam, a 
SacdX princess (58)* The alliance may have been designed to epitomise
(53) S.P* 71 (13) f* 196 Memo* of Thomas Marren". * dated Tangier 3Q/8/1669
(54) MouBttes "Histoire***” p. 36 cf* S.P. 71 (13) f. 265 Lord -Howard
to Charles II* Tangier, 13/ll/l669
(55) MouBttes "Histoire***11 p* 48, as compared with the^garbled "al-Fasi 
chronicle” material reproduced in the "Nashr al-Mathani** *11 (ed*/tr* 
Michaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol. XXIV p* 209), citing the sultan’s nephews 
as the nephews of "al-Abyad”. English notes support MouBtte1© 
identification of the sultanfs enemies (S.P. 71(13) (seqohd notation) 
ff* 37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II # Tangier, 10/2/1670 N.S. 
and 24/4/1670)
(56) MouBttes "Histoire* . p p .  57-8
(57) ibid* p. 35
(56) ibid. pp* 35 and 61 cf. S.P. 71 (13) ff.260 and
263. Lord Howard to Charles II , Tangier,
13/11/1669.
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for the benefit of the MurrakushX# an cAlawi succession to Sa°di 
government of their city. At the same time# it neatly disassociated 
al-Rashid himself from any suggestion that he might need such a 
buttress to his personal authority. As Lalla Maryam was also kin 
to the Shabbanat, the marriage may also be seen as a diplomatic 
bauble tossed in the direction of the Shabbanat masses, still 
undefeated in the Hawz (59).
The winter of 1669—70 saw the flight or execution of al-Rashid*s 
enemy kinsmen from the Taza region (60). Their removal set al-Rashid 
free to make a definitive bid for the elimination of Illigh, and the 
military mastery of inner Sus# which was now the only significant 
region of the Maghrib al-Aqsa which did not see al-Rashid as its 
suzerain. To bid for the entire Sus was ambitious. In addition to a 
mountain shell# the region had its man-made defenoes:
".•Vquantite de chateaux et de villages ou les Barbaras 
sont fortifies. Ils y ont chacun deux ou trois armes# 
pour changer, en quoy ils fondent leurs richesses. Les 
Susis sont plus adroits aux armes et plus guerriers que 
tous les autres Barbaras." ^  ^
The fire-arms and associated gunpowder were largely of local 
manufacture# but could be respected by an European commentator (62)
Yet the attractions of the Sus were manifold. The region had the 
glint of riches. The "inner Sus" valley had been noted in commonplace#
from the time of Idrisi# for its canny industry (63). And comment from
the early cAlawI period vouches for SusX prosperity* The region was
(59) MouBtte: "Histoire..." pp. 37-8
(60) ibid. p. 48 cf* S.P* 71 (13) Second notation ff.
37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II. Tangier 10/2/1670 M.S. and 
27/4/1670
(61) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 198
(62) Anon: "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans..." p. 336
(63) Dozy and de Goeje: "Description de 1*Afriaue.*.." pp* 61-2 of the text
and 71-2 of the translation*
known for its mineral wealth, which included veins of the money 
metals silver and copper (64)* In food-produotion, it countered a 
degree of aridity with a rich and commercially developed sea-fishery
(65)* Most vitally, the Sus seems to have contained, at this period, 
the most significant route by which trans-Saharan gold filtered 
into the Maghrib al-Aqsa* This point is open to question (66)* Contemporary 
European reporters from the early cAlawT period tend to give remote- 
hand accounts of Moroccan "Guinea" trade, which lack attention to 
precise detail (67)* But there are notes which suggest that, over 
northerly reaches, the predominant trans-Saharan route in employment 
was aimed at the Sus, and swung even further to the west than did Daudar 
Pasha,s Lektaoua road to Timbuktu (68)* cAli Abu Hassun, ,j2d£abit of
m
Illigh for over thirty years (69), is said to have enjoyed the profits 
of a periodic caravan trade with Timbuktu (70)* In his prime he had 
been described, presumably with geographical grandiloquence, ass
(64) S*I* 2e Franee Vol* III No* XCIII Memo, of consul Perillie on
Moroccan trade, Sale, 3an# 1689 p. 234
(65) S*I* 28 France Vol* W  No* CXLIV Memo of 3*-B* EstellB. putatively
dated to October 1698 p. 703
(66) The mid-seventeenth century is a dark age for the study of trans-
Saharan traffic* It lies midway between two rich fields of study;
the classic gold-centred mediaeval period, of which the most recent 
investigation is contained within the work of V* Magalhaes-Godinho: 
"L^economie de l fempire Portuoais aux XVB et XVI6 siecles" (Paris,
1969) pp* 100-127; and the nineteenth century, which has provoked 
re-examination of the trade as a comprehensive exchange of commodities, 
work pioneered by 3*-L* Miege in "Le Maroc et LfEurope***" Vol* II 
pp* 146-545 Vol* III pp* 74-5 and 358-66} and Vol* IV pp* 381-85
(67) See, for example, the "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" pp* 706-12 
and Windus pp* 210-13
(68) See H* de Castries; "La Conquete du Soudan par el-Mansour (1591)" and
its appendix "Relation de l’Anonyme Espagnol" in "Hesperia" Vol* III
(Paris, 1923) pp* 433-478, for an analysis of the route from the 
Oar a to the Niger bend, which would seem, from comparison with Leo 
(ed. Ramusio f* 73) to^have prevailed within trans-Saharan traffic
from the Maghrib al-Aqsa, throughout the sixteenth century*
(69) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" p* 705
(70) S*I. 29 France Vol. I No* LXII Memo* of H. Prat. Marseille, 8/6/1669, 
p. 271.
"Siddy Ali of the South, who hath cutt of the golden trade 
and usurpes in Suz the province scituate between Atlas and 
thB river Senega."
It seems probable that, over this period, any Fasi bound for the 
Niger bend made use of a prevailing parabolic westerly route that 
avoided the appalling Tanezrouft, rather than travel more directly 
by way of Tafilelt and Tuat# Fasi rumour of I¥lou8tte,s day associated 
the road to the "country of the blacks", and access to its fabled 
wealth, with control of the Sus (72), rather than control of Tafilelt 
or Tuat# And, towards the end of the seventeenth century, imperial 
gold caravans are said to have proceeded towards the north of the 
empire by way of Tamanart in the coastal slopes of the High Atlas (73)* 
The extension of al-Rashidfs military authority southwards to 
cover the entire Sus may therefore be seen as an enterprise likely to 
have had Fasi backing# But the sultan seems nevertheless to have made 
the city a concession, in order to purchase its continuing support 
over the period of his absence. This probable concession was the removal 
of an imperial nuisance from the civic environs* those shcucaga, or 
"easterners", who had accompanied al-Rashid in his progress towards Fes# 
Upon the city*s northerly outskirts were laid the foundations of a 
fortress, the "Qasbat al—Khamrs"# Its name is associated with the 
sharaqa. a party of whom were supposedly detailed to build it (74)# But 
it is known that, at the time of MouBtte*s ransom, in 1680, the fortress 
remained incomplete, supposedly because of the threat to Fes which
\ rg
(71) S#I# 1 Anoleterre Vol* III No# XCIII Anon# Leconfield MS No# 
73: "A brief relation of some latter occurrents in the state and
kingdom of Morocco" dated by the editor to c# 1638 p# 468
(72) MouBtte: "Histoire..*" pp. 43, 135-7 and 197
(73) S#I, 2s France Vol. IV No. Cl Memo# of 3-B# Estelle. Sale,
29/7/1697 p. 529
(74) "Tur.iuman" p# 11 of the text and 23 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif. M S  p. 27
its commanding' position would have allowed it to impose (75)* This 
lack of completion is in line with a tradition recorded by al—Zayyani; 
that the Fasi were able to persuade al-Rashid to set his sharaQa at a 
distance from the city, and quarter them upon lands between the Sebu 
and Warga (76)# Here the shoraoa could present no immediate threat 
to Fes, or to its suburban stipple of orchards and vegetable plots (77); 
but, as a 11 iavsh". or grouping distinguished for land-tenure by 
military service, they could act to Fasi advantage, as a rough­
handed "government presence" near to a section of the route from Fes 
to Tetuan* A clue to the date of the displacement is an incident 
from 1670: the public execution within Fes of a party of highway 
robbers from the Awlad 3amaca (78), a grouping from the rural region 
to which al-RashXd*B sho-racia were allegedly dismissed* Their arrest 
could have been symptomatic of the activity of newly settled sharaoa*
aw
Isma il, the khalifa of Fes may thus have been deprived of a 
close-settled horde of cAlawI supporters* But he was granted a 
fillip to his personal status. In the April of 1670, apparently as 
a preliminary to the coming campaign, the sultan arranged for his 
brother a marriage, celebrated with sufficient splendour to receive 
notice within"al-Fasi chronicle"(79)* The alliance seems likely to 
have been politically significant, designed to balance the favour
(75) "Hors la ville, dans un liep appele le Commice, est un chateau
quo Mouley Archy avoit commence, et qui est demeure imparfait,
pour le prejuduce qu*il apporteroit si ceux qui auroient este
dedans s*y fussent soulevez, a cause qu*il est sur un lieu 
eminent et commands la ville, qui est dans une plaine"
(Mouette: "Histoire***" p„ 188)
(76) "Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p. 27
*
(77) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p. 183 cf. R# le Tourneau: "Fes avant le
Protectorat" pp* 483-7
(78*) "Nashr al-Mathani**." ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 211 
cf* "Tur iuman" p« 11 of the text and 22 of the translation
(79) "Nashr al-Mathani*.*" Volume cited above* p* 209 cf*
"Tur iuman" p. 21 of th§ text and 11 of the translation
previously granted to Ahmad ibn Muhriz* But there seems no justification 
for al-NasirX*s allegation that Ismail’s bride was, like the bride of 
his fellow-khalXfa , a woman of Sa°dX birth (80)* It is possible that 
she was the "princesse de Touet", whom MouBtte alleged had been married 
to Ismacil in 1666, as a preliminary to an earlier campaign (81)* For, 
in 1666, al-RashXd is unlikely to have been in contact with Tuat, then 
granting temporary shelter to his exiled nephew Muhammad ibn Muhammad*
But by 1670, his da1id al-Nasir is known to have laid claim to the 
region (82)* This marriage may have cemented the claim*
But, for 1670, any Tawati link was overshadowed by the Susi venture, 
Al«RashXd*s High Atlas victories of the previous year were enough to give 
even the Shabbanat the hope of rich Susi pickings to come* When al-RashId*s 
southbound army reached Marrakesh, Shabbanat warriors abandoned their 
skirmishes with the forces of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, and rallied to the 
sultan of the "Gharb“ (83)* This may have amounted to al-RashXd1s 
re-inforcement by several thousand cavalrymen (84)* The Shabbanat were 
followed by a mass of Haha peoples who flooded to al-Rashid*s haraka
m
as it took the coastal route southwards. They were joining a general 
with an unbroken record of victory who no longer needed formally to 
ally himself with rural hordes: all offers of matrimonial connections 
were refused O s).
The Susi campaign was no total pacification of the "Chleuh" heart-
(80) "Kitab al-Istiosa***" Casablanca text, Vol* VII p* 30 cf. Fumev
translation, AjM* Vol* IX p* 53
(81) MouBtte: "Histoire***11 p* 28
(82) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp, 59 and 60-61
(83) MouBtte: "Histoire**.11 pp* 40-41
(84) Both MouBtte and an anonymous English commentator casually but
Independently put the fighting strength of the Shabbanat, within their 
"Hawz" home-country, at six thousand ("Histoire***" p, 67 of,
S*P* 71 (14) f* 259 Anonymous Memo* dated Sale, 1/5/1673)
(85) "Tous les checqs des Arabes***le vinrent trouver avec plusieurs
presens et lui amenebent plusieurs de leurs filles..*Mouley Archy*** 
refusa les filles qui lui avoient este presentees, et, sans les 
voir* les charges de presens et I b s  remit entre les mains de leurs
peres" (Mouette: "Histoire***" p* 41)
land. But it involved the elimination of Illigh as a node of political 
power. The reigning murabit , Muhammad ibn cAlX Abu Hassun , was brought 
into confrontation with al-Rashid at the end of a decade during which 
Illigh had been at the eye of complex internecine rivalry (86). In 
1670, his divided clan definitively lost to al-Rashid the control of 
major Susi economic centres, including Tarudant (B7), ThB murabit 
himsejf fled southwards from Illigh* Allegedly he went towards an allied 
"kingdom of the Sudan" (88). By this kingdom, contemporaries presumably 
meant Bambara Segu* Despite rumours to the contrary, echoes perhaps of 
the trans-Saharan expeditions of the reign of A^mad al-Mansur, it seems 
highly unlikely that al-Rashid pursued his enemy southwards across the 
desert, or came into personal confrontation with the forces of Segu (89)* 
For, over the winter of 1670-71, the sultan is known to have been back 
within the "Gharb" (90), In his train came the Shabbanat who, together
Q  M ,
with abid or black slave soldiers, were the troops most closely 
associated with al-Rashid’s two last years (91)•
Fes may thu3 have engineered the removal of one alien body of 
troops, only to be irked by the proximity of the equally alien 
Shabbanat. And by this date, the sultan’s line of victories may be
(86) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre” p, 705
(87) MouBttes "Histoire**." pp. 36 and 41-2 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani**." 
ed./tr.^Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp* 210-11 cf.
"Tur.iuman" p* 11 of the text and 22 of the translation*
(88) MouBttes "Histoire*.." p* 43
(89) This rumour, apparently an eddy within an European tradition of 
writing headed by MouBtte, was still current, with flamboyant
ramifications, in the days when Oames Grey Backson was consul In Mogador, 
more than a century after the supposed event ("An account of the Empire
of Morocco" London, 1809 p* 295 and footnote to pp. 295-6). ThB
developed tale, with its unconvincing suggestion of a counter-invasion 
of the Sus from Segu, was taken up by M. Delafosse and set into "Haut* 
Seneaal-Niqer" (Tome I) (Paris, 1912 pp. 247-8) and into the same author’s 
"Les debuts des troupes noires au Maroc" in "Hesperis" Vol* III (Paris,
1923 pp. 1-11)
(90) MouBtte: "Relation**." p. 57 cf, "Tur.iuman" p. 11 of the text and
22 of the translation*
(91) MouBttes "Histoire..." pp, 44,- 48 and 67
92,
thought to have sat him above the challenge of a queruluous citizenry 
as to his personal following* Echoes of' al-Rashid’s heightened power 
around the metropolis in the aftermath of the 1670 Susi campaign are 
to be found in MouBtte*s allegation of the sultan*s latter-day bullying 
of citizens (92)* But there were concurrent compensations for Fes*
Much of the profit of the SusX campaign seems to have been ploughed 
back into the metropolis* A Fasi building programme gives some 
indication of the scale of these profits* Into this programme there 
was set the most impressive of grace-notes to relations between sultan 
and city: the , allegedly "le plus magnifique"
(93) of any such institution in Fes* A library was added to the 
southern face of the Qarawiyyin (94)* And a new palace was built in 
Fas al-Oadid, for al—Rashid himself (95)* Its associated economy would 
have been tied firmly to the metropolis.
The sultan could now afford luxuries outside the range of finance*
Such were certain niceties of prestige appropriate to a Muslim ruler: 
a local pilgrimage for himself, and the despatch of a mu.iahid cavalry 
force to harass English Tangier (96)* These moves aligned with 
ordinances designed to enforce public morality (97)* All, together 
with the building programme, filled out al-Rashid’s governmental image* 
Further, the once tirelesp military champion made a bid towards becoming
C M
a palace ruler* He set a subordinate general from the A ras in command
(92) MouBtte: "Histoire * * •11 p* 45
(93) ibid* p. 185 cf. "Tur iuman" p* 11 of the text and
22 of the translation
(94) Lakhdar: 11 La vie litteraire..." p. 48* The information is taken from 
an inscription set into the relief of the library masonry*
(95) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." pp* 186-7 cf* "Tur.iuman" pp* 11. 5f the text
and 22-3 of the translation
(96) "Turiuman" pp* 11-12 of the text and 23 of the translation
cf "Bustan al-Zarlf*.." MS p* 27
(97) MouBttes "Histoire*.." p. 45
of a follow-up expedition into the Sus (98). It was probably from this 
expedition that there was despatched the token force which, in the 
September of 1671, arrived in Timbuktu to receive the formal allegiance 
of its warring "Orman" factions (99)*
In less than six years, al-Rashid had risen from the standing of a 
marauder at the gates of Fea, to that of suzerain over a vast territorial 
span* But, outside of Fes, where his government can be seen in terms of 
a rough, but on-going understanding with the citizenry, al-RashXd*s 
authority seems to have had little basis beyond the prestige that sprang 
from an accumulated chain of striking bpt lucky victories. Further, 
there was an in-built flaw to this authority* The elevation of two 
khalXfatan carried obvious risk* And, while al-Rashid hunted in the Rif, 
during the early months of 1672, he heard that Ahmad ibn Muhriz had 
gone, with Marrakesh, into open rebellion (1D0). The episode was short­
lived. The young prince was betrayed and captured while trying to make 
for Christian soil. He was sent in disgrace to Tafilelt (101). His uncle
C « «
thereby inaugurated the imperial Alawi development of Tafilelt as a 
spreading "dower house" for less favoured kinfolk (102). Marrakesh 
submitted once again to al-RashXd. Chance prevented this submission 
from being more than a passing nod* In the April of 1672, al-RashXd
died in his prime: he was unexpectedly killed in a riding accident in a
(98)"Mashr al-Mathani***" ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 221 
"Tur Iuman" p. 12 of the text and 23 of the translation,
(99) Anon* "Tadhkirat al-nisvan fi akhbar muluk al—sudan" ed./tr. 0. Houdas
and E. Benoist as "Tedzkiret en-Nisian..." (Paris, 1899 and 1901)
pp. 158 of the text and 257-8 of the translation*
(100) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." p. 54 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited
above. loc. cit*
(101) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." p* 58
(102) For this function of Tafilelt in IsmaGXl*s day, see Busnot (Chapter'.III 
passim)* Gerhardt Rohlfs described the developed Alawi percolation
of nineteenth century Filali society ("Roise durch Marokko" Bremen, 
1868, part translated by de Tonnac as "Le Tafilelt d’apres Gerhardt 
Rohlfs" in "Renseionements Coloniaux" Aug* 1910 Vol* II pp* 243-57).
Murrakushi park*
One memory of al—Rashid would be that of a sultan whose reign had
compounded the civic delights of open roads and low prices* MouBtte
passed on Fasi nostalgia to this effect (103)* The nostalgia was
probably heightened by the disorder which followed al-Rashid*s death*
The main current within this turbulence may be seen, ironically, to
have been determined by al-Rashld’s own pre—arrangement of the
political arena within his empire* This current was immediately
vitalised by the unexpected removal of its author* Succession to
al-Rashid in 1672 was bound to involve a tussle* Al-Rashid had sons
of his own (104)* But the two boys "en bas age" noted as being under
the Fasi tutelage of IsmacIl at the end of their father*s reign (105)
are likely to have been offspring of one or both of the sultan*s
cpolitically significant A ras and Snassen marriages* If adult, princes 
of such birth would have been able to attract the military support of 
akhwal or maternal "kin"# But the succession of a minor was out 
of the question* Further, al-RashId,s expulsion of rival chieftains 
from the Maghrib al—Aqsa meant that only an Alawi prince could make 
a swift bid to be sultan. And, of °Alawi candidates, only the two
mm mm — G t
khalifatan , Isma il and Ahmad ibn Muhriz* were possessed of significant 
political and military status, A third prince, al-Harran, brother to
flu l*|iQ Mat
al-Rashid and to Isma il, had shadowy ambitions. But, in 1672, he had 
only thB weak base of Tafilelt, where he had been al-RashId*s cAlawI 
governor (106)*’
The immediate succession crisis was a predictable race for acclamation
(103) ",V,ies chemins qui avoient toujours eate remplis de voleurs, furent
rendus libres. Et par ce moyen le commerce estant asseure, 
l*abondance comments a regner en tous lieux, at toutes choses 
devinrent a,.,bon marche" (MoujStte: "Histoire..." p. 45)
(104) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Mjchaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p, 338
(105) MouBtte; "Histoire..." pp, 61-2
(106) ibid* p .  28
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between Isma 3,1 and Ahmad ibn Muhriz* Isma il had the immediate advantage 
ef proximity to Fee, and the city formally acknowledged him (107)*
Ahmad ibn Muhriz, despite the support of al-Harran, and a summons 
from Tafilelt by his Murrakushi allies, was unable to organise his 
position in the south with sufficient speed to prevent Marrakesh also 
from falling to his rival (108), So, following the standard dissident,s 
pattern of retreat to a strategically placed rural region, the former 
Murrakushi khalifa withdrew to the High Atlas* There he allied with 
the shavkh of "Guilaoa". or "Glawl", who dominated the "al-Fayja" mountain 
saddle which separated the "Hawz" of Marrakesh from the Dar°a valley (109) 
Meanwhile Isma il, in Marrakesh, arranged for a symbolic move which 
implied rejection of the southern capital, and a counter—identification 
of al-Rashid’s memory both with Fes and with himself* He brought his 
brothers remains northwards, to be re-interred within the mausoleum 
of a Fasi scholar-saint, CAlI ibn Hirzihim (110)• As a "douceur" towards 
Fes, this failed* Fas al-Bali was set to negotiate the terms upon which 
it would truly accept: a successor to al-Rashid* In the late August of 
1672, the Fasi citizenry mounted a surprise attack upon a column of 
IsmaCIl*a troops, about to leave the cityfs outskirts for Tafilelt (111)* 
The city then summoned Ahmad ibn Muhriz, barely known within the north, 
to be a figurehead to its resistance (112)* The defection of the 
metropolis touched off a wider dissolution of IsmaCIl*s authority* The
(lQ7)"Nashr al-Mathani***" ed*/tr. Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 221 
of* "Tur.iuman" p* 12 of the text and 24 of the translation*
(108) MouBtte: "Histoire***" pp* 62-4
(109) ibid* p* 65
(110) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above* p. 224 cf*
"Tur.iuman" loc* cit*
(111) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p, 67 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani***" loc* cit*
(112) MouBtte: "Histoire*. p *  68 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani.**" Volume 
cited above* pp* 224-5 cf* "Tur.iuman" p* 13 of the text and
25 of the translation*
Shabbanat precipitately abandoned the new sultan, and returned, bag 
and baggage, to the Hawz , in order to lay siege to Marrakesh upon 
their own account (113)* Peoples of the Sebu valley, or "inner Gharb", 
summoned al-Khadir Ghaylan back from his exile in Algiers. In the 
November of 1672, he was ushered by the Algerine Turks towards Tetuan, 
in the company.of certain Titwani Naqsis exiles* H© was well received 
throughout his own former sphere of influence (114)*
Meanwhile, Ahmad ibn Muhriz had left the al-Fayja region, and come by 
a date route from Tafilelt to Taza, by way of Debdu (115)* He came in the 
autumn, and was accompanied by a Filali force (116) which could well have 
been a rabble of date-vendors. In Taza he received notable re-inforcements, 
sent out from Fas al-Bali (117)* Yet he did not dare to approach the 
metropolis* Meanwhile, IsmacIl was reluctant to confront the capital* He
Q  #*K
maintained a small garrison of abid in Fas al-3adid (118), but moved 
the mass of his available troops against Taza (119), leaving orders that 
the garrison should not engage in combat with the Fasi citizenry upon 
ite own initiative (120)* Civic leaders organised attacks upon the fortific­
ations surrounding the "old city". One notable sortie was led by
(113) 'V**Ven plein midy, plians leurs bagages, les mirent sur leurs
ohamsaux, avec leurs femmes et leurs enfans**.Ils furent mettre
v V +  S
le siege devant Maroc, apres avoir ruine tout lo paSs par ou 
ils passerent:*"’ (MouBtte: "Histoire***" pp* 67-8) cf*
S.P. 71 (14) ff* 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo* dated Sale,
1/5/1673)
(114) MouBttes "Histoire***" p. 69 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani*.." ed*/tr*
Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 225
(115) MouBttes "Histoire***" p* 68 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani * * *" loc* cit*
(ITS) MouBttes; "Histoire*.." loc* cit*
(117) ibid* p* 69 cf. "Relation**." p. 67
cf# 5*P* 717147 ff* 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo* dated Sale
1/5/1673
(118) MouBtte: "Histoire**." p. 70
(119) ibid* p. 69
(120) S.P* 71 (14) ff 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo* dated Sale, 1/5/1673
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an Idrissid sharif (121 )* In thB spring of 1673, the Fasi “Grandees" 
were allegedly "resolved to dye rather than surrender" (122)* They could 
be resolute in the unlikelihood of starvation: it is for this period 
that the "al-Fasi chronicler" delineated the deprivations of the "Grandees" 
under siege conditions in terms of the difficulties of obtaining sheep
C M
for the due celebration of the sacrifice of Id al-Kabir (123)*
Isma il gained the ascendancy after deciding upon a lateral 
military gamble that proved successful* He shifted his attentions away 
from Ahmad ibn Muhriz in Taza, and towards the western plains, where 
Ghaylan was established* A minor spring campaign, led by a lieutenant of 
Isrnacilfs, failed to dislodge the mu.lahld (124)* So, in the dune of 
1673, Isma il himself moved the mass of his forces into the environs 
of Alcazarquivir* Here they met with Ghaylan*s followers, dispersed 
and placidly harvesting (125)* The muiahid was killed during the ensuing 
battle* Isma il was able to take control of routes which Ghaylan had 
previously dominated. These included the routes linking Fes with 
Tetuan and with Sale* Subsequently Isma il moved upon Fes, in order peaceably 
to open negotiations with the city (126). After intensive debate, the 
city fathers decided to receive him (12?)* But their ceremonial 
reconciliation with their sultan was devoid of any civic humiliation* 
cAbd al-Qadir a1-Fasi, shavkh of the city zawiva. and, in MouBtte's 
terms "le plus fameux magicien de toute la ville", went hand in hand
(121) "Mauley Drice, lfun des plus fameux de leurs saints et qui descendoit
du fondateur de cette ville*" (MouBtte: "Histoire**." p* 70)
(122) S.P, 71 (14) ff* 259 and (copy) 260 Anon* Memo* dated Sale, 1/5/1673
(123) See Prologue P* 18
(124) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anon* Memo* dated Sale, 1/5/1673
(125) MouBttes "Histoire***" pp, 71-2
(126) ibid* pp, 73-4
(127) ibid* p. 74
with Isma“il to the tomb of al-Rashid, and there exacted from the
sultan an oath of peace (128). This was an identification of al-Rashid
with Isma il that was made upon the terms of the city, rather than the
terms of the sultan*
Entry into Fes gave IsmacTl an immediate advantage in hia dynastic
duel* Ahmad ibn Muhriz had made use of his rivalfs westward diversion • •
against Ghaylan to repeat certain of the “Chergi" moves which had 
preceded al-Rashid!s career of victory* He had allied himself with sons 
of al-Lawati, and captured Dar ibn MashCal (129). These moves were now 
pre-empted* Isma il was able to move eastward from Fes along the Taza 
corridor. By the spring of 1674, he had established his authority over
CBar ibn Mash al and its environs, and punished the groupings who had
rallied to his rival. Ahmad ibn Muhriz withdrew to Tafilelt, where
• * ?
presumably his Filali following dissolved. He then retreated to the
0 / \ —c*-Dar a (130)* Dynastic victory did not restore Isma il's personal
confidence in the political security of the ‘'Cherg1** It seems to have
been at this period that the Dila'X exiles within Tlemsen were summoned
back westwards, and ordered to settle in Fes (131)*
The city was about to receive the counter-blow for its proudly
calculated period of one year, two months and eighteen days' resistance
to IsmaCXl (132), He prepared to slide from under the inherited mantle
(128) MouBttes “Histoire.**11 p. 74 cf “Nashr al-Mathani. . e d * / t r *  
Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p* 234
^ „ _ _
Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi had an indigenous reputation as a miracle-worker, 
to which one of his sons devoted a work of filial piety, entitled 
“Tuhfat al-akabir fX manaoib al-shavkh cAbd al-Qadir” (Lakhdar:
“La vie lit t is raifee. ..“ p. 79)
(129) MouBtte; “Histoire...” p. 73
(130) ibid. pp* 75-6
(131) This summons took place at some point preceding a Tilimsani revolt 
against its Turkish garrison, dated to Rajab 1085 = Oct.-Nov* 1674. 
Al-Qadiri TBnderBd thanks that, by this date, the Dila'i had left 
Tlemsen and were therefore safe from harm (“Nashr al-Mathani...” 
Volume cited above, p, 244)
(132) “Nashr al-Mathani...” Volume cited abovB. p. 234
of a "sultan of Fes", by abandoning personal identification with the 
metropolis, and associating the seat of government with a more docile 
towns his old appanage of Meknes. Preparations for the withdrawal 
began in 1674, when the foundations of a new Miknasi palace complex 
were begun (133). Meknes, at a distance of forty miles, was too near 
to Fes to be considered in political isolation from the great city.
In the mid eighteenth century /denier noted that, in good weather, 
it was possible to make the return journey from Meknes to Fes within 
a single day (134), But there was a tradition of enmity between the 
two places (135). Meknes was the nearest urban centre to Fes with any 
pretensions to economic independence. Its environs were noted for 
agricultural prosperity, and for the existence of a large and valuable 
salt pan (136). In the declining days of the Wattasid sultanate, the 
Miknasi orbit had allegedly produced one third of the revenues of the 
"kingdom of Fes" (137), The place was therefore well-suited to the 
establishment of a gobbling palace economy.
The initial palace establishment was skeletal, comprising building 
labourers and guards. But even the transfer of building labour from 
Fes to Meknes meant the transfer of an enterprise and a consumer group. 
The enterprise was considerable. The aafid who was made superintendent 
of the building site was also made titular governor of Meknes, and of 
Tamesna, the modern Chaouia, in order that he might havB financial
(133) MouBttes "Histoire..." p. 111
(134)h*g.de Chenier, 1788 English translation Vol, I, pp, 82-3
(135) Leo had somewhat naively noted of the Miknasi populaces "tengono 
grande odio col popolo di Fez, ne si fa alcuna manifests cagioneV 
(ed, Ramusio f, 31)
(136) Busnot p. 248
(137) Leo ed, Ramusio f, 31
scope for buying in the materials necessary for the construction of
the palace (138)* The consumer group was similarly considerable. The
palace building force may never have reached the vast complement of
30,000 attributed to it in the late estimate of lilindus (139)* But it
is likely always to haVB numbered thousands* For the mode of
construction in use, that of pounding "tabby", an earth-lime mixture,
between a framework of wooden boardsr(140), did require intensive
labour* The l%knes building workers are a body whom it has been
customary to regard simply with compassion (141)* But its small and,
from the point of view of source-material, heavily over-exposed
Christian minority, is known to have been by no means penniless (142)*
And its sad indigenous majority, made up from rural levies, and from
convicted criminals (143), did at least require feeding*
Three years would elapse before there was any major transfer of
high palace personnel from Fes to Meknes* In the interim, Isma il
survived a double political crisis centred upon Marrakesh* In the
summer of 1674, the sultan took an haraka through the Tadla, defeated
1V 1
the Shabbanat force which had come up to meet him, and re-took the 
southern capital* There he set up an Acras aa*id* He then retired 
northwards, conducting a punitive campaign into the "Jabal Fazzaz" 
on the return journey (144)* In the following year, 1675, IsmaCil
(138) Pidou de St* Olon tr* Motteux pp* 116-117
(139) Windue p* 114
Bus not pp* 155-6 cf* Wlndus p* 24
(141) The anonymous "Relation**«de la Mercv" contains a rare extension 
of European compassion to thB "Moorish" majority of the work­
force (p* 655)
(142) Braithwaite pp* 352—3
(143) "Tur.iuman" pp. 13 and 29 of the text, and 25 and 54 of the
translation*
(144) MouBtts: "Histoire*.*" pp. 77-9
was brought back to the "Hawz" by the need to face Ahmad ibn Muhriz 
once again (145)* This prince had come to Marrakesh by way of the Dar°a 
and Tarudant* His political acceptance within "'inner Sus", in combination 
with his old Glawi connection in the "al-Fayja" region could have been 
sufficient to re-fuse his links with Marrakesh# So no great credence 
need be given to MouBtte*s narrative details which suggest that
C
the boudoir politics of the Sa di woman Lalla Maryam were vital 
preliminaries to her husband being invited back into the southern 
capital (145)* However, the uomanfs position as symbolic inheritrix of
q M
the Sa di tradition within Marrakesh may have been diplomatically 
significant in drawing the Shabbanat into a coalition with Ahmad ibn 
Muhriz that used the "red city" as its base*
Ahmad ibn Muhriz was able to hold Marrakesh for two years, in a 
defence marked by at least one battle sufficiently significant to 
warrant report in "al-Fasi chronicle" (14?)* The period was otherwise 
notable chiefly for strife within the besieging forces* At this period, 
Isma il "shrugged off" those allies from northern hill—country who had 
bean particularly associated with his brother al-Rashxd, and whom, in a
O Msense, he had inherited* He rounded upon the A ras, whom he accused of 
conspiracy with their clan-fellow, his ga!id who still remained in 
Marrakesh* The clan, including members left behind in Fes, was all 
but extirpated (148)* Al-Lawati of the Snassen figured equivocally 
alongside this episode* He was allowed personally to survive, possibly 
because he held the status of father-in-law to Isma0!! himself* But his
(145) MouBtte: "Histoire* p *  80
(146) ibid* pp* 80-81
(147) "Nashr al-Mathani**." ed#/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol# XXIV p* 249 
of* Mouettes "Histoire***" pp# 93-4
(148) MouBtte: "Histoire***" pp* 85-90 cf* "Turiuman" p# 13 of the text
and 23 of the translation*
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court status evaporated (149)* His lapse from favour was probably
consequent upon the earlier disloyalty of his offspring* Hb was the
father of sons who had allied with Ahmad ibn Muhriz two years* •
previously#
It is probable that Isma il was able to dispense with allies 
whom he considered dubious, because he had the resources to buy others*
Windus accounted for Isma il*s progress over this period in terms not 
only of "Courage and Vivacity", but also of:
"#**the Help he met with from the Dews, particularly MBmaran 
their Governour, who supplyed him with Money to carry on the 
War against his Gpposers*" ^gg)
This note is not written in any tone of Sheridanesque anti-
Semitism* And it has the corroboration of indigenous Dewish
tradition, in which this period was remembered as particularly
notable for Dewish merchant association with the expansion of
Isma il*s authority (151)#
The surrender of Marrakesh to Isma il in the summer of 1677
followed private dynastic dealings* After employing his brother al-
Harran as go-between, Ismacil is said to have agreed to allow his
nephew to withdraw in peace into "inner Sus" across the High Atlas,
with the independence of his government over the Wadi Sus and Dar°a
valleys recognised (152)* Ahmad ibn Muhriz would never again "stand• ■ •
in" as heir to the Sa°dx: symbolically, he left Lalla Maryam behind
him in her Murrakushx palace (153)#
Following the withdrawal of Ahmad ibn Muhriz and his personal
(149) MouBtte: "Histoire**." p* 89
(150) Itlindus p. 117
(151) Chronicle of SaCdya ibn Danan ed#/tr. Va.ida Text Wo. XXI (Part II) in 
"Un recueil de textes*,.", "HespBris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 141
(152) MouBtte: "Histoire***" pp* 102—5
(153) ibid* p. 104
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military entourage, Isma0! ! ^  army was allowed into the city of Marrakesh* 
Partial sack followed, and a number of Murrakushi magnates were either 
put to death or mutilated (154)* This provided a grim contrast with the 
courteous 1673 denouement to the siege of Fes* However, punishment for 
Ismacil,s former opponents was not inevitable* Those Shabbanat who had 
chosen not to follow Ahmad ibn Muhriz into retreat had their proffer 
of service to Isma il accepted* But this was to be service at a distance*
The force was, in the first instance, ordered to migrate to the environs 
of Melilla (155)* Here they were neatly interposed between Snassen 
country and the region once dominated by the A ras*
Subsequently, while the sultan was still engaged in the punishment 
of Marrakesh, he received news of the political intrusion into the 
Central Atlas region of a lone Dila*i, Ahmad ibn cAbd Allah, grandson 
to the murabit Muhammad al-Hajj* This young Dila*x had gone on 
pilgrimage from TlBmsen, but taken the opportunity of Ismacil!s 
involvement in the "Hawz" to return from the east* He had picked up a 
small Turkish Bscort for the last lap of his journey* Hastily IsmaCil 
gathered together a rag-bag local followings
"Cette nouvelle fit cesser les cruautez que le Roy exerco.it 
sur le peuple da Maroc et luy fit publier un pardon 
general pour tous ceux qui voudroient l,accompagner dans 
son retour a Fb z* II fit suivre ses troupes de toutes les 
cafilles ou pauplBs dfArabes, qui vinrent se mettre sous 
son obeissance***"
There were concurrent dynastic disturbances within Tafilelt (157)* But 
dealing with this secondary problem was postponed* Three successive
(154) "Tur.iuman" pp* 13 of the text and 26-7 of the translation of*
MouBttes "Histoire***" pp* 106 and. 108
(155) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." p* 106
(15S) ibid* p* 108
(157) "Nashr al-Mathani**." ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol. XXIV p, 261 
cf* "Tur 1uman" p* 14 of the text and 27 of the translation
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expeditions into the Central Atlas were undertaken in order to 
eliminate the final spasm of Dila*I military power. The last and most 
brutal was led by Ismacil himself. It failed to take hold of the 
Dilafi leader, but was nevertheless a complex and crushing demonstration 
of the military power which Ismacil could muster at this juncture (158), 
Loyal service to Isma il during the siege of Marrakesh and its 
Central Atlas coda made political fortunes. This was a period for the 
advancement of “new men", to whom rumour would persistently allot 
improbably humble origins (159)? a shorthand indication that their 
power came not from local ascendancy, but from the 8ultan*s fostering#
In 1677, Ghaylan*s former sphere of influence in the western plains 
received a new qafid. Umar ibn Haddu al-Hammami (160)* Like Ghaylan 
he was based at Alcazarquivir, and was destined to have close, if 3anus- 
faced relations with the Christian infidel! these combined harassment 
of the enclaves, at the head of a local following of mti.iahidun (161), 
with the conduct of diplomatic relations with Europeans (162), A
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kinsman of Umar, Ali ibn Abd Allah al-Hhmmamx, was set over Tetuan
• 9
(163), Members of this Hammami clan, mu.iahid captains recognising the 
sultan, would dominate both western plains and Western Rif throughout 
the remainder of the reign* They were men of ability, as would be averred 
by the Europeans whom they encountered, Samuel Pepys, for instance,
(158) MouUttej: "Histoire,,." pp, 107 and 110 cf*
"Tur iuroan" p, 14 of the text and 27 of the translation*
(159) Examples of such rumours are given by Pidou de St* Olon (tr* Motteux 
pp, 116 and 121) and bv Windus (p, 202)
(160) Routh! "Tangier'* . p p ,  160-161
(161) MouStte! "Histoire* . p ,  112
(162) For the gatidts reception of the Kirke mission from Tangier in 1681, 
see? Anons "The last account from Fez..*containina a Relation of 
Colonel Kirkfs Reception at Meauinez etc" (London, M.D,) pp. 1-4
(163) MouBtteJ "Histoire* . p p .  150 and 200 cf. M,! Dawud: "Tarlkh 
Titwan" Vol.I, (Tetuan, 1959) p, 258
recognised in cAli ibn cAbd Allah a "Moor'* of personal distinction (164)# 
Advancement similar to that of the Hammami cams in 167? to men of 
the Rusi clan* °Abd Allah a!-Rusi, who had been a companion of IsmaGil 
in the mahalla or military camp outside Marrakesh, was appointed 
governor of Fas al-Bali in absentia# After the third and final Central 
Atlas campaign against the DIla*i intruder, cAbd Allah, one of that 
campaign*s victorious generals, was able to enter Fes in triumph, to 
take up his post* His father was made master of probate (abu *1— 
mawarlth)(l65)« Members of his clan would for fifty years continue to 
be Isma°Il,s effective representatives within Fas al-Bali.
The crisis of 1677 may also have seen the nascence of a military 
corps later to be closely associated with the sultans the corps of 
Udaya, a crack cavalry force which would stand in relation to Isma0?! as 
the Shabbanat had stood in relation to Sa°di sultans# An individual 
general, "Leudaya”, was a distinguished cavalry commander during the 
third Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (166)# It is possible that he led 
a body of the troops swept together from the environs of Marrakesh#
Memory of this service may lie embedded in al-Zayyani*s 11 just—so—story** 
as to how Xsma°il, in 1677, founded the Udaya, as a corps gathered from 
among his own akhwal. serendipitously located in the Hawz (167)
Tradition was later to amplify al-2ayyani*s association of the 
Udaya with the Shabbanat (168)* But, in IsmacIl*s day, the two groupings
(164) ,fThe Alcade (°Ali ibn °Abd Allah) and his company appeared like very
grave and sober men# His discourse and manner were very good and, I 
thought, with more presence of mind than our m a s t e r S # l P e p y s  
ed# 3* Smiths M3ournal at Tangier** from "The Life, journals and 
Correspondence of Samuel Pbpvs Es q * F*R.S.tl Vol. I (London, 1841) p# 370
(165) "Nashr al-Mathan?#*.u ed#/tr# Michaux-Bellaire A#M# \/ol# XXII/ p* 260
(166) MouSttes KHistoire.#.** p* 110
(167) ”'Bustan al-Zarlf.#." MS p* 29 cf* Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-1B
"" #T" "
(168) 11 Bus tan al-Zarif##.u loc. cit* cf. al-Nasiris trKitab al-Istiosa..«lt 
Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 50, Fumev translation, A.M. Vol#^  IX p# 66 
Al-Nasiri*s developed tradition, which would make the Shabbanat one
division of the Udaya would seem to spring from military nomenclature among 
the "lldaya11 of his own day, quartered on lands to the south of Sale. Sees 
3# le Cozs 'jLes tribus guichs au Marocs essai de geographic agraire” in 
trRevue de Geooraohie du Marocu Vol* UII (Rabat, 1965) pp# 3-52 Map. p# 14
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were distinct* IsmacIl made no attempt to associate the Shabbanat 
personally with himself* After the first dismissal, outside Marrakesh, 
the force was scattered into different provinces* Thus, one troop of 
Shabbanat was sent into the Tadla, to be met there by St# Amans in 
1683 (169)# And, according to al-Zayyani, other Shabbanat, in association 
with members of a fellow Hawz grouping, the Zirara, were sent to 
garrison Qujda, to build three neighbouring "Chergi" forts, and to 
contain the SnassBn (170)# Al-Zayyani knew the eastern march forts 
personally (i71 )* So his notes on their garrisoning may be accredited#
But his concept of the policy behind their deployment may be dismissed*
Hb claimed that the Shabbanat and Zirara had been the oppressors of the 
Hawz , and that the Snassen, against whom they were pitted, owed 
allegiance to the Regency (172)* But it has been s b b o that, during
Q  m *
the very early years of Alawi history, the Snassen had been noted 
most particularly far their association with al-Rashid# And it is thus 
straightforward to assume that Ismacri*s aim in setting Shabbanat 
and Zirara around Snassen country was simple neutralisation: the 
tilting against each other of two bodies of warrior tribesmen who 
had each been closely associated with other political leaders, 
including IsmaCil*s living rival Ahmad ibn Muhriz, and whose loyalty 
to IsmaCil personally was thus equally to be thought questionable,
(169) "Journal du Vovaoe da St. Amans" pp* 337-B
(170) "Tur.iuman" p# 18_of the text and 34 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif**.11 MS* p* 34
(171) A1 ZayyanX was in 1792 nominated governor of Oujda# He once took 
shelter In al- Ayun, a major "Chergi" fortress, allegedly built
by the followers of a Zirari qaHd ("Turiumanat al-kubra..*" p* 140 
cf# "Tur Ionian11 loc* cit* cf* "Bustan al—Zarif** *" loc. cit*
MM ^  Q  * *
(172) "lima kanu alavhi min al-zulm wa fl~1awr bi-qabafil al-hawz.*.*
a .  —  —  *  Q  _
(reference to a Zirari aatid)***wa amaruhu bi ’l-tadvXg ala 
bani visnasin idh kanu shi at al-turk"
("Since they (the Shabbanat and Zirara) oppressed and maltreated the
peoples of the "Hawz", ••♦.he ordered him (their oa|id) to constrain
the Snassen, who were disposed to favour the Turks") '
("Tur.iuman" loc. cit*)
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From 1677 onwards, Ismacil had Meknes as his own capital, to be 
the cynosure far forces loyal to himself* Following his Central Atlas 
victory, the sultan travelled to his new fliknasi palace, and, with a 
wolf-sacrifice, inaugurated its habitation (173). Imperial authority 
over Fes was affirmed from the Fliknasi base* In the December of 1677,
IsmacIl appointed a new qadi of Fes, Abu cAbd Allah Bardalla (174), who 
may be presumed to have been outstanding in his loyalty as a "sultans 
man", as he was atill in office twenty years later (175)* Soon afterwards 
in a pageant—like gesture that was typical of his style of government, 
the sultan conducted a personal Fasi victory parade, to clinch the 
earlier al-Rusi triumph* He brought the recently rebellious al-Harran 
of Tafilelt with him to the metropolis* There, as "the,sultan benignant", 
he ceremonially pardoned his errant brother in full view of the Fasi 
citizenry* Thereafter, he graciously consented to be the guest of the 
city fathers, over the feast of cId al—Kabir (176)* Significantly, 
this was the season at which it was appropriate to present formal 
hadava or gifts to the ruler (177)* Then, having demonstrated to Fes 
an Basy exercise of the upper hand, IsmacIl retired to Meknes*
The palace at Fteknes would never be completed to its master^ 
satisfaction* As is well-known, the sultan was his own grand architect, 
and as much "addicted" to the issue of summary demolition orders, as to 
the issue of instructions for building (178). Physically, therefore,
(173) MauSttes "Histoire.*." p. 111
(174) "Nashr al-Hathanl**." ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*!*!. Vol.XXIV pp. 260-
261
(175) "Lettres Inedites*.." No. 12 p* 53
(176) "Nashr al-HathanT..." Volume cited above* p* 261
(177) S*I* 2b France Vol* IV No* CXLIV Memo* of D*-B* Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 pp. 694—5
(178) Mindus PP* 115-11;6 For an analysis of the diknasi palace complex 
from an architectural point of view, see H. Terrasse "Histoire du
flaroc" Vol. II pp* 266-8
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the Miknasi palace complex underwent more than half a century of 
heaving protean development, before its present outline emerged. Yet 
thB palace had its permanent aspects. It dominated the "pittiful 
Country Town11 (179) that MeknBs had previously been, like a gigantic 
mahalla or imperial camp. Its lime-white walls and glittering green-tile 
roofs caught the eye from a distance of miles (180). Local assets, such 
as lime-kilns (181) wars requisitioned to serve its needs. A gaggle of 
"camp-followers" came to settle in "nouala" or reed-huts, outside the 
town gates (182). Within the town, palace denizens and dependents 
eventually predominated (183). And, even In MouBtta*s day, the palace 
guard alone could be estimated as eight thousand (184). Among ths 
palace dependents there must be counted the Miknasi Jews. The gaHd 
of the Jewish community of the Maghrib al-Aqsa seems to have moved to 
Meknes with the sultan. He was granted the contract for provisioning 
the palace (18S), and was also responsible for the prelimihary 
quartermastery of imperial campaigns (186). It seems likely that the 
price for this Miknasi contract was paid in real estate* The old town 
houses of the MiknasSi Jews were surrendered to the sultan in 1682, as 
residences free for his renting out (187). The bargain was apparently 
worth-while. The new Miknasi Jewry, built with labour detached from 
the palacB building site (188), came to be seen as the most visibly 
prosperous commercial centre of the developed capitals(189).
(179
(180
(181
(182
(183
(184
(185
(186
(187
(188
Pidou de St* Olon tr. Motteux p. 71
Busnot p. 14 cf. Braithwaite p. 286
Busnot p. 15
Busnot loc. cit. cf. Pb I Puerto Bk* VI Ch. Ill p. 640 
Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. Ill pp. 639-40 
MauBtte: "Histoire. . p .  176 
Busnot p. 20
/Sale, p. 111
s*1* 2 Franee Vol. IV Ho. XIII Memo, of J-B. Estelle , 11/B/1693
"Nashr al—Mathanl..." ed./tr. Mlchaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 349
T* Phelps! "A true account of the captivity of Thomas Phelps"
(London, 1685) p. 13
(190) Busnot p. 15
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The analogy of the mahalla or military camp could be extended to
1 71 T
the Miknasi palace personnel* According to a classic analysis, Islamic 
government could be divided between the spheres of the Mpenf* and the 
’’sword** (191). It will be stressed later that IsmaGilfs government 
maintained the "pen” at a rudimentary stage of development (192)*
Men of the "sword" were the buttresses of the state* Xn this, Ismacilfs 
government conformed to tradition of rBcent centuries* Leo’s account 
of the sixteenth century Wattasid administration within Fes portrays 
a government whose designated officials were for the most part 
military captains, holding posts of responsibility either within the 
household staff of the sultan’s army as arrayed for campaign, or as 
tax-gathering military governors within the provinces* At the head 
of a list of captains, quartermasters, stable-masters, rural 
commisraries and the like, there figured only two civil servants of 
high degree: a "maggior consigliere", presumably a "wazir". and a 
"secretario" who trebled as "thesoriere" and "maggiordomo" (193)* The 
military bias to this list is echoed to an even more striking degree 
in a second and more haphazard piece of itemisation drawn up by 
MouBtte: his conclusory list of the "Families Illustres" of Morocco(l94). 
Here, amid a plethora of magnate families and individuals, of generals 
governors and saints, and of the living and the dead, there are to be 
found only two men who might be thought of as purely civil officials: 
a defunct "visir", and the somewhat specialised "maistre-d*hotel ou des 
serrails de Fes"* "Zelquetin", the officer named as "tresorier", is known
(191) ibn Khaldun: "Muqaddima** *" ed*/tr* de Slane as "Les Proleoomenes 
d’ibn Khaldoun" (Paris, 1865) Vol. IX pp. 46-8
(192) See Chapter IV Pp. 164-166
(193) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 43
(194) MouBtte: "Histoire* * pp, 200—201
i i o
from his later careBr to have been a general.
Yet although IsmaCil's government was of a markedly military cast, 
the forces at the sultan*s disposal were as yet unremarkable* The troops 
with which Ismacil won control of the region within the Atlas arc, 
during the first five years of his reign, were probably dominated 
numerically by followers of provincial quwwad* Mou8tte described the 
practicalities of muster during Isma ilfs early years as follows:
"II range luy-mesme ses troupes en bataille, les paye par 
ses mains et en fait la reveue en personne; et afin de 
voir si le nombre qufil a paye a ses alcaydes est complet, 
il les fait assembler sur les hordes de quelque profonde 
riviere, dont les quays de coste et d*autre sont gardez 
***puis, le premier jour, il fait passer l*infanterie, 
le second la cavallerie des Arabes, et le troisieme les 
troupes de sa maison*,,"
Cavalrymen were not only "Arabes" or rural horsemen. They came from 
town and country alike, A proportion of such troops from both town 
and country would seem to have owed the sultan the favoured but 
onerous lavsh service, known to have existed since Sa°di times *
This involved liability to regular military service in exchange for 
the remission of taxation (l9fo), For townsmen, such service went 
along with the grant of a mount (19?)* However, the majority of 
troops in the first two categories noted by MouBtte may be thought of 
as nafXba troops* These owed military service to the sultan by lot, 
and simply as his subjects. They were allowed no remission of 
taxation* Indeed, in the towns, the muster of such troops was carried 
out with the aid of the tax-roll (198)*
(195) MouBtte: "Histoire* . p ,  149
(196) A zahir of Ahmad al—Mansur, dating from 1588, demanded permanent
.lifted service from a branch of the Shabbanat domiciled in the 
Agadir region, and granted remission of taxation in exchange.
(5, le Coz; "Les tribus ouichs au maroc” pp, 3*4)
(197) S*I* 2 France Vol, IV |\Jo* CXLIV tlBmo* of 3—B* Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1598 p. 695
(198) ibid*
C / \The sultan*s askar or standing guard (199) which formed the third
body of troops mentioned by MouBtte, was as yet, by the standards of
the second half of Isma ilfs reign, a force of limited proportions
and mixed constitutions It was an institution cast in an anGient and
not even particularly Islamic moulds that of the bodyguard alien from
the fabric of local society, and identified with the ruler in person*
c *•It was already dominated by the force of abid which had germinated in 
the days of al-Rashld* However, in MouBtte’s day, these Cabid had not
Cyet come numerically to swamp the sultan*s following of a la.!, or 
European renegades# Renegades had been prominent within IsmaCTl*s 
forces outside Marrakesh (200)# And, of the three gates to the Miknasi 
palace of MouBtte’s day, two were said to be guarded by "blacks" and 
one by renegades (201)• Tentatively this may be put forward as an
C M
indication of the contemporary ratio of the sultan’s abid to the
C M
sultan’s a lai.
0 M 0
Abid and a la.i may both be seen as living socially in limbo except 
for the bonds by which they were linked to a military commander#
The showy little procession which celebrated a Christian’s conversion 
did not mark the convert’s acceptance into Muslim society (202)# It 
merely marked a formal surrender of the mores of Christendom* Co-option 
into military service was the general rule (203)* And MouBtte noted
(199) When describing a military force, al-Zayyani would use either of the 
two terms 1und or askar# The latter term seems to have indicated
"standing army"# This was the meaning retained by the word in the latter 
nineteenth century (R* Mauduits "Le Makhzen Marocain " in "Renseionements 
Coloniaux11 Paris, 1903 p# 302)
(200) MouBtte: "Histoire##.1* pp. 96 and 106
(201) MouBtte; "Relation..." p# 148
(202) The social distinction was symbolised by a bar against the convert’s 
marriage to any but a slave girl, or the daughter of another renegade 
For casual note of this bar, see Busnot p. 157 and Braithwaite p# 349
For subsequent commentary in greater sociological detail, see de Ch^nier 
(English translation of 1788) Vol# I# pp, 155-6 and Lempriere p# 342
(203) Thus the English renegade "Pilleau" was described as "...at present a
Soldier, as all the Renegaddes are, who have no particular Trade or
Calling#" (Braithwaite p# 192)
with satisfaction that the life of an European who had "turned Moor”
continued to be one of slavery (204)* In an ethnic sense, however, the
G **
a la.i may be seen as the tail-Bnd of one military tradition, about to
give way to another* From its Barliest Islamic centuries, successive
rulers within the Maghrib al-Aqsa had employed cohorts of European
troops, including the primordial sagaliba (205), the rum or free
Christian mercenaries of the later Middle Ages (206), and the Sa°di 
Ca lal* All these had been troops of honourable status* Europeans could
Q M  «M Q  Mi
describe the a la.i or "elches" of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa di as his "best
r i it ~n ■ t i #  ,
souldiers" (207), and followers of his grandson as "elshes of quality"
(208)* But during the early cAlawJ period, the status of the aCla,i 
collapsed* European respect for the renegade as a soldier gave way to 
embarrassed scorn for the "poor white"* Renegades were MouBtte*s "enfans 
perdus" (209) and, later, Braithwaite*s "worst Set of People of all here**, 
sad, drunken, profligate Fellows, half-naked and half-starved" (210).
This plummet in reputation is likely to reflect a real deterioration in 
the quality of European soldiery willing to undertake Maghribi service*
(204) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p* 175
(205) As an instance, sagaliba were cited by al-Bakri (tr« W* MacGuckin de 
Slane as "Description de ltAfrique Septentrionale par el Bekri" 
Algiers, 1913 pp. 93 of the text and 187-8 of the translation) in
a context in which they appear as advantaged slave troops who, around 
the year 900 A*D* demanded their freedom from the lord of the Middle
Rif state of Hokur*
(206) For information on the rum, see 3.M.3.L. Mas Latrie: "Relations et 
commerce de l*Afrique septentrionale ou Maghreb avec les nations 
chretiennes du moven age" (Paris. 1866) and 3* Alemany:
"Milicias Cristianas al Servicio de los Sultanes Musulmanes del
Almagreb" from "Homena.is a D. Francisco Codera" ed# D* Eduardo 
Saavedra (Saragossa, 1904) pp. 137-155 "'
(207) S.I. 1re Anoleterre Vol. II Ho. LXXXIV George Tomson to Robert
Cecil. Marrakesh, 30/10/1603 p. 233
(208) S.I* 1rs Anoleterre Vol. Ill No. XCIII Leconfield MS No. 73
p. 467
(209) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 93
(210) Braithwaite p* 349
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In a period of expanding European armies (211), when "the recruiting 
officer" could become an established European literary figure, early 
Alawi sultans offered no unusual financial draw to bring in European 
mercenaries from a wide catchment (212)* They had access to two narrow 
and erratic stocks of European recruits: captives taken by the corsairs, 
and fugitives from the enclaves# Of these, the fugitives in particular 
were men unlikely to be malleable into a°la1 troops of high quality (213) <>
Q  ^  £
The salvation of the early Alawi askar was the development of an 
c ■■
imperial corps of abid* The corps was, for the seventeenth century, an
Q an#
Alawi innovation* It will be stressed later that no major force of 
black troops attached to the Sa°di sultans (214)* The early association 
of Cabid with al-Rashld has already been noted (215)# By the end of al~ 
Rashid’s reign, Cabid were being employed, not simply as the sultan's 
personal guards, but in sufficient numbers to be despatched upon a tax- 
raiding haraka , under ths commander whom MouBtte knew as "Bousta" (216)*
The services of "Bousta" were inherited by IsmacIl (21?)# A round figure 
for Isma il's following of black troops, tossed out for 1672, was two 
thousand (218)# By the end of the 1670s, the black guard, quartered in
(211) See G*(\J* Clarke: "War and Society in the Seventeenth Century"
(London, 1958)
(212) Braithwaite dismissed the renegade pay of his day as "20 Blanquils a 
Month, which is twenty Twopences, and a little Flower"# Officers 
were paid ip proportion (p. 349)
(213) Such fugitives were commonly criminals and pressed men, deserting from 
the appalling conditions of service which characterised all the
enclaves with the exception of Portuguese Mazagan# Tangier literature
endorses MouBtte*s picture of a drain in sorry manpower from these 
alien pustules# An anonymous author of 1680 strongly urged an 
improvement in the terms of Tangier service, as "melancholy drunken 
fits" took many men into "running to the Moors" (MouBtte: "Histoire..." 
pp# 182 and 194—5 cf# Anon: "A Discourse concerning Tangier"
(London, 1680) p# 22)
(214) See Epilogue Part I Pp# 286-8
(215) See Chapter I Pp. 55-6, and the present chapter P# 91
(216) MouBtte: "Histoire. . p #  44
(217) ibid. pp# 78 and 201
(218) ibid# p# 68
tents around the new Miknasi palace (219) had expanded so far that, as 
noted previously, one estimate of its size could be eight thousand (220).
It is possible that, from the beginning of his reign, IsmaCil was 
wary of the possibility of a military coup along the lines which, in 1671 
had led to the seizure of the reins of Algerine power by the diwan of
m Q m
janissaries. For, in his first decade, Isma il established the pattern
G Mby which he would conduct relations with his abid , to the very end of
his reign. In the days of MouBtte, as in the days of Windus, he meted
out to his guard an adroit blend of vicious discipline and gaudy favour, 
that produced docility towards himself, and a compensatory insolence 
towards his subjects (221). Further, he would allow only adolescents 
from his corps of black page-boys close to his person. These pages-were 
the musket—toting lads known to all European reporters (222). Busnot 
knew them as the "Chafferats" (223), a possible rendering of shafarat. 
These adolescents are likely to have graduated to a corps dfelite 
within the Miknasi guard, and thus given to the officer echelons of
Isma il*s askar an increasingly nBgroid aspect* Few renegades were
taken young enough to fulfil an apprenticeship within the sultan*s 
service parallel to that undergone by the "little Blacks" (224).
Counter to the accepted tradition, set into al-Zayyani*s texts for 
the latter 1670s, it can be maintained that the primary guard of °abid 
was built up without recourse to any dramatic raking of the country for 
slave recruits. There was a domestic source of natural increase for the
(219) MouBtte: "Relation..." pp. 151-2
(220) See the present chapter P. 108 (Note (184))
(221) MouBtte: "Histoire..." pp. 175-6 cf. Windus pp. 139-143
(222) See, for example, MouBtte: “Histoire. . p .  176 csfo Pidou de St* 
Olon tr* Mottsux pp. 113 and 150 and Ulindus loc. Git.
(223) Busnot p. 205
(224) Pidou de St. Olon tr* Mottsux p. 150
force# For whereas the European renegade woman was an exotic rarity,
black slaves of both sexes were brought into the Maghrib al-Aqsa*
Leo alleged that his own contemporaries in the Dar a region specifically
encouraged their slaves to breed (225). And the young pages of
MouBtte*s day were said to be the sons of palace serving women (226),
Haratin* dark-skinnBd sedentaries from the oases (227), formed a further 
• •
pool of manpower that could havB been tapped on the sultan*s behalf#
During the reign of Muhammad III, direct recruitment from the oases 
is known to have been an accepted mode of replenishing the ranks of 
thB sultan*s army (228)* This practise aligned with the oasean
C or* — *
antecedents of the Alawi. And it is known from Tawati records that 
slaving was ancillary to mid-seventeenth century oasean warfare (229)* 
Finally, there was the self-gBnerating process by which hadava , 
presentations of tribute to the sultan, added recruits to the very 
military sanction which rendered hadava politic* Magnates and tribes 
alikB are recorded as having included, within their •’douceurs** to the 
sultan, numbers of black slaves that could run into hundreds (230),
Hadava were also a regular source for the supply of cavalry horses 
(231)* Half the °abid guard of MouBtte*s day was mounted (232)# And, in 
time , the sultan*s stables would become one of the wonders of Meknes9
(225) Leo ed* Ramusio f# 73
(226) MouBtte; “Histoire*.*** p. 176
(227) See Appendix A. Pp* 335-337
(228) Thus in 1172/1758-9, the haratin from three oasean groupings along 
the Ziz were pressed into military service, on the pretext that 
the^ were dissident* Mine years later, a aafid who was himself a 
wasif. or high ranking palace slave, was despatched to gather in a 
force of abid from the "Qibla" or western Sahara#
(“Bustan al-zarlf. . . MS pp. 100 and 108 )
(229) Timmi MS and the chronicles of al-Tawatl and al-Amuri quoted 
Martin pp# 47, 55 and 56
(230) MouBtte; "Histoire*.**' pp. 98*^  99 and 111
(231) ibid* pp# 98 and 99 cf* Del Puerto Bk. I Ch# XU
*" p. 59
(232) MouBtte; “Histoire*.*l! P* 176
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recognised as such in both indigenous and European writing (233)*
The stables are evidence of a glory in horse-flesh that was, at this 
period of the history of the Maghrib, distinctive to the martial 
mores of the Maghrib al-Aqsa* In the neighbouring Regency of 
Algiers, the prime soldier was the janissary infantryman* But
C mm
cavalry, in the aarly Alawi Maghrib al-Aqsa, was rated far above 
Infantry?
n*.*a Horseman being in the highest Esteem imaginable 
amongst them, and the Foot the contrary, insomuch that 
those who command thousands of them are not esteemed 
equal to the Commanders of fifty H o r s e . ^ 34)
c ••
It was the abid cavalry who fought alongside the sultanfs person 
in battle (235). Cavalry skills and glittering trappings governed 
military and political displays almost exclusively* Tilting, or
Q w m
its musket-bearing development, “la b al barud” were the standard 
expressions of festivity and welcome (236)* An anonymous companion 
of governor KirkB of Tangier, who had witnessed “Moorish” 
celebrations could assert that?
“...their chief breed of Horses**.for shape and speed 
are certainly the most Noble and Rarest Kind in the 
World. Their Horses Habits and Furniture, on Festival 
Daies, make up a Figure of extraordinary State and shew 
their emulating one another*..and though they are plain 
and poor in everything else, yet the Trappings of their 
Bridles and Saddles are rich and finB to an incredible 
degree." (23?)
It will be seen that Ismacil,s cavalry was perhaps more effective 
as an expression of conspicuous display around Meknes, than as 
the spearhead of a war-machine, poised to combat an alien army*
(233) Pidou de St. Olon tr, Motteux pp, 72—3 cf, Ulindus p, 175 
G^# “Tur.iuman” p* 15 of the text and 28 of thB translation
(234) Hindus p. 143
(235) MouBtte: “Histoire*.*n p* 159
(236) For examples, see the w3ournal du Voyage de St* Amans” p* 317, cf, 
S.I* 2S France Vol. IV No* XIII Memo* of 3-B, Estelle , Tetuan 
3une 1693 pp. 78-9 cf, Windus pp. 8-9 and 152-155
cf, Pidou de St* Olon tr. Mottuex pp. 67-8
(237) “The Last Account from Fez:..*11 p. 2
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CHAPTER III: ISMAIL'S YEARS OF IMCREASIMG ASCENDANCY
Foreshortening within the indigBnous tradition has granted to 
IsmaCil, for the first half of his reign, a standard images that of 
the tireless and aggressive warrior who, for twenty—four seasons, 
never passed an entire year in his palace (1), This is iconography.
After 1677, when he was relatively sure of his military supremacy 
within the Atlas arG, IsmaCXl frequently proved that, as a war—leader, 
he could be cautious, procrastinatory and fickle. Only gradually did . 
he accommodate himself to the burdens of territorial expansion beyond 
the Atlas arc. It is true that the period 1678-90 can superficially 
be seen in terms of successful aggression* These years saw the full 
extension of tsmaCil*s purely dynastic suzerainty within the Maghrib 
al-Aqsa* They also saw peripheral victories in the jihad. But these 
victories form part of an overall paradox to XsmaCil*s reign* They 
came to the sultan whon his military policies were not at their most 
heavy-handed.
Over the years 1678-80, retreat enabled IsmaCil and his household 
to survive a major trial by natural disaster. During the early months 
of 1678, a serious outbreak of plague swept'inland from Tetuan (2). It 
did not subside for over two years* "Al~Fasi chronicle" noted the 
ferocious measures undertaken in the spring of 1678 for the protection 
of the sultan and his entourage. cAbid troops were set at river-fords
(1) Thus, al—ZayyanI noted, with reference to the year 1104/1692-3:
"fa-innahu aqama fl tamhid al-maqhrib wa hurub al-thuwwag wa fl-khawari.i
C —  C © * »  —  — —
ala dawlat arba wa ishravn sana. lam vuc^ pm biha fi darihi sana wahida"
( Thus he spent twenty-four years of his reign in setting the Maghrib to 
order, and in wars against rebels and dissidents* During that time there 
was not a single year in which he remained in his own hbuse**.)
("Turiuman" ed. Houdas p. 25 of the text cf. 46 of the translation)
(2) MouStte: "Histoire..." p. 112 cf. "Nashr al-Fiathani. e d , / t r *
Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV
pp. 227-8
118
with orders to slaughter travellers attempting to reach Fleknes or Fes 
from plague-stricken northern towns# But the miasma reached Fes, and 
the city*s extramural “Suq al-Khamis11 was fired, in an attempt at 
hygiene (3)*
The crisis forced Ismacil into the conduct of an extensive haraka#
For the first time, as sultan, he would cross the Atlas# This move had 
some of the trappings of venture and aggression# But it was fundamentally 
governed by the sultan*8 interest in self-preservation# In the Flay of 
1678, Ismacil completed what muster he dared# This included a summons 
to the Fasi militia, the last men allowed to travel between Fes and 
Fleknes before communications bBtwBen the cities were ruptured (4)# Muhriz, 
the sultan*s eldest son was left in Fes as vice-roy (5)# But the mass of 
the imperial household and army was lumbered clear away from Sais, on to 
the plateau of the uppBr Floulouya (6)# The subsequent track of this 
monstrous caravan, during a twenty month long expedition was, for the 
most part, an extensive promenade of Isma ilfs eastern and southern 
territorial perimeters#
The journey involved the sultan in incidental forays, in certain of 
which he was involved personally* But these forays were atypical# Flou^tte, 
in his “Histoire*#*1 gives an extensive account of this haraka# as 
experienced by a party of European captives who, as orderlies, formed part 
of its company (7)# His narrative makes it clear that much of the expedition 
was militarily flaccid* Its first expression of aggression was a feeble
(3) “ Mashr al-Flath ani* * *1 ed*/tr* Flichaux-Bellalre A#F1* Vol# XXIV p# 227
For thB siting of the “Suq al-Khamis” on the northern outskirts of the 
“old" and ”new“ cities of Fes, see R* le Tourneaut”Fes avant le 
Protectorat“ p# 383
(4) “Mashr al-Flathani***” Volume cited above* pp# 227—8
(5) MouBtte: “Histoire**»“ p* 113
(6) MoufSttes “Relation**»“ p# 66 cf* “Mashr al-Mathani*..“ Volume cited
above* p* 278
(7) Flou&ttes “Histoire*.,” pp* 114-125
summer1 tax-raid upon Moulouya peoples, ending in negotiation. A 
subsequent move into Tafilelt, Isma il's only known visit, as sultan, 
to the dynastic homeland, was essentially a royal progress among the 
m^nor shurafa1. That clique of cAlawx kinsmen, including the recently 
pardoned al-Harran, which was opposed to lamaCilfs authority, avoided 
confrontation with the haraka in Tafilelt, by slipping into "Chergi” 
country far to the north, and awaiting the sultanfs departure.
It was at this stage that Isma il took the major risk of the 
expedition. After summoning re-inforcements from Fes, where the plague 
was still rampant (8), he took his army westward into the difficult 
country of the Ayt °Atta Beraber, which centred upon the "Gabal Saghru", 
or north-eastern spur of the Anti-Atlas. The mountain Ayt cAtta were 
able so to maul the infantry of the imperial military column (9) that 
IsmaDil*s demands of them had to be reduced to the bare essentials of 
peace with honour: formal submission, the promise of an open road for 
travellers through Ayt cAtta country, bound for Marrakesh, and, as a 
peculiarly chimerical token of suzerainty, an acknowledgement of the 
sultan*s right to demand of these hill-folk Jihad-service at need (10).
m Q | h ,
It is possible that Isma il was demoralised by his. effective defeat at 
Ayt Atta hands* He shrank from the possibility of further military 
encounter. Rather than remain in Ayt °Atta country, or take his following 
west or south into regions currently under the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn 
Muhriz, the sultan took the risk of a midwinter crossing of the High Atlas 
by way of the snow-fraught "al-Fayja" region* He met with no military 
challenge here* For although the Glawi shaykh who was local chieftain
(8) MouBtte: "Histoire*.*tf p* 117 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani♦.*" ed./tr*
Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 289
(9) MouBtte: "Histoire*. p .  119 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani*.." loc. cit.
(10) MouBtte: "Histoire* . loc. cit.
was father-in-law to Ahmad ibn Muhriz, he had been insulted by his son-
• # '
in-law*s contraction of a further marriage alliance with a rival Susi 
chieftain# He accepted Ismacil*s bribe, and let the alien army pass# 
However, as a security measure, to prevent provocative looting, the 
sultan was forced to execute a number of his own thievish followers.
Dire weather conditions involved the expedition in heavy losses in 
manpower, beasts, treasure and equipment (11).
The next seasonal year, from January 1679 to January 1680, was a 
period in which the sultan’s moves lacked military drama, Jfc carry a 
certain implication of exhaustion# The plague continued to smoulder within 
the cities# So Isma il continued his perambulation# He "lived off the 
land", levying contributions from the open plains of "Tamesna", the 
modern Chaouia, before striking inland into the Tadla, the region where 
his Dila’i enemy Ahmad ibn °Abd Allah still lunked# Ho major moves were 
made against this enemy# The sultan merely supervised the construction 
of a bridge and a fort, while a subordinate general conducted minor 
forays into the hills (12)# The sultan had now been absent from Meknes 
for over a year* Possibly he was uneasy as to the surviving strength of 
loyalty to himself within Meknes and Fes# Fdt whilB he was still absent 
from these, the cities of SaSs, he arranged for his authority to be 
blazoned there, in the grim melodrama of a showpiece execution# Abd 
al-Rahman al-Manzari, the sultan’s wazir. who may once have been governor 
of Fas al-Jadid (13), and who had more recently been a companion of the
(H:) MouBtte; Histoire#" pp# 121-2 and 161-2 cf# "Tur.iuman" pp# 18-19 
of the text and 33-4 of the translation cf "Bustan al-Zarif.#" MS
p# 43
(12) MouBtte: "Histoire##»" p# 124
(13) This is to accept al-Hasiri’s MS reading of the wazir*s name, and the 
consequent identification, and to reject the reading "Elmetrari" given 
by Houdas (^ Kitab al-Istigsa#*#" Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp# 48 and 
6*1 % HTur iuman" ed#71r# HoTicfas p# 19 of the text and 34 of the 
translation#)
long haraka. was executed upon a trumped-up charge of personal morality.
His remains were despatched to be dragged through Fes and then through 
Meknes (14). Clearly this calculated piece of frightfulness was an
example of Isma0! ! ^  technique of "government by pageant".
Chance then favoured the sultan. Ahmad ibn °Abd Allah al~Dilafi was 
taken by the plague. His death seems to have enabled IsmaCil confidently 
to return to Meknes, with an advance guard of his Cabid only* This return, 
in the Danuary of 1680 (15), can hardly be deemed the triumph (16) that al- 
Wasiri wished to imply* But it was the return of an accepted ruler. It 
was the festival seasons "la Pasque de Leide Cubir", and "tous les 
grands du royaume.*.vinrent faire leurs complimens avec de presens" (17) • 
The sultan was now free to widen his military horizons.
During the period 1680-90, and indeed down to 1701, Isma°il had 
three major spheres of military concern: the "Cherg", the Sus and the 
jihad* The significance of both "Cherg" and Sus is relatively easy to 
gauge. Both were regions which were prosperous in themselvesf and they 
were crossed respectively by the major pilgrimage route, and what was 
probably the major gold-route of the Maghrib al-Aqsa . Between the two 
there was an obvious geographical polarity which would eventually involve 
the sultan in two-way military tension* But, for a decade, Isma il’s 
cautious approach to military entanglement allowed the two regions to
alternate as spheres of military priority*
(14) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 124 cf. "Tur.iuman" p. 19 of the text 
and 24 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." M5 p. 33
(15) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 125
(16) "wa wasala al-sultan ila miknasa. fa-ihtalla bi-dar mulkihi. wa
iatacada arrka cizzihi"
("And the sultan reached Meknes, took possession of his royal palace 
and sat upon his glorious throne") ("Kitab al-Istiasa...11. Casablanca
text” Vol. Yll p. 61 )
(1?) MouBtte: "Histoire.**" loc. cit.
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By comparison with the demands of "Cherg" and Sus, the jihad , a 
coastal struggle, may be seen as merely ancillary to imperial policy.
It was never the object of personal campaigning on the part of the 
sultan. Isma il*s was essentially an inland empire, to which the 
coast was literally of marginal significance* Isma il*s great officers 
were typically haraka generals* There existed no Moroccan parallel to 
the Algerine ta*ifa of the rutasa! or privateer captains. And, on 
Ismael’s behalf, the mu.iahid Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammaml would makB 
the boasts
"•♦•fly master, whom God preserve, has no need of the sea, or 
of maritime affairs to make him great and prosperous...for 
less than would suffice for the building and entertaining of 
one ship, he can maintain a thousand horsemen, that are more 
worth than a thousand ships*’1
When faced with the nascent ’’gunboat" policy of European powers, bent 
on putting an end to the depredations of Moroccan corsairs, IsmacTl, 
although he had a private and, as will bB seen later (19) increasing 
interest in the little Saletin corsair fleet, was loth to spare troops 
to defend his own ports against alien reprisal. Watch and ward along 
the coast was habitually assigned to local men, or to troops of low 
quality* A landward bias also kept IsmaCilfs practical involvement 
in warfare with the Europeans of the enclaves at a low level. Here
lihad was essentially petty, localised warfare. From 1680 onwards, 
it was to be carried out in the sultanfs name, and with at least the 
token assistance of imperial troops* But fundamentally it was the 
concern of regional quwwad commanding peoples of the Habt and Western
(18) Translation of a letter from the "Alcaid Hamet" to "The captain of 
Tangier, Kirke the English", included in S. Pepys t Miscellanea
Vol. II p. 381 and quoted in Routh: "Tangier..." p. 234 (Footnote)
(19) Sea Chapter V Pp, 227-8
Rif whose territories adjoined the coastal outposts of the aliens.
But the jihad was nevertheless an instrument of imperial policy.
It will be seen that the victories of the mujahidun were systematically 
publicised by the sultan, in an attempt to enhance the glamour and 
legitimacy of his rule..To public opinion within thB Maghrib al-Aqsa, 
Christendom was the ideal enemy* It has been noted that, in one of its 
rare touches upon foreign affairs, the “al-Fasi chronicle" which 
emanted from the literary intelligentsia, recorded the victories of 
the Ottoman Balkan campaign of 1683 (20)* And there were wider 
expressions of martial religious fervour* Northern townsfolk, apparently 
unconcerned that in celebrating a seasonal midsummer festival they 
were carrying out a practise belonging essentially to the iahiliva 
rather than to Islam, would on "St* 3ohn*s Day" organise processions 
and mock-battles in celebration of the holy wars
"***at which time the gravest People will be passing
through the streets with wooden Horses, Swords, Launces 
and Drums, with which they equip the Children that can 
scarce go, and meet in Troops in the 5treet, and engaging, 
say *Thus we destroy the Christians1*"
It was against such an ideological backdrop that Ismacil was working 
when he aligned military manoeu#rBs of his own in accordance with the 
progress of the coastal war with the Christians*
The sultan IsmaCilfs formal intervention in thB jihad dates from 
the spring of 1680, and should be set into the context of widespread 
natural disaster. The plague was in Its final spasms^ and throughout
(20) See Prologue Pp* 18-19
(21) Windus p # 45  Leo simply recorded^that on "5t, Dohn!s Day" it was
customary for the Fasi to light straw bonfires
throughout their city ( ed* Ramusio f* 38). The more developed notes
of Windus imply the grafting of latter-day ideological content on to 
an ancient festival, after the fashion in which Guy Fawkes Day 
developed*
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the Maghrib al-Aqsa, the spring rains failed catastrophically (22)*
Set into both thB “Nashr al-Mathani.* *11 (23) and MouBtte*s “Histoire..
are detailed accounts of elaborate religious ceremonies involving
prayers for rain. The final processions within Meknes were lBd by
IsmaCil himself, as imam of the people (24). The cloudless skiBS would
seem to have demanded acta of public expiation. When the sultan, in March(25),
C
issued a command to Umar ibn Haddu al-Hammami that he should lay siege 
to Tangier, he may well have been making a gesture of flamboyant piety, 
parallel, on the grand scale, to his orders for the destruction of the 
little Catholic shrines within the Miknasi building site (26).
The siege marked the intensification of the jihad rather than its 
move into an entirely novel phase* Umar ibn Haddu, the lieutenant of 
IsmacIl*s who had slipped into Ghaylan*s old sphere of influence, had 
been skirmishing intermittently with the Tangier troops ever since 1677 
(27). And the sultan*s hard military committment to this siege was of 
the lean cut that became standard in such affairs. Isma il despatched 
to the muiahid commander*s aid “quelques troupes de..*Noirs“ from his 
own guard. They were to accompany the locally raised army which the ga'id
(22) MouBtte: “Histoire.**” pp. 9 and 135
(23) “Nashr al-Mathani. e d * / t r .  Michaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol* XXIV
pp. 335-6
(24) MouBtte recorded that “une secheresse generate*..avoit gate tous les 
grains et les fruits” and noted that, after several processions,
Isma il “le 17 mars,«.*se revetit d*un vieil habit tout crasseux et 
d*un mechant turban sur la teste, et, les pieds nuds, il sortit du 
palais, accompagne de tous ceux de sa Cour, aussi pieds et testes 
nues, et de tout le peuple de la ville en pareil estat. En cet 
equipage, il visita toutes les mosquees des saints de sa loy*..“
(“Histoire...” p. 126)
(25) MouBtte: “Histoire...“ p. 128 cf* Anon: "An Exact Journal of the 
Siege of Tanaier” (London, 1680) p* 1
(26) MouBtte: “Histoire*.*” loc. cit.
(27) See Chapter II P. 104 and Routh: “Tanaier.**“ pp. 160-169
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mustered at his own provincial capital Alcazarquiv/ir (28)* The deployment
C "■*
of a few abid outside Tangier is unlikely markedly to have weakened 
the military forces at Isma il*s own disposal* The sultan himself 
never visited the siege*
The mass of Isma il*s forces were, for this campaigning summer, 
destined for the “Cherg"* The preliminaries to this, the sultanfs 
first major eastward move, suggest that he wished to preface the 
campaign by establishing an understanding with the city of Fes* Late 
in April, IsmacIl summoned to Fleknes the aged °Abd al-Qadir al-FasI, 
shavkh of the zawiyat al-Fasi* He came personally to receive the 
shavkh at the most notable sanctuary in Meknes, lodged him in one of 
the new-built wings of the palace and, in his honour, proclaimed a 
general amnesty for prisoners* It is possible that the sultan was 
also financially generous to his guest* Immediately upon his return to Fes, 
shavkh began extensions to the buildings of his zawiva (29)*
This visit may signify more than the public establishment of 
amity with a notable civic sage* It is passible that the sultan was 
toying with the idea of a bid for Tlemsen, and that he wished the shaykh 
to activate in his favour the unofficial diplomatic links by which 
Tlemsen was connected with Fes* Fes and Tlemsen were sister cities, 
linked by the transverse eastward route of the northern pilgrimage*
Under political or economic pressure, merchants of either city might 
shift their business to the other* During the seventeenth century there 
seems to have been a marked westward shift by Tilimsani who were opposed
(28) MouSttes "Histoire,*.M p* 128
(2g) "Nashr al-Mathanl***1* ed*/tr. Flichaux-Bellaire A.M* Vol. XXIV p. 337
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to government from Algiers (30 ). Of those citizens who remained, there
m Q m
may have been a number who, during the first decade of Isma il*s reign,
Q m
seriously considered exchanging Algerine for Alawi rule. The religious 
expression of such political views would have been association with the 
dominant Shadhiliya tarioa , to which all the important fraternities of 
the contemporary Maghrib al-Aqsa, including the Jazuli "way” of the 
al-Fasi, were also affiliated (31). The minority sympathy with Algiers 
was expressed, in Tlemsen, by association with the Qadirzya clan of the 
Awlad Sayyidi Shaykh (32). During a Tilimsani uprising against the Turks, 
in the autumn of 1674, thB city*s Shadhiliya zawiva of SayyidI Abu Madyan 
had been destroyed (33). In 1680, MouStte alleged that Tilimsani "Moors*' 
were continuing to request Isma il*s aid against Algerine forces, as 
they had been doing for some time (34)
Fasi citizens of 1680 would have had an interest in the sultan*s 
acquisition of Tlemsen. Its capture would have removed the fiscal 
barriers to trade (35) between the two cities* And it is possible that, 
in an hungry year for Fes, this would have facilitated a westward flow 
of grain from thB agricultural whorl to which the smaller city of 
Tlemsen was hub. According to nal-Fasi chronicle", the Fasi granaries
(30) 0* Dapper: "Africa*..11 ed./tr. Ogilby p. 208# The origin of this 
piece of secondary source material is unknown. But the existence of 
a Tilimsani community_in Fes earlier in the seventeenth century is 
vouched for by al-Ifrani, who noted mob attacks upon this community 
during 1610 riots ("Nuzhat al-Hadj..." ed./tr. Houda3 p* 234 of 
the text and 388 of the translation)
(31) For a summary of Sufi religious affiliations in the Maghrib al-Aq^a, 
see E. Michaux-Bellaire "Les Confreries Religieuses au Maroc" in A.M. 
Vol XXVY T  (Paris*,^79275* pp. 1-86 and in particular pp. 72-82
(32) A. Cours "Ltetablissement des dynasties des chierifs au Maroc, et leur 
rivalite avec les Turcs de la Reoence d1AlQer ^509-1830*' (Paris, 1904)
p. 247
(33) "Mashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-BellairB A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 244
(34) MouStte: "Histoire..." p. 134
(35) The existence of such barriers is implied within "Ocklev"*s allegation 
that, within Morocco, traders from the Ottoman Empire paid lower 
taxes than did other alien merchants (p. 40 ),
had been exhausted since the time when the iihad had been declared; 
there seems to have been heavy associated inflation in the city (36)* But 
it will be seen that Fasi hopes were dashed by the actual course of the 
"Chergi" campaign* The expedition demonstrated that lsmacIl was no 
military champion of purely Fasi interests* and that fundamentally the 
concerns of city and sultan were divergent*
Before his departure eastward* IsmacIl received a fillip to his 
prestige at second hand* the capture of two outlying bastions to the 
Tangier defences* Fort Charles and Fort Henrietta* A truce with the 
English followed (37)* The victory was blazoned forth* and the victor 
received in triumph at the palace gates (38)* This mulahid victory was 
the only remarkable achievement by Isma13! ! ^  forces during the year 1680*
It will be noted that al-Zayyanl endowed IsmaDIl,s first easterly 
expedition with considerable military and political moment (39)* But* as 
recounted by MouBtte (40)* the 8Ultan*s haraka of 1680 emerges as an 
expedition quite as dilatory and self-preservatory as the long haraka of 
the previous two years* Isma II*s priority seems to have been the feeding 
of his army during a famine-summer* and* once again* its preservation 
from plague* In late Oune* the sultan,s column moved eastwards* away from 
the capital,s pestilence* It moved into the territory of groupings 
from the Angad plain* who are alleged two years previously to have rallied
C36) Nashr al-flethanlw..11 ed*/tr* nichaux-Bellaire A*P1* Vol. XXIV
pp* 335 and 358
(37) MouBtte: "Histolre**.11 pp. 129-131 cf* South: wTangier•*•" pp* 175-80
(38) The sultan* "...envoya publier par toutes les rues de Hiquenez* qu'Amar 
Hadou son esclave avclt reimports une signalee victoire sur les Anglois* 
en ayant tue un grand nombre* fait quantite de captifs* et pris dix- 
huit pieces d*artillerie*.*at lorsqu’Amar arriva avec ses depouilles* 
le Roy I1alia recevoifc comma triumphant hors des portes de son 
chasteau*'* (MouBtte* "Histoire...*1 p* 131)
(39) 5ee Epilooue Part II Pp* 328-9
(40) MouBtte* "HistoirB...” pp* 131-2 and 133-4
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to his dissident Filall kinsmen, refugees within their country during
the sultanfs temporary occupation of Tafilelt (41 )• Local murabitun
*,_l
persuaded the sultan to accept a mediated settlement* But only at the 
end of the presumably harvest-stripping summer did IsmacIl stir his 
following into a move upon Tlemsen* By this time, the Turkish garrison 
of its citadel had been effectively re-inforced, in expectation of his 
attack* The sultan was presented with a letter from Algiers, threatening 
positive military action if he did not confine himself to accepted 
frontiers* After petty wrangling, he received news that Meknes was 
plague-free and withdrew*
A startling note within ft&l-Fasi chronicle1* implies that, within 
Fes, the haraka had been expected to move more decisively in the eastern 
march* For late August, there is recorded the news that the sultan had 
been defeated outside Tlemsen and that, in consequence, the already 
inflated price of grain had taken an additionally vicious upward flirght
(42)* The news of defeat is dismissable as rumour* But it may still be 
inferred that IsmacTl,s military moves had failed to match Fasi economic 
hopes* The expedition seems also to have fallen below IsmacIl*s 
expectations* He may have hoped that the expectant Tilimsani populace 
would rise on his behalf* And his mood upon his return to Sals may be 
judged from the plaintive note within "al-FasI chronicle" that, upon his 
passing through Fas al-Oadid, after having reached the gates of Tlemsen, 
the sultan refused to spend even a single night in the proximity of Fes 
itself, but went on straight to Meknes (43)*
(41) NouBtte: "Histoire***" p* 116
(42) "filashr al-WathanT***" ed*/tr* fllchaux-Bsllaire A*P1* Vol* XXIV p* 338
(43) "Naahr al-flathani **.” Volume cited^above* loc* cit*
The return is here dated to 3/Shacban/l091 ■ 29/8/1680* MouBtte*s 
narrative ("Histoire**." p* 134) implies a September date that 
overcrowds his later tale-telling*'
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Within weeks of his inglorious return to SaXs, IsmacIl nipped a
political development in the bud by demoting the titular vics-roy of
Fee: the ill-beloved eldest son Muhriz, whom two years previously he had
left in token authority over the plague-ridden metropolis, Fasi notables
journeyed to Meknes in support of the claims of Muhriz (44), It seems
probable that these Fasi notables had made of the young prince a civic
protege. It is consequently likely to have been for his father*s
political security, rather than for the licentiousness adduced by
FlouStte (45), that the young prince was dismissed to Tafilelt, along
with the sons of al-Rashld (46),
The successor of Kuhriz within Fes was his half-brother Muhammad,
• *
Muhammad was still a child, too young for his beguiling by the Fasi yet 
to be of great significance to his father. Twelve was the most advanced 
estimate of his age given by any member of Kirke*s Tangier mission, 
which met with the young prince during his first year of office (47), 
However, unlike Muhriz, who was henceforward to be a minor political 
figure, Muhaipmad was to be significant dynastically for the next quarter 
of a century. His singling out at a young age for titular eminence, and 
his later retention of that eminence can most plausibly be accounted for 
by the suggestion that personal charm graced both the boy and his mother. 
All that is known of the mother is that she was European* Her nationality 
was variously attributed by European commentators and is irrelevant* As a 
"RenBgado Christian11 (48) she was, in the terms of local society, 
effectively of slave origin and without kin. Her union with Isma il could 
thus have brought him no political advantage whatsoever* ¥,bt, along with
(44) "Nashr al-Mathan&Vi?1 ed,/tr, Michaux-Bellaire A,PI* Vol, XXIV p, 338
(45) MouAttes "Hiatoire,,,11 p, 134
(46) "Nashr al—Mathani,,,11 Volume cited above, loc, oitw
(47) HThe last account from Fsa,,»n p, 3
(48) ibid, loc, cit.
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her son, she was set up in al-Rashlc^e former palace in Fas al-Jadld, 
with her own courts the move was a combination of estrangement and 
promotion*
The removal to Fes of an European “queen” may have co-incided with
an increase in the MiknasI palace status of another of IsmacTl,s
womenfolk, CAyisha Mubarka the “Black Queen” (49)* Unlike the alien
mother of Muhammad, cAyisha was a woman about whose person followers
of her husband would congregate, in the role of real or notional
c
kinfolk* As will be seen, Ayisha came eventually to symbolise the 
relationship of the cavalry corps of Udaya to IsmaGIl (50)* In 1680, 
the corps of Udaya is known to have been developing* During that year, a 
fort known to MouBtte as “LudBya” was constructed next to the new 
MiknasI palace, as a citadel for its defence (51)* It has been noted 
that the Udaya are likely to have originated in 1677, with the sultan,s 
scooping into his train of a rabble of Nawz and Murrakushi men (52)* 
Tradition suggests that the Udaya force expanded in stages, and that 
the second wave of its recruits came from beyond the Atlas (53)* For 
the year of dearth 1680, there may have been an influx of potential 
Udaya recruits, migrants from “the Province where old Mulev was born"
(54) and from similar oasean regions, brought across the Atlas by 
drought*
Drought may also have provided the impulse to the extension of 
Isma il*s suzerainty across the Atlas, as far to the south-east as Tuat*
(49) “La Reyna Negra" s Del Puerto Bk* V* Ch* 43 p* 616
(50) See Chapter Itf Pp* 170-174
(51) MouBtte: “Relation**.” p* 148 cf* “Histoire***” p. 190
(52) See Chapter II Pp* 103 and 105
(53) “Bustan al-Zarif***11 MS p* 29
(54) Thus Braithwaite described the place of origin claimed by the “Lydyres" 
of his own day p* 24
As noted previously, al-Rashld had maintained a representative In Tuat 
for a period at the end of his reign (55)* But It seems improbable that 
there was any direct continuation of a link between Sals and Tuat during 
IsmsPll^ early years* Until 1677, IsmacIl was engrossed in his duel with 
Ahmad ibn Muhriz for mastery within the Atlas arc* During this period, 
the politics of the south-eastern oases are likely to have been conducted 
in effective isolation from those of the interior Maghrib al-Aqsa* In 
1677, Ismacil sent out to Tafilelt a oatid of his own, Mamdun (56)* 
However, the sultan seems to have wielded little Filali authority over 
the next few years, except during his short period of personal intrusion 
into Tafilelt in 1678* Ismacil,s half-brother al-Harran is likely to have 
been seen as primus inter pares among the leading Filali shurafa**
However, at a point probably to be dated to the autumn of 1680, the sultan 
was able to command his oatid Hamdun to lead a Filali haraka out as far 
as Tuat* Other commanders, including al-Harran, seem to have accompanied 
the qalld on this expedition (57)* This Filali coalition may well have 
been a "spin-off11 from economic disarray* Tafilelt, dependent upon the 
lower Ziz and Rheris for the irrigation of its palm-groves, is likely to 
have been affected by the 1680 drought* But Tuat, which draws its water 
from subterranean reservoirs ("foggara") (58), may well have been spared 
disaster* The expedition seems to have taken revenue in kind, as well as
(55) See Chapter II P* 90
(56) MouBtteS "Histoire* . p p ,  106 and 116
(57) The chronology is that of MouBtte ("Histoire**." p. 135)* But the 
expedition ho noted seems identifiable with that dated to 1678, and set 
into the Tauati record of one "al-Tamentiti" (quoted Martin p* 64)* This 
expedition was said to have been led by three of Isma 11*8 guywad, one 
of the yamdun, the others "al-Mahdi" and All, all accompanied by 
al-HarrSh , It seBms necessary to subordinate this chronology to that of 
MouiStte, who noted that in 1678, al-Harrah , then at odds with Isma il, 
had retired to the Angad region* ("Histoire*.." p* 116)
(58) 3* Despois and R* Raynal: "Gsoaraohie de l*Afrigue du Hord-Ouest" (Paris, 
1967) p* 451 cf* Capitaine Los "Les foggaras du Tidikelt" in 
"Travaux de l^nstitut de Recherches Sahariennes" Uol* X (Algiers,
1953) pp* 139-179 and Vol XI (Algiers, 1954) pp* 49-77
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in "Rashldlya" currency (59)* It may be seen as the instrument with which
Sais and Tafilelt reached out to Tuat together, to compensate for the failure
of the September date harvest in oasean regions nearer to the Atlas. In
broader terms, it marked a new period in the economic subjection of Tuat
to a sultan in Sa£s* Three further Tauati expeditions uould be mounted
from Sals during the early 1680s (60 )*
The extension of IsmsPil^ authority over Tuat is remarkable in terms
cof distance* The Bus, Dar a and "Qibla", which included regions far nearer 
to Meknes than was Tuat, had as yet been left to the suzerainty of Ahmad 
ibn Muhriz. The disproportion is evidence of the comparative ease with 
which an intermittent authority based upon the haraka could be extended
v ..
along a geographically open route* It may also be evidence of Ismacil,s 
continuing reluctance to engage with his nephew in the rough country that 
hedged "inner Sue1*# * .
There was to be no urgency to Isma 11*8 movements against Ahmad ibn 
Muhriz, for as long as the nepheu*s interests remained limited to "Chleuh" 
country and to its southern fringe* It is true that an army supposedly 
pitched against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was mustered in Sals during the spring of 
1681 (61)* But in MouBttefs opinion this army was destined only for 
Marrakesh (62)* The campaign which IsmaCil envisaged may have been 
essentially defensives a counter demonstration of force in the face of a 
nephew whose military reputation was soaring* During the previous year,
Ahmad ibn Muhriz had been occupied in a "Qiblan" war, of which reports had 
come back to Meknes, along with a gift of twelve eunuchs, which the nephew 
presented to Ismacll (63)* The reports included the tale of a mighty victory,
(59) "al-Tamentiti" quoted Martin p* 64
(60) "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 65
(61) wMashr al-Mathani**.11 Bd,/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV p* 345 
cf* "Tur .Inman" *o. 19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf*
"The last account from Fb2*.." p* 2
(62) MouBttes "Histoire*..11 p« 145
(63) ibid* pp* 135-7
won by Ahmad ibn Muhriz at Taghaza, over a Sudanic prince, son to a
fabulously wealthy king* This talB may well have been simple rumour, a
by-product of the exotic gift, and one further northerly echo of the
Sudanic expeditions of the reign of Ahmad al-Mansur* The character of
the tale ia to be judged by its details on the bravura of Ahmad ibn
Muhriz in storming the walls of Taghaza* Taghaza was a bleak salt-mine,
which by this date is likely to have been in its last stages of
habitation, if not deserted (64)* Even in its heyday, it had been
simply an huddle of huts and caverns (65)* The Saharan battle reports need
evince nothing more than the pre-occupation of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, in a drought
year, with the protection of his southern frontier from the cjreenward
migration of desert peoples* The gift to IsmacIl may even be seen as a
wheedling indication that the nephew, currently under pressure, desired to
maintain the established territorial delimitation* Nevertheless, both
"al—Fasl chronicle*' (66) and the drama of Mou8ttefs narrative make it clear
that, btj 1681, an highly enhanced opinion of the military prowess of Ahmad
ibn Muhriz had become widespread within Sals. This added menace to a
northward diversion of the prince*s interests* He movBd into his father-in-
law^ High Atlas territory of the Banu Zaynab, adjoining the "al-Fayja"
region (67)# From here he was well-poised to make a bid for Marrakesh*
But in 1681, Isma il*s threat of a southerly counter-move was not to
be carried out* The affairs of the lihad intervened* In early April, peace
was made with the English of Tangier (68)* In the aftermath, the muiahidun ,
cunder the leader of Umar ibn Haddu* were diverted towards Mamora, the
(64) R# Maunys "Tableau Geooraphiaue de 1*Quest Africain au Moven Aoe***" 
(Dakar, 1961) p* 116
(65) R* Mauny et*al* "Extraits tires des l/ovaoes d*Ibn Battuta" (Dakar, 1966) 
p* 35 cf* Leo ed*Ramuslo f* 77 ** *
(66) "Nashr al-Mathan?***" sd*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M. Vol* XXIV p* 345
"Tur 1uman" p* 19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif.»*" MS p. 34
(68) "Nashr al-Mathanl**»" Volume cited above* p* 346 cf*
Souths "Tangier***" pp* 2D8-9
least defensible of the Spanish enclaves* Within four dayay Mamora, 
whose water-supplies had been cut* was ready to capitulate (69)* The 
capitulation was carefully staged as a theatrical set-piece for the 
enhancement of the sultan's glory* The Spanish authorities within 
ttemora Mere willing tamely to accept terms which involved the surrender 
of the town's heavy field-pieces, and the enslavement of its garrison, 
barring the six officers and a chaplain (70)* Ratification of these 
terms was deliberately delayed until the sultan, summoned post-haste, 
could arrive at Mamora in person, to receive the ceremonial submission 
of its captain general (71)* Subsequently, provincial governors 
throughout l3macXl's domains were commanded each to organise a week's 
celebrations (72)* The show did not betray the regional interest which 
lay at the centre of mu.iahid political gravity* Isma°il took the guns 
and the captives^ but cUmar ibn Haddy was kept complaisant* He and his 
following were granted the town's booty* They built two new settlements 
on the outskirts of the former Spanish fort (73)*
It is possible that this capture of Mamora, a second port to Sale (74)*, 
endowed Isma il with sufficient glory to outweigh, within the Atlas arc, 
the risen prestige of Ahmad ibn Muhriz* The whole campaigning season lay 
ahead, and the incidents surrounding Mamora's capitulation had not been 
of a weight sufficient to induce military exhaustion* But the projected
(69) “Nashr al-MathanT**." ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol. XXIV p* 346 
cf* L* Galindo y de Vera* "Histopja, vicisitudes v politics tradicional 
de Esoana respscto de sus poseslones en las costas de Africa** (Madrid, 
1884) pp* 275-6
(7Q) Moubttes "Histoire*..11 pp* 147-8
(71) Moabite t"Histoire*..11 loc* clt* of* "Turiuman" dp* 19 of ths text and
33—6 of the translation cf, 11 Bustan al-Zarif*.*" MS p. 34
(72) Moubtte* "Histoire..." p* 148
(73) Moubtte: "Histoire***" p* 150 cf* "Turiuman" p. 19 of the text and
36 of ths translation* The origin of^al-Nasirr's^suggestion
that the town was repopulated by Susi Cabjd ("Kitab al-Istlosa* * *". 
Casablanca text Vol* VII p* 63 cf* Fumey translation A*M* Vol*IX p* 84) 
is unknown, It would seem unreliable, as Isma il had not yet set foot 
in the Sus*
(74) S.I* 28 France Vol* IV No, CXLIV Memo* of 3*-B* Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 p* 705
southward move against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was abandoned* The indefatigable 
reporter Germain Mou8tte, who was ransomed in the May of 1681, could 
view the land he so gratefully left as a divided empire, whose towering 
unifier al-RashXd had been succeeded by two rival princes (75)*
It seems likely that Ahmad ibn Muhriz only drew down upon himself 
attack from IsmacIl in the north, by his own renewed intervention in the 
"Cherg"* Both indigenous and European sources record the rumour that, 
before the opening of the campaigning season of 1682, the southern 
prince made diplomatic contact with 8aba Hassan, Dey of Algiers, with a 
view to a dual-pronged attack upon Ismacil (76)* It also seems possible 
that, with the understanding of the Dey, Ahmad ibn Muhriz entered into 
dealings with frontier groupings from the politically sensitive eastern 
march* St* Amans, waiting in Algerine waters on the eve of his embassy 
to Morocco, recorded the rumour that "un chef d'Arabas" had organised 
"quelques levees'* in the name of the "roy de Sus", nephew to the Moroccan 
sultan (77); the context implies a border location for this activity* 
However, events of 1682 ruptured any possibility of collusion 
between Algiers and the ruler of the Bus* Baba Hassan indeed brought an 
army westwards (78)* He was able to punish Tlemsen in a sack that was 
well-remembered in the day's of Shawfs eighteenth century travels (79)
(75) MouBttes "Histoire**." p* 60
(76) S*I* 28 France Vol* II _No* XX p* 252 Prat to Seionelav Marseille,
15/8/1682 cf* "Turluman" p.^19 of the text and 36 of the 
translation cf* "Bustan al-Zarif**." M5 p* 34
(77) S.I* 2® Franee Vol* II No* XXI p* 254 St. Amans to Seionelav.
11/9/1682* St* Amans* informant was Pere Bean le Vacher, who straddled 
the roles of vicar apostolic and French consul in Algiers*
(78) 5*1* 2* Franee Vol. II No* XX p. 252 Prat to Seionelav Marseille,
15/8/1682 cf* No* IV St* Qlon to SBionelav Genoa,3/6/1682 pp* 208-9
(79) Shaw; "Travels and Observations**." p* 49 cf* 5*1* 2* France Vol. Ill 
p* 75 Memo* of consul Piolle in Algiers, dafcegi 17/5/1687, and recalling, 
in the context of a renewed threat from Isma Xl against "Tremessen",
the "pillage qua Babassan avoit fait en cette uille"*
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By mid-Bune, there was an uncouth envoy of Ismacil*s in Constantinople 
(80), presumably despatched to protest against border incursions by the 
Algerine troops, incursions which al-Zayyanl*s tradition inflated into
C \
an invasion of Snassen country and the capture of Dar ibn Plash al (81)# 
However, by this time, Algerine border aggression was evaporating under 
external pressure# Cherchell lay under the threat of bombardment by a 
French fleet under Duquesne, and Baba Hassan was forced to retreat to 
its defence* He made peace with IsmaeIl, who had brought an army into 
the "Cherg" against him* As part of this agreement, the Dey is alleged 
himself to have put down the rising of frontier peoples who favoured his 
SusI ally (82)# lsmacIl himself was currently at peace with major 
European naval powers* The early months of the year had seen Moroccan 
ambassadors in both Paris and London# But there was a convenient religious 
veto against conflict with fellow Muslims under pressure from the infidel 
(83)# This freed the sultan from "Chergi" involvement, and offered him 
the opportunity to turn southward in pursuit of Ahmad ibn Muhriz#
Isma II fs entry into "inner Sus" was an unprecedentedly bold venture#
It marked a serious and complex expansion of the sultan's military horizons# 
Unlike the relatively open "Cherg", the Sus was protected by terrain from 
being the object of relatively brief summer campaigning# Prior to this 
first Susl expedition, Ismacilfs army was seem, in the Dune of 1682, massing
(80) S#I# 2* Franee Vol# II No* XII p« 229 Guilleragues to Louis XIV,
Pera, 13/6/1682
(81) "al-turk la'u bi~roahallatihim* wa i s t a w W Cala ban! viznasin wa °ala
mm Q T / r " " 1 " "" ' 1,1111
dar ibn mash al"
("*##the Turks came with an armed force and took possession of Snassen 
(country) and of Dar ibn Mash al") "Turiuman" p* 19 of the text cf*
36 of the translation#
(82) S#I# 2* Franee Vol* II No# XXI p#* 254 St* Amans to Seionelav. 
Algerine waters, 11/9/1682# Information from P~ire Bean le Vacher.
(83) It could be alleged that IsmacIl would have pursued the Algerine army in 
1682, "si les docteurs de se loy ne l'eussent empesche, luy ayant 
represente que e'eatoit contre leur religion de poursuivre leurs freres 
tandis qufils estoient attaques par dss Chrestiens" (S*I. 2* France 
Vol. II No* XX p* 252 Prat to Seionelav. Marseille 15/8/1682)
137
outside Sale (84)* It was not to return to Sals until the November of 
1683 (85)# For Isma il the expedition was unfortunate# Paucity of eye­
witness evidence makes it impossible to detail Susi opposition to the 
sultan of the "Gharb11# But the course of Sus! events suggests that around 
the figure of Ahmad ibn Muhriz there had coalesced both the civic forceI •
of Tarudant, and the rural resistance of "Chleuh" countryfolk, and that 
Isma^Tl had therefore to wade across a recalcitrant province# When the 
French embassy of St# Amans reached IsmacTl,s mahalla in the December of 
1682, it was still stationed in High Atlas mountain country, considerably 
to, the north of Tarudant (86)# The city of Tarudant itself was only 
invested during the following spring, when Ahmad ibn Muhriz retreated 
thither (87)* At this point, Susi opposition to Ism?5!! reached a 
violence discernable even as filtered through the medium of Jfal^FasI 
chronicle"* 1683 saw three successive and bloody encounters in the 
region of Tarudant# In all of these, Isma il would seem to have been 
worsted (88)# His situation may have been complicated by commissariat 
problems 8 this was yet another year of dearth (89)* In the late summer 
of 1683, Isma il accepted a renewal of peace with his nephew (90), and 
retreated to Safs, leaving Ahmad ibn Muhriz peaceably to re-inforce his
(84) S*I. 28 France Vol* II No# XIV p# 234 St* Amans to Seionelav , 
Toulon, 2/7/1682# Information from Sale, by way of the "echevins1* of 
Marseille#
(85)^ashr al-MathanT***" ed*/tr# Michaux-Bellaire A#M# Vol* XXIV p* 357
(86) "Journal du Vovaoe de St* Amans** pp* 328-9
(87) 11 Nashr al-Mathani* * *11 Volume cited above# p* 356
(88) "Nashr al—MathanX***" ibid* loc# eit# cf#
"Tur.luroSfn" pp* "19-20 of the text and 37 of the translation
(89) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above# p #  357
(90) "Nashr al-Mathani**." ibid* p# 356 cf# "Tur luman"
- - loc* cit*
cf# "Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p* 35
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own authority within the Sus* In the September of 1683* the nephew* in 
a genial mood, was re-establishing mastery over the Sue! port of Agadir 
(91)* The uncle’s mood was such that, on hie return to Sals in November, 
he refused to receive a courtesy visit from the Fasi aCvan (92)*
The sultan may have been well aware that these a°van had made good 
use of his absence* The unlucky dry spring of 1683 had caused considerable 
social disturbance within their metropolis* Hungry members of the Fasi 
populace had forcibly to be made to return to the city* after fleeing 
their responsibilities (93)* Civic dignitaries seem to have extracted 
what advantage they could from this social miasma* The adolescent vice­
roy Ruhammad was set up in public* to distribute free food to the starving. 
The distribution was made* not from the palace* but from the zawivat 
al-FaaX (94)* The location of this hieratic action suggests that* during —  
the period of his father’s southern absence* the young prince* like his 
half-brother and predecessor Muhriz before him* had been drawn into a 
degree of identification with the magnates of Fas al-Ball* The advantage 
of such an identification would have been mutual* In this context,
"al-Fasx chronicle" gave to the young vice-roy the sobriquet of "the 
scholar" ( "al—calim")* This implies that Muhammad* the prince without 
maternal kin* had already become identified with a "pressure group" 
who might act for him in lieu of sueh kinfolks the culama’* Henceforward* 
this growing eon of Isma il’s would always be Ruhammad al- Alim* the 
schoolmen’s prince* And, for as long as his father allowed him to remain 
within the city of Fes* he may be thought of as an inheritor of the
(91) S.I. 2* France Vol* II No* CXCII Extract from the journal of the 
privateer 3ean Doublet pp. 597-9 (Dating corrected in Volume V of the 
series No. LXXXX p* 528)
(92) "Nashr al-Mathani**«" ed*/tr* Richaux-Bellaire A.PI* Vol* XXIV p* 357
(93) "Nashr al-Rathanl**." Volume cited above* p* 356
(94) "Nashr al-Mathani*#." ibid« loc* cit*
tradition of al-Rashld* an cAlawI prince who identified himself with 
Fasi interests*
m m Q t m  ■
Isma il’s warrior credit cannot have been high during the early 
months of 1684* Blit the sultan’s prestige was about to receive a 
gratuity* Since the summer of 1683, the evacuation of Tangier by its 
English garrison had been a prospective certainty (95)* There were 
blatant preparations for departure, including the destruction of the 
port’s fortifications and famous mole* Meanwhile, the enclave was 
kept under tokBn and amicable siege, at the command of the aa’id 
of Tetuan, cAli ibn cAbd Allah al-Hammaml (96), whose following came 
from the Western Rif* Samuel Pspys, a witness to one stage of the 
evacuation procedures, was able to meet this "Alcade", exchange 
pleasantries with a "Moorish" sentry, and watch the mulahidun idly 
pacing their own camp "almost like ghosts, all in white" (97)* When 
the evacuation was completed, in February 1684, these muiahidun needed 
only to enter and rebuild the ruined town (98)* To this acquisition of 
the hulk of a small port, a prize was added by chance* The move into 
Tangier concentrated cAlI ibn cAbd Allah’s followers in the town's 
general vicinity when, ipi early April, a flagship of Spain ran aground 
near to Ceuta* Its abandoned cargo, which was effectively presented to 
the Muslim infidel, included coined money and a battery estimated at 80 
cannon* A contingent from Fes was sent out to aid the local Rlfl 
Ghumara in the thankless task of dragging the cannon into Msknes (99)*
(95) Rouths "Tanoier***" pp* 274-251
(96) "Tur.iuman" p* 20 of the text and 38 of the translation cfv
"Buatan al-Zarlf***" MS p* 35 cf* Rouths "Tangier***" loc* cit*
• 11 J "1
(97) S* Pepys ed* 3* Smith "The Life* Journals etc***" Vol* I* 
pp* 370-371, 424 and 433
(98) "Naahr al-Mathani***" Ed*/tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M* Vol* XXIV
pp* 371-2 cf* "Tur tuman" p* 20 of the text and 38 of the translation*
(99) "Turluman" loc* cit* of* S*I* 2e France Vol* III No* CXIII Memo*
of 3-B* Estelle dated 19/7/1690 p* 312
Their safe delivery may be assumed to have proved cAli ibn cAbd Allah 
a loyal servant to Isma0!!*
In Meknes, the latter end of 1684 is likely to have been taken up 
with preparations for Ismael's second bid to take the Sus* One sullen 
captive from the MiknasX palace building site, who was only too relieved 
at the sultan*s departure from his own vicinity, carefully noted the 
date upon which the great haraka made for the souths Danuary 1st*
1685* He further remarked that, whatever the outcome, "Fight Dog,
Fight Bear11, it was two or three years before the sultan's return was 
to be expected (100)* In envisaging such an unprecedented period of 
absence from the lands within the Atlas arc, campaigning in a region where 
he had already met with severe defeat, IsmacXl had clearly subordinated 
his characteristic caution to a straightforward desirB for the acquisition 
of his nephew's rich territory*
There was little threat to his own sovereignty within the Atlas arc*
But the devolution of power associated with the sultan's absence from the 
region influenced particular political fortunes* As vice-roy, at the 
centre of government in Meknes, there was left the adolescent prince 
Zaydan (101), Ismael's eldest son by cAyisha Mubarka, the woman to be 
associated with the cavalry corps of Udaya (102)* This seems to have 
been Zaydan's first induction to political prominence* As will be seen, his 
status among Ismael's sons would later be paramount* Maintenance of order 
within the provinces was entrusted to great guywad* Bias within European 
source material makes Tetuan the best known of such provincial commands*
(100) T* Phelpss "A true account of the captivity***11 pp* 8 and 12* The 
author's terming Daftuary 1st "New Year's Day" indicates that he was 
using the "Nb w  Style1* chronology*
(101) It was to Zaydan as vice-roy that Isma0!!, still within the Sus in 
the November of of 1686, addressed a letter giving instructions for 
the protection of the restored Spanish Franciscan mission in Meknes 
(Del Puerto Bk* VI Ch* IV pp* 648-9)
(102) For discussion of the problem of cAyisha Mubarka's relationship to the 
growing corps of Udaya, see Chapter IV Pp* 170-174
It is from this period of Isma il's second Susi campaign that Ali ibn 
cAbd Allah can be seen to have held court and government like a petty 
sultan* His state was publicly demonstrated when, in the September of 
1685, he arranged a magnificent wedding ip Tangier for one of his sons 
(103), a ceremony that was possibly ancillary to the son's establishment 
as governor over the new Muslim town* The ga,id of Tetuan had a 
responsibility which particularly distinguished him* He conducted 
diplomatic relations with European powers, acting always in the sultan's 
name but enjoying a wide scope for discretion (104)* The first of this 
ga'id's known series of letters written to Louis XIV on behalf of his 
master, dates from the month following IsmacTlts second departure for the 
Sus (105)* Within the developing diplomatic status of cAlI ibn cAbd Allah 
there may be discerned the embryo of the "nivaba" of Tangier, the pre- 
Protectorate government office through which all European correspondence 
with the sultan was necessarily channelled (106)*
During the sultan's three years of absence from Sais, over the period 
1685-7, the mechanism of his government continued at least to turn over* 
Tuat was granted the remission of half its taxation as customarily 
assessed (107)* But no known graces were extended to peoples within the 
Atlas arc* Obligations in the matter of defence are those for which most 
evidence survives* During Ismael's first Susi expedition, the coastal 
regions had enjoyed peace* But during this second expedition, the Atlantic
(103) 8*1* 2e Franee Vol* II No* CIV Extract from the journal of the
French naval officer Brodeau pp* 536-9
(104) S*I* 28 France Vol* III No* V* Extract from the journal of Pierre
Estelle, at Tangier, for the November of 1686 p, 10
(105) S*I* 2e France Vol* II No* LXXVI pp. 474-7 cAlI ibn °Abd Allah
al-Hammami to Louis XIV 7/Rabil/lQ96 as
* 11/2/1685
(106) R* Mauduits "Le Makhzen Marocain" pp* 298-9 cf* 0* Ayaches "La 
question des archives historiaues marocaines" p* 371
(107) Imperial zahir discovered at Aougrout and reproduced in translation 
by Martin* d . 65
littoral was under persistant threat from the sea* Correspondingly, 
demands were made upon coastal peoples, and upon the militia of the inland 
towns* Three months after the sultan's departure, the citizens of Sale 
were fined for failing to keep an adequate guard of the coast: a 
night-raid by English ships had destroyed two Saletin corsair vessels 
sheltering in Mamora harbour (108)* During the following year, 1686, 
when a French fleet under d'Estrles cruised off Tangier for several 
weeks of the early summer, a force from the interior, under the 
nominal command of one of Isma il's sons, was brought to the assistance 
of Ali ibn Abd Allah** This re-inforcement was rumoured largely to be 
made up of the citizen militia of Fes and Marrakesh (109)# These men had 
been made to pay towards the waging of the campaign# Allegedly they were 
terrified that they might be ordered to march south, to join companions 
who were with thB sultan himselff under, an al-Rusf commander (110),
The sultan, once reluctant to become involved in the Sus, was now 
making a determined effort towards its acquisition* The immediate 
campaign was concentrated around Tarudant, in a siege that took two 
years* This siege was punctuated by bloody skirmishes, and by a series 
of attempts to undermine the city walls (111)* It was the city with 
which Isma il was at war* His dynastic rival-in-chief Ahmad ibn Muhriz
(108) S*I* 2s France Vol* II No* C jfernando Superviela* French vice- 
consul in Cadiz, to Seignelay, 9/7/1685 pp* 521-2 cf*
Vol. Ill No* CXIII Memo of 3-B* Estelle. Sale, 19/7/1690 p* 318
(109) "***la plus grand partie est compozee de marchands et d*autre gens de
famillB de Fez et de Maroc" (S*I# 2e France Vol* II No* CXLVIII 
p* 652 Consul Perillie to Seionelav , Sale, 8/8/1686)
O'10) Perillie to Seionelav loc* cit* cf* "Turluroan" p* 21 of the text and
40 of the translation
(111) A near-contemporary supplement to the indigenous tradition on this 
siege is to be found within the unpromisingly entitled work of a 
former English slave, Francis Brooks: "Barbarian Cruelty" * Brooks 
fonew personally the three survivors among four Englishmen who had 
bought their freedom by joining the sultan*s corps of "pioneers" 
outside Tarudant, and remaining there until the successful 
conclusion of the siege*
was eliminated from the struggle at a relatively early stage (112). He^ 
left the city on a private errand, accompanied only by a small guard 
of his abid , ran across a similarly small party of lama il's men, 
and was shot dead during the ensuing skirmish (113)* His death ended 
more than thirteen years of personal opposition to Isma0!!, but was 
of minimal significance to the siege* As figurehead to Rudani 
resistance Ahmad ibn Muhriz was smoothly replaced by his uncle al- 
Harran, who had opted to join nephew rather than brother in the 
dynastic struggle (114)# The succession was in line with the Rudani 
formality that resistance to an °Alawi sultan from the "Gharb'* should, 
whenever possible, be made in the name of an °Alaw! prince* But the 
ease of thi3 particular succession suggests that any CAlau! prince 
might be adopted by the city, with equal convenience*
The death of Ahmad ibn Muhriz may have caused more pertinent dismay 
to Isma il himself than to his enemies within the city walls* Dynastic 
tradition is incorrect in asserting that Ahmad ibn Muhriz was killed 
incognito (115)* More contemporary information suggests that the man 
who killed "Mully Hammet" knew the identity of his victim perfectly 
well, and innocently expected a reward for having put an end to the 
sultan's rival* Instead he was dragged at the mule-tail* His body was 
afterwards exposed at "a place where the Country People used to come 
into the Camp” (116), as a warning to the army and to local "Chleuh** 
alike that the persons of members of the dynasty were to be regarded
(112) S.I* 2° France Vol. II No* CV pp* 543-4 Perillie to Seionelav.
Sale, 18/11/1685
(113) Brooks pp* 18-20 cf* nTur,iumanK o* 21 of the text and 39 of the
translation cf. 11 Bustan al-Zarif**.n MS pp* 35-6
■ 1 1 1 1 *
(114) "Tur.luman1* p* 40 of the text and 21 of the translation cf*; al-Ifranis
KZ111 al-warlf*.*" p* 56 cf* Brooks p* 19
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(115) “Turiuman" loc* cit* cf* "Bustan al-Zarlf...” MS p* 35
(116) Brooks pp* 18-20 (Quotation: p* 20)
as inviolable*
In the March of 1687, Ismail's forces were able to breach the 
wall of Tarudant and take the city (117)* The storming and massacre 
Implied in al-Zayyanl's narrative ^118) should be taken as literary
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convention* Isma il's victory seems to have been relatively 
leisurely, and preceded by negotiation* The memory of al-Harran,s 
"escape” (119) may conceal his pre-arranged evacuation of Tarudant, 
analogous with the evacuation of Marrakesh by Ahmad ibn Muhriz before 
its capture by Ismael in 1677* As for the fate of the populace:
"Mully Ishmaell entred his men and took both the City and 
Castle, and promised the people he would be kind to them; 
but when he took the Town, he secured their Arms, Ammunition 
and Treasure, and carried the people of that place to 
Macqueness*" (120)
The note on "Treasure" aligns with northern rumours concerning an 
heavy and systematic spoliation of Tarudant, aimed at the city's 
social and economic ruin (121)• The allegation of mass deportation 
interlocks with the chronicle record that a new population, the 
RifI community of Fes, was ordered to migrate to Tarudant, after
(117) S.I. 2 Franee Vol* III No* XVII p* 41 Catalan. French consul 
in Cadiz, to 5alonelay. 14/4/1687, quoting information recently 
received from Pierre Estelle in Tetuan*
Al-Xa^yanl's chronicle material dated the capture of Tarudant to 
Dumada 1^1098, a month crossing the March and April of 1687 
("Turluman" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation)
(118) "fa-dakhalaha °anwatan bi 'l-savf" ("He entered it (the city) by 
force at sword-point") (“Tur .toman" loc* cit*)
(119) "wa haraba al-harran" ("And al-Harran fled") "Bustan al-Zarif***"
* fis*p.J36)
Al-Ifrani's glutinous "Zill al-lterlf***" suggests_that al-Harran 
was pardoned by his brother and exiled to the Hijaz ( p* 56)
(120) Brooks pp* 20-21
(121) S*I* 2s France Vol* III No* XVII p* 41 Catalan to Seionelav.
Cadiz, 14/4/1687 cf* ^
No* XCIII Memo, of consul Perillie on Moroccan trade, dating from
January 1689 p* 234
Ismacil had made the place into a "ghost city" (122)*
In terms of al-Ifrani's dynastic myopia, the "fath rudana". or 
victory over Tarudant, was an event of great moment which marked the 
accomplishment of Ismail's "tamhld" or ordering of his empire.
Decorously he shifted its date by seven months, into an alignment 
with the year's festival of °Id al— &dhan. or Day of Immolation. And 
he claimed that the city's fall entailed willing submission by the 
peoples of "further Sus" (123)* This view is open to wide question*
It will be seen that, in the long term, IsmacIl's capture of Tarudant 
was an hollow victory. It did not lead to the city's economic ruin* 
Mushroom-like, Tarudant was within two years noted as functioning, 
apparently efficiently, as the economic centre for "Moorish" and 
Jewish merchants of the Sus, and as the clearing-house for debts 
contracted in the course of Agadir trade (124)* Nor did the fath 
rudana entail the shrivelling of Sue! opposition to government from 
the "Gharb"* On the contrary it may be seen as having committed 
IsmacIl to a protracted military occupation of "further Sus", a 
region which would come to be regarded as "the thorn in the sultan's 
foot" (125).
Admittedly, the fall of Tarudant carried an immediate eclat* As 
news of the city's surrender spread, the victor was granted
(122) "wa amara bi—khurui ahl al-rlf alladhlna bi-fas vi'tuna li-
sukna tarudant havthu lam vubtjg. biha ahad"
("And he gave orders for the migration of the RifI community of Fes 
and for their coming to settle in Tarudant* For not a single 
parson remained there*") ("Turiuroan" p* 21 of the text cf* 46
of the translation)
(123) al-Ifranl: "Zlll al-UarIf«*.» p. 56
(124) S.I. 2® France Vol.Ill No. XCIII Memo* of Perillie dating from
Oanuary 1669 pp* 234 and 235
(125) "Cette espine que le rov de Marroc a dans le pied luy fait une
grande peine*" (3*1. 2 Franee Vol. IV No* C H I  3-B* Estelle to
Pontchartrain Sale, 23/10/1697 p* 535)
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ostentatious expressions of loyalty* In Tetuan, Ali ibn Abd Allah 
organised "grandes festes" by way of victory celebrations (126)*
And Muhammad al- Alim, the vice-roy of Fes, journeyed all the way to 
Tarudant with an escort of Fasi °ulamat * shurafa' and a°van , in 
order to congratulate his father (127). The deputation may symbolise 
Fasi hopes for the subsequent exploitation of the Sus*
Meanwhile, in Algiers, there were rumours that conflict 
with the victorious sharlf was imminent (128)* These rumours were 
apparently fBd by the sharlf himself* In the May of 1687, the Dey 
al-Hajj Husayn, commonly known as "Mezzomorto", is said to have 
received a bombastic communication from Isma al* This communication 
approximated to a declaration of war* Allegedly it harked back to 
"Chergi" events of five years previously, and amounted to a demand 
by Isma il for the surrender of Tlemsen, together with the value 
of depradations made by Baba Hassan within that city (129)* Rumour 
rebounded back into the Maghrib al-Aqsa* A consignment of tents, 
which Isma0!! commissioned from Sale, were believed in that city 
to be destined for a projected "Chergi" campaign (130).
However, even by the time Isma il's letter was said to have
arrived in Algiers, a chill had fallen upon the euphoria of the
Rudani victory* The sultan had already discovered that the subjection 
of Tarudant was not the subjection of the Sus* He was not militarily
(126) S*I« 28 France Vol. Ill No* XVII Catalan to Seionelav. dated
Cadiz, 14/4/1687, and containing information from Pierre Estelle
in Tetuan* p. 41
(127) "Tur iuman" p* 21 of the text and 40 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarlf***" MS p* 36
(128) S*I. 2e France Vol* III No. XIX Memo* of Piolle. French consul in
Algiers, 19/4/1687 p. 45
(129) S.I. 28 France Vol. Ill No XXIX Memo* of Piolle, Algiers,
17/5/1687 p* 75
(130) S*I. 2e France Vol* III No* LIV PeriHie to Seionelav. Sale,
26/7/1687 p. 133
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free to come north to put force behind his threat of a "Chergi11 
campaign, or to defend hie own Atlantic littoral, under renewed 
French naval threat* News came to Sale of a six months1 veto upon 
any departure from the supposedly victorious sultan*s army (131 )*
The coast was left essentially to its "home-guard" pattern of defence 
(132)* In the Duly of 1687, the news in Tetuan was that the sultan 
was still engaged at "Tolidan" (133)* Laudatory accounts of his 
exploits need indicate no more than that he was still engaged in 
haavy fighting* The eventual date at which IsmaCil abandoned 
personal campaigning within the Sus is likely to have been autumnal, 
and a matter of season rather than decisive victory* A. lieutenant 
"Zacatin", whom MouBtte had known as Ismail*s "treasurer" (134), 
and who was sufficiently close to the sultan to be referred to in 
conventional parlance as his "uncle" (135), was detached from the 
sultan*s army, set in command of a sizeable body of cavalry (136), 
and left in the Sus with orders to prosecute Ismail’s interests*
IsmacIl himself led the main body of his troops northwards* A tax- 
raiding force, headed by an al-Rusi commander, would seem to have 
been hived off from this army upon its homeward march, and despatched 
to Tuat* There, from the end of Danuary 1688, gysur-ruining government 
troops made up for the previous two and an half years of fiscal lenience (137).
(131) S.I* 2e France Vol* III No* XXIV p* 70 Perillie to Seionelav
Sale, 12/5/1687
(132) S*I* 28 France Vol* III Nos* XXIV and LIV pp* 70 and 133,
Perillie to Seionelav* Sale, 12/5/1687 and 26/7/1687
(133) S.I* 28 France Vol* III No. LII pp, 128-9 Pierre Estelle to
Seionelav. Tetuan, 26/7/1687
(134) See Chapter II Pp* 109-110 and MouBttes "Histoire**»" p* 200
(135) "Ocklev" p* 54
(136) S.I* 2e France Vol* III No. LXII p. 162 Perillie to Laonv
Sale, 10/2/16B8
(137) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and corroborative Timmi document, 
quoted Martin pp* 65-7
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Meanwhile, the sultan himself returned to Meknes (138)*
In Meknes, Isma il received news of challenge within both Sus and 
"Cherg". "Zacatin"*s forces were embroiled with "Chleuh" mountain men
(139). To the east, a muted confrontation was being mounted within 
the Regency* For, since the victory over Tarudant, Ismael's reputation 
within Algiers had allegedly been "redoutable" (140)* From the spring 
until the November of 1687, Mezzomorto had dawdled about his own capital, 
allegedly expecting that IsmacXl would make some move against him (141)* 
And, in the 3anuary of 1688, following a short expedition against his 
own southern march (142), the Dey moved an army into the "Cherg11. The 
timing of this move suggests that the Algerine troops were poised to 
face the sharif who had newly come northwards* But a pose of neutrality 
was carefully preserved* The Deyts forces were turned, not against 
Tlemsen or against rural peoples of the march, but against the 
Spanish presidio of Oran, which they beset as mu.1 ahidun from the 3anuary 
of 1688 until the following August (143)*
It is possible that Mezzomorto*s donning the mantle of a mu lahid 
saved Isma°Xl from the immediate obligation of carrying out a threat 
to Tlemsen which he had issued in the bubble of victory over Tarudant, 
and which he may not have wished to make good* However, at the end of 
August 1688, the moral barrier posed by the siege of Oran was lifted* 
Thereafter, IsmaCIl was urged to move eastwards even by Porte diplomacy.
(138) 5*1* 2 France Vol* III No* LX p. 152 Translation of a letter 
from Abd""ftliah al-Rusi to Perillie dated Meknes 12/1/1688, and 
suggesting that the consul come to the capital for an audience of the 
sultan*
(139) S.I* 2b France Vol* III No. LXII p* 162 Perillie to Laqnv. Sale,
10/2/1688
(140) S.I. 28 France Vol. Ill No. LV p* 138 Memo, of Piolle. Algiers,
2/10/1687
(141) S.I. 2° France Vol* III Nos* LV and LVI Memos* of Piolle. Algiers
2/10/1687 and 29/11/1687 pp. 138 and 140-141
(142) S.I. 28 Franee Vol III No* LVI Memo, of Piolle. Algiers, 29/11/1687
p. 141
(143) L, Galindo y de Veras "Historia. vicisitudes*.*" pp, 279-282*
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Mezzomorto mas currently at odds with his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan 
Sulayman HI# An Ottoman envoy, Khalil Aga, was despatched towards the 
Maghrib al-Aqsa with a letter that was rumoured to grant its sharlf a 
diplomatic "free hand1' to move against the Regency (144)# However, the 
“free hand** was kBpt in rein# Khalil Aga was kidnapped by Mezzomorto 
as his ship passed through Algerine waters in the October of 1688 (145)* 
Isme^il’s only immediate reprisal for the Insult was an act of petty 
high-handedness: in November he seized a party of French captives who 
had been taken by Algerine corsairs, but afterwards disembarked upon 
cAlawi territory (146)#
The Sus was still an escalating military commitment » Reinforcements 
to ”ZacatinH,s army of occupation, under the command of Ahmad ibn Haddu 
al-CAttar(147) passed through Sale in the December of 1688 (148)# Yet, 
even in the same month, there was a prefiguration of a separate and 
major campaign# A consignment of military baggage carts was set under 
construction by Saletin joiners, at the imperial command * The labour was 
singular, in that wheeled traffic was little known in the contemporary 
Maghrib al-Aqsa# Perillie, the French consul in Sale, believed that the 
carts were destined for the ’’Cherg1* (149)#
The new year brought further indications that the sultan might be 
intending to move eastwards# IsmacIl was at pains to refurbish his 
relations with Fasi notables, after a fashion reminiscent of thB
(144) S*I* 20 France Vol# III No# XC p# 223 Vauvre to SBionelav , Toulon,
9/11/1688
(145) S#I# 2s France Vol* III No# LXXXV pp# 214*15 Isma0!! Pasha* 
exiled Pasha of Algiers, to Louis XIV , Tetuan, 2275htf 11-Hijja/1099
« 17/10/1688
(146) Brooks pp* 77-8 cf# S*I. 2s France Vol# III No* LXXXVIII 
pp# 220-221 Catalan to Seionelav. Cadiz, 8/11/1688
(147) This officer is not to be^confused with the mu.iahld captain
Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami al-BattuwI.
• • *
(148) S.I. 2e France Vol* III No# XCII p# 231 Bed Atiplars. naval envoy,
k° Seionelav. Sale,' 5/1/1689
(149) S.I. 2® France Vol. Ill No. XCI p* 228 Perillie to Seignelav , Sale
25/12/1688
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preliminaries to his first uChergi“ campaign* IsmaCil was not a ruler 
noted for lavish hospitality or financial ostentation* His personal 
frugality and public stinginess were standard points for European 
comment (150)* Yet, in February 1689, he invited the Culamat of Fes to 
feast with him, in celebration of the conclusion of a series of lectures 
in commentary upon the Our*an* Money was distributed at the feast (151)*
In March, Algerine vessels were noted to be flitting Moroccan ports (152)* 
According to report, Algerine troops were brought to mass in the region 
of Tlemsen (153)*
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Yet Isma il failed to carry out the expected eastward venture. The 
Franco-centric PerilliB saw this reluctance to expand along a 
geographically open north-eastern frontier as IsmacTl*s betrayal of his 
own "grand dessein" (154)* It is simpler to see that caution onde 
again prevented the sultan from making an aggressive move that might have 
had dire consequences* There was continuing unrest within the Sus, and 
rumours of further unrest in Marrakesh and in Tafilelt (155)* All could 
have provided considerations to weigh against Isma il making any 
flamboyant gesture against the Regency*
The sultan turned instead to the jihad as a source of renown to be 
obtained with greater military economy* Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami, ca*id 
of the north-western plains, and brother and heir to GUmar ibn Haddu, the 
victor over Mamora (156), was ordered to muster an army at his provincial 
capital of Alcazarquivir, for an attack upon the presidio of Larache* He
(150) For examples of such comment, see Pidou de 5t* Olon tr* Motteux p. 60 
°T* Busnot pp* 40 and 52 cf, Mindus pp* 121 and 137
(151) "Nashr al-Mathani*,," ed*/tr* Michaux-BBllaire A,M* Vol,XXIV p, 411
(152) 5*1, 2e France Vol* III No, XCVII p. 244 Perillie to Selonelav ,
Sale, 25/3/1689
(153) S.I* 2e Franee Vol* III No* CII Perillie to Seionelav , Sale
16/7/1689 " p. 264
(154) ibid* pp* 263-4
(155) ibid. p* 263
(156) "Turiuman" p* 19 of the text and 36 of the translation.
was granted the services of a party of French renegade “pioneers" (157), 
but seems otherwise, at this stage of events, to have been left to his 
own resources* The siege was opened in the August of 1689 (158) and 
lasted four months* Its chief distinction was an heavy use of the
“pioneers"'* gunpowder (159)* An early estimate of the army of attack at
24,000 foot to 4,000 horse (160) is doubtless highly inflated. But thB 
proportions given are not unsuitable to siege warfare. And, when seen 
within the wider context of a society besotted with cavalry skills, 
they tell their own tale as to the quality of the soldiBry brought to
mill around the presidio. The sultan took no personal part in the
assault upon Larache* He was not even summoned formally to take part in 
its highlights. But it seems that he remained in Meknes while the siege 
continued, leaving subordinates to suppress Murrakushi disturbances, and 
to direct the continuing Susi warfare (161), At the end of October,
“k*10 wulahidun took the town of Larache, as distinct from its little 
citadel (162), From this point onwards, a Muslim victory was inevitable*
Q
Deftly the sultan sent in a detachment of his own abid , together with 
levies from the civic militia of a number of towns (163), Three weeks 
later, in mid-November, the defending forces surrendered upon terms
(157) "Qcklev" p, 12
(158) “Nashr al-Mathani* * *“ ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 411
cf* S.I* 2° France Vol. Ill No* CIII Perillie to Seionelav. Sale
879/1689 pp* 268-9
(159) L* Galindo y de VeraJ "Historia. vicisitudes* . p p ,  283-4 cf* 
al-Ifranis “Nuzhat al-Hadi..." ed* Houdas pp* 406 of the text and
' ' *' 506-7 of the translation.
(160) S.l. 2® france Vol. Ill No. CIII Perillie to Seionelav 8/9/1689
p. 269
(161) ibidi, p, 270
(162) S.l. 2s France Vol. Ill No. CV Perillie to Seionelav. Sale 6/11/1689
p* 275 cf* “Tur.luman" p. 22 of the text and 42 of.the translation.
(163) S.l, 28 France Vol. Ill No. CV Perillie to Seionelav. 6/11/1689
which non-Spaniards delighted to record as shameful: the chiBf officers 
and friare arranged to go free, along with their possessions and church 
plate* Isma il took the cannon and ammunition, and was permitted to 
enslave almost the entire surrounding populace, which was estimated at 
above 1,600 and included around one hundred officers (164)* Ahmad ibn 
Haddu*s followers were allowed to repopulate the port (165), which 
became a quiet haven for ship-building, fishing and “pirating in Row­
boats" (166), The ga*id built a residence in the town: the “Summer-house" 
Braithwaifce saw nearly forty years later (167).
Capture of this shallow-water port was of no particular advantage 
to Isma ilfs total command of the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Yet, from a partisan 
Muslim viewpoint, the taking of Larache was a noble achievement* It was 
a victory for the forces of Islam which, unlike the taking of Mamora 
and of Tangier, had involved a period of genuine warfare. It was 
celebrated in poetry which forebore to stress the sultan*© absence 
from the scene, and which, somewhat ill-adviaedly, went on to threaten 
Ceuta and Oran (168), The victory was carefully wrung for its 
propagandist value. The Larache gates were dragged into Meknes (169).
And, according to "al-Fasi chronicle", there was issued in January 1690 
an imperial zahir that black shoes werB no longer to be worn) for their
(164) S.l. 20 France Vol. Ill No. CVII Perilljjg to Seionelav. Sale 
18/11/1689 pp. 280-81 cf. Brooks pp. 45-7 cf.
"Ocklev" pp. 5-7 cf. "Tur luman" pp* 22-3 of the text and 42-3 of 
thB translation*
Curiously, Perillie*s figure of 1634 for the total number of Spaniards 
enslaved is not far from al-Zayyani*s round estimate of 1,80D.
(165) "Turluman" p*j23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 40
(166) BraithwaitB pp. 295 and 299
(167) ibid. p. 296
(168) Al-Nasiri referred to three such pieces of verse, and quoted in 
extenso two poerns^ the works of Fasi literati of Ismacii*s day 
("Kitafa al-Istiosa***" Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 73-76 cf.
Fumev translation. A.M. Vol* IX pp* 99-103)
(169) Windus. thirty years later, saw the gates set up in IsmsCil*s palace.
(p. 102)
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wear was alleged to have begun as a sign of mourning for the surrender
of Larache to the Spaniards in 1610 (170)*
Politically Isma il was now in the ascendant* Victory in the jihad
co-incided with a maximal extension of his Miknasi grip over the Sus. By
C M
the March of 1690, Ahmad ibn Haddu al- Attar had returned from the Sus*
* • • •»
He was granted high palace favour, and appointed governor of Sale, Safi 
and Agadir (171 )• The honours indicate that the commanders previous 
year*s campaigning within "Chleuh" country had made its mark. And 
indeed it would be two years before any further rumour of Sus! unrest 
reached the French consulate in Sale* More than four years would pass
C at
before Ahmad ibn Haddu al- Attar had to return to the re-inforcement
• • i*
of "Zacatin'^s army of occupation (172)* The early 1690s may thus be
seen as years during which the sultan of the uGharbH, by way of his
lieutenants, achieved a degree of authority over ^Chleuh" country that 
he will be seen to have found difficulty in regaining at later stages 
of his reign* This Susi victory seems to have been a valid, if 
temporary expression of forcible pacification, which should properly 
overshadow al-Zayyanl’s well-known tales of pacification among the 
Beraber of the Central Atlas (173)*
Recognition within the Sus had brought Ahmad ibn Muhriz into alliance 
with "Qiblan1* peoples of the western Sahara (174)* Now that IsmaDil in
hie turn was overlord of the Sus, he may have made parallel alliances*
toindus transmitted the memory of such an alliance in the language of
(170) "Nashr al-Mathani.**u Fes lithograph of 1B92 Vol. II p* 136 of the
first notation*
(171) S.l* 2e France Vol* III No* CXII Memo* of 3-8* Estelle, directed
by way of a Marseille intermediary and dated 6/7/1690 pp. 297-8
(172) S.l. 20 Franee Vol* III No* CLXXXI Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , Tetuan
27/2/1693 p. 559 cf. Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo, of the same, Sale
19/10/1694 pp* 303-4
(173) See Prologue Pp* 22-24 and Epilogue Part I Pp. 294-303
for notes upon the weakness of this Beraber material*
(174) MouBttes "Histoire**." p* 135
decorously riggish romance, saying of Ismacil that?
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"In the year 1690, before he was Waster of Sahra, there 
came a Woman from that People to him who, hearing of her 
coming, went to meet her on Horseback, at the head of 
twenty thousand Wen* She told him the People of Sahra were 
desirous to put themselves under his Protection, but that 
he must fight her at Launce-play, if he had a mind to have 
hBr, at once the Pledge of their Fidelity, and the Prize of his 
Victory* She set him hard at first, but afterwards suffered 
herself to be over-powered, was put among the rest of his 
Women, and Troops were sent to protect the Frontiers of
SfihEa." (175)
The anecdote echoes an indigenous tradition concerning a marriage 
alliance between Isma°il and a Saharan woman that, as a result of 
dynastic metabolism, would later be blown out of all due proportion
(176)* Behind Windus*s stylised narrative there seems to lie only
m m Q m m
the suggestion that Isma il was now sufficiently prestigious a 
ruler for certain desert peoples freely to accept his suzerainty, 
and to seal the bond with the gift of one of their daughters# The 
note upon "Troops" subsequently being sent to the south suggests 
that the sultan was able to capitalise upon the alliance by making 
some moves in sheltered territorial expansion* Thus it is known 
that, during the 1690s, imperial renegade troops were being sent, 
in the mass, to the DarCa valley (177)# It is evBn possible that 
the despatch of a force of Isma 11*8 soldiery to Timbuktu dates 
from this expansionist period# Timbuktu lay at the end of the Susi 
gold-route. And the existence of Isma il*s Timbuktu garrison is 
vouched for by a latter day note upon sub-Saharan strife of the 
early 1740s, in which a part was played by troops who bore the name
(175) Windua p# 136
(176) See Epilooue Part II Pp# 313-16 for further discussion of this
matter #
(177) "Ocklev" p. 26
of Ismacil,s Maghribl* men (178)* It is likely to have been such 
intervention which astonishingly made "Isma il, sultan of the Arabs"
(sultan al-°arab) a name to conjure with at the Niger bend, even in 
the mid nineteenth century (179)#
In the 3uly of 1690, OBan-Baptiste Estelle, as the newly 
appointed French consul in Sale, remitted one of his first and most 
dutifully copious consular reports (180). The report gave a brief 
assessment of the contemporary situation of Moroccp and of its ruler*
Estelle was young (181) and eager; and in tailoring his information
for the benefit of a government currently at war with Spain, he may 
well have accentuated the positive aspects of Isma il*s sovereignty, 
in the hopes of encouraging French interest in a Moroccan alliance*
Yet, as son to the contemporary French consul in Tetuan (182), the 
young Estelle was no stranger to MaghribT affairs* In their 
chronological context, his notes may be regarded with respect! a 
respect ironically heightened by afterknowledge of the reverses which 
Isma il was to see during the coming decade* The affairs of Sus, 
jihad and "Cherg" all find their place within the report* All serve 
to demonstrate IsmacTl calmly in the ascendant* The sultan was 
described as being currently dynastically secure and thus, within a 
context that specifically included the Sus, "paisible possesseur de 
ces grands et vastes pays" (183)* In writing of the sultan’s disputes
(178)HTadhkirat al-Nisvan***" ed*/tr* Houdas and Benoist p* 74 of the
text and 119 of the translation*
(179) B.N.P* A. MS 5259 f* 66B Shaykh Ahmad al-Bakkav to al-Haii CUmar
(information from Dr* A* Zebadia) *
(180) S*I. 2e France Vol* III No* CXIII pp. 310-319 Memo* dated 19/7/1690
and directed by way of a Marseillais intermediary,
(181) S.l* 28 France Vol. Ill No* Cl Perillie to Salonelay , Sale
7/7/1689 p. 258
(182) See Prologue P* 37 (Note (73))
(183) S.l. 2e France Vol. Ill No* CXIII Memo* of 3-8* Estelle directed
via Marseille , 1 9 / ? / l 6 9 0 p *  311
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with Hle Roy Catholiqua11, the consul noted that Mamara and Larache 
had already fallen to ill-armed forces of attack# He could therefore 
predict an imminent Moroccan capture of the three remaining Spanish 
enclaves (184)# There was little for Estelle to say concerning 
conflict within the "Cherg*1* Concentrating upon the actions rather 
than the rumours of the previous decade, he recorded that war with 
the Algerines was a rarity (185)* In suggested explanation he pointed 
out that Moroccans, even though they regarded the Turks as heretics, 
had commercial and pious interests in remaining at peace with their 
eastern neighbours: for it was important that the annual pilgrimage 
caravan be allowed to proceed freely towards Cairo and Mecca (186)#
One facet to Estelle’s account of Isma il*s person is interesting 
but questionable, even for 1690, and even within a context designed to 
delineate the sultan as a savage worthy of respect# The reporter 
described Ismacil as "naturelleraent valBureux et indefatigable a la 
guerre" (187). The judgement suggests that its author had been 
over^influenced by the sight of a deal of ceremonial tilting and
Q w M
la b al-barud around Meknes# For Estelle was here perpetuating a 
commonplace# Since the capture of Marrakesh in 1677, Ismacil's record 
in the field would seem only partially to justify his glorification 
as a warrior# Only the Sus, during Isma il*s two expeditions thither, 
had seen bitter warfare to which the sultan had personally been a war- 
leader; and even in the Sus, credit for the degree of makhzan 
ascendancy obtaining in 1690 would seem to have rested with the
(184) S.l* 2° Franee V/ol# III Wo# CXIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle directed
via Marseilles, 19/7/1690 pp# 315-16
(185)
(186) 
(187)
ibid*
ibid*
ibid#
p* 315 
p. 316 
p. 315
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commanders who had fallowed up their master's unfinished rural 
campaigning* The **Cherg* had been associated less with war than 
with "alarums and excursions"* And military credit within the lihad 
must obviously go to the great mulahid captains. Estelle's praise for 
Isma0!! the warrior suggests that this sultan's majesty was wielded 
with one important sleights a capacity for extensive delegation 
without personal loss of martial reputation#
********** *»»#*■** X* ******* MXXXXX mmxx  x  x  x * * x x x «  m m
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CHAPTER IV: THE POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM
ADMINISTRATION. SUCCESSION AND RURAL PACIFICATION
Administration and Palace'
Alien contemporaries, with eyes upon MeknBs, and little knowledge
a n
of the deep Moroccan interior, could describe Isma il as a despot*
According to Bean-Baptiste Estelle, the sultan was able to govern 
"ce vasts Empire avec un pouvoir si absolu que tout tremble sous ses 
ordres" (1)* The claim aligns with the historians* common view that 
Isma0!! achieved an ascendancy over the Maghrib al-Aqsau that was of a 
force and magnitude which made it alien in nature from the government 
of his successors, and which was unsurpassed until the imposition of 
the Protectorate (2)* Conversely, the claim accords ill with modern 
sociological assessment of byegone and beleaguered Maghrib! polities*
Gellner has summed up the "traditional North African state" as 
hopelessly weak: no "oriental despotism", but a flimsy net, capable of 
catching an hold oVer meek towns, but incapable of achieving an impress 
upon a rural society defined by tribalism and Islam, rather than the 
fiat of a central government (3).
It is possible to take a median view, and to maintain for IsmacIl*s 
empire the concept of monarchy, while modifying its absolutism* Contemporary
mmQ  ■*»
European assessment of Isma il's government as absolutism is obviously 
to be treated most gingerly* It resulted from the transposition to an 
alien society of contemporary European thought-patterns* Thus MouBtte was 
thinking in Erastian terms when he stated that the sultan was spiritual
(1) S*I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, putatively
dated to the October of 1698 p* 687
(2) E* Michaux-Bellaire? Article "Makhzen" in E.I* 1st* Edn* Vol* III 
p* 168 cf* Terrassa Vol. II pp. 263-4 and 286
(3) E* Gellners Introduction to "Arabs and Berbers" ed. E* Gellner and
C* Micaud (London, 1972) pp. 15 and 18
and temporal sovereign of his empire, because he appointed the qudah (4)* 
Other Europeans saw the hallmark of a centralised monarchy in the sultan's 
lack of any formal council* To Bean-Baptiste Estelle, this was government 
at the royal whim (5), not government whose forms were rudimentary* In 
the same vein, Busnot was able to dismiss the sultan*s great officers or 
"Alcayds" as courtiers, surrounding their master "par forme", while his 
council was kept "tout entier dans sa tete" (6)* The European view of 
Isma il as a despot was in all probability intensified by the more grisly 
rituals of Miknasi court life* The sultan was the object of formalised 
gestures of deference* Great officers walked shabby and barefoot in their 
master*s presence, and attendants contorted their bodies in accordance 
with his physical movements (7)* The execution of criminals and of palace 
offenders, by the sultan*s orders and often by his hand was, as Bvery 
foreign eyewitness stressed, casual and commonplace* All this was part 
of the display of majesty according to the conventions of pageants 
ceremony which served to heighten the distinction of a ruler whose 
grandeur lay in the size of his bodyguard, and whose apparel and public 
demeanour generally held nothing to indicate great rank (8)* Court 
phenomena of this nature cannot be translated into evidence for an 
absolute authority over the empire at large*
At an opposite pole, discussion of the sultan's widBr authority 
in terms of land-tenure gives that authority the appearance of an 
unrealistically precarious economic basis* For, if MouBtte is to be 
believed, there was no recognised array of crown estates, and it was
(4) MouBtte: "Histoire* * p .  160
(5) 5*1* 2° Franee Vol* IV No, CXLIV Memo* of B-B* Estelle putatively
dated to the October of 1698 p# 693
(6) Busnot p* 45
(7) MouBttei "Histoire***" p* 163 cf* tilindus pp* 95 and 124-5
(8) Pidou de St* Qlon tr* Motteax pp* 92 and 150-151 cf* Busnot pp, 22'
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necessary to define the sultan's revenue in terms of tribute (9).
Oblique corroboration for the general truth of this assertion, in
relation to lands within the Atlas arc, if not to Tafilelt, may be
traced within the sultan's efforts throughout his reign to acquire
property in a private capacity* His acquisition in 1682 of the dews'
houses in Reknes provides one example of such behaviour* The consequences
of the dynasty beginning its sovereignty in comparative poverty may
perhaps be traced within the standard European stress upon the sultan's
relentless financial avarice* Europeans in general did not appreciate
the territorial limitations within which this avarice might be expressed.
Even the regions of Ismacil's empire whose relief made them relatively
accessible must be seen as honeycombed with wagf, or, in the local
terminology, "hubus11 territories: islands of relative fiscal and 
« 1
administrative immunity, tied to pious foundations* Braithwaite, bn 
his journey from Tetuan to Reknes, passed through an hubus region 
which seems identifiable with the territorial orbit of Uazzan, a provincial 
zawiva whose founding shar?f had first risen to local prominence in the 
mid seventeenth century (10)* Here was "the seat of a living Saint, the 
most famous one in the whole Country", the people of whose town were 
"all his Vassals, and the Produce of the Country all round the Town, 
at his Disposal, the People paying no other Taxes but to him*" (11)
Yet, lack of a "demesne"* and the existence of territorial immunities 
did not deprive the sultan of a power basis* That power basis is best 
understood in terms of authority over men* Windus gave the quintessence
(9) MouBtte: "Histoire**." p. 164
(10) E* Riehaux-Bellaire: "La Raison d'Quezz&n" in "Revue du Ronde 
Rusulmane" (Paris, Ray 1908) pp* 25-34 cf* the tar.fama of 
"Rawlay Abd Allah Sharif" in the "Nashr al-Rathani*.»" ed./tr.
Richaux-Be1laira A.R* Vol* XXIV pp. 262-266
(11) Braithwaite pp* 129 and 131
of the sultan Isma^Il's provincial administration in the following 
words:
"His manner of governing is by Alcaydes, who have no 
Commission, but receive their Authority only by his 
saying, *Go govern such a Country, be my General or
Admiral! •*”^ 2)
The bonds linking the sultan with such quwwad may be sBen as the 
sinews of IsmacIl's government* For it was the quwwad who brought 
in tribute to Meknes,
It is impossible fully to analyse the administrative role of 
quwwad* Only an handful of individual governors are known by name, 
and not all of these held power contemporaneously* The combined 
territorial cover of the quwwad is therefore impossible to estimate.
But it is possible to say that ouwwad wore the personae of "sultan's 
men". They were not merely "autonomous power-holders who had their 
positions ratified from the center" (13)* It is true that certain 
well-known quwwad originated as local chieftains. But in accepting 
the role of provincial qa'id they became identified with the sultan. 
Thus, Ali ibn Yshshu, the Zammur leader who became one of Isma il's 
generals while retaining authority within Beraber territory at the 
Middle Atlas foot, would be murdered at his master's death (14)* New 
ouwwad who had ousted previous local chieftains were identified with 
the sultan from the time of their advancement. The conventional 
expression of such identification was the myth of humble birth, which 
has been noted as being attached to the gammam! and the Rusi, "new men" 
of the latter 1670s (15)* Further, there were certain ouwwad who tosb
(12) hiindus p* 121
(13) Gellner: Introduction to "Arabs and Berbers" p* 15
(14) S.l. 2e France Vol, IV No, LXI 3-B. Estelle to Pontchartraln 
Bournal for August 1695 p* 355 cf* "Tur iuman" pp. 24-5 and 30 
of thB text and 45-6 and 56 of the translation*
(15) See Chapter II Pp, 104-5
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from the ranks of the palace guard (16)# It would seem unquestionable 
that these last werB popularly identified with the central government#
It was conventionally believed that a sultan*s qa’id began his 
political career destitute at the sultan*s hands# An informant of 
Windua gave a cynical account of the preliminaries to the advancement 
of a new imperial governors
"Now#*#the Emperor never beats a nan soundly, but the nan 
is in the high way of Preferment, and it is ten to one 
but His Rajesty passing by him in Chains a few Days after, 
and finding him in a sad pickle, he calls him his dear 
Friend, Uncle or Brother#*#senda for a Suit of his own 
Cloaths (which is a great Compliment) makes him as fine as a 
Prince, and sends him to govern some of his great Towns; 
for by this means he is sure he has not left him worth a 
Groat, and will make a careful Computation of what he may 
get in his Government#.#"
Retention of the post of aa*id and identification with the central 
government were both maintained together by the rhythmic transmission 
to the capital of festival hadava* The making-up of a tribute caravan 
was complex and costly (18) and, in Braithwaite*s words?
"###it was Ruley Ishmael’s Policy to extort so much from 
his Governors that in return they had no way left to 
supply him but by making themselves odious to the People, 
and in this lay his greatest Security#11
Following a visit to Reknes, the sultan*© favour to a oa*id could be 
delicately expressed by the gift of a caftan or of a queen’s ribbon (20). 
The real reward was permission to continue in office# To this there 
might be added a degree of influence at court# A major governor was
(16) RouBtte: “Histoire*#," p, 176 cf# Windus p# 144
(17) hiindus p. 145
(18) Del Puerto Bk# I Ch. XIV p. 59 cf# S.l. 2° France Vol# IV
No* XXV Remo* of 3-B* Estelle dated 12/9/1693 p# 221 (
Both sources independently describe the make-up of a qa’id of Tetuan, s 
annual hadXva.
(19) Braithwaite p, 36
(20) d0 ia FayB! "Relation en formB de journal de voiaqe pour la 
redemption des captifs aux roiaumes de Raroc et d1AlQBr**.PBndant 
les annges 1723. 1724 et 1725" Paris,' 1726 p.' 240
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likely to maintain a courtier as his agent (21)* And 3ean-Baptiste
Estelle noted that the sultan was "facille a se laisser seduire***
par sea alcaydes ou gouverneurs de provinces et de villes” (22)#
Away from Meknes, the provincial qa*ld enjoyed the profitable
aspect of his persona as nsultan*s man"s the localised devolution
upon himself of much of thB sultan*s authority. Like the power of the
sultan, the power of a aatid was not to be expressed in terms of land-
ounership. No estates were attached to the office of governor as
such (23)# However, in granting a governorship, the sultan made the
grant of a territorial sphere open for exploitation# The aa*id had the
power to extract tribute, to deploy troops upon his own as well as the
sultan*s behalf (24) and, pragmatically, to levy contingents of forced
labourers into his personal service (25)# Hfe also enjoyed the profits
of what might be termed 11 low justice” : cases involving offences which
were less than capital, and could therefore be settled in the absence
of oadX or sultan (26)#
A qa^id maintained his own khalifa to act over periods when he was
resident at court* He also maintained an infrastructure of subordinate
officers (27). The latter would seem to have been civil as well as
c «
military* A characteristic of early Alawi government was dispersal of 
bureaucracy# Much of the incidental tedium and expense of administration 
was localised* Quwwad were responsible for assessing as well as gathering
(21) Busnot p. 207 cf* al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr# Justinard p. 147 
cf. Braithwaite p. 35
(22) S.l. 2e France Vol. Ill No. CXIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle dated 19/7/1690
directed via Marseille p. 312
(23) Uindus p. 227
(24) S.l. 2e France Vol* IV No. CXLIV Memo# of 3-B. Estelle putatively
dated to the October of 1698 pp# 694—5 St 696
(25) Braithwaite p# 12
(26) S.l* 28 France Vol. IV No# CXLIV Memo of 3-B. Estelle , putatively
dated to the October of 1698 p# 696
(27) ibid. p. 694
CF» Pel Puerto Bk.I# Ch# XIV p. 54
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in rural tribute (28). Urban tax-rolls were kept by the town governors
(29). Similarly the records of the Saletin customs dues uere worked 
out by the kuttab of the governor of Sale port and, as a rule, maintained 
within Sale* They would be summoned to the sultan*s notice in evidence 
only if the sultan were dissatisfied with the relevant sums that came 
to him in revenue (30)*
Certain Tawati documents admirably illustrate the administrative 
format by which much paper-work was localised. Incoming open letters 
from the central government contain demands for the Qur*anic zakah. or a 
proportion thereof, expressed in the most amiable and general terms (31), 
By contrast, the documents drawn up locally, to record the make-up of 
a^difa'or fiscal "meal11 for the sultan, are detailed and complex (32)* 
They list contributions towards the whole, as gathered from various 
groupings within the oasean population* The wide range in the sums as 
listed carries the implication of care within local assessment*
The corollary of dispersed bureaucracy was the retention of the 
Miknasi civil administration in relatively low profile. Aliens
(28) Pidou de St* Olon tr* Mgtteux p# 107
The practicalities of a peaceable early Alawi "oharama" are 
unlikely to havB altered far beyond the pattern described in relation 
to groupings or "casts" of the attenuated Sa di realm of the 1630ss 
"*..the chief Alcaid who is designed for the service, being come to 
thB country where the gram is to be levied, sends to the chief Sheck 
of the cast, which may consist of three or fower hundred doress of 
him informing himself of the true number, hee sends to the particular 
Sheck of each doar. and allotteth to each tent a souldier..."
(S.l. 1re Anoleterre Vol. Ill No. XCIII Leconfield MS No. 73 p. 484)
(29) S.l* 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo, of 3-8. Estelle, putatively dated
to the October of 1698 p. 695
(30) ibid. p. 709
(31) Martin* translations of open "sharifian" letters foi'mallv addressed to 
the inhabitants of the TawatX complex and dating from Sha ban 1096
(= 3-31 CJuly 1685) and 10/Safar/l111 (= 7/8/1699) pp. 65 and 74
(32) MSS found at Timmi and Aoulef containing taxation records of the Tuati 
contributions of 1099 (1687-8) and 1108(1696-7) reproduced in 
translation by Martin pp. 65-7 and 71
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customarily floundered in the attempt to grapple with the nerves of 
this administration, and might list an highly eclectic team of central 
government officials* Thus Pidou de St* Olon grouped together a "Grand 
Mufti", a chief eunuch, a treasurer whom he identified with the 
contemporary Rusi governor of Fes, and, fourthly, the superintendent 
of the Miknasi palace building site (33)* It would eeem that the 
sultan had no minister fulfilling the European imaginative mould of the 
"Grand Vizier" as drawn from the Ottoman court of the "Grand Signior"*
The conventional clerical companion of the Maghrib! sultan was a 
simple talib , demurely holding a copy of the Qur1an , mute guarantee 
of the legality of the sultan*s decisions (34)* The term wazir has 
already been noted as being in administrative use* But no wazir seems 
ever to have enjoyed outstanding court rank* Thus cAbd al-Rahman al- 
Manzarl, the wazir of the plague years was remembered chiefly for the 
circumstances of his death, as the victim of a showpiece execution 
which implies that man and office combined token status with 
expendibility. A later wazir , Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab, had insufficient 
personal authority for a letter sent under his name alone to be thought 
fit to carry WBight with the shavkh of the al-Fas! zawiva: he wrote in 
tandem with cAbd Allah al-Rusi the sultan*s aaHd of Fes (35)* A certain 
al-Yahmadi would be remembered in sentimental nineteenth century tradition
(33) Pidou de St* Olon tr* Motteux pp* 116-110* By the "Grand Mufti", the 
author may have meant the qadj of Fes or of Meknes* 3-B. Estelle was 
better informed than Pidou de St# Olon was, in 1698, he noted that 
Morocco had no "grand mouphity" as such (S.l* 2 France Vol* IV*
No* CXLIV p* 697)* A note within al-Fasi chronicle pertaining to 
a clerical squabble of 1677, carries the suggestion that in Fes, the 
country*s greatest centre of learning, it was customary for the 
function of "mufti" to be subsumed within that of "gadi"* ("Nashr al- 
Mathani***” ed./tr* Michaux-Bellaire A*M. Vol. XXIV *p. 261)
(34) "II fait toujours porter devant lui l*Archoran par son Talbe, comme la
regie de ses Conseils, et le niveau da sa Conduite*" (Busnot p. 48)
(35) nt-ettres IneditBS***" No. 25 dated 9/Muharram/l 109 b= 28/7/1697 p* 72
“Cv fas Isma il s most notable minister, and the personal companion of his 
sorrows (36)* This al-Yahmadi existed, and was a man of some personal 
standing# There survives, in addition to government correspondence of 
his own (37), a volume of verse dedicated to this wazXr by the poet
Q wmm M wm
Ali Misbah al-Zarwali, who acted as his private secretary (38)* However 
it seems possible to suggest that al-Yahmadi*s posthumous fame grew as 
a fictionalised notoriety within literary circles, fired by the verses, 
and by the wazir*s own reputation as a bibliophile (39)* The minister 
was unknown to European commentators on the MiknasI politics of his 
period, the 1690s* Further, he may be seen as an isolated figure who 
founded no administrative tradition* The great court figures of 
Isma il*s closing years who came to the notice of Windus, would include, 
in addition to members of the royal family, generals, guardian eunuchs, 
principal 3ews and the merchant manager of a crown monopoly (40)* But 
Windus knew of no great minister* And in the months following IsmaCil*s 
death, Braithwaite would dismiss IsmaCTl*s administration as a government 
markedly uncouth in that therein Hnone but military Wen” had bBen 
“encouraged” (41)#
Among the variety of notables whom a succession of European 
commentators considered to hold the office of “treasurer”, the most 
credible is the guardian eunuch noted by Windus (42)* For IsmaCil*s
(36) Akansus quoted al-Nasiri: “Kitab al-Istiosa*..”. Casablanca text 
Vol* VII pp* 65-6 cf* Fumev translation A.M* Vol* IX pp* 86-7
(37) Three of the “Lettres Inedites**.” carry al-Yahmadifs name, as 
recipient of the first and author of the second and third* They are 
the letters numbered 20 ( 8/Dhu ,l-QaCda/l104 = 12/7/1693); 23
( 2/Ramadan/l108 = 25/3/1697 ); and 24 (undated) pp* 67 and 69-70
(38) "Sana al-muhtadX ila malfakhir al-wazlr al-vahmadT” cited by Lakhdar
in “La vie littgraire...” pp. 172-3 #
(39) Lakhdar op. cit p* 53
(40) Windus pp# 109, 152-5, 186, 196-8, 209 and passim*
(41) Braithwaite p* 351
(42) Windus p* 109
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"treasury" was essentially "treasure"! it consisted of a growing hoard 
of trophies, jewels and ornamental saddles as well as coined money (43)* 
The army might receive donations from this hoard, but not the palace 
administration. The running expenses of the palace were ordered 
separately* Thus the revenues earmarked to cover that most grandiose 
of governmental economic enterprises, the construction of the Miknasi 
palace itself, were, as has been noted previously, gathered and dispersed 
in a system that was quite separate from the central coffer (44)* 
Similarly, the women's quarters were administered as a distinct 
institutions herB the sultan's principal queen oversaw the doling out 
of appropriate supplies (45)*
The monstrous plethora of imperial children born within the 
women's quarters would seem to have been raised with the greatest 
thrift that circumstances allowed* The sole ornaments of price worn by 
most of IsmacIl'a sons and daughters were the baubles with which they 
were each presented at birth by the country's Dewish community (46). The 
sultan's prestige allowed him customarily to dispose of his daughters 
without granting them a dowry (47)* And the sons were brought up as 
urchins, "thievish and ravenous as kites" (48)# The education received by 
Muhammad al- Alim was quite exceptional* Most of Isma il's sons were
endowed only with a slave, an horse, and the limited care their mothers
could give them (49)* European visitors to Meknes were astonished that,
(43) S.l. 20 France Vol* XV No* CXLIV Memo* of 3-8. Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 p. 693
(44) See Chapter IX Pp. 99-100 cf# Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux
pp. 116-117
(45) S,I. 28 France Vol. IV No* CXLIV Memo of 3-B* Estelle.putatively
dated to October 1698 p. 694
(46) de la Fave p# 160
(47) S.l* 2s France Vol# IV No* CXLIV Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 loc. cit.
(48) Pidou de St* Olon tr# Motteux p. 97
(49) S.l. 2e Franee Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo, of 3-B* Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 loc. cit.
in this capital, a prince would accept a small "tip" (50)*
Only the sons of IsmacIl's favourites could hope for more than 
"what was absolutely necessary for their Subsistence" (51). In accordance 
with the pattern set for Isma il's eldest son Muhriz, the majority of 
these boys were regularly dismissed, at adolescence, to Tafilelt, the 
one region where the sultan seems to have been able to dispose of land 
in quantity* In Tafilelt, each son was customarily granted a plantation 
of date-palms (52)* Early in the 1690s it was noted that the export of 
dates was a Fzlali monopoly, by imperial decree (53)* Ismacil was a 
sultan whom MouBtte is well-known to have credited with the outlook 
of a grocer (54). In this particular matter of Fllall trade, he may 
well have been fostering the commercial interests of members of his own 
immediate family*
The Udava Succession
Exile to the simple life and political nullity was never the fate 
of certain of Isma Il's sons# And even recall from Tafilelt was possible# 
Thus, Muhriz was occasionally noted in battle upon his father's behalf, 
after the date of his first dismissal (55)* Favourite sons continued 
to be made titular vice—roys within towns and provinces. A seventeenth 
century work of dynastic eulogy, which recounted cAlawi history down to
m Q k ,
the 1690s selected eight of Isma jlI's sons to name as notables of whom 
their father might bo proud (56). These sons had been nurtured to battle
Busnot pp* 59-60
Braithwaite p* 205 
Uilndus p. 190
Pidou de St* Olon tr. Motteux p. 34
MouBtte: "Relation*..11 pp* 15Q-151 quoted Ch*-A* Dulien p. 228
©For example in the "Relation de St. Amans" (S.l. 2 France Vol. II 
No* XXXVII Diary note for 1o/l2/16B2 p7 340)
(56) Ahmad ibn cAbd al-CAzIz al-°AlawIs "Al-anwar al-husniva..." c. 1690/ 
1102 Published Casablanca, 1966 # pp* 88-9
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from childhood* Oean-Baptiste Estelle in 1690 described the nine and 
ten year old princes playing at full-tilt, bare-back astride war- 
horses# He further noted that sons of full age, some “alcaydes de 
divers pays, provinces et cantons*’, were already the protagonists of 
an endemic internecine warfare which gave a straightforward preview 
of the power-struggle inevitable at IsmePilfs death (57)#
The sultan could well have taken an ambivalent approach to this 
squabbling* To a certain extent he could afford to regard the tussles 
with a bland equanimity. In Estelle*s words:
“Celuy qui regne aujourdhuy dit que#,*cela donne lieu a tous 
lea enfants d*estre guerriera."
Such an attitude upon Isma il*s part need not have been impolitic*
Mutual combat kept his sons occupied} and, at this period, their 
struggles had not yet been grafted on to provincial or civic unrest. 
Nevertheless, in 1690, it was already clear to contemporaries that 
IsmacIl had cut one swathe through his sons* rivalries, by designating 
an heir. This heir-presumptive was Zaydan, who had first come to 
prominence as the adolescent vice-roy of Meknes, during thB years of 
his father*© second SusI campaign (59), In 1690, Estelle recorded 
that Zaydan was paramount among the sultanfs sixty mounted sons, and 
that he was the one adult son who was kept close to his father*s 
side (60),
Zaydan*s grooming for pre-eminence is likely to have been 
associated with Ismacil*s fostering within Sals of the cavalry corps
(57) S.l. 28 France Vol. Ill No. CXIII Memo, of 3-B* Estelle 19/7/1690
directed by way of Marseille p. 315
(58) ibid. loc. cit.
(59) See Chapter III P* 140
(60) 5.1. 2° France Vol# III No. CXIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle 19/7/1690
directed by way of Marseilles loc. cit.
of the Udaya. For this corps was bound up with the figure of Zaydan*s 
mother* The heir-presumptive, his mother, and the Udaya may be thought 
to have risen together in MiknasI prominence* All three are likely to 
have been fostered deliberately by a sultan concerned to manufacture 
a military fallowing linked with himself and his line, as the 
Shabbanat had been linked with 5acdl sultans.
0 m m Q w
The corps of Udaya was a creation of Isma il*s which eventually 
came to number several thousand (61 )<, During Ismacil*s reign members 
of this corps werB stationed only within Sals, firstly at Meknes and 
latterly also at Fas al-3adid (62). The force seems to have undergone 
considerable metamorphosis during its first decades* Contemporary 
trace-references and dynastic tradition alike suggest that the Udaya 
company was built up in stages, beginning with an initial recruitment 
which swept a Murrakushi and "Hawz" rabble into the train of Ismacil*s 
fierce Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (63), By the middle years of 
Isma ilfs reign, the Udaya had become a corps with a distinctively 
aristocratic air* In their close personal association with the 
monarch, the Udaya could be compared with the wider corps of Cabld •
But there was one marked distinction between abid and Udaya* It was 
not a distinction of complexion. Udaya were commonly dark-skinned* It 
was a distinction of status. The Udaya were free warriors, bound to the 
sultan in alliance rather than servitude. The bonds were those of a 
social fiction: that the Udaya were an agnatic kin-group, communally 
linked with IsmacXl through relationship to a woman, his "black queen*'*
(61) Braithwaite p* 157
(62) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp* 29-30 cf. Del Puerto 8k. V Ch. 43
* p. 616 and Bk. VI Ch. 3 p. 639
(63) See Chapter II Pp, 103-4
Del Puerto described the Udaya in their "imago" state as:
"Los primeros hombres...todos Mulatos obscuros de un linagB, 
que llamen LUDEAS que son Cavalleros de el Rey, y oy los 
mas estimados, porque son parientes de la Reyna Negra; y assi 
essan los mas fantasticos y sobervios* Es buena gente de 
guerra, pero no salen sino quando el Rey se pone en 
campana; y por esso tienen todos sus armas, y cavallos, 
sin pagar garrama*"
It will be noted later that dynastic mythology came to associate 
the Udaya with Ismacil*s mother (65). But there is no doubt as to 
the identity of the "Reyna Negra" who formed the personal linchpin 
to the Udaya alliance* She was cAyisha Mubarka, named within the 
chronicle material transmitted by al-Zayyani (66), and unquestionably 
wife rather than mother to Ismacil* Facets of her role as IsmaGil,s 
principal queen are indicated in the variety of names attached to 
her within the historical notes of Busnot* Here she appears variously 
as "la Sultane", "Lalla Aloha", "iHnfame Loudais" and, most 
frequently, and in deference to the name of her eldest son, as 
"Zidana".
During the 1690s, when this son had reached warrior age, cAyisha 
Mubarka came to enjoy notoriety and palace power. She cut a startling 
figure about Meknes. Free from the restraints which palace custom 
imposed upon her women companions, she would appear in public, girt 
with a sword and carrying a lance (&7)* She was alleged to have 
considerable influence over her husband. Bemused Europeans who saw 
in her only "a Mollatto, of a very plain and disagreeable Person" (68)
(6^) QbI Puerto Bk* V. Ch. 43 p. 616
(65) See Epilogue Part II Pp* 317-319
(66) "Turluman" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif*.*" MS pp* 33-4
r l n r  i f m .  i
) "Qoklev" p. 96 cf. Busnot p. 54
(6S) “Ocklev" pp. 95-6
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were delighted to attribute this influence to witchcraft (69).
Zaydan’s designation as heir-presumptive, and the associated 
court enhancement of his mother, together raise problems as to Ayishafs 
identity, and as to the nature of her relationship to the Udaya to 
whom she was formally "sister"* It seems certain that cAyisha had 
been associated with Isma il from the beginning of his reign* The 
association is vouched for by European estimates as to the approximate 
age of Zaydan when he came to be of military note (70)* Yet cAyisha 
seems not to have taken paramount status among IsmacIl's womenfolk 
until some years after her marriage* MouBtte covered the first nine 
years of Is'macXlts reign in detail* He tattled away upon the Myrrakushl 
politics that were supposedly conducted by Lalla Maryam, principal 
wife of Ahmad ibn Muhriz (71)* But he gave no indication that any 
wife of Isma il held any comparable status or position of influence*
And while he knew three of Ismacil,s sons by name, he made no mention 
of the boy Zaydan* Yet, in different contexts, he knew "Udaya” as the 
name of both a general and a fort (72)*
A possible solution to the problem may lie in the identification
C «■»
of the dark-skinned Ayisha Mubarka with the "princesse de Touet" allegedly 
bestowed upon IsmacIl by al-Rashid (73)* European commentary of IsmacTl*s 
middle years retained a garbled tradition that the sultan*s principal
(69) Thus Jean-Baptiste Estelle wrote of the sultanfs "premiere famme, 
qui est m&re de Moulay 2idan, quy est maiatresse de l*esprit de ce
prince (et, ce dit-on, la magie y a part)***" (S.l# 2 France Vol. III
No* XLI Memo* dated Sale, 2/5/1694 p* 267)
cf. Busnot p. 53 cf. "Qcklev" p. 96
(70) Jean-Baptista Estelle in the July of 1690 described Zaydan as being 
aged around eighteen to nineteen (5.I. 2 France Vol. Ill No* CXIII 
Memo* directed by way of Marseille 19/7/1690 p* 315)
(71) MouBtte: "Histoire**." pp. 80-81
(72) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." p. 110 and "Relation" p. 148
(73) MouBtte: "Histoire*.." p* 28
wife had been given to him long previously by his brother (74)* One
officer who definitely claimed blood relationship with cAyisha had as
his patronymic “ibn cAtta" (75)* This was the patronymic cited by al-
Zayyani as belonging to the second of Ismacilfs principal U'daya
commanders (76)# The Ayt cAtta, a wide confederation of Beraber peoples
seem even during the seventeenth century to have percolated out from
their “Dabal Saghru" heartland as far to the south-east as Tuat, a
region from which they had, around 1660, been able to exact tribute (77)*
If the identification of Ayisha with the “princesse de Touet" is correct,
then her court anonymity during Isma ilfs early years could bB explicable
in terms of a break in the political and fiscal links between SaSs and
Tuat which al-Rashid had forged (78)* However, the re-opening of °Alaui
political contact with Tuat, late in 1680, could well have encouraged
the rallying to Ismacil of men claiming clan-fellowship with a TawatJ
and Atta bride whom Isma II had married in the days of his brother*
• * 7
The very exoticism of free recruits from a distant oasean region could 
have encouraged IsmacIl to employ such men as the focus to a rag-bag 
force of recruits with a "Qiblan" (79) name, which he was already in 
the process of agglomerating* The consequence could have besn privilege
Q
for Ayisha and her sons, and a blanket identification of the corps
(74) Thus Del Puerto alleged that “la Reyna, principal Muger de Muley 
IsmaBl.**oy la Senora Reynante”, had originally been a slave-girl 
bought from al-Rashid* A similar rumour was passed on by Busnot*
Its grounding would seem to have been European slave gossip of the 
early eighteenth century* (“Mission Historial***!t Bk* I* Ch* X p* 36 
cf* Busnot p* 52)
(75) Braithwaite d * 95 The reference relates to a named maternal uncle of 
Ahmad al-Dhahabi, Isma ilfs successor, and second son to Ayisha 
Mubarka*
(76) “Bustan al-Zarif***“ MS p* 30
•
(77) Martin _pp* 55 and 56, quoting the oasean chroniclers al-Tawatl and 
al-Amuri, of whom the first was an eighteenth century author*
po? an extended discussion of Ayt Atta expansion desertwards from 
the Dabal Saghru, sees Ross E« Dunns “Berber Imperialisms the Alt Atta
Expansion in South-East Morocco" in “Arabs and Berbers” ed. E. Gellner
and C. Micaud pp* 85-107
(78) See Chapter II P* 90 and Chapter III P • 131
(79) See Appendix B* Pp* 338-339
with the newcomers, as the “single lineage" Del Puerto believed he 
knew (80 )* Evidence that the corps had not always been monolithic 
would survive within al-ZayyanXfs tradition of successive waves of 
Udaya recruits, and of two distinct founding Udaya generals, of whom 
the second, Muhammad ibn °Atta, would be regarded as "son" to Abu 
Shafra, -the first (81 )*
The period crucial to the consolidation of the Udaya as a force 
close to the monarchy is likely to have been the period of Ismacil*s 
second expedition into the Sus, over the years 1685-7, when Zaydan,
"sister*s son" to the Udaya was made titular Miknasi vice-roy* Loyal 
Udaya service over this period may even have accounted for the 
subsequent securing of Zaydan*s status as heir-presumptive, and also 
for the establishment of Udaya officers themselyes as a military elite 
around Meknes* Al-Zayyani noted that these officers were endowed with 
a particular slice of imperial revenues the nawa*ib or customary dues 
received from zawava (82)* Erom IsmaCil,s middle years, Udaya are
known to have predominated among the inhabitants of al-Riyad, an area
of the capital in which Ismacil*s most prominent courtiers built their 
houses, and which formed the nearest Miknasi equivalent to a fashionable 
suburb* In Del Puerto,s early eighteenth century account of Meknes, 
the area was noted as an Udaya quarter (83)# And it was described by 
al-Zayyani, in the plangent context of its razing to the ground in the
(80) See the present chapter P. 171 (Note 64)
(81) “Bustan al-Zarif*.*11 MS pp* 29-30* For a more extended discussion
of the problems posed by the indigenous tradition as to the origin of
the Udaya, see Epilogue Part II Pp# 317-321
(82) “Bustan al-Zarif***“ MS p* 29
 “• '
(83) “REAT El AMBAR**#donde viven los principales Alcaydes, por ser lugar
privilegiado de Dusticiasj porque sus moradores son aquellos LUDEAS" 
(Del Puerto B|<* VI Ch* III p* 639)
early 1730s, as :
“.♦♦the town of al-Riyad which was an ornament to Meknes... 
in it were^the houses of the governors, and the secretaries, 
and the Udaya and the administrative officials of the sultan 
Isma°il." (04)
European notes support the indigenous tradition of al-Zayyani, 
which states that IsmacI!l detached a body of troops from his primal 
Miknasi force of Udaya, and sent them to garrison Fas al~0adld. Wo 
firm date can be attached to the posting of these troops to the 
metropolis. But the move is likely to have preceded 1693, a date 
for which Pidou de St. Olon recorded that Old Fes was known to have 
a "white" and New Fes a "black" population (85). For the remainder 
of the reign, Udaya cavaliers, whose numbers were to reach an 
estimated three to four thousand, would exercise within the environs 
of Fes "the power of collecting the King's Taxes, and gathering into 
the King's Magazines his Wheat, Barley etc." (86). The garrison's 
existence would provide an obvious line of tension between sultan 
and city* In the days of al-Rashid, the Fasi had wished to prevent 
the establishment, within the immediate environs of their city, of 
a sizeable body of alien troops: al-Rashid's "shiraoa" (87)* Now 
the citizens were constrained to live cheek-by-jowl with a corps of 
"sultan's men", and accept the inevitable associated harassment*
According to Braithwaite, the "Ludyres*..practised" their assigned 
duties with a "rigorous...hand" (88).
(84) "madinat al-riyad allati kanat zina tniknasa...wa fiha dur al-Cumroal
wa 'l-kuttab wa *l-udava wa ahl-dawlat al-sultan ismacil"
("Turlumen" p. 39 of the text cf. 71 of the translation)
(85) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 27
(86) Braithwaite p. 157
(87) See Chapter II P. and "Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 27
(88) Braithwaite pp. 157-8
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Rural Pacification
For lsmacIl, the opening 1690s were years slicked over with an 
appearance of consolidations years during which the sultan enjoyed the 
profits of a far-flung taxation frontier, possessed the renown of a 
victor, and could hope for an orderly “Udaya" succession that would 
align with one joint of his military power-base. One cautionary note 
must be inserted* This stage of Xsmacil,s reign has long been falsely 
lit by a will o* the wisp* Within a myth which al-Zayyani built into 
the indigenous tradition, the years leading up to 1692 were years 
during which Isma il crowned the elimination of dynastic opposition 
to his person with the completion of a rigorous pacification of his 
kingdoms* To al-Zayyani this pacification was "tamhid" s a morB 
trenchant "tamhid" than the establishment of a merely dynastic 
supremacy, for which al-Ifranl made use of the same word (89)* This 
"tamhid" involved a purposeful military programme that was expressed 
in a series of memorable rural campaigns* According to al-Zayyani*s 
view of Isma il's reign, this programme of pacification was brought to 
a definable conclusion in 1692, with a momentous expedition into the 
"CJabal Fazzaz" or Central Atlas (90)* Problems connected with this 
largely dubious body of tradition will be examined in the "Epilogue" 
to this work*
The rural pacification that may genuinely be attributed to
Isma il!s period is better understood in terms of equilibrium than
forcible achievement* Its essence was the provision of security for 
bona fide travellers passing across the sultan's territories* This
(89) al-Ifranis "Zill al-4iarif**." pp* 52-56
(90) "Turluman" pp»J23-25 of the text and 43-46 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif*.*" MS pp* 40-41
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was a theme summed up in a quaint saw gleaned by Shaw during his 
"Chergi" travels of the 1730ss
/
"♦•♦that, during the long Reign of the late Muley Xehmael 
♦♦•a Child (according to their Manner of speaking) might 
safely carry a PiBce of Money upon his Hand from one End 
of the Kingdom to another###"^g ^ ^
and continued in the most frequently repeated of al-Zayyani’s 
literary flourishes concerning Isma il’s period: that during the 
sultan’s latter days, a dhlmtni or a woman could travel from Oujda 
to Uadi Nun without fear of molestation (92)# These commonplaces 
belong to the world of a sultan’s public image, and do not imply 
dogged imperial police work# Al-Zayyanifs own expansion of the 
theme of the undisturbed traveller implies that, even ideally, 
the provision of rural security was a localised responsibility, 
analogous with the localised responsibility for bureaucratic 
paper-work# further, it was security for the notable and well-to-do: 
no security at all for travellers who could not prove their good 
faith# Thus the author claimed that the paradisaical Maghrib al-
«  « w g M I
Aqsa of Isma il’s day had been a land in which:
"•••therB remained no place in which pretenders or criminals 
might find a refuge# A stranger seeking a night’s lodging 
at a wayside hamlet or village would not be accepted#
Instead he would be seized until he had ^rcduceci an -(ov- Kis
appearance# For if they (the local populace) let him go,
(91) Shaw p. 17
(92) "Tur luman" p* 28 of the tsxt and 52 of the translation cf#
"Bustan al-Zarif># »*' MS pp# 40-41— —————————5——*—”
The artificiality of this flourish is underlined by its em£loyment 
of the word "dhimml"# inappropriate to the society al-Zayyani knew, 
which held only one protected community, that of the Oews, 
customarily referred to by the author as "al-yahud"#
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they would be held responsible for anything he stole or 
plundered, and for any crime he committed#
Contemporary material supports tradition in implying thB 
successful imposition of localised responsibility for security* within 
thosB regions known to Europeans# Thus Pidou de St# Olon praised 
Isma ilfs "Justice##*in respect of Robbers and Wurtherers", and noted 
that clearing of the highways had been effected at the local level by 
the sultan "causing those who live near the Place where##*the crime 
is committed to be punish*d with Death or a Fine" (94)# ^ean-Baptiste 
Estelle noted that the local populations who were held communally 
responsible for crimes committed within their region, would watch 
travellers carefully, and prevent them from journeying by night (95)*
The sultan should not bB seen as personally involved in such 
peace-kBeping at the local level# It is indeed true that, in the 
days when al-Rashld was newly sultan and "champion of Fes", out to 
prove his mettle, direct onslaught upon rural brigandage had involved 
the sultan and his personal following# But delegation of such duty 
is likely soon to have become the rule# Thus it has been seen that the
mm *-Q
party of fiwlad Jama a bandits, whose execution was an highlight of 
IsmaCil,s vice-regality of Fes, are likely to have been brought to 
justice, not by the sultan, or even his khalifa, but by al-Rashld's
(93) "wa lam yubog minhum li-ahl al-da awi wa ll-fasad mahall va1 wuna
l ■ c -  \  •  -
ilavhi wa vatamanna una (Texts vamtanl una) bihi hatta anna ma.ihul
* «r-nr ^
al-hal idha bata fi hillat aw dashraQ vaqbidunahu ila an 
tutabavvana &ara>gtu,ha* wa-in sarrahuhu vu*adduna ma saraaahu 
wa nahabahu aw ic|tarafahu min al-haram"
("Turiuman<r p# 29 of the text cf# 55 of the translation)
(94) Pidou de St# Olon tr. Rotteux pp# 103-4
(95) S#I# 28 France Vol# IV No# CXLIl/ Memo# of J-B# EstBlle, putatively
dated to October 1698 p# 693
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estranged shoracia troops (96). Even at this point, IsmaCilfs involvement 
with the safety of travellers may have been, as it later became, 
ritualised! a matter of public relations, expressing the "good ruler"fs 
personal association with peace and order* Thus, as sultan, IsmaCil 
would execute highway robbers in public, with his own hand, as a show 
for the benefit of the representative of a foreign power (97). He 
would amiably cross—question high-ranking visitors as to their security 
upon the routeway, knowing that such visitors had had the scrupulous 
escort of a series of great quwwad (98)* And, paternally, he would 
berate local ahuvukh who came to be received in Meknes, with an
insistance upon their responsibilty for keeping the roads clear (99).
There is no straightforward link between Isma ilfs fort-building 
and the degree of rural peace established during his reign. Al-Zayyani 
mada a well-known note that Isma il was responsible for the construction 
of seventy—six fortresses (100). Taking this note as his starting point, 
de la Chapslle worked to demonstrate that forts provided a web which 
traced out the major routeways of Isma ilfa empire. And he dated a 
majority of these forts to IsmaCrifs own period (101)* In the Epilogue 
to this work, it will be suggested that evidence for dating any fort 
specifically to Isma0!!1© reign is rarely definitive • This sultan!s 
reputation as "fort-buildBr extraordinary" may be too comprehensive* More
significantly, it must be pointed out that the building of a rural fort did
(96) See Chapter II p. 89
(97) S.I. 28 Franca Vol. Ill No* CXII Memo, of J-B. Estelle* as
interpreted by Magny, Marseille, 6/7/l690 p* 300
(98) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 332
(99) al-Zarhunl of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 112
(100) "Tur.iuman" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation.
(101) F* de la Chapelles "Le Sultan Moulay Isma*il et les Berberes 
Sanhaja du Maroc Central" in A.M. Vol. XXVII (Paris, 1931) 
p. 25 and Footnote (2) covering pp. 25-28
not necessarily imply pacification, either in the real or the 
euphemistic sense* The character of the fort’s garrison, and the 
relationship of that garrison to the society in which it was 
embedded, u/as of greater significance than its physical defences. For 
these defences were not always impressive* The Maghrib al-Aqsa lagged 
behind seventeenth century developments in Vaubanesque fortification.
Some of the Moroccan works still standing in 1808, and attributable 
in part to IsmacIl*s reign, were indeed sufficiently massive and 
complex to arouse at least the qualified appreciation of Napoleon’s 
envoy Burel (102). But these fortifications were chiefly citadBls. Many 
rural forts, particularly those now lost entirely to sight, are likely 
to have been less imposing. The first "Qasba Tadla" of Isma^il’s reign 
was built, under the sultan’s own supervision, inside three months (103). 
It seems probablB that such a fort followed a farm noted by dB Chenier 
and, later, In greater dBtail, by Burel, as being common in areas of 
rural Moroccos that of the simple blank-walled enclosure, devoid of 
towers or machicolation, and inhabited only under crisis conditions (104): 
thB Maghribi version of a "peel tower".
In her recent study of Ismail’s military policy (105), Magali Morsy
(102) A* Burel: "Memoirs Militaire sur l’Empire de Maroc presente a 5a 
Majeste Imperiale et Royale le 3 juin 1810, redige en avril 1810" 
ed* 3* Callle as "La Mission du Oaoitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808"
(Paris, 1953) pp. 75-76
(103) Moubtte: "Histoire..." pp. 124-5
The "Gjasba Tadla" that still stands, which local tradition came to 
attribute to Isma Tl (6h*-€* de Foucatiild: "Reconnaissance au Maroc 
1883-4" Paris, 1888 p. 57) may indeed date from Isma^il’s reign, but 
seems to have been built under the direction of his son Ahmad al- 
Dhahabi, viceroy in the Tadla region during the latter part of his 
father’s reign ("Turlumen" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation)
(104) de Chenier Vol* I pp, 8'6-7 cf* Burel o^, clt. p* 77
(105) M. Morsy: "Moulay Isma’il et l’armee de metier" in "Revue de 1’histoire 
moderns et contemooraine" Uol* XIV April-3une 1967 pp* 97-122
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focused attention upon one particular province, Tamesna, thB modern 
Chaouia. She concluded that here, during Isma il*s reign, there were 
six forts providing an adequate "infrastructure politico-militaire” 
for maintaining the local populacB in direct submission to Meknes,. (106)
As the author admitted, Tamesna is likely to have been a relatively 
placid province during the period* It included the hinterland of Sale, 
and is thus the probable regional source for Oean-Baptiste Estelle*s
M fl q
observation that, on the authority of the local aa id. a single abd 
could go out tax-collecting among villagers, armed only with a baton
(107). It seems over-bold to attribute such placidity to the shadow 
of government fortifications* The existence of two of the author*s six 
named forts, and the garrisoning of both by renegades, seem vouched for 
only by references taken from the late and dubious source "Pellow" (108) 
Of the remaining four establishments, two are described as "forteresses 
de tribus", garrisoned by local contingents* No evidence appears to 
survive as to the garrisoning of the fifth or sixth fort* But the last- 
named, Piers el Guemenat, was merely a simple fortified enclosure* It 
guarded a market place, and may indeed have been a "peel tower11, 
functioning essentially to the benefit of local society*
In regions more notable than Chaouia for thsir defiance of central 
government behests, the construction of forts is likely to have been a 
matter of some political and social moment* But the fort*s essential 
significance rested in its men, rather than its "tabby" walls. In certain 
key regions it was l8maCil*s policy to deploy alien garrisons, literally 
"foreign bodies", as a scattered irritant across rural society. According
(106) PI* Morsy op* cit* pp* 111-112
(107) S.I* 20 France tfol. Ill No. CXIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle*19/7/1690
directed by way of Marseille p* 314
(108) For notes upon the deficiencies of “Pellow" as a source, see 
ProloQUe Pp* 41—2
to an indigenous tradition noted previously, the pattern was set by 
the instructions given to the (v1a°qil followers of the Zirarl qaVid of 
Oujda in the late 1670s: that his followers should build three new forts 
at key points within Snassen country, to be used as bases for harassment 
of the Snassen, and in particular for their constraint (tadvia) from 
trespass upon the Angad plain (109)* Al-Zayyani was not so invariably 
blunt in describing relations between rural groupings and neighbouring 
garrison troops* Orderliness is implicit in his note that local 
populations from around individual forts ware detailed to bring their 
lawful Qur*anic dues into the appropriate fort, for the sustenance of 
its troops and their horses (110)* But the frequent working of the 
system in practise may have been well summed up in Braithwaite*s 
callous but succinct account of the life-style of typical renegade 
detachments:
"♦♦•generally sent to garrison remote Castles upon the 
Confines of the Country, whsre they are obliged to rob for 
their Subsistence, until the Country People knock them on 
the Head*"
The value of a fort as an indication of a "government presence" 
is likely to have varied with the pattern of surrounding dwellings.
In the Central Atlas dir or piedmont, where the local populacB were 
tant-dwellers as late as the 1B90s (112), the qusur of the makhzan 
hod the advantage of being thB only local buildings* This singularity 
is picked out by onB credible word in al-Zayyani^ conclusion to his 
folk-memory tale of Xsmacil*s last great Central Atlas campaign: the
(109) "Tur luman" p* 2s ^he text and 34 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif♦♦." MS p. 34 of Chapter II P* 106
_  *
(110) "Tur iuman" pp* 18-19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf. 
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS loc. cit*
— T - i- im  r , .  . .  , 1 ' P
(111) Braithwaite p* 350
(112) W.B. Harris: "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco" in "The 
Geographical Journal" (London, 1897 pp# 638-45) pp* 639 and 642-3
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note that the loyalist Yimmur qifid cAli ibn Barka was instructed to 
set up at Tishghalin, for his thousand followers, a building described 
not as a fort (galca ) but as an "house” (dar) (113). In oasean ciusur- 
country, where the typical domicile was thB communal mud-castle, 
government forts would have been less noticeable. As one agglomerated 
sedentary group among many, the makhazini of the governorrs following 
would have slotted with particular Base into the pattern of local 
rivalries* But their walls would have given them no strategic advantage. 
Muhammad al-Safar, sent to Tuat in 1693, with orders there to establish 
a permanent base centred upon the reconstructed Sa di qasba..seems 
notable for having proceeded about his governorship with diplomacy 
and delicacy (114).
In no region were forts seen as the final expression of central 
political authority at the local level. Even al-Zayyani, who made fort- 
building part of the stylised framework of his campaign accounts, made 
it obvious that the building of forts did not mean the definitive 
subjection of rural populations. The author, as will be seen, gave a 
mass of data upon fort-building in Snassen country and in the Central 
Atlas (115). But his narrative suggested that, within both regions, 
punitive expeditions were necessary after the forts had been built*
And in Tuat, a region that was customarily upon relatively placid 
terms with the makhzan. the one recorded major insurrection against 
Muhammad al-Safar is said to have been put down, not by the relatively 
helpless governor himself, but by the interposition of a relief
(113) ”Tur iuman” p* 24 of the text and 46 of the translation
(114) Chronicle of ”Sidi Bahaia” quoted Martin pp* 70-71
(115) For a critique of this data, see Epilogue Part I Pp. 284-5
and 308-9
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expedition led by the qa*id ra^ihi (116) GhazI Abu £lafra (117)*
Throughout the empire, the ultimata government sanction for ensuring 
compliance and the raising of taxes for a central coffer, was not the 
static fort, but the armed haraka, tautologically mobile. The threat of 
such an expedition seems to have been a more effective curb to rural
peoples than the: reality of a fort. Among the most comp ant inhabitants H
A
m m  Q  ^
of the Maghrib al-Aqsa during the early Alawi period WBre the sparse
itinerant groupings from the tent crescents of the downlande and
flood plains of the far north-west, the regions best known to European
observers. These were regions without rural forts. But they were regions
easily vulnerable to expeditions mounted from Meknes or Tetuan* Significantly,
evBn the populace of the “Dabal Habib'*, who were sat into a finger of the
Western Rif, and thus had the advantage of relatively difficult terrain,
were customarily willing to buy off the threat of an haraka by negotiations
«
with the governor of Tetuan (118). The inhabitants of more open north­
western country seem to have been, from the roakhzan viewpoint, ideally 
behaved. Their placatory approach towards the representatives of 
authority, or towards those who lay under its peace, is epitomised in 
their swift and free supply of provisions to those travelling under 
government auspices (119). Herein lay true pacification. For the 
intensity of the repugnance that could lie behind such good offices is
(116) The title of an expeditionary commander who was not a provincial 
governor:
"...he sends them to gather the Tribute of some Country, with 
the Title of an AlcaydB; and if he remains by him without any 
employment*..he is called Alcayde of his Head, which is a sort 
of Alcayde titular or Reforms." (Windus £. 144 cf* (for a note 
emplcying the samB title) al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Isticsa..." 
Casablanca text, Vol. VIII p* 35 cf. Fumev translation A.M. 
Vol. IX p. 313)
(117) ChroniclB of "Sidi Behaia" quoted Martin p. 79
(118) Windus pp. 77-8
(119) "Journal du Vovaoe de St. Amans" p. 319 cf. Windus pp. 73-4 
cf* Braithwaite p. 134
to be inferred from Busnot*s record of the purification by fire of 
the sites along the Sale-Meknes route where his Christian party 
had rested, duly fed and guarded for the night (120).
(120) Busnot p. 12
CHAPTER Vs YEARS OF HUBRIS AND NEMESIS
The decade 1691-1701 was, for Isma il, a period that began in 
military ascendancy and Islamic splendour# But it continued with 
reverses which the sultan*s boldest military experiments and 
endeavours were unable to stave off# And it ended in debacle#
During the early months of 1691, the one source of possible unease 
for IsmaDIl was the continuation of signs pointing to impending war 
in the "Cherg". In the February, there was a two-man Moroccan embassy 
to Algiers* Its errand was superficially cordial, but it was dismissed 
by al-Hajj Shacban Dey as a "spy" embassy (1)# In May the honours were 
icily returned* An envoy from Algiers spent a month in Meknes demanding 
reparations for losses resulting from border-raids carried out by 
Ismacil*s subjects (2). He seems to have gained no satisfaction, and 
Dean-Baptiste Estelle veered towards the opinion that a "Chergi" war 
with the Regency was imminent (3)#
But Isma il took no personal eastward initiative* Over the summer
and autumn of 1691, the 8ultan*s own interests seem to have run to a
politic self-indulgence* Still capitalising on the fall of Larachs, he 
awaited a grandiose exchange of captives: the barter of the hundred 
officers taken from the fallen presidio for more than a thousand "Moors" 
from Spain (4)* The suggestion of rescue implicit within the exchange
(1) S.I* 2e France Vol# III No* CXXI1I Lemaire. French consul in Algiers
to Pontchartrain 13/2/1691 p# 345
(2) S.I* 29 France Vol III No. CXXX Memo, of 3-B* Estelle , Sale,
”16/6/1691 p. 375
(3) ibid. loc. cit.
(4) Negotiations leading towards this barter had one delightful by-product:
the "Rihlat al-wazir fi ,ftikak al-asir" written by Ismacilfs envoy to
Spain, the katib Hammu al-WazIr al-GhassanX# As an account of the author*s
experiences in Madrid, the work is alive with fascination combined with
cross-cultural astonishment, and constitutes a worthy counter-blow to the 
number of contemporary and for the most part disdainful works which emerged
from European embassies to early Alawl Morocco.(See the translation by 
H. Sauvaire as "Voyage en EspaonB dfun ambassadeur marocaine" Paris, 1884 
cf. Lakhdar "La vie litteraire..." pp* 122-125 )
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may, for many of the ’’Moorish” ransomees, be misleading# At this period 
’’Moors” resided in Spanish ports in considerable numbers# Some were 
slaves, or at least open to impressment as such (5). But the allegation 
that, in this case, normal Spanish currency restrictions had been 
relaxed in order to allow the ransomed ’’Moors” to bring home their 
earnings (6) suggests that the slave status of many among the vast 
party was marginal# However, the barter gave Ismacil scope for the 
enaction of one of the major pageants of the reign# On the 18th# October 
1691, the ransomees arrived in Meknes for a long and euphoric ceremony 
of individual welcome by the sultan# Bean-Baptiste Estelle, an eyewitness* 
described the ceremony# The ge^id of Tetuan approached?
"•••venant avec douze tambours audevant battant a leur mode,
©t deux grands pavillions verds, couleur de son Prophete, 
qu’on luy portoit dBvant; les Mores le suivoient* Ensuitte 
le Roy les attendant a la ports de son palais##.Ils 
s*apracher0nt tous de luy et ce prince###les baisa toys 
l*un apres lfautre au visage, les hommes; pour les femmes, 
il ne voulut pas les voir# Le nombre de mille Mores estoit 
compose de 700 hommes et de 300 femmes# En apres, il leur 
donna un habit a chacun, tenement que l,honnestete quB 
ce prinGe fit a ces Mores le mirent (sic) si bien dans le 
coeur de ses sujets que l*on entenddit partout que:”Vive le 
Roy et qu*il regne de longues anneesl” II avoit besoin de cette 
politique pour se mettre bien dans le coeur de ses sujets#••11
This Miknasi auphoria was soon to be cooled from the east, by the most severe
military crisis of Isma il*s reign: the threat and eventual reality of
a Turkish invasion* The pious sultan would be subjected to a punishment
haraka#
»
An apparently contemporary, if outrageously biased account of the
(5) ’’...amongst the several towns situated on tho coast of Spain, there
may be MoorBS purchased at very reasonable rates, such as are aged, 
blind or lame. Its no matter, all will pass so they have life*1'
(S*P. 71 (16) f. 271 Paddon. naval envoy to Morocco, to Bolinobroke.
Tetuan, 5/4/1714)
(6) S.I# 20 France Vol* III No* CXXXVI Letter from a Spanish Franciscan
to Aljpad ibn Haddu al-Hammami, Ceuta, 12/9/1691 p. 39T
(7) S.I. 2S FrancB Vol# III No# CLI Memo, of 3-B. Estelle. Sale
2/3/1692 p. 454
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conflict of 1691-2 is contained within the "Daf.tar al-Tashrifat" of 
one Muhammad, an Algerine katlb. and a fervent admirer of al-Hajj 
Sha°ban Dey (8). This "Daftar al-Tashrifat" suggests that preliminary 
aggression came from the wests that in November 1691, Zaydan, acting 
upon his father’s orders, led an army northwards from the Sahara 
upon an extensive border raid that culminated in a battle with the 
Turkish TilimsanX garrison. The narrative is invective-ridden:
Isma il was a qa’imi or petty commander, his son a bastard, and his 
following malusian or heathens. The narrative is also stylised. Thus, 
the invaders were said to have come three days* march into Algerine 
territory, to have fought with the Turks for three days, and three 
nights, and to havB precipitated a declaration of war that was made 
against them after three days of deliberation in the diwan of Algiers 
(9). Beneath the bluster and the neatening there seems to lie the 
record of a limited bpt relatively successful raid in the Tlemsen 
region, led by the young Zaydan. It is possible that here rests, in 
embryo, the foundation of al-Zayyani*s puzzling tale of dynastic 
"derring-do": the narrative of Zaydan’s expulsion of the Turks from 
Tlemsen in 1700, and of his subsequent raid upon the palace of a "Bey 
of Mascara" (10)*
The November raid could have been treated as an act of impudence.
But it was seized upon by al-Hajj Sha°ban Dey as justification far a major 
campaign designed to put an end to such incursions. Isma il’s potential 
strength was respected. Both the sea and the land forces of Algiers were
(8) Portions of the "Daftar al—TashrXfat". together with a nineteenth 
century and a modern French translation have been reproduced within 
de Castries’ "Les Sources Insditss..." Vol. Ill as text No. CLXIV 
pp, 499-513, which will be cited hereafter.
(9) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 501-2 of the text and 505-6 of the modern 
French translation cf. S.I. 2a France Vol. Ill No. CXLVII p. 432
Lemaire to Pontchartraln. Algiers, 31/12/1691
(10) "TurIuman" p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan ai-Zarlf..." MS _P£* 41-2
Further discussion of al-Zayyani’s treatment of this affair will 
be given in tha Epilooue to this work, Part II Pp. 332-3
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mobilised against him with smooth and efficient deliberation. In 
December a force of three thousand janissaries was despatched by sea 
to Kerchtil, the nearest port to Tlemsen that was not in infidel hands 
(11). Far 1692, the customary naval support lent by Algiers to the 
Ottoman fleet was refused in advance. Corsair activity was forbidden 
for three months. All available vessels were required as troopships (12).
m q m
Isma il took alarm and, as a gesture of goodwill, sent off to Algiers 
the hundred and twenty out of his thousand-odd ransomed “Moors" who 
were of Algerine birth. With them there allegedly came the promise of 
an embassy which would explain away the recent border clash (13). But 
inexorably the AlgerinB preparations continued. The mass of the forces 
at the Dey*s disposal were for this year loaded in the direction of 
Tlemsen and beyond (14). Only a token force was despatched to thB eastern 
march with the Regency of Tunis (15). In the spring, further reinforcements, 
janissaries, spahie and Kabyles, were sent by sea to the Tlemsen region. 
Overland there was sent an haraka. centred upon a small force of Turks, 
to which werB gathered indigenous groupings from the Regency. On the 6th. 
April, the Dey himself left Algiers in style, to join his army (16).
Given the unease of contemporary Algerine politics, and the parallel 
weakness of his eastern to his western frontier (17)* it would seem that
(11) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" p„ 502 of the text and 506 of the modern French
translation cf. 5.1. 2® France Vol. Ill Wo* CXLVII Lemaire to 
Pontchartrain. Algiers 31/12/1691 p. 432
(12) S.I# 2B France Vol. Ill Wo- CXLVI Dusault, French Algiers merchant, to
Pontchartrain 30/12/1691 p. 430
(13) S.l. 2G France Vol* III Wo* CXLIX Dusault to Pontchartrain 14/1/1692
pp. 437-8
(14) S.P. 71 (3) f. 455 Memo, of consul Baker, Algiers, 7/1/1691 O.S. 
cf. S.l. 2 France Vol. Ill No. CLIV ftl-Ha.M Sha°ban Dev to
Pontchartrain 3/Rajab71103== 2l/3/1692 pp. 473-4
(15) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 502 of the text and 505-6 of the modern French
translation.
(16) S.l. 2s France Vol. Ill No. CXLI Lemaire to Pontchartrain. Algiers
19/5/1692 p. 486
(17) For a general history of Algiers during the period see H.-D. de Srammont 
"Histoire d*Aloer sous la domination Turciue (l5l5-1Q30)"Paris. 1887 
Chapter XVIII
the Dey was staking his political survival upon the assumption of a 
short and sharp victory in the field* Shortly before his departure, it 
was predicted that only the “vieux barbons de la milice" would be left 
as a token of his government within Algiers (18)* But the gamble 
succeeded admirably, A mass of border groupings rallied to the Dey*s 
army until he was over-loaded with “Moorish1* cavalry (19). This could 
have been an embarrassment, had it not been for the total incompetence 
of the defence—forces with which he was met* Isms^il forebore to go into 
the field himself. Instead he entrusted his army to the care of the young 
Zaydan (20), who can have been little more than twenty* More senior 
generals are known to have been with Zaydan (21)* But the military 
history of the Maghrib al-Aqsa over the previous fifteen years would 
suggest that none were accustomed to full-scale battle in open country*
The Dey*g army was given sufficient leeway to reach al-MashariC , a 
ford across the Moulouya. There it was not even challenged. According 
to reports reaching the French consulates, the Regency forces were able 
to attack Zaydan*s army while it was in camp# Its survivors fled from 
the carnage amid heavy losses in horses and equipment (22). The way to 
Fes lay wide open. But the Algerine troops advanced only as far as Taza, 
two days* journey from Fes itself (23). There the Dey encamped. In all
(18) S.l. 2e France Vol# III No. CLV Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers
22/3/1692 p. 475
(19) S.l. 20 France Vol. Ill No. CLXII Dusault to Pontchartrain. Algiers 
cf. Brooks p. 79 20/5/1692 p. 487
(20) Brooks p*_ 80 cf._"Turiuman" p. 26 of the text and 44 of the translation 
cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 40
(21) In the following year, cAli ibn cAbd Allah al-Hammami, □atid of Tetuan 
was reportedly still suffering from a would in the arm, received during 
this campaign (S.l. 2 France Vol. IV Wo. XIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle
Tetuan, 11/s/1693 p. 76)
(22) S.l. 2e France Vol. Ill No. CLXVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle , Sale
12/9/1692 p. 525 
cf. "Nashr al-MathanI>».«" Fes lithograph of 1892 Vol. II p. 157 
(Al-Zayyani*s texts give no reference to this encounter).
(23) Brooks p. 80 cf. "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 503-4 of the text and BOB
of the modern French translation.
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likelihood he was waiting to be bought off* His alternative would have
been the drastic step of laying siege to Fes, a city which may already
have grown disgruntled with Ismac:Tl (24), but which would probably not 
freely have opened its gates to an Hanafi invader.
In Meknes, Isma il opened his treasury with a startlingly free hand 
(25) and gathered up an heterogeneous following, ranging from members of 
his own guard of cabld to Christian slaves (26)* The last were troops 
whose use epitomised military desperation. Then, accompanied by men of 
religion who would act as mediators (27), the sultan went to meet the 
Dey* Peace was swiftly brought about, and the Algerine army withdrew (28). 
According to 3ean-Baptiste Estelle, IsmaCil, in Taza, made to the Dey a 
number of clear-cut diplomatic concessions (29)* It seems over-sophisticated 
to see the interim Taza agreement in these terms* The uDaftar al-Tashrifat" 
in its own theatrical style, recorded only a request by IsmaGil for "pax*1! the 
Haman" (30). English report alleged that IsmacIl bought peace with an 
advance payment of "an horse and furniture which cost 200,000 crowns and 
forty-Bight Mules laden with Gold" (31)* Such notes ring true* Eormal 
submission reinforced with heavy bribery was the standard Maghribi
(24) S.l* 2e France Vol* III No* CLXVIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , Sale,
12/9/1692 p. 527
(25) S.l* 2e France Vol. IV No* CXLIV Memo* of 3-B* Estelle* putatively
dated to the October of 1698 p. 693
(26) Brooks pp* 81-2 cf* S.l. 2e France Vol. Ill No. CLXVIII Memo*
of 3-8. Estelle Sale, 12/9/1692 p* 526
(27) Memo* of 3-B. Estelle (as immediately above) loc. clt*
(28) According to al-Zayyani*s chronicle material, IsmaCil joined Zaydan 
after Id al-Saohir which, in 1692, fell in mid-3une ("Tur iuman" p* 24 
of the text and 44 of the translation)* According to the "Daftar al- 
Tashrifat". the bulk of the Algerine troops, transported by sea, were 
back in Algiers before the end of duly (p. 504 of the text and 508 of 
the modern French translation).
(29) S.l. 28 France Vol. Ill No. CLXVIII Memo, of 3-B* Estelle , Sale,
12/9/1692 p. 527
(30) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" loc* cit*
(31) S.P. 71 (3) f* 245/495 Memo* of consul Baker, Algiers, 15/7/1692 O.S. 
cf* Brooks p. 82 ( which, curiously, quotes the same sum in treasure.)
response to defeat by a punishment haraka*
V
A more serious bid to forge a durable agreement between IsmaGil
and Algiers followed in August, when the Dey and his forces were back in
their capital (32)# An CAlawI embassy travelled to Algiers# It contained
high-ranking government officials, and was formally led by °Abd al-Malik
(33), a son of Ismael's who was newly rising to prominence# But this
prince was as yet an adolescent of around fifteen (34). And the embassy
as a whole seems to have been dominated by °ulamay (35)# Its numbers
included Muhammad al-Tayyib ibn Muhammad al-Fasi, idehtifiable as the 
• • «
major original "al-Fasi chronicler" (36)# It is possible to sbb this 
embassy partly in Fasi terms, as an attempt by the city*s religious 
aristocracy to restore the peaceable relations with the Regency that
C Mthe rBoent blow to Alawi military reputation had presumably made 
necessary to the future security of the pilgrimage caravan. For it 
would seem that the city identified closely with the mission, and feared 
for its safety# The chronicler reported, presumably with satisfaction, 
that when thB city received a false report that the entire embassy party 
had been murdered, the consequence was communal civic mourning, which 
postponed celebration of the feast of Ashura until there was reassurance 
that the envoys were safe (37)* The envoys were indeed safe* But it will 
be seen that their mission brought no secure peace to the "Cherg"* For
(32) "Daftar al-Tashrifat11 p* 504 of the text and 508 of the fnodorn French
translation*
(33) ibid* p# 504 of the text and 509 of the modern French
translation cf# "Nashr al-Mathanr*#." Fes lithograph of 1892
Vol# II p* 157 of the first notation
(34) S.l. 2° France Vol. Ill No* CLXVII Memo, of 0-6* Estelle? , Sale,
‘12/9/1692 p. 528
(35) According to the "Daftar al-Tashrlfat". the mission numbered one 
hundred and twenty, and was dominated by "grands marabouts" (p# 509 
of the modern French translation)#
(36) "Nashr al-Mathani*..«" Volume cited above# loc* cit#
For an identification of the major "al-Fasi chronicler" see 
Prologue P# T7
(37) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Volume cited above. loc* cit*
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the defeat of 1692 was no curb to Isma il s military style. Indeed, 
his ignominious capitulation to the Algerine Turks outside Taza urged 
the sultan into moves which may be interpreted as attempts to recoup 
losses in men, in resources, and in military prestige*
The most expansive of these attempts by IsmaCil to restore his
cown strength, was impressment into the corps of abid of a mass of raw 
recruits scoured from within the Atlas arc* The consequences of this 
impressment reverberated for years, and its memory was simplistically 
to be enshrined within the well-known indigenous tradition as to the 
foundation of IsmacTl,s army of n°abid al-Bukharin (38)* This 
impressment may have followed immediately upon defeat* In the August 
of 1692, the aa^d of Tetuan included, within his annual hadiva. 
uniforms for Cabid (39)* The item was also included within the hadiva 
for the following year (40)• Direct references to mass conscription 
date from 1693* For the spring of that year, 3ean-Baptist« Estelle 
recorded that negotiations of his own, concerning the reception of 
the French ambassador Pidou de St* Olon by the aforementioned gafid of 
Tetuan, had fallen to pieces, allegedly as a result of the qa*idts 
pre-occupation with fulfilling the suitan*s summary demand for twelve 
thousand blacks (41)♦ Of this vast and presumably nominal quota, some 
hundreds seem actually to have been assembled and despatched to Meknes*
On its own journey to Meknes, the embassy party mBt a force of abid 
drawn up at a ford, for the benefit of the Christians* Pidou de St Olon
(38) For a critique of this tradition, sees Epilogue Part I Pp* 279-292
(39) S*I. 2e France Vol. Ill No* CLXVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle , Sale
1279/1692 p. 521
(40) S.l* 2e France Vol* IV No* XXV Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , Sale
23/10/1693 p. 221
(41) S.l* 28 France Vol* IV No* XIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle. Tetuan
1VW1693 pp. 71-2
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guessed that these men were the Titwani recruits (42)* From the duly 
of 1693 there survives an administrative memorandum which refers to 
the mustering and registration of Cabld from two associated Arabic- 
speaking groupings of the Sebu plain, the Banu Malik and the Sufyan 
(”al~ta,iammuCat (sic).**wa fl-diwan ***al~mushtafnil Cala Cab?d ban! 
malik wa sufvan”) being carried out according to the sultan*s instructions
while he himsBlf was on campaign (43)#
The practical mechanics of conscription are likely to haVB been 
flagrantly questionable* The proportion of recruits who were genuine 
slaves cannot be known* Pragmatically, co-option could frequently have
been carried out upon the basis of colour alone* Free negroes and
mulattos, the detritus of the slave population of previous generations, 
had long formed a Bection of Maghribi society (44)* De Chenier was to 
note that it was:
”#**customary among the Moors to marry their male and female 
negroes, and, after a certain period, to restore them to 
freedom." (4g)
But he tartened his own sentimental picture of the merry and simplB 
lives lad by communities of these free negro labourers by the proviso 
that they were “considered as slaves among the Moors, even after they" 
were “restored to liberty*1 (46)* This last note adds to the credibility 
of an extended account of Ismacil*s quest for slaves that is contained
WMIWIIIilMWIIIHIIim— IWWlJIIrtWnWHlH W I W I H  ■ n W l l l l f l i > W W « H I I I B H  Mi II W I M W  H>— M
(42) S*I* 2e France Vol* IV Wo* XXII Memo* of Pidou de St* Olon
Toulon, 7/9 /1693 p. 170
(43) "Lettres InBdites,**” No* 20 Muhammad ibn Qaslm to Muhammad ibn
al-ijlasan al-Vahmadi 8/ Dhu 1 l-QaLda/ 1104 = 12/7/1693* p* 67
(44) Thus, from the high mediaeval period comes al—Bakri's curious account 
of an independent community Df negroes (sudan) living in a disease- 
wasted creek between the Sebu mouth and Arzilla (al-Bakri ed./tr*
de Slane p* 87 of the text and 176 of the translation, noted by 
M* Brett In “Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth 
to the Twelfth Century A.D*" , “Journal of African History” Vol* X (3) 
(London, 1969) p. 355
(45) de Chenier (English translation Vol. I) p* 280
(46) ibid* p* 282
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within the narrative of Gohn Windus. This account, associated in the 
text with a 1698 bid for the co-option of manpower from the city of 
Fes, alleges that;
"•••the Emperor appointed all the Records of the Country to 
be searched, that Discovery might be made of such as were 
descended from Slaves or Renegadoes* In this Search were 
committed a great many Cruelties; and many thousands of 
poor People, either for private or public Piques, or being 
of a duskier Complexion than ordinary, if they could not 
produce long Scrowls of their Genealogies, notwithstanding 
their having lived free for Ages, and enjoyed comfortable 
Fortunes, were declared Slaves, their Estates and Persons 
seized for the Use of the Emperor; and some were forced by 
Torture, to desire their Friends to call them their Slaves: 
and if they happened to be poor, after the pretended Patron 
had received a Ducat, or sometimes less from the Emperor*s 
Officers, he was forced to be at the Expence of two or 
three more, to send them handsomely cloathed to the 
Emperor*"
Horror-stricken though its reporting of the crudities of impressment 
may be, this account does indicate that it was necessary for makhzan 
agents .of the quest for recruits to work within at least a show of 
paper legality* All available evidence, including the late material 
set into al-Zayyani*s texts (48), would suggest that the mass of 
recruits to Isma il*s expanded abid force was taken from regions 
socially and economically central to the sultan*8 domain* Here, where 
impressment was blatant, the sultan was acutely concerned to obtain a 
slick of legal acquiescence to the activity which built up his "slave 
army"* Complaisant jurists expressed such acquiescence by adding their 
signatures to a dxwan or muster-roll of recruits to the new force (49);
(47) Windus pp* 215-216
(48) "Tur Iuman" p* the text and 29 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif.*." MS pp. 31—2
njl 1 J ' " 'a "L " ' V  : ^ "
(49) Thus Muhammad ibn Qasim wrote to al-Yahmadl. with reference to the 
dlwan; "bana (sic) ulama1 fas al-mashhurxn kullihimi wada u aydahum
c ^ ,
alavhl"
("It was brought to the attention of all the most famous Fasz scholars* 
They set their hands to it*")
"Lettres Inedites..." Wo. 20 dated 8/Dhu *l-QaCda/l104 - 12/7/1693 
p* 67
documentation which seems identifiable with the sultan!s list noted 
by Windus;
‘•.♦♦a Register made of the unfortunate People found, or 
forced to be Slaves, signed by all his Cadies,.••so that 
they and their Children are become Slaves by a Form of
Laul*" (so)
There exists a curious manuscript which, in deference to a margin 
note linking it with the reign of IsmaCil, has been judged to be a 
copy of part of this register (51). It lists, grouping by grouping, 
an astonishing total of 6586 slaves (“wusfan” ) from a rural region 
within the economic orbit of Fes: the country of the Banu Zarwal, and 
of two associated "3abali" peoples. Its vocabulary is, for the most 
part, carefully legal* It stresses the slave status of the individuals 
named, sometimes to the extent of referring to them as "al-mamalik 
al-ariqga1 al-wusfan”. But the standard ascription of ownership 
within this text is given in terms associated with inheritance 
("irth /mawruth"). 5uch terminology gives rise to a suspicion that the 
relevant slave-ownership was frequently technical; that individuals 
living as free men may well, as Windus alleged, have been classed for 
makhzan purposes, as the slaves of prominent neighbours, on the 
pretext that a master-slave or master-client relationship had existed 
between their mutual ancestors. This might account for the record 
that "slaves" in thousands were to be found within a region whose rural 
economy might be thought to have held little place for them, Leo described
(50) Windus p, 216
(51) The MS is now in the possession of M. G. S. Colin, who believes it 
to be a copy of an authentic register. The copy itself is written on 
paper of a quality no more than a century old, and would appear to be 
the work of a scribe practising calligraphy. Its relationship to an 
original diwan would be incapable of precise definition. Perhaps the 
best argument for its authenticity in general, if not in detail, lies 
within its format: a mass of names set within a framework of 
repetitious formulae, It would seem an unlikely candidate for late, 
original composition.
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the country of the "Beni Guazerwal” as a densely populated and 
agriculturally rich region, whose inhabitants were noted for their 
frequent skirmishes amongst themselves (52). Such a pattern of life, 
which may be assumed to have persisted, would have given rise to a 
mass of “publick and private Piques1*, to which a government levy in 
manpower would have provided a rich opportunity for the resolution*
During the 1690s, recruits to the new “slave army" or “ iund min 
al-wusfan” (53) were kept near to the capital, ready for deployment 
when they ware not actively in the field* In 1698, 3ean-Baptiste
m Q h ,
Estelle would state, in relation to slave troops, that Isma ils
“••♦pout avoir a present vingt-cinq mil, tous armes d*un 
sabre et d*un fusil, et chacun son cheval. II en tient
deux mil a Miquanes pour sa seurete, et. le restB aux
environs do Miquanes, a dix lieues autour, pour les 
avoir dans un jour assembles, quand il en pourra avoir 
besoin*"
This division between an inner two thousand and an outor mass could 
reflect an important contemporary split within the “black army", of 
which Estelle, with the blanket racial perceptions of an European 
may have been unaware* As indicated previously (55), the cabid of
i« q m
Isma ilfs early years had been militarily an highly regarded and, in 
part, lengthily-trained corps* Many had grown up in the imperial 
service, graduating by way of the sultanfs personal guard of musket- 
toting adolescent pages* These "Young Rogues” (56) seem most commonly 
to have been born and, more latterly, deliberately bred from parents of
(52) Leo ed* Ramusio ff* 51-2
(53) "Lettres Inedites...” Mo* 10 Isma°il to Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Qadir
a 1-Fas I 25/Dhu f 1-Hi j ja/1108 ^ 15/7/16 97 p. 50~~
(54) S.l. 20 France Vol. IV Mo* GXLIV Memo* of 3-B. Estelle putatively
dated to October 1698 p* 692
(55) See Chapter II Pp. 113-115
(56) Windus p. 142
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recognised slave status (57)* During the mid 1690s, however, when the
0  mm
sultan's army of abid would seem to have been swollen with raw adult 
recruits, pressed men in thousands, that army can no longer have been 
dominated numerically by a professional core. But such a core may have 
continued distinct and, at least in part, resident within Wajh cArus, 
the °abid garrison suburb to the north-west of Meknes (58)*
ftFor an understanding of Isma il*s military circumstances in the mid- 
1690s, it is necessary to reverse, upon the pivot of its own chronology, 
the traditional two—tier model of the development of Ismacil*s slave 
army* As will be seen (59), this tradition tells of a primary generation 
of raw recruits, taken in the late 1670s, and succeeded, some sixteen 
years or so later, by a steadily expanding force constituted from among 
its own progeny, and trained in the sultanfs service from childhood*
This tradition would date Isma il*s first recruitment of children 
for training to 1100 A.H,/l688-9 A.D. (60). The chronology implies 
that, during the mid-l690s, when this first group of boys rose to 
military age, there opened a period of marked increase in the quality 
of troops at Isma il*s disposal. In actuality, the mid—1'6908, as the 
years of mass-impressment, are likely to have known an increase in the 
quantity, but a severe adulteration in the overall quality of the troops 
claimed by the sultan as his slaves. During this period IsmaDil could
(57) Thus, from information gained in 1693, Pidou de St. Olon referred 
to Isma il's policy of deliberately encouraging the progeniture of 
young slave recruits, by the arrangement of marriages between adult 
slaves, and the use of these slaves* provincial postings "like a 
Nursery to serve him upon occasion11 (Motteux translation p. 128)
(58) 11 Tur.Iuman" p# 16 of the text and 30 of the translation cf*
Busnot p. 182 cf, Windus p. 185
(59) See Epilogue Part I Pp, 2B1-283
(6°) 11 Turiuman" p* 22 of the text and 42 of the translation cf,
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p* 36
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and did deploy "blacks" in thousands* Such deployment did not 
necessarily mean* as it would have done in his early years, that the 
sultan was setting "crack regiments" into the field. It may indicate 
instead the use of newly pressed men in large numbers. Such gross 
but makeshift manoeuvres may be seen as a clue to the chequered 
character of Isme^il’s military career during the nine years 
following the al-MashariC defeat*
Over the winter of 1692-3, which followed this disgrace, lsmacil 
prepared personally to take the field, with the aim of recouping both 
honour and authority among the populous groupings of his eastern march. 
At the time of the Turkish
invasion, the fluid limit of cAlaui suzerainty in the "Cherg" had
shifted alarmingly far to the west, A show of cAlawi force within
march country was necessary to the regaining of the old cAlawi eastern
taxation frontier. This put Ismacil to the politically awkward
necessity of campaigning at the edge of the Regency without provoking
a second counter-move from Algiers* So, at court, before the campaign
opened, he was careful verbally to insist upon his regard for the
friendship of the Ottoman sultan (61), And he chose, as the designated
victims of his eastward haraka. the Banu °Amir of "Oranie", This
grouping inhabited open country, and could be envisaged as easy and
suitable prey for a swift summer expedition* More vitally, the Banu 
c
Amir were "moros de pazes". effectively subject not to Algiers, but to
the Spaniards of Oran* Consequently, an haraka aimed at their punishment
• ' " '
could be given a mulahid gilding, as a blow aimed at a people "qui
(61) Thus Pidou de St* Olon recorded that, during his audience of the
sultan in the 3une of 1693, which immediately preceded the "Chergi" 
haraka. Isma il welcomed the French as fellow allies of the "Grand 
Seigneur" (S,I* 20 France Vol. IV No* XXII Memo* of Pidou 
de St* Olon , Tou 1 on," 7/971693 p. 172),
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frequentoit parmy les Chrestiens sans#.#ordres et sans aucun raison”
(62)* and who had recently joined the Spaniards in a raid upon fellow 
Muslims (63)# The expedition was preceded by a pilgrimage to the shrine 
of Idris I at Zerhoun (64)# And it could be referred to by a makhzan 
official as an ”harakat al-saCjdat al~mubarakau (65): a pious venture*
J-.J. X l _ _ . - T T W a j . _ _ J  - T- T  .
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In Fes, a city whose ulama* had recently helped to forge a peace 
treaty with the Regency, the pious venture may well have been seen as 
dangerous meddling along the eastern march# IsmaCil seems to have 
believed that the loyalty of Fes was not to be relied upon in his 
absence# For he took the precaution of removing Muhammad al— Alim from 
the vice-regality of the city (66), setting into Fes as his temporary 
successor, the as yet innocuous adolescent °Abd al-Malik (67). By this 
date Muhammad al- Alim had been vice-roy in Fes for thirteen years, 
and his identification with the city may be seen as a political bond 
far stronger than the aura of simplB popularity based upon virtue, 
which Oean-Baptiste Estelle cited as the reason for the princefs 
destitution (60)# That destitution may be seen as a signpost pointing 
towards the divergence of imperial and civic interests#
The heraka into "Oranie” was bloodthirsty and brief# ThB sultan
(62) S*I. 2e France l/ol# IV No# XXII Contemporary French translation of
a letter from IsmacXl to Pidou de St. Olon , dated 10/Dhu !1-Hijja/I104
= 12/8/1693 p# 207
(63) S#I. 2S France Vol* IV No# XIII Memo, of 3-B* Estelle* Tetuan
W 8/1693 p# 125
(64) S.I# 28 France Vol# IV No* XXII Memo# of Pidou de Sti Olon# Toulon
7/9/1693 p# 188
(B5) ”Lettres Inedites***” No* 20 Muhammad ibn Qasim to Muhammad ibn
al-Hasan al-Yahmad? 0/Dhu fl~Qa*da/l104 « 12/7/1693 * p. 67
• _ •
(66) S#I* 2 France Vol# IV No* XLVXII Memo# of 3-B* Estelle, completed 
19/10/1694, and referring to events of the previous year p. 296
(B7) ^Lettres Inedites..*” No# 20 Muhammad ibn Qasim to Muhammad ibn
al-Hasan al-Vahmadi 8/Dhu U-Qa^da/HO^ - 12/7'/1693 * ioc. cit*
(68) "Les Mores de Fez adoroient ce prince, qui est liberal, saiga et d*une 
retenue peu commune a ses Moresl,#*#qualities, of course, attributed 
to Muhammad*s part-European parentage! (S#I# 2 France Vol* IV 
No. XLVIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle completed 19/10/1694 loc* cit*)
left for Taza, where his troops were mustering, in the late June of 
1693 (69)# He was to be back in Meknes before mid—September (70). In
w m  Q
the interim, the Banu Amir, warned of the sultan*s approach, had 
retreated en masse towards thB protecting Spanish fortress of Oran (71 )•
IsmaCil subjected the fortress to a token day*s mulahid siege (72)#
But it was neighbouring peoples under Algerine suzerainty who bore 
the brunt of the expedition1s punishment. The consequence was 
Algerine protest (73) but not Algerine reprisal.
It is thus probable that the expedition was successful in
Q  M
thrusting eastwards the Alawi taxation frontier, and that this success
had repercussions at both the local, and the international level.
Locally the next three years saw a series of successor raids. They
may be seen as a form of "beating the bounds": markedly destructive
and essentially rural* There is no known evidence that they were 
associated with any bid for Tlemsen* 3ean-Baptiste Estelle could 
sum up the ravaging simply as "field-burning"-(74). These raids were to 
be variously led. Their usual commander was a noted black general 
flascud ibn al-RamX, qatid of Taza* His scratching at the march was 
quite separate from Isma il s "Chergi" ambitions as conducted at the 
level of international politics.
(69) S.I. 2s France Vol# IV Wo. XIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle , Tetuan,
ii/8/1693 p. 125
(70) S.I. 28 France Vol* IV No. XXV Memo, of 3-B. Estelle. Sale
13/10/1693 p. 221
(71) S.I. 20 France Vol* IV No. XIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle. Tetuan
11/8/1693 p. 126
(72) Galindo y de Veras "Historia# viclsitudes..." p. 284
(73) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV Wo. XII Lemaire to Pontchartrain , Algiers
6/8/1693 (p. 52) cf„ Wo* XXV Memo, of 3-B. Eatelle. completed in
Sale 23/10/1693 pp. 222-3
(74) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV Wo. XCVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle. Sale
29/7/1697 p. 514
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Upon the wider scale, XsmaCil toyed with the idea of recouping 
military prestige in relation to Algiers, by means of an offensive 
alliance with Tunis* In the Danuary of 1694 there was a Tunisian envoy 
within Meknes, who came to Ismacil loaded with gifts from Muhammad 
Bey, and left amicably (75), For this year, al-Hajj Sha°ban Dey was 
known to be planning a bold venture against Tunis, According to 
Tunisian rumour, it was agreed in Meknes that lama il should, as a 
diversion, lead an expedition towards Algiers as soon as he knew the 
Deyfs army to have left for the Tunisian march. He would thus provide 
the Bey with an opportunity to turn aggesssor instead of victim (76), 
Phantasmagorically, the Dey claimed afterwards that this arrangement 
was linked with an agreement that, at the conclusion of the projected
m m Q m m
double-pronged campaign, Isma il would be ceded Ottoman territory as 
far to the east as Tunis itself, while the Bey would take an empire 
stretching as far as Cairo, within which territory Ismacil would be 
hts wazir (77), At the heart of this flummery could be a trace of 
proposals for some border adjustment by which the Bey, "c b  traitre", 
had promised, in the event of major victory, ude mettre le pays 
ottoman aux mains des arabes11 (78),
This projected international venture off Ismacilts was doomed to 
abortion. Preparations for a major venture into Algerine territory 
were made and then abandoned, leaving the sultan both at peace with 
the Regency and in possession of his Tunisian bribe, Dean-Baptiste 
Estelle, with an over-sophisticated sarcasm, saw in this an example
(75) S.I, 2° Franee Vol, IV No, XXXI 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain.
Sale, 20/2/1692 pp, 241-2
(76) S*I, 28 France Vol, IV No, XXXVIII Auoer-Sorhainde. French consul
in Tunis, to Pontchartrain p. 263
(77) Letter from al-Haii Shacban Dev to Louis XIV , from the camp outside 
Tunis, dated 11/Muharram/l106 « 1/9/1694, and quoted in translation
in E, Plantet! “Correspondence des Devs dMloer avec la Cour de France11 
Vol, I (Paris, 1889) p* 418
(78) ibid* p. 419
of admirably astute policy on the part of a barbarian (79). But the
sultanfs behaviour suggests timidity in the event, rather than
cunning duplicity. There seems no doubt that in the spring of 1694
IsmaCil intended to move eastwards. He arranged for his son Zaydan
to spend April in Taza, supervising the mustering of an army (80).
And he himself was rumoured to have been uncommonly open-handed to
the troops assembled there (81). However, it is not certain that this
army ever even left Taza. It may have been stalled following the
reception of information that al-Hajj Sha°ban Dey had despatched a
token Algerine force to his western march, when sending the main
body of his troops eastwards (82). The Bey would later claim a
C ^
clear military victory over Alawi forces (83). The claim was 
probably bluster. During 1694, no rumour of any armed encounter in 
the “Cherg" percolated through to 3ean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale.
IsmaCil*s relapse into caution may, as Estelle believed, have 
been influenced by a threat from within his own domains. Muhammad al-
Q rm —
Alim had refused to reconcile himsBlf to a peaceable Filali exile.
He had made the standard gambit of a prince fallen upon hard times: 
that of moving into an alliance, sealed by marriage, with a 
strategically placed rural grouping. His allies were Ayt °Atta (84),
Q
whose westernmost territories fringed a Dar a-Marrakesh routeway,
(79) ”Sa politique pour un barbare sst assurement a admirer. II se moque
de toute la Barbarie** (S.I. 2 France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo, 
of 3-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 298)
(80) S.I. 2s France Vol. IV No, XXXV 3-B, Estelle to Pontchartrain , Sale
8/4/1694 p. 256
(81) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No, XLIII 3-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain.
Sale,' 167571694 pp. 276-7
(82) S.I. 2b France Vol IV No. XL Lemaire to Pontchartrain. Algiers
30/4/1694 p. 265
(83) Al-Hajj ShaCban Dev to Louis XIV , the camp outside Tunis, dated 
11/fluharram/1106 =1/9/1694. Quoted in Plantet: “Correspondence des Devs*1
# Vol. I. p. 419
(84) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, completed
in Sale, 19/1Q/1694 p* 297
cRemote from SaSs as it was, this activity of Muhammad al— Alinas
provided a milestone to his father's career* it was the first act of
open filial defiance with which IsmaCil had been faced*
The projection and subsequent abandoning of the "Chergi1'
campaign of 1694 was a signpost to deterioration in IsmaCilfs
standing* It proved the sultan unreliable as an ally of a foreign
power* And it is unlikely to have strengthened his grip within his
own domains* To subjects who remembered the Turkish victory of 1692,
failure to move eastwards is likely to have appeared weak rather than
astute. The appearance of imperial debilitation may have fired
southern resentment against rule from the "Gharb". For over a year
the Sus had grumbled with disturbance (85)* By the October of 1694,
it was necessary to re-inforce,militarily,government authority within
c ***
southern regions. An army of abid, estimated at three to four 
thousand, went southwards under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Haddu 
al- Attar, and of the young Abd al-Malik (86)* The general went on 
to inner Sus$ the young prince remained as a disciplinarian viceroy 
in Safi, the contemporary port for Marrakesh (87).
At this point, when Isme^il's prestige in both uChergw and Sus 
would seem to have been low, the sultan turned to the .jihad* his 
source of easy glory in earlier years, and determined that his 
mu.jabidun should capture Ceuta. He may be presumed to have been 
confident of cheap victory, likely to bring him no greater military 
difficulty than the siege of Larache had brought* This confidence was
(85) S.I. 28 France Vol. H I  Ho* CLXXXI Memo* of 3-B. Estelle , Tetuan
2772/1693 p* 560
(86) S.I* 20 France Vol. IV Ho* XLVIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle
completed in Sale, 19/lo/l694 pp. 302-3
(87) S.I. 2S Franee Vol* IV Ho* LI Memo* of 3-B* Estelle* completed
in Sale, 2T/WT69A p. 312
misplaced.
The mounting of the siege of Ceuta, in the autumn of 1694, was 
sudden, but carried out according to formula. °Ali ibn CAbd Allah, 
the ga*id of Tetuan, who was in Meknes upon his annual tribute-paying 
visit, was given summary orders to take the Spanish fortress. He is 
said to have protested the lateness of the season (88). His protests
q M
were over-ruled. He was granted a force of five-hundred abid 
cavalry (89)5 a troop of renegades to man fourteen cannon, and to 
serve as "pioneers" (90)5 and the formal permission to muster a 
mass-rabble of.his own following of Rif-men, "Brabers or Country 
People, arm!d in a very strange and unusual Manner", with casual 
implements (91). Hostilities commenced at the end of October (92). At 
around the same time, a parallel siege is said to have been laid 
against the smaller Spanish presidio of Melilla (93). Thus began a 
conflict which, at an oscillating intensity, was to involve mu.iahid 
forces, and to compromise the sultanfs Islamic prestige for the 
remaining thirty two and an half years of his reign.
In the Sus, Isma il*s autumn expeditionary force met with 
relative s u c c b s s . By the Oanuary of 1695, Isma ilfs writ ran once 
again far enough to the south for him successfully to order the 
enfranchisement of the crew of an alien barque, run aground at
(88) S.I. 20 France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle.
completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 302
(89) "Qcklev" p. 10
(90) S.I* 28 France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle.
completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 loc. cit. 
c^« "Qcklev" Chapter Is passim.
(91) "Qcklev" p. 10
3 Vol. IV    _____ _ _
Tetuan, 14/11/1694 p." 305
(92) S.I. 28 France No. XLIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain
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Agadir (94)* And by early April, the entire inner Sus was alleged to
g ™
be quiescent under the authority of Ahmad ibn Baddu al-'Attar, 
who had sent the ringleader of previous disturbances as a prisoner 
to the sultan (95)*
Meanwhile, within the hitherto uncomplicated jihad# the fortunes 
of war went decidedly awry# Ceuta had been well re-inforced, and its 
captain-general showed no inclination to surrender* In the December 
of 1694, disgruntled civic contingents were sent to swell the 
numbers of mu iahidun* ^ean-Saptiste Estelle recorded the difficulties 
experienced by the governor of Sale in rounding up his quota of two 
hundred civic "volunteers” (96)# The civic troops are likely to have 
included Fasi, recorded in chronicle material as having contributed 
to the siege a detachment of five hundred musketeBrs, of which the 
personnel was changed every six months (97)* Like other mu iahidun. 
the newcomers faced an harsh winter (98) and no military progress*
In the June of 1695, Ismacil added an estimated two thousand cabid. 
together with further civic detachments, to the forces of attack (99) 
to no avail* No longer could there be any Idea that Ceuta would fall 
with the ease of Larache. The contrast was difficult for IsmaGil to 
comprehend# Bfeavy suspicion of collusion with the enemy fell upon 
the muiahid captain CA1I ibn CAbd Allah(100)# In August and in
(94) S#I* 2° Franee Vol* IV No# LIV Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , Sale
2672/1695 p. 328
(95) S#I# 29 France Vol# IV No# LXI Memo* of 3-B# Estelle , completed
In Sale, 29/9/1695 p# 345
(96) S*I, 2S France Vol* IV No* LI Memo* of 3-B* Estelle* competed
in Sale, 24/12/1694 pp* 316-17
(97) "Turiuman” P*J23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf#
,r Bus tan al-Z arif * * * ” MS p. 40
b •
(98) S*I* 2 France Vol# IV No* LVI 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain# Sale
20/3/1695 p. 333
(99) S*I, 2° Franee Vol, IV No LVIII 3-B, Estelle to Pontchartrain« Sale
23/6/1695 (p. 338) cf. Memo* of the same, completed in Sale,
29/9/1695 p. 350
(100) "Tur.juman” loc* cit* cf. "Bustan al-Zarlf**.” MS loc, cit#
September, two successive and independent auwwad were sent to 
estimate the strategic worth of Ceuta*s defences* Both, honourably
0 mm 0 «H
or no, are alleged to have vindicated Ali ibn Abd Allah by 
confirming the impossibility of taking thB place (101)* Ismacil 
refused to accept their verdict, and sent up to Ceuta g further
C •“*
force of abid. estimated at four thousand (102)* By the criterion
of manpower, he was committed to the jihad as never before#
A lateral threat to Sa$s boiled up within the "Cherg11* In the
high summer of 1695, there had been an Algerine embassy in Meknes,
protesting at the border incursions of the previous two years# Its
summary dismissal (103) provoked the massing of Turkish forces
within the Tllimsani march, a move which the French consul in
Algiers could interpret in terms of war (104)# In November, as a
counter-move, Muhammad al- Alim, who had slid back into his fatherfs * 7
0 M
service, was sent eastward at the head of yet another abid army, 
said to number four thousand (105)# Three months later, in the 
February of 1696, the prince was ambushed by Turkish troops while 
he was on a minor tax raid* He was heavily defeated (106)# The 
aftermath was a rumoured threat of invasion from the east (107)*
This "Chergi" threat provoked a flurried redeployment of 
manpower# A force originally destined to accompany Zaydan towards
C101) S*I* 2s France Vol. IV No* LXI Memo* of 3-B* Estelle completed
in Sale 29'/9/l695 pp* 355 and 357
(102) ibid* p* 357
(103) ibid* pp# 347-8
(104) S#I# 28 France Vol* IV No* LXXI Lemaire to Pontchartrain. Algiers
'31/8/1696 p. 425
(105) S.I, 2e France Vol* IV No# LXVII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle completed
in Sale 2/47l696 pp* 385-6
(106) ibid* p. 401
(107) ibid* p. 407
cf* No* LXX Memo* of the same, completed in SalB 24/8/1696
pp# 416 and 421-2
a proposed vice—regality in Marrakesh was diverted towards the eastern
march (108), The siege of Ceuta lapsed into subordinacy. Four thousand 
c »■
of its abid are said to have been withdrawn thence and taken into the 
centrally constituted army (109)* Yet more recruits were hauled into 
the sultanfs service* Zaydan was belatedly sent to Marrakesh to raise 
thence a corps of five hundred cavalry; his adolescent brother Hafiz 
had orders to raise a similar number of troops from Tamesna and 
Dukkala; and other sons of Ismacl!l were despatched to various points 
of the empire (110), presumably upon similar errands* OncB again, as
■ w  Q
in the aftermath of al-Mashari , the sultan was scouring his domains 
for men* The terms upon which these latest troops were gathered in 
are likely to have been those of impressment* And it may be thought, 
from the part "white" and part "black” make-up of a recent Saletin 
contingent pressed in for Ceuta (111)* that in a crisis, the military 
role of the "pressed man" and that of the "military slave", newly 
taken, was impossible to differentiate. The two may have been 
distinguishable only along the hazy line of colour*
In the event, the newly pressed troops were not required to 
defend the eastern march* Isma il was rescued from the threat of 
invasion by a turn of fortunes within the Regency* In the August of 
1696, news came to Algiers of desertion from (112) and finally of
mutiny within the Algerine mahalla in the Tilimsani march, with the
" •  'J r '
(1D8) S*I* 28 France Vol# IV No* LXVII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , completed
in Sale 2/4/1696 pp, 401 and 402
(109) ibid* pp# 406-7
(110) ibid* pp* 405, 406 and 407
(111) S*I, 2B France Vol* IV No* LI Memo, of Estelle, completed
SalB, 24/12/1694 —  p. 316
(112) S,P, 71 (3) f* 677 Memo* of consul Cole, Algiers, 31/8/1696 N*S*
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election there of a new Dey, who turned his troops eastwards upon the 
capital (113)« This left the pathway open for a force of IsmaCil,s 
own, undor Mascud ibn al-Rami, to carry out the fourth in a series 
of annual raids into Regency march territory (114)# The force was 
rumoured to have reachBd "Oranie" before meeting any opposition 
sent out from Algiers (115)*
However, southern crises developed and eventually swallowed many 
of the troops now available to IsmaCil* The autumn of 1696 saw an 
inept conspiracy within Marrakesh that involved the heir-presumptive 
Zaydan (116)* The conspiracy had alleged Susi connections but, like 
all post-1677 disaffaction based upon Marrakesh, as distinct from 
the ultramontane Susi heartland, it fizzled pathetically* Like 
other recent offences upon Zaydan's part (117), his role in this 
affair was dealt with as a youngster's peccadillo* The heir- 
presumptive suffered merely a spell within sanctuary, and recall 
from Marrakesh to Meknes (118)* But the fact that the prince had been 
caught so swiftly by southern disaffection put an end to his vice- 
regality over "treacherous" (119) Murrakushi* And the affair seems to haVB
(113) S *1. 2e France Vol* IV No* LXXI Lemaire to Pontchartrain ,
Algiers, 31/8/1696 p. 425
(114) S.I* 28 France Vol* IV No* LXXIV Memo* of 3-B* Estelle„ completed
in Sale, 12/12/169G pp* 436-7
(115) S*P* 71 (3) f* 685 Memo* of consul Cole* Algiers, 15/9/1696 N.5.
(1 *16) S*I* 20 France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo* of 3-B* EstellB« completed
in Sale, 12/1271696 pp. 435-6
(117) For example, the murder of imperial officials in Fes, noted both 
by 3ean-Baptiste Estelle (S.I. 2° France Vol* IV No* LXI Memo* 
completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 355) and, with a different 
chronology, by al-Zayyani ("Tur iuman" p. 25 of the tcaxt and 47 of
the translation.)
(118) S.I. 2e France Vol* IV No* LXXIV Memo, of 3-B* Estelle* completed
in Sale, 12/12/1696 p. 436
(119) Ismacil had a blanket opinion of Murrakushi and other southerners 
as traitors* In 1692, he explicitly confined negotiations with thg 
French for the ransom of "Moorish'* galley-slaves,^to men born within 
towns of the "kingdom of Fes", and gave Murrakushi treachery as
his reason for leaving unfortunate southern captives to their fate* 
(S.I* 28 France Vol. Ill No. CLI Memo* of 3-B* Estelle. Marseille,
2/37i692 p. 457)
spawned more serious disturbances further south# By the spring of 
1697, it could be claimed that the entire "kingdom of Sus" was in 
a state of disturbance sufficiently severe to warrant the despatching 
thither of a force of "blacks" estimated at six thousand (120). They 
were to re-inforce the former "Chergi" army of Mas°ud ibn al-Raml 
which had already been transferred southwards (121), presumably to 
the gross weakening of Isma il's eastern flank*
The jihad necessarily lapsed into a state of comparative shadow, 
and could be said to lack "la chaleur qu'ons le comenca" (122)* But 
there was no question of the siege of Ceuta being abandoned# By this 
date it supported a localised armaments industry, under thB surveillance 
of an Irish renegade (123) who seems identifiable with the Bohn Carr 
whom Braithwaite met thirty years later, when he and his "Foundery" 
had been absorbed into the palace economy of Meknes (124). The siege 
also pinned down imperial troops# The Ceuta Cabid were chiefly infantry, 
and therefore, presumably, low quality soldiery} but thBy were still 
maintained outside Ceuta in thousands, and were thought to outnumber the 
"Moors" of the besieging army (125)*
During 1697, with forces split between Sus and .jihad. IsmaCil 
showed signs of approaching the exhaustion of his available manpower* 
Over the summer there were rumours that the petty siege of Melilla
120) S*I* 28 Franee Vol. IV No. LXXXIX Memo* of 3-B* Estelle, completed
in Sale, 1/5/1697 p* 489
121) ibid* loc* cit*
122) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV. No. LXXXVIH Pierre Estelle to
Pontchartrain. Tetuan/ 29/4/1697 p* 477
123) "Qcklev" pp. 16-18 cf* S.I. 2 9 France Vol. IV Memo, of 3-B. Estelle
No. LXVII,completed in Sale 2/4/ 1696 pp# 400 and 404
124) Braithwaite pp. 180, 185-6 and 196
125) S.I* 2° Franee ^Vol* IV No. CV Extracts from the printed
"Nouvelles du Siege de Ceuta", based upon Dutch information issued in 
the Hague, and reproduced within the "Gazette de France". Information 
from the March and April of 1697 p. 540
fin
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had been abandoned (126)* And in dune, following the defeat of MasCud 
ibn al-Ramx in the Sus, the re-inforcements sent to him at first,
C
under the command of Ahmad ibn Haddu al- Attar, were estimated in
• » 4*
hundreds rather than in the customary thousands (127). However, in the 
Duly of 1697, it was alleged that a member of sultan's governing clan 
within Fes, the Rusi, had been appointed commander of a further army 
intended for the Sus (128), Significantly, this appointment co-incided 
with the first stages of a remarkable legal tussle between the makhzan 
and leading Fasi Culama'.
In al-Zayyani's chronicle material it was recorded that, during 
Dhu 'l-Hijja 1108, an Hegiran month crossing the May and 3une of 1697, 
there was sent to Fes an open imperial letter, addressed to the qadi
C
and to the ulama*. and censuring their refusal to accept the sultan's 
legal ownership ("tamlik") of the Gabid listed within the diwan. or 
military register (129), During the following months, in the year A,H, 
1109, there followed a second communication, formally demanding 
recognition of the sultan's rights to the tamllk of Fasi haratin (130)
(126) S.I, 28 Franne Vol. IV No* XCIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain
Tetuan, 30/7/1697
(127) S.I. 28 Franee Vol, IV No* XCIV Memo, of 3-B. Estelle. Sale
18/6/1697 pp. 509 and 510
(128) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. Cl Memo, of 3-B. Estelle , completed
in Sale 30/9/1697 pp. 527 and 529
(129) "Tur iuman" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf.
11 Bust an al-Zarif..." MS p. 41
       *
(130) "warada kitab min °indahu Cala tamlik haratin fas, fa_ quri'a
c -  • *
ala 'l-minbar"
("There came a letter from him concerning the ownership of
Fasi haratin. It was read out from the pulpit") ("Tur iuman11 loc. cit.) 
• « '
A clue to the dating of this communication may be found within a
private letter concerning the haratin. from whose date the year is
missing, leaving only "the first dayof Rabi0", which for 1697
would have corresponded with the 17th. September. ("Lettres
Inedites..." No* 13 Isma il to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-fasl
p. 57)
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A storm of private correspondence seems to have been associated with 
these public communications. A portion of this correspondence, 
consisting of letters addressed to Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Qadir 
al-Fasi, survives in an accessible form (131). The afore-named 
recipient of these letters was an high civic dignitary. Hfe lacked 
the precise status of an official functionary. But, as shavkh of the 
city zawiva of the al-Fasi, he represented thB clerisy who were the - 
moral leaders of the city* Further, he was son to the man who, in 
1673, had led Isma il by the hand to swear pbbcb with Fes at the tomb 
of his brother al-Rashid (132). He was thiiis an appropriate diplomat 
for negotiations between sultan and city. And he had the additional 
significance of being closely associated with the organisation of 
jihad service by representatives of the Fasi civic militia (133).
The "al-Fasi" correspondence of Duly 1697 indicates urgencys 
imperial letters ranging in tone from the defensive to the unctuous 
were being despatched at intervals of a few days (134). The letters 
themselves do not spell out the precise occasion for this urgency. 
Indeed, one particularly detailed and querulous letter would imply 
that the sultan was currently incurring unaccountable legal opposition 
to a fait accompli. It suggests that the sultanr was requesting merely
(131) Five of the "Lettres Inedites...”. those numbered 10, 11, 12, 13 
and 25 (pp. 48-57 and 70-72) would seem clearly to pertain
to the crisis of 1697. Of these, the letters numbered 10 and 13 
contain passages of particularly detailed argument.
(132) See Chapter II Pp. 97-8
(133) A^ragged section of one imperial letter to Muhammad ibn CAbd al- 
Qadir al-Fasi, associates the "shavkh" with "those five_hundred_ 
musketeers who were at Tangier" ("tilka al-khamsumgf'ia/- rankallati 
kanat bi-tanja". and with the forces currently/outride Ceuta.
("Lettres"Inedites..." No. 13 Date imperfect, p. 57)
(134) Thus, of the "Lettres Inedites...". No. 10 is dated from 25/
Dhu *1-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697. Letter No. 11 dates from threB days 
later, and letter No. 12 from three days later still 
(".Lettres Inedites..." pp. 50, 52 and 55)
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a straightforward legal affirmation of his proprietorship of a slave 
force already in existence (135), and that in this matter, his concern 
was only for military discipline, as slaves had personal qualities 
of which the free soldier was devoid (136)* The suggestion is too 
bland to explain controversy in 1697* For, as has been seen, efforts
IM Ami
to obtain jurist signatures to the diwan of the abid had been made as 
early as 1693 (137), and had then met with no known difficulty* Indeed
C  Ml
the sultan insisted that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir himself had lent 
his legal skills to an appropriate definition of the status of the 
"wusfan al-gaba^l" (138), presumably the rural "slave" recruits
(135) "...iatancujna minhum iundan bi-mu.iarrad l.jtimacihim min wasat
aabatilihim* wa idkhalihim iund al-1avsh**..... igtanagina
li-hadha *l-1und min al-wusfan* wa oulna lihim an antum aultum
la vasuoh shira* hatiulali &l-wusfan"
("**.from them we acquired an army simply by gathering them together 
from out of their tribes, and incorporating them into the regular 
army###We have acquired this army of slaves* But, upon this matter, 
we declare that you are saying that the purchase of these slaves
was illegal") ("Lettres Inedites**«" Mo# 10 Isma il to Muhammad ibn
CAbd al-Qadir al-Fasi 25/Dhu *1-Hijja/ 1108 = 15/7/1697 #pp. 49 and 50)
(136) "wa 11-wusfan min al-na.ida wa Tl-ha2m wa *1 gabiliva wa *l-sabr
—  •  —  —  0 *
ma lavsa fi ahavrihim min al-ahrar***wa ntoa va.iuddu tarakhivan
t o  t o  Q  t o  Q  t o
min hadha *l-dabt alladhi huwa alavhi aw falta la yahbusu anha
• * — — — ~ 
shay** wa yatruku ma dakhala fihi min diwan al-muslimin* wa
vaastdu aabilatahu"
("For in slaves there resides courage, determination, strength and 
endurance, which are not to be found externally among free men###
When there is occasion for any slackening of the control laid upon 
(a free man), or any unexpected event, nothing prevents him from 
behaving thus: he forgets what he has taken from the treasury of the
Muslims, and heads straight for his tribe" ("Lettres Inedites.#,." No# 10
Letter cited above p. 49)
(137) See present chapter Pp# 195-196
(138)"#..wa qad tatabba°ta ams? wusfan al-qaba*il kulliha aw .iulliha hatta
• D-  -
istahaagtahum bi11-mu lib al-shar i alladhi lam ycybgn. li-qabatjl
fihi ma vagulu «
("For you yourself disposed of the affair of the slaves from all or most 
of the tribes, after such a fashion that they stood within the require­
ments of the law, which does not leave to the tribes what it is said
to do in this case") ( " Lettres Inedites#**11 No. 13 Date imperfect P# 56)
taken into the army over the years since al-Mashari. « The
correspondence of 169? rBdounds with imperial castigation of
contemporary scholars, "talabat al-waqt11 (139), and implies a
V
reversal of previously acquiescent attitudes*
This reversal seems explicable only as the outcome of a novel 
bid for the enlistment of slave troops from within Fas al-Bali, a 
city previously exempt from such recruitment. The prospect of this 
recruitment could well have cast into a flurry of dismay the
q w
civic ulama* who had acquiesced, without blenching, in the
practical crudities of impressment outside the city walls. A bid
for Fasi slave recruits was certainly made, and may be equated with
al-Zayyani*s note upon the sultan’s demand for proprietorship of the
"haratin fas". One letter from IsmaCil to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir 
• • •
al-Fasi specifically relates to "the quest for Fasi haratin" ("al-
bahth fi haratin fas")(l4Q). It states that responsibility for this 
• * •
quest had devolved upon °Abd Allah al-Rusi (141), father to the Rusi 
general who in the July of 169? had been set in command of a Susi 
expedition, and who may therefore be presumed to have been in urgent 
need of troops from that date onwards* Significantly, cAbd Allah al- 
Rusi was himself the co-author of a letter to the al-Fasi shavkh which 
urged the shavkh to be amenable to the sultan*s requests (142)* Further 
memory of recruitment pressure put upon Fes is to be found within the
(139) "Lettres Inedites**," For such castigation see,in particular,letter 
Mo* 11s Isma il to Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Qadir al—Fasi, dated the 
28/Dhu fl-Hijja/1108 = 18/7/1697 pp. 50-52 passim*
(140) "Lettres Inedites***" Mo* 13 Ismacil to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir
al-Fasi Date imperfect* p* 55 *
(141) ibid* loc. cit*
(142) "Lettres Inedites**," Mo* 25 CAbd Allah al-Rusi and Muhammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhab al-Llazir to Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Qadir al-Fasi« 
9/Muharram/ 1109 » 2877/1697 * pp. 71-72
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account of Isma ilfs mass co-option of slaves as given by Hindus* He 
recorded that the Fasi, although "in some better Condition than the 
rest of the Country" had, at the culmination of Xsmacil,s great 
"Search", been approached by the sultan*s officials (143).
To hinge the entire legal furore of 1697 upon the narrow issue 
of a civic quest, is to pose a minor problem of chronology. The 
first letters of the relevant correspondence with Muhammad ibn 
CAbd al-Qadir al-FasX date from the last month of 1108 A.H., rather 
than 1109 A.H., the year of the sultan*s public claim to proprietor­
ship of the haratin fas. But it is possible that pragmatic attempts 
at impressment, together with a generalised "feeler" correspondence 
concerning the entire question of the " Iund min al-wusfan". antedated 
the formal claim for civic conscripts. The first surviving letter of 
lsmaCXl*s to the al-Fasi shavkh Muhammad contains a pointed 
reference to the current inadequacy of the military support which 
the sultan was obtaining from Fes along traditional lines of 
recruitment (144).
The tussle of 1697 brought sultan and city to loggerheads* The
more placatory passages within the letter to the al-Fasi shavkh
Muhammad in which Ismacil expatiated upon his demand for haratin 
• • •
fas, suggest that the sultan was meeting with powerful civic opposition
(143) Hindus pp. 214 and 215-216
(144) (With reference to the city of F e s . . haluha...min al-dacf
—  —  „  „  -  ■  _  “ “ ™  '' 0
kathiran hatta in/tagg aradna an nakharruia minha alfayna aw
*m ***0 * Q C m
thalathat alaf (lacuna) la yu.sa uJuna alavhi wa vaz umuna
* n m 0 M «W1 M  Q
Inna m m  la. vaaduruna ala ^1-wusul li-hadha *1- adad"
("Its condition.*.is frequently of such a debility that it gives us a 
refusal if we try to get two or three thousand men out of it (lacuna) 
they do not help in this matter, and they pretend that they are 
unable to reach this quota")
("Lettres Inedites..." No. 10, Isma°il to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir 
al-Fgsl 25/Dhu *1-Hijja/1108 a 15/7/1697” * p. 48)
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to this demand# The strength of this apposition is likely to have
been based upon the difficulty of isolating and categorising "haratin
• •
fas11# The term “haratin” (sg* hartani) is highly ambiguous in its 
• • • •
racial and social connotations. It can only be used with its full
ramification of meaning within the context of oasean society, wherein
it denotes the share-cropping serf-cultivators who characteristically
form a sizeable, if depressed, sector of the population, and who are
commonly dark-skinned (145), In the Fes of IsmaCil,s day, the term
seems loosely to have covered Saharan immigrants. In this period, as
in later centuries, Fes was broadly divided socially according to the
criterion of complexion, and dominated by families of “hauts blancs”,
Del Puerto could maintain that the "Moros de Fez” were a “white"
population who only admitted dark-skinned people into their society
as a servant class (146), This was the potential source of civic
dehiscence which the makhzan. in its dBmand for haratin. attempted
* •
to exploit. It was insisted that Ismacil,s demands for recruitment 
were directed only at the city*s "red-hided" oasean famine-migrants, 
lawless natural slaves, who were unfit to inhabit a sophisticated
(145) For an amplified discussion of the connotations of the term
hartanl/haratln , see Appendix A Pp* 335-337
• • 6 •
(146) ,es toda la gente muy blanca, y no admiten negras, sino es
para criados." (Del Puerto Bk, V. Ch# XLII p, 615)
In amplification of this note there ma^ y be cited a nineteenth 
century Gobineau-esque sketch of the Fasi population spectrum: 
“Le noyau,,,consists en (vlaures,,,On les remarque a la couleur 
claire de leur peau et a leurs beaux traits distingues: ce 
s'ont des marchands habiles, tranquilles et dignes dans leur 
conduite,*,les couches inferieures de la population, les 
ouvriers, les portefaix, les petits marchands, sont en
grands partis des Negres esclaves liberes, des metis de Negres
et d*Arabes,.,“ D, Lenz: “Timbuktu" tr, Lehautcourt as 
"Timbouctou— Voyage au Marge, au Sahara et au Soudan"
(Paris, 1886 Vol. I p* 149)
urban environment (147)# The combination of invective and flattery 
slurred over a dangerous demand. It may be supposed that the race- 
line was quite impossible to draw precisely, and that the threat of 
its imposition as a criterion for military impressment cast a 
broad shadow. Even though the sultan*s own chancery-letter implied 
that persons of genealogical respectability would not be classed 
as slaves (148), it was made clear that the onus of proving 
genealogical immunity lay with the individual (149). flen of substance 
may well have been thereby threatened. For there were recognised
(147) "wa oad Calimta...roa taaaddama fX hadha H-qharb min al-zayqh
m m  Q  mm mm mm
wa 11-fitan wa ma hiva al- ada fi Bl~nas min al-shuohl wa 11-
lawalan fX 9l-aotar. wa khususan fi hadha ahmar al-iild.
- - «_c * •„ _ •
famahma kanat mala at aw masohaba..•.wa fas hiva madina
kabira wa hadira min al-hawadir. yahuzu al-nas °ala 91- inhiyaz
— ' 'J* . r 1 • • • «» c — *
ilavha *l-tamaddun wa ,l-khayr wa *l-sanati . wa la yukhlagu
min ahl hadha ^-.iildat al-raoaba min tamaddun wa tanusl."
("And you know...what has happened here in the west, how there is 
misdoing and disorderliness, and how here it is the custom for the 
populace to work and to roam throughout the provinces* And this is 
especially typical of these red-hided folk, whenever there is famine 
or hunger.••.And Fes is a great city and a metropolis* The disposition 
of its people is towards civilisation and excellence and skills. 
Civilisation and society are not perfumed by people from this slave 
race.") ("Lettres Inedites.^." No* 13 Isma°il to Fluhammad ibn 
Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi. Date imperfect. * p. 56)
/ \ “ C C M
(148) "wa la va lamu bi ll-far alladhi huwa minhu innahu ishtamala
Q
alavhi al-ricia"
("...And if he does not know the clan to which he belongs, then let him 
be taken into slavery") ("Lettres Inedites..." No* 13 as cited above
loc. cit. )
(149) "va.iibu al-bahth wa !l-taftish fi haratin al-madina min alall
_ c „ • “  • c
hadha ma nft li ya rtfa kull wahld avna asluhu wa ayna *l-far
alladhi huwa minhu"
("••.It is necessary that there should be a quest and an investigation 
among the haratrn of the city, to establish, in the case of each and 
every one, his place of origin, and the clan to which he belongs.")
("Lettres Inedites..." No. 13 as cited above, loc. cit.)
oasean immigrants in Fes who were not men of the "sweeper" class to 
which Leo had drawn attention (150)# In 1682, IsmaCil had been able 
to demand rents from Filali residents of Fes whom he summarily 
ordered to l e a V B  the great city for the evacuated Jewish houses 
of old Meknes (151)#
The sultanfs argument on the haratin fas, as expressed to
• 0
C M M
shavkh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir, was clinched by a superficially 
generous offer, tossed in the direction of the "white" burgesses: 
that a proportion of the city*s militia of musketeers, the "rumat 
fas". currently liable for jihad service outside Ceuta, should be 
replaced by "red-hides" who would be military wusfan in the eves 
of the law (152)# This was an adroit suggestion# Clihad service was 
more often irksome than glorious# Over the past fourteen years it 
had involved Fasi contingents in cannon-dragging, coast- guarding 
and camping outside the Ceuta walls* And it was the responsibility 
of established family men, who were expected to supply their own 
rations and gunpowder (153). ThB provision of a substitute warrior 
was already the customary and lawful mode of evading such service (154)#
(150) Thus, of the "Beni Gumi" whose home territory lay 150 miles to 
the south-east of "Segelmesse11, it was noted that "gli habitatori 
sono poveri e fanno ogni vil mestiBro in Fez", The inhabitants
of "Segelmesse" itself were likewise a ”*.#vil popolo: e quando 
vanno fuori, fanno tutto li vil mestieri" (Leo ed# Ramusio f* 74)
(151) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed#/tr# Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol# XXIV p. 349
(152) "**• (lacuna) wa min hadha naCtabiru mas*313 ahmar al-iild hadha
(lacuna) rumat fas vagdamuna fi salahihim. wa nahnu nakhlafu
c — *— • — —
lihi adadahum min al-wusfan aliadhina hum iund. allah subhanahu*
• •
( "###thus we have a solution to the problem of these "red-hides"..#
( ). The Fasi musketeers should come forward as is
appropriate, but we are setting up a substitute force of like number,
from among the slaves who are part of the army, God be praised for it.")
("Lettres Inedites..." No# 13 Ismacil to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi
* Date imperfect, p# 5?)
(153) S.X. 2e France Vol. Ill No. CXIII Memo, of 3-B. Eatelle. Sale
19/7/1690 pp. 314-315
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This offsr of mass substitution, on the sultan*s terms, could have
been designed to expose the Fasi “clergy11 to pressure from the Fasi
"laity". For it was thB "laity" who were bound to perform jihad-
service. The rank and file of the clerisy, fuaaha*. shurafa1 and
members of religious fraternities, were customarily exempt from the
obligation (1S5).
The offer was not taken up# There were, of course, individual 
c ***
ulama* willing to be accommodating# There survives a letter from one
Q  0 m  Q  ^  w m  _
unknown alim to Muhammad ibn Abd al-CJadir al-Fasi , urging 
complaisance, and insisting upon the security of the sultan*s legal 
ground (156). But, as a body, the lawmen stood sufficiently firm 
to bo castigated en masse, during the following Hegiran year (157).
There is no evidence that Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir himself ever 
yielded to the sultan a truly conciliatory reply. His only known 
fatwa upon the question of impressment asserted that received opinion 
was unanimous as to the freedom of any man whose slave status could 
not be provan (158 )s a noble and accurate delineation of the relevant
(155) "Nashr al-Mathani#. e d . / t r .  Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol# XXIV p. 337
(156) Anonymous letter quoted in translation by Muhammad El-Fasis 
"Biooraphie de Moulav IsmaBl" p. 16
(157) "wa fi Cam 1110 1sfa. ki'bab al-sultan li-fas» vamdahu al-^mma wa
vadhummu al- ulama*"
("And in the year 1110 there came a communication to Fes from the sultan, 
praising the populace, but castigating the clerisy")
("Bitstan al-ZarTf. MS p, 41 
*
(158) "wa amma man lam tathbut raoprvatuhu li-ahad. fala kalam la-na
fihi idh la khilaf fi mulkihi amr nafsihi. wa la tQ3allatcu
c c — —li-ahad alavhi bi-bav wa la bi-ohavrihi. li-anna al-asl fi
11-nas huwa al-hurriva."
•
("As for any man for whom the status of a slave is not established, we 
cannot say otherwise than that there is unanimity concerning his 
ownership, as regards his own person# Ha may not be subordinated to 
any authority, by sale or by any other process. For the fundamental 
human condition is one of freedom.") Muhammad El-Fasis "Biooraphie 
de Moulav IsmaBl" Appendix p. 29 cf. pp. 19-20 of the main French text.
tenet of Islamic fiqh (159), to be appreciated, in spite of its 
author*s previous co-operation with the sultan1s policy of slave 
conscription outside the walls of Fes* The gadl of Fes, Bardalla , 
a makhzan appointee with less of a facility for intransigence than 
the al-Fasi shavkh. seems likely to have shifted his ground 
uneasily in reaction to the sultan*s demands* A fatwa which he 
had sent to the sultan by the late July of 1697 was apparently 
acquiescent (160)* But his temporary demotion during the following 
year (161) would suggest that, throughout the crisis as a whole, he 
proved himself less than fully co-operative* In the sultan*s legal 
defence, Akansus asserted that Ismacil had taken pains to obtain 
fatawa that were favourable to the building up of his army, from 
the "Mashriq" as well as the "Maghrib11 (162)* Such endeavour seams 
to under—write the weakness rather than the strength of the backing 
which the sultan could obtain from his own lawmen*
There is no evidence that these lawmen met with any "lay" 
pressure towards compliance* Uindus, in his own quaintly tiihiggish 
terms, summed up Fasi resistance as defiantly communal, a defence
(159) For discussion of this question, see R* Brunschvigs article headed
"CAbd" in E.I. (2nd* Edn.) Vol* I* (1954) p* 26
(160) fa-la budd min*..tashihikim ll-ma tadammanathu tl-a.iwibat allati
« .  »  ' ",r •  1 1 1
waradcih min qabio, ?l-qadi bardalla wa sahibihi idh la vtimkunu
~  • ** Q  *** ^  mm mm mm m m *  *  m m £
al-i 'timad ala mu.iarrad fatawahuma duna mutala atikim wa
•
oubulikim"
("For it is essential that.*«.your corrected interpretation should for 
this reason go along with answers already received from the gadT* 
Bardalla andjiis companion, as it is impossible to place confidence 
in the fatawff. of these two alone, without your pronouncement and 
assent*") ("LettrBS Inedites*.." No. 12 Isma il to Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Qadir al-FasT , 2/Muharram/l109 = 21/7/1697 p. 53)
(161) "Bustan al-2arif**.» MS p. 41
(162) Akansus quoted al-Nasirl: "Kitab al-Istigsa*.*". Casablanca text, 
Vol. VII p* 881 cf Fumey translation A.M. Vol* IX p. 121
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of "Liberties" much dearer than "Lives or Estates" (163)* Less 
oratorically, Fasi rejection of the sultan*s demands may be interpreted 
as appreciation that these demands amounted to the "thin end of a 
wedge"* The years 1693 and 1696 are known both to have been noted 
for heavy-handed impressment of slave troops* During the summer of 
1697, when the threat of such impressment seems first to have been 
imposed upon Fes, the degree and complexity of the sultan1s real 
and potential military involvement in "Cherg" , Sus and jihad 
alike, would have made it clear that conscription along any 
established pattern would be an on-going process* To grant to the 
sultan the right to recruit inhabitants of Fes as members of a 
slave corps, rather than members of a free citizen militia, was 
a concession heavy with the capacity for escalation*
Moreover, the demand came at a point when there was a relatively 
low correlation between the demands of sultan and city. The sultan 
could insist that the military support he was demanding was the 
foundation of the khilafa divinely laid upon him (164)* He could 
complain that relations with Fes were not as they had been in the 
days of his brother al-Rashld , and recall the relative strength of
(163) Hindus p. 216
- v M  Q  Q  M  M  M, W  M
(164) "wa la va zibu an thaqib fahmikim ma aaamana yllah fihi min
hadha 11-mansib alladhi aaamana wa tawwaoana min haml aCba*
_  c • «.
hadha ll-khilafa***nazarna fi ll-iund alladhi alavhi madar
asas . al-khllafa"
("A man of your piercing intellect will not have forgotten what God 
determined for us in connection with this office to which he appointed 
us* He hung about our neck the task of bearing the burden of this 
regency***and we recognised, in the army, the foundation of the 
regency, to which it is the core*")
("Lettres Inedites No* 10 Isma°Il to Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Qadir al-Fasi
25/Dhu ' 1-Hi jja'/l 108 = 15/^716 97 p* 48
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military aid granted by the city to that former sultan (165)* In 
its political context this argument seems naive* As has been noted, 
al-Rashid had been, in effect, the “sultan of Fes", keeping court 
within that city, moulding policies that were in accordance with 
Fasi interests, and ploughing back into his capital a proportion 
of the profits of his inexorably successful warfare* In 1697,
mmQmm M M
Isma il, the "sultan of Meknes", confronted Fasi civic leaders 
comparatively as a failure, and as a ruler whose policies cut 
across civic interests. The sultan’s bid to maintain control of 
the turbulent Sus seems to have been associated with the threat 
that inhabitants of the city would be swallowed into military 
slavery* The once-successful prosecution of the jihad had, in 
the siege of Ceuta, come to be waged as an expensive and fruitless 
cannonade that made no more than banal ideological sense. And, most 
significantly for Fes, the sultan’s eastward adventures had been 
unprofitable* They had failed to bring Tlemsen within the western 
orbit. In 1692 they had brought a Turkish army to within two days* 
journey of the city walls. And they had come to hamper the commerce 
of Fasi merchants. The mid 1690s were a period of rolling agricultural 
glut for the "kingdom of Fes" (166), Yet, eastward tensions had
(165) (With reference to Fasi troops) .."...gasaru °an al-°adad
al-ma°ruf lihim gablu fi avvam akhina ’l-rashid"
(''They fall short of the number agreed earlier, in the days of 
our brother al-Rashid") (^ Lettres Inedites*,," No, 10 Isma0!! 
to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir al-Fast 25/Dhu ’l-Hijja/ 110B =
15/7/1697 * p. 48)
(166) In a general account of Morocco, dating from 1698, Dean-Baptiste 
Estelle described the "kingdom of Fes" as the granary of Isma ilfs 
entire empire, and noted that the previous four years had seen a 
particularly low price for grain: forty sous to the quintal*
(S.I. 29 Franee Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo* of 3-B. Estelle, putatively
dating from the October of 1698 p* 696)
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brought IsmaCil to veto thB provisions trade with the Regency (167), 
probably the one trade in which the Maghrib al-Aqsa had the edge 
over eastern neighbours (168)#
h q h
It is improbable that relations between Isma il and Fes ever
fully mended after 1697* Such evidence as exists for the period
following 1697 goes to suggest that the spasmodic cordiality
discernable for the earlier part of Isma ilfs reign, was at an erid*
Indeed, henceforward it is possible tentatively to trace a pattern
of overall deterioration in relations between sultan and city,
bound up with the sultan,s successive demands for military and
financial aid* The downward slide saw particularly acute crises
in 1708, and again in 1718* It saw its logical
culmination, after Isma il s death, in the effective mid-eighteenth
c *■*century shift of the major Alawi centre of government from SaSs
to Marrakesh*
Yet in the summer of 1697, there could be a flicker of hope*
Isma0! ! ^  eastward embarrassment diminished briefly* The previous 
four summers of "Chergi" ravaging by MaghribX troops had come to
(167) S.I. 2e Franoe Vol* IV No* Cl Memo* of 3-B* Estelle, completed
Sale, 30/9/1697 p* 530
(168) Lemprie’re* at the end of the eighteenth century, was to record the 
disadvantage to Maghribi traders upon the pilgrimage route that 
stemmed from "The manufactures Indeed of both ALGIERS and TUNIS” 
being brought to a greater perfection than those of MOROCCO11 (p. 346). 
It is unlikely that the gradient in quality was any different a - 
century earlier* However the climate of northern Morocco gave it, in 
European eyes, a cornucopian capacity for agricultural production. It 
is known that the Regency was accustomed to purchase provisions from 
the west* Thus, in the August of 1706, there was an Algerine complaint 
against the French capture of a peaceful vessel sent from Algiers 
'•vers les cotes du Cherif de Maroc, pour y acheter du ble"
(Husavn Dev to Vauvre tr* Petis de la Croix and quoted E. Plantets 
"Correspondence des Devs***1' Vol* II p* 50)
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provoke a diplomatic protest from Constantinople (169), one of the 
rare occasions upon which the Porte deigned to grant to the "sharif 
of Fes" (170) diplomatic attention of its own initiation* On the
Q
feast day of Arafa 1108, which corresponded to the 29th* June 1697, 
a deputation presented Isma il with a letter from the Ottoman 
sultan, adjuring him to make peace with the Algerine Turks. XsmaDil 
appears to have complied with the behests of the embassy with an 
ingratiating haste* He loaded the chief envoy with gifts, and granted 
the party an escort overland back to Algiers (171)* Open commercial 
relations with the Regency were re-established in September (172)*
The "ChBrgi" peace set IsmaCIl free for a short time to 
concentrate upon the Sus, where his troops were opposing "Zaeatin" 
whom the sultan had once called his "uncle" (173), but who was now 
a major dissident commander (174)* Government forces had fallen 
back northwards, and WBre attempting to assert control over a 
prime Susi strategic points the mountain gasba of Tamanart, set 
where the High Atlas ranges fall towards the coast, and said by
(169) S.I. 2e France Vol. XV No* XCVIIX Memo, of 3-B* Estelle L Tetuan 
29/7/1697 pp. 513-14, 516-17 and 519 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani.**"
Fes lithograph of 1892 p* 160 (First notation)
The suggestion within the "Bustan al-ZarTf..." (MS p. 41) that
there was a double protest, over the Hegiran years 1107 and 1108, is
associated with the name of an anachronistic Ottoman sultan, and
appears to be the result of textual confusion* On this point, the 
"Tur iuman" (p* 25 of the text and 47 of the translation) is equally 
to be discredited, as it attaches the name of yet another anachronistic 
Ottoman sultan to its dating of a single embassy to the year 1107 A*H. 
(12th. August 1695—30th* Duly 1696).
(170) 5ee A. Cour: "L^etablissement des dynasties*» p* 207, for an 
account of Isma il*s attempt, early in the eighteenth century, to 
ingratiate himself at the Porte^ and of the Ottoman ruler*s refusal
to allow him the title of "sultan".
(171) 5.1* 20 France Vol. IV No. XCVIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle. Tetuan
29/7/1697 p. 519
(172) S.I. 2S France Vol. IV No. Cl Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, completed
Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 530
(173) See Chapter III P. 147
(174) Busnot pp<> 80-81
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3san-Baptiste Estelle to dominate the main Miknasi-Guinea routeway
(175)* Here, traders and governor alike were defying the sultan for 
the first time in eight years, in a stance which had warranted 
the withdrawal of 3ohn Carr, the master-bombardier, from outside 
Ceuta, and his posting to Tamanart (176). In the autumn of 1697,
°Alawi princes, firstly Zaydan (177) and secondly Muhammad al-°Alim
(178) were despatched to the Sus. The latter prince would seem to 
have been the more successful general^. He was credited, in addition, 
with having won the trust of customarily skittish southern peoples (179)* 
However, it was to be impossible to consolidate government of 
the Sus from Meknes before the "Charg1 was re-activated as a sphere 
of war* An highly placed but maverick prince, Ali, third son to 
Isma8!! and CAyisha Mubarka (180), had gone over to Algiers 
during the summer of 169T* At the opening of 1698, he name back 
westwards to the Tilimsani march, at the head of an Algerine raiding 
party (181)* The intrusion betokened more than a family squabble* 
Relations between IsmaCil and Fos were still tense, and the l6Chergu 
was the politically sensitive region which, within living memory, 
had launched al-Rashid to power, and to the capture of Fes* Peace 
between the sultan and economic capital was therefore patched up*
(175) S.I* 20 France Vol* IV i\!o* Cl Memo* of 3-B* Estelle, completed
in Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 529
(176) ibid* pp. 527 and 529
(177) S.I* 2b Franco Vol. IV No* CIII 3-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain
Sale, 23/10/1697 p* 535
(178) S.I* 2° France Vol. IV No. CVIII 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain
Sale, 23/11/1697 pp. 549 and 550
(179) S*I* 2s France Vol* IV No. CXVIII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle* completed
in Sale, 26/4/1698 p. 596
(180) Braithwaite p* 20 cf* Anons "Relation da ce qui c,est passe dans le 
Rovaumo du Maroc dapuis 1727 .iusou'en 1737" (Paris, 1742^ } p. 222 
Both sources describe cAli as being full-brother to lama il*s _
successor Ahmad al-Dhahabi, known to have been full-brother to Zaydan<
(18 7) S*I. 2 8 France Vol* IV No* CXVIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle, completed
in Sale, 26/4/1690 p. 598
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Windus recorded that, in 1698, Isma il abandoned, for the time being, 
his efforts at obtaining slaves from Fes, "ordered" the citizens "to 
pay one hundred Quintals of Plate, and gave over his Search;" (182).
The fine was accompanied by a gesture of displeasure: the demotion
fc*"16 dadi and of the shuhtid. or official civic notaries (183). But
•    '
the demotion of the qadi may only have been a token disgrace. Bardalla
*
is known to have been back in office during the following decade (184)
Meanwhile, at the military level, the sultan initiated counter- 
c
moves against Ali and his Regency troops. The swift intensity of the
father*s reaction contrasts remarkably with the inaction which, four
years previously, had greeted Muhammad al-CAlim*s flight to the Filali
Ayt Atta, and the indulgence with which Zaydan*s Murrakushi plotting
of 1696 had been met (185). Further troops were withdrawn from
Ceuta, whose besieging force, by February 1698, is said to have
stood at half the size of that of the previous spring (186). And
successive contingents were drawn up from the Sus* At the end of
January, Ahmad ibn Haddu al-cAttar came north (187). In February he • * ..
was followed by Zaydan (188). And, lastly, Mascud ibn al-Rami was 
brought back to his old "Chergi" posting (189). The departure of 
these three generals left Muhammad al-cAlxm as sole major custodian 
of the Sus, a natural successor to "Zacatin" who had been quietly
(182) Uindus p. 216
(183) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 41
(184) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 163
(185) SeB the present chapter P . 209
(186) S.I, 28 France Vol. IV No. CXLVIII Extract from the "Nouvelles 
du Sieae de Ceuta", for the month of February 1698 (p. 717)
The information is alleged to have been obtained from a "Moorish" 
captive.
(18?) S.I. 2B France Vol. IV No. CXVIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle, completed
in Sale, 2674? 1*698 p. 596
(188) ibid. p. 598
(189) S.I. 2e Franee Vol. IV No. CXX Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, completed
in Sale, 5/5/1698 p. 611
eliminated (190). At a less rigorous moment it had been said that his 
father dared not leave this charming prince for more than two months 
together in the same region (191)* Now, with no fellow-custodians to 
watch over him, he had been left in command of the empire*s most 
potentially breakaway region* Fortuitously, the sultan had set up 
a framework for a division of his own empire that would not be of 
his own making*
Northern affairs remained sufficiently complex for Muhammad to 
be left in Susi isolation* Campaigns of 1698 failed to eliminate °Ali 
from the "Cherg" (192)* Meanwhile the iihad diversified* The siege 
of Ceuta was still maintained, muttering spasmodically, and showing 
a brief flare-up over the summer (193)* But the vital area of 
confrontation between the sultan and Christendom shifted from land 
to sea, and from attack to defence. In the May of 1698, the French 
naval commander Coetlogon was sent out against the Sale corsair 
fleet (194)* By this date, such a move was a declaration of
political and economic war upon Ismacil himself*
During the 1690s, the sultan*s interests had come to overlay 
the corsair activities of his subjects* At Martil, the port of Tetuan, 
there was mounted in 1693 a project for constructing a fleet which 
might police the straits of Gibraltar, and raid the coasts of Spain 
(195). Three vessels were ultimately built (196). Sale also saw a
(190) “Qckleyr p. 55
(191) S.I* 26 France Vol. IV No* CVIIX 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain
Sale, 23/11/1697 p. 550
(192) S.I. 28 France Vol* IV Dusault to Pontchartrain , Algiers, 21/3/1698
(Arch* Affaires Etrangeres (3) ff* 379-80) noted p* 598 (Note 2) cf.
No. CXX Memo* of 3-B* Estelle Sale, 5/5/1698 p. 611
(193) S.I* 28 France Vol. IV No* CXLVIII Extracts from the “Nouvelles du
Siege de Ceuta11 covering the period Feb*-Nov. 1698 pp. 717-721
(194) S,I* 28 France Vol. IV No. CXXII Instructions from Louis XIV to
CoetloQon. Versailles, 28/5/1698 pp. 617-619
(195) S.I. 20 France Vol. Ill No* CLXXXI Memo, of 3-B. Estelle* Tetuan
1 7 /2 /1 6 9 3  p* 559
(196) S.P. 71 (16) f* 93 Memo, of Mr. Corbiere* 12/5/1713
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period of ship-building by the sultanls order (19?)® As is well-known
(198) Sale also saw the effective imperial monopolisation of corsair 
activity® In 1690, there had been six Saletin corsair vessels, of 
which two, said to be the worst-armed, had beBn the sultan*s property
(199)* However, the seven Saletin vessels Of 1698 were effectively 
Isma il’s fleet? he was owner of all but one® The exception was the 
property of his admiral Abd Allah ibn Ayisha (200), who, as the 
empire’s sole corsair of note had, during the 1690s emerged as one 
of its magnates (201)*
But the sultan*s personal interest in corsair activity did not 
mean that the sultan now considered the ports a strategic priority# In 
response to the demonstration of the French flag before Sale, he 
procrastinated* In the September of 1698, he allowed for the 
arrangement of an eight-month truce, by negotiation with dfEstrees, 
Coetlogon's successor in command, and sent ibn Ayisha as ambassador 
to France* The backing-and-forth of the eventually fruitless 
negotiations at Versailles (202) suggest that the admiral was 
personally far more concerned than was his Meknes-based master for 
the elimination of the French naval threat, but that he dared not
(197) S*I* 2° Franee Vol* IV No* XXVII 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain
Sale, 6/12/1693 pp* 233-4
(198) See Brignon et* al; "Histoire du Maroc**»<> pp* 247-8, for 
speculation upon the depressant economic significance of this 
development for Saletin corsair activity*
(199) S.I* 2e France Vol. Ill No. CXIII Memo* of 3-B* Estelle , Sale,
directed by way of Marseille, 19/7/1690 p* 318
(200) S.I, 2° France Vol* IV No# CXLIV Memo, of 3-B* Estelle, putatively
dated to October 1698 pp. 705-6
(201) 11 Ockley” p. 55
(202) A summary and attempted analysis of these negotiations, stressing 
French redemptionist concerns, forms an introduction to the fifth 
volume of uLes Sources Inedites* . 2 8 Serie, ed. Ph. da Coss£- 
Brissac (Paris, 1953^ pp* 1-10* This volume is dominated by texts 
relating to the ibn Ayisha embassy, an unwarrantably over-exposed 
episode whose consequences for the Maghrib al~Aqsa were negative 
and peripheral. Its most interesting feature was ibn Ayisha*s 
seizing the opportunity for sounding out the possibilities of 
private and peaceful commercial adventuring with a French merchant 
house.
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agree to the relatively bleak terms he was offered. These contained
no suggestion that munitions, as well as “Moorish" captives might
be bartered for french captives, along the pattern which would be
entertained by the English and Dutch, who werB not obliged to nod
to the papal ban upon arms trading with the infidel (203).By
holding out, in hope for the supply of French munitions, Isma il
was, in the long run, inviting French attack from the sea*
In the spring of 1699, Mascud ibn al»Rami was able to penetratB
"Oranie", and to persuade the insubordinate prince °Ali first to
parley, and then to return to his father In Meknes (204). IsmaCIl
presumably feared any repetition of princely meddling in the "Cherg11
as a stratagem for advancement, and took up the attitude that CAli*s
creturn had been made too much of a royal progress* Ali was 
threatened with execution, and given the exemplary, but very real 
physical punishment of a musket-shot drag at the mule-tail. Fines
Qg* Mg M
were imposed upon Mas ud ibn al-Rami, who might be thought to have 
served his master well, and upon those members of the al-Rusi clan 
who had welcomed the prince as he passed through Fes (205).
The sultan*s public torment of his own son opened what is likely 
to have been a period of uneasB in high circles: a period of "the 
pageant of the sultan malignant" in which show-piece executions 
became policy. Isma il*s reoime was, of course, popularly famed
(203) Busnot p* 8 cf* S.P. 71 (15) ff. 1-185 (first notation)
passim.. for documentation covering peace 
_ negotiations of 1700 and the aftermath, carried
out by Ali ibn Abd Allah of Tetuan, on behalf of Ismacil, with 
representatives of William III of Orange. These resulted, over four 
years, in the ransom of over two hundred English, Dutch and Huguenot 
captives.
(204) S.I. 2e France Vol. V No. XLV "Journal de Louis Barmond". 
"chancellor" to 3-B. Estelle in Sale, Note for the 21/3/1699 p. 269
(205) ibid. p. 270
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during his lifetime and later, for being that of a blood-boltered
ogre (206)* And indeed, his style of government was never devoid
of casual killings (207), or of the liquidation of dangerous
political figures, of which the elimination of the once-beloved
"ZaBatin11 had provided a recent example* But the public execution
of a notable, as an instrument of state, had been alien to Isma il*s
rule for a period of twenty years preceding 1699* Its last known
victim had been the wazir al-Manzari, whose execution had followed
the sultan’s disastrous 1679 winter passage of the High Atlas (208)* 
c
The punishment of Ali was politically rather than personally 
vindictive. The prince seems thereafter to have lived within Meknes 
in ease and favour (209)* But his first fate marked the beginning 
of a series of carefully staged pieces of “frightfulness", and of 
selective victimisation, presumably designed to encourage an 
obedience upon which IsmaCil no longer had the self-assurance to 
rely. Consequently, fear for life within high circles may be seen 
as one strand to the subsequent political history of IsmacTl,s 
empire*
In the dune of 1699, Dflbd Allah ibn cAyisha returned to Sale, 
loud with complaints of French duplicity (210 )* The truce was
(206) Thus an English consul in Algiers, presumably reflecting popular 
contemporary Algerine opinion, could say of Isma xl: “that Inhumane 
monster diverts himself after dinner by killing his people about 
him as Doroitian did Flyes“(sic) (S.P. 71(3) Memo* of Baker* Algiers
7/1/1691-2 0.S* f* 455)
(207) The number of these was always prone to vertiginous exaggeration. In 
one area susceptible to investigation in detail, that relating to
Christian captives, Koehler, after a close examination of the Miknasx 
Christian burial register, noted that, in forty years, 109 captives were 
recorded as having met their deaths by the sultan’s hand or order: a number 
of unfortunates that is minimal by comparison with easy customary relevant 
estimates in thousands* (“Quelgues points d’histoire sur les captifs*.1
P* w )(208) See Chapter III Pp. 120-121
(209) Itlindus p. 181
(210) S.I* 2° France Vol, V No. LI “Journal de Louis Bermond”
Note for the 10/6/1699 p* 311
ended, and the sultan*s Saletin fleet resumed full-scale depredations*
Indeed it was expanded* By the end of the year, its numbers had
increased from seven to ten (211)* Care concerning the possibility
of reprisal was tossed aside* In November 1699, a letter to Louis XIV
ranted its assertion that bombardment from a French fleet was likely
to fall only on ohea plain ("al-fasih min al-ard") and palm-trees,
* •
and that it was therefore impossible to threaten the sultan as 
neighbouring Barbary powers could be threatened (212)* From a ruler 
based at Meknes, this was hyperbola thrown out from a nub of hard 
strategic truth (213)* But it invited attack from the sea, at a 
period when the military demands of Sus and "Cherg" were escalating 
yet again.
Within both regions, it was essentially rural resistance to
C3 *■'* C
Alawi authority that was increasing* In the Sus, Muhammad al- Alim, 
still his father*s vice-roy, was, by the opening of 1700, rumoured 
to have been driven back upon Tarudant by hordes of mountain 
"Chleuh" (214)♦ By the following spring, there were similar rumours 
of massive disaffection within the eastern march, mounted by "Arabes"
(211) S*I. 28 France Vol. No« LXXX Description of Sale by the 5r*
de la Maisonfort , Rouen, 28/12/1699 p. 520
(212) uaw zannu an vaCmaluna nahnu ka-ahl tunis wa tarabulus wa adalat
S —  7—  5 ■ -  j  c  “  ' ™  : “
al-.laza’ir* fa-nahnu wa fl-hamd allah ma indana shav* bi *l-kushta11
n_r"" - 1 "' j-j—
("Do they think that they can deal with lis as with the people of Tunis and 
Tripoli, or with the garrison of Algiers? Praise be to God that there is 
nothing of importance to us along the coast*") ^
(S*I* 2e Franee Vol* V* No* LXXII IsmaCil to Louis XIV 12/Dumada 1/1111=
5/11/1699 p* 460)
(213) It may be compared with the tale passed on by Burel, that Sayyidi 
Muhammad III had once asked the French consul Salva for an estimate
of the cost to Louis XV*s government of an expedition aimed at the 
destruction of his coastal fortresses, and then mockingly offered to 
destroy them himself for half the price ("M&moire Militaire* * p p *  66-7)
(214) S.I* 2° Franee Vol* VI No. VI Du Plessis-Moreau to Pontchartrain 
Paimboeuf, 25/1/1700 (p* 97). Reported information brought by way
of a French vessel, out of Sale*
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who had rallied to the token Turkish force of occupation currently 
based there (215)* This disaffection seems to mark a second collapse 
of the "Qranie" taxation-frontier, as re-established in 1693* The 
collapse may be seen as a consequence of events of the previous three 
years: Isma°il,s open capitulation to the Ottoman embassy of 1697, 
which had returned to Algiers by way of the "Cherg"; and the
C M
subsequent adventuring of Ali within the region, which may have 
aroused disturbance that far outran his personal removal from the 
scene* In Sale, the deterioration of Isma^l^ "Chergi" authority 
could be said to threaten the sultan*s relations with an already 
bitterly malcontent Fes (216). And, over the following year, IsmaCil 
would once again treat the "Cherg" as an area of increasingly vital 
military concern: a testing ground for the efficiency of his 
authority.
In the May of 1700, the sultan was said to have sent all his 
available cavalry into the "Cherg" (217), while Cabid infantry, 
under the black ga*id Malik, was despatched to Tangier, which had 
come under threat from a French squadron (218)* At the beginning of 
Duly came a two-day bombardment of Tangier* This was Morocco*s first 
recent experience of real, as distinct from looming aggression from 
the sea, and an example of the growing advance of Europe in the
(215) S.I* 28 France Vol. VI Wo. XCIII Manier dB la Closerie to
Pontchartrain , Sale, 25/5/1700 (p. 149)(The author was in name, if 
not title, the successor to Oean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale. He was a 
protege of Abd Allah ibn Ayisha*s French commercial partner.)
cf* , for the relatively small scale of the Turkish force within
the rural "Cherg", i*e» "fifty tents" consul Durand to
Pontchartrain. Algiers, 20/8/1700, quoted in de Grammont: 
"Correspondance des consuls d*Alger" in "Revue Africaine" Vol. XXXI
(Paris, 1887) pp* 437-8
(216) S.I. 2e France Vol* VI No. XIII Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain , as above. loc* cit*
(217) ibid. loc. cit
(218) ibid* loc. cit*
cf* S.I. 2 France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain. Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197
tactical use of naval warfare. An eyewitness from a French vessel 
could describe the enemy, "negres" and "MoraiHe", wading into the 
sea, evidently expecting a musket-exchange with a landing-party, 
but subjected instead to cannon-fire from the calm distance of 
a musket shot and an half (219). The alien fleet was still in 
adjacent waters at the end of July (220). But IsmaCil*s landward 
interests prevailed. He withdrew the force of Cabid infantry from 
the coast, and there was concomitant news that horses were being 
levied from throughout the empire (221). This suggests that the 
sultan attempted hastily to issue his infantry with mounts, before 
sending them eastwards. The urgency implied by the use of ill-trained 
troops is likely to have resulted from opportunism. The main forces 
of the Regency were set to face the Tunisian march (222). This 
involvement of al-Hajj Mustafa Dey at a far distance may be thought
m Q m
to have aroused in Isma il hope for an untrammelled opportunity to 
refurbish his eastern frontier.
One rogue Alawi prince, Ali, had already disturbed his father*s 
interests in the "Cherg". The opportunity would not bs offered to 
another. Zaydan, so far from taking the eatern command, and leading 
a raid upon Mascara, as the indigenous tradition would suggest (223), 
was at this point denied the leadership of troops for the "Cherg" (224), 
who were left to the ultimate authority of Mas°ud ibn al-Rami. In
(219) S.I. 2e Franee Vol. VI No. XVI Extract from the "Journal du
Chevalier de Fabreoues" on board the galley“Victoire",
4-5/7/1700 pp. 171-2
(220) ibid. for the 29/7/1700 p. 180
(221) S.I. 2° Franee Vol. VI No, XVIII Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain. Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197
(222) de Grammont: "Histoire dtAloer..." p. 270
(223) "Tur.iuman" pp^ 25-6 of the text and 48 of the translation cf, 
"Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS pp. 41-2
(224) S.I. 28 France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain, as above loc. cit.
the September of 1700, while on a minor tax-raid, this general was
surprised and defeated by the Algerine battalion of the march* Hfe
cwas perhaps mindful of the fate of Ali, the prince whom he had 
conducted back to Meknes the previous year, and also of the fine 
which he himself had recently paid: for he deserted immediately 
to the Algerines (225)* Meanwhile the main forces of the Dey were 
still operating far to the east, pitted against a Tunisian invading 
army which they defeated, on the routsyay from Constantine to 
Algiers, in early October (226). At this stage of events, IsmaDil 
can be seen as drawn on by the bait of continuing opportunity, and 
driven on by the loss of his leading "Chergi" commander. To 
extricate himself from this quandary, the sultan made a move 
unparalleled since 1693* Ha left a junior son Hafiz as vice-roy 
in Meknes (227), and went out into the "Cherg11 to take command of 
his troops in person* He reached the march in mid-winter (228).
At first, Isma il*s “Chergi11 aims would appear to have been 
restricted, rural and strictly punitive: in sum, a forcible bid 
at maintaining his taxation frontier at its outermost limit. Tlemsen
C Mwas ignored* The Alawi mahalla skulked within the western reaches of 
the Regency, bedevilling the cold seed-time of agricultural hill- 
peoples (229). Its activities soon roused Algiers* In the Danuary of
(225) S.I. 20 France Vol. VI No, XX Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain, SalB, 19/9/1700 pp 206
(226) Pontchartrain to al-Ha_1,i Mustafa Dev. Versailles, 24/11/1700, quoted 
in E. Plantet; "Correspondence des Devs**." Vol. II p. 9
(227) Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. XL p. 804
(228) S.I. 2e France Vol* VI No* XXVI Durand to Pontchartrain
Algiers, 16/2/1701 p. 241
(229) ibid*  loc* cit.
Consul Durand*s February estimate of Isma il*s distance from
Algiers as "trois grandes journees” could have been gleaned from 
over-alarmist city-gossip. It contains the repetitive Algerine 
number three, which had adorned the "Daftar al-Tashrlfat1* (See. P.
Vet the rumour does indicate that Isma il had ventured way beyond 
bounds acceptable to Algiers.
1701, the Algerine diwan resolv/ed that the Day should carry out a
spring campaign against IsmaCil (230). This campaign was to be
less deliberate and comprehensive than that of 1692# On this
occasion there was no naval transport of the troops who were to 
c
combat the Alawi menace 5 the Algerine corsair fleet was sent 
eastwards to bring back Regency forces remaining in the Tunisian 
march (231). But in February an interim force was sent overland 
against IsmaCil (232)# And al-Hajj Mustafa Dey moved westwards in 
the fallowing April (233)# With him were all three "Beys'1 of the 
Regency of Algiers# Yet the estimated size of his army, sixteen 
thousand, was compact by comparison with that of Isma ils its 
core was made up of six thousand Turks, of whom five thousand 
were infantry (234)#
It was probably disparity in numbers which led IsmaCil, at this 
point, into the greatest miscalculation of his military career# The 
sultan was generally reckoned to have agglomerated an army of 
cavalry that significantly outnumbered the Turkish force (235). 
Abandoning the caution of half a lifetime, Isma il took this 
following out along the road to Algiers, to meet the advancing
(230) S#I# 28 France Vol# VI No* XXIII Durand to Pontchartrain.
Algiers, 10/1/1701 pp. 221-2
(231) S.I# 2e Franee Vol# VI No# XXVIII Durand to Pontchartrain.
Algiers, 2/5/1701 p. 2:47
(232) S.I* 2e France Vol* VI No* XXVI Durand to Pontchartrain.
Algiers, W 2/17OI p. 242
(233) 5#I* 2e France Vol# VI No# XXVII Durand to Pontchartrain.
Algiers, 14/4/1701 p* 244
(234) ibid# loc* cit.
(235) Busnofc (p. 85) gave a figure of 60,000# Contemporary report was 
rather more cautious. The "Gazette de France", presumably upon 
the advice of Durand, gave a figure of 50,000 (S#I. 2e France 
Vol. VI No. XXIX "Gazette.#." extract for 21/5/1701 cf.
No. XXVIII Durand to Pontchartrain. Algiers, 2/5/1701) Durand*s 
figures are not impeccable. He gave a later round estimate of 
40,000 (S#I# 20 France Vol# VI p. 250 (Note 2) Durand to 
Pontchartrain 22/6/1701). The smaller the estimate the more 
likely. All the reports quoted were gleefully inimical towards 
Isma il
DBy at Djidioua (236), There his army, ill-disciplined, ill-armed and 
ill-suppli8d (237) was cut to pieces in an afternoon (238) by the 
veteran Turkish infantry (239), Its survivors had to retreat through 
the march country of peoples whose coming harvest Isma il had spent 
the previous four months trying to ruin. The physical horror of this 
retreat stains even the muted record of the campaign allowed to 
survive within al~Zayyani*s texts; these elide the defeat, but note 
that numbers of Maghrib! soldiers died of thirst on their return 
journey towards SaSs (240)*
For IsmaCil himself, rumoured to have been wounded in the field 
(241), the episode was crucial, both as regards eastward ambition, 
and as regards the sultan^ mode of government. After Djidioua, 
IsmaCil accepted a "Chergi" frontier at the river Tafna, and sent 
his east-bound troops no further than Snassen country. And he 
abandoned personal campaigning; there is no record of his ever having 
commanded an haraka after 1701, At its limits, IsmaCil*s empire
(236) Chronicle of Samuel ibn SaOl ibn Danan ed,/tr, Va.ida Text no, XXV 
from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperia11 Vol, XXXVI (Paris, 1949) 
p, 148 cf* S,I, 28 Franee Vol, VI No, XXIX Extract from
the "Gazette de France11. 2l/5/l701. (p, 250 )
The toponyms cited in both texts indicate a battle-site as noted 
above, along the Mascara-Algiers routeway, and near to the river 
Cheliff. Busnot set the battle in the region of "Tremezen", This 
assorts ill with his own account of the over-extended supply-lines of 
Isma il,s troops (pp, 85-6)
(237) Busnot, loc, cit, cf, S,I, 2B France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier 
de la Closerie to Pontchartrain. Sale, 4/8/1700 p, j|97
This latter text reported poverty in arms and supplies among Alawi
troops in the “Cherg",for a date as early as the August before the
battle.
(238) S.I. 28 France Vol, VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de
France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.
(239) S.I. 2B Franee Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2). Durand to Pontchartrain
Algiers, 22/6/1701
(240) “Tur luman" p, 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..," MS p. 42
(241) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de
France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.
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continued fiscally and politically dependent upon the haraka; at
V
its heart, for the next quarter-century, there was a palace- 
ruler.
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CHAPTER Vis THE PALACE RULER
"Vivre dans une habitation fiXB, c*est le plus grand des 
malheurs: c’est sur le dos des chevaux que se trouve 
la place du Sultan*11
The indigenous tradition of al-Zayyanl, broadly accepted by 
major secondary sources, would divide IsmaCil*s reign into two 
periods: an era of successful internal military effort, followed 
by an era of comparative ease and security (2)* This viewpoint has 
spawned a complex of subsidiary problems: queries as to why Isma il, 
the pacifier of his realms, was unable, during the latter phase of
q mm
his reign, to establish an Alawi state more viable than the polity 
which dissolved at his death into an anarchy torn by his fratricidal 
sons (3).
There is indeed a case for seeing IsmacIl*s reign as divided 
into two. But IsmaCil*s last personal campaign, which culminated 
in the defeat at Djidioua, provides the most illuminating point of 
division* The milestone significance of this battle does not only 
rest in its transformation of the sultan into a palace ruler* By 
making defeat the pivot of Ism^il^ reign, it lends to the latter 
half of that reign a perspective that is grim rather than triumphant*
This perspective dissipates the need for speculation as to IsmaCil*s 
short-comings as a state-builder over the long term* During the latter
(1) Translation of a commonplace quoted by the anonymous author of the 
"Hulal al-bahiva***11. a late nineteenth century work, part trans- 
lated by E. Coufourier as uChronique de la vie de Moulay El-Hasan11 
in A.M* Vol. VIII (Paris, 1906) pp. 330-331
(2) "Turiuman" p* 25 of the text and 46 of the translation cf* Terrasse 
ttolg II P* 260 and 263-4 cf. Ch*~A* Julien p. 229 cf, Brignon 
et* al* p* 244. Of the secondary authors, even Terrasse the most 
cautious, allows to Isma il a latter day "vingtaine d*annees de paix",
(p. 264)
(3) See, for example, Terrasse Vol. II pp* 277-8 cf. Brignon e|* al*
pp, 245-6
half of the reign, the warrior credibility of the ageing sultan's
government may be seen as ever open to question* The interest of
this period centres upon the tactics by which the palace ruler
maintained his authority.
Understanding of this entire second half of Ismacil's reign
is, as has been noted (4), bedevilled by the problem of meagre
source material. Indigenous chronicle coverage of the period is
thin, and there survives no contemporary alien commentary of the
calibre that Germain MouBtte and 3ean-Baptiste Estelle provide for
periods within the seventeenth century. It is therefore possible
to give only a comparatively and increasingly brief resume of
IsmaCil*s latter years.
These years began with a period during which IsmaCil was
subjected to internal military challenge. The battle of Djidioua,
in April 1701, touched off a major escalation in Susi secession*
Thereafter, the old tri-partite pattern of an imperial military
concern divided between "Cherg", Sus and jihad , was superseded,
Jhe sultan's military investment in jihad and "Cherg11 shrivelled
away, and the politics of the Maghrib al—Aqsa came to be dominated
by the question as to whether the Sus would be maintained as part
of IsmaCil*s empire.
In the early summer of 1701, the formal defection of the Sus 
cbegan* Muhammad al- Alim declared himself independent of his newly
/  \  Q  ...
defeated father (5), He thus became one of a series of Alawi princes
(4) See Prologue Pp* 12-13 and 33
(5) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Salll ibn Danan ed./tr, Vajda Text no. XXV f&om 
"Un recueil de textes*.." in "Hesperis" Vol0 XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 154 
cf* S.I. 2e Franee Vol* VI No* XXXI 3-B* Estelle to Pontchartrain 
Paris, 29/6/1701 (pp* 254-5). The news Estelle had received, presumably 
by way of Sale and Marseille, did not include the name of Isma Il's 
secessionist son. Out of an high regard for Muhammad al- Alim, Estelle 
guessed the delinquent, wrongly, to be an half-brother Abu *1-Nasir.
of the period whose ambitions were grafted on to "Chleuh" secession*
Like his cousin Ahmad ibn Muhriz before him, Muhammad was regarded 
in the Sus as an independent sultan* His declaration of independence 
was carried out with deliberation* The Rudani bavca in Isma^l^ 
favour was annulled by a body of local fuqaha* of Murrakushi 
education; IsmaCil was informed of the development by letter; and 
the irate replies issued by the MiknasI chancery were ceremonially 
burned in the middle of the Rudani market place (6)*
There was a particular religious bias to this secession which 
gave it the flavour of an internal Islamic .jihad* Muhammad had 
smoothly carried over into the Sus the tactic of alliance with the 
clerisy which had previously marked his long vice-regality within 
Fes (7)* In the Sus he was, once again, the prince who loved the 
schoolmen (8)* Here was a deft transference of affection* For the 
Sus held schoolmen of an alien cast* It was a region from which 
Fes was regarded as so far slovenly in religious matters as to have 
all but one of its major mosques incorrectly orientated (9). SusX 
rejection of Sa*isl domination could therefore be made in the name 
of true religion* Muhammad*s Rudani clerical supporters were said 
to have given “new birth to the sunna which had vanished from the 
capital city of Tarudant” (10)* The theme of legitimation by piety 
was employed upon Muhammad*s behalf even within his relations with 
aliens* Thus, an English Agadir merchant was sent to beg recognition
(6) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr* Justlnard pp* 159—160
(7) See Chapter III Pp* 136-139
(8) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr* Oustinard p* 159
(9) ibid* p. 138
(10) ibid* p* 159
For discussion of the literary tradition concerning relations between
Muhammad al— Alim and Susi scholars, see Lakhdar: “La vie litteraire*. 
* '("pp*" 116-122)'
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of queen Anne for the government of: “the Indulgent Father, our 
Preist-like lord and Dove-like King, Prince of the Believers,
Protector of Religion, our lord Mahamd", and adjured to tell England 
of his “truth and sincerity, his justice and piety, his Mercy and 
Clemency to Christian captives as well as to Mohametan belBivers" (11)* 
By the nineteenth century, tradition, as passed on by the "Chleuh"
m* Q
author Akansus, was to see the entire episode of Muhammad al- Alim’s 
secession as an expression of regional disaffection which the clerisy 
had dominated* Thus, Akansus could say of Muhammad's Susi following:
"I speak comprehensively of the region of the Sus, because 
his (Muhammad's) activities were entirely confined to that 
region, and because most of those (Susi) who were qualified 
in knowledge and in piety were with him, as his ardent 
partisans."
The regional aspect to the secession was evident to contemporaries* 
Thus, an European merchant reporter would allege that Muhammad had 
been "crowned*..by the free consent of all the adjacent Countreys"
(13). The very declaration of independence would seem to have won 
Muhammad local support sufficient to remove the pressure of the
(11) S*P* 71 (15) ff* 127 and 129 Translation of a letter to queen Anne 
from "Abdalah ben Abdelcader the Andalusian", dated Agadir, Safar 
1115 s= 16/6/1703-14/7/1703 A*D*, and accompanied by diplomatic 
instructions for its courier, the merchant Dohn Treville*
The letter's florid ascription of Muhammad may be contrasted 
with his father^s relatively curt diplomatic title: "amir al-
mu'minin al-muiahid fi sabil rabb al- alamiV* ("Commander of the
faithful and warrior upon the path of the master of eart££u> tevncjs" ) 
See* for examples, S*I. 28 France Vol* II Nos* XXVIII, LVI and LXV
Isma II to Louis XIV Dates various* pp* 293, 4065and 434)
(12) "wa oauluna Cammat ahl al-gutr al-sus li-Sit^zuhurahu al-tamm innama
kana hunalika wa li-an lull man vantasibu ila 'l-cilm wa *1-
mm  m  Q  mm
salah minhum kana ma ahu muwafioina lihi"
• •
(Akansus quoted al-Nasirl: "Kitab al-Istiasa****" Casablanca text, 
Vol* VII p* 92 cf.Vumev translation A*M* Vol* IX p* 126)
(13) S*P. 71 (15) f. 159 Memo* of Bartholomew Veroell. London, 7/9/1706
"Chlsuh" mountain men who had been milling around Tarudant for over
a year (14)* For, in the October of 1701, two European traders had to
travel inland as far as Tata, past Tarudant and across the Anti-
Atlas* in order to reach Muhammad and his victorious mahalla (15),
* — * ----
In 1701, IsmaCil was in no position to counter his disloyal 
son* He was in financial straits* The Djidioua defeat had entailed 
losses in equipment and in “Chergi" revenue* And the defection of
Q
Muhammad al- Alim deprived the sultan of resources that came from 
or by way of the Sus* Busnot cited Muhammad's retention of a 
northward-bound Susi gold caravan, as an early indication of the 
son's defiance of his father (16). Desperately, the sultan 
attempted to recoup his losses* Allegedly the _ad hoc negotiations 
of the period threatened even the Fasi millah with compulsory imperial 
purchase at a knock-down price; the demand was later waived in
lieu of an extraordinary contribution from the Dewish community, to
be given in money and in military equipment (17)*
Politically, Isme^il's priority was concentration upon preventing 
imperial authority from disintegrating at the empire's heart* There 
was an exemplary execution* CAbd al-Khaliq, the Rusi governor of Fes, 
was put to death upon the delayed and feeble charge of his having 
killed one of the sultan's abid al-dar or palace guards; ha was 
immediately replaced in office by his own brother, Hamdun al-Rtjsi (1B)*
(14) See Chapter V P* 231
(15) S*X* 2° Franee Vol* VI No, XXXIII Pierre Bouoard to the house of
le Gendre* Agadir, 16/11/1701 pp* 260-261
(16) Busnot pp* 80-81
(17) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sabi ibn Danan ed,/tr, Va.jda Text no* XXV from
uUn recueil de textes..." in “Hesperis" Vol. XXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 153-
155
(18) "Tur.iuman" PP*_26 of the text and 48-9 of the translation cf*
"Nashr al-Mathani***11 Fes lithograph Vol, II p, 170 of the first
notation*
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C
The fruitlessness of intercession upon the unfortunate Abd al-Khaliq*s
behalf by Fasi civic religious leaders (19) makes it seem possible that
one ground for the governor*s selection as victim was a rapprochement
between the Rusi and Fas al-Bali that might have given Fes another
al-Duraydi (20): a localised military despot# The execution may be
seen as an oblique shot, fired for the warning of city and governing
clan alike# In 1701, IsmaCil dared not flout Fes more directly#
After the execution, Zaydan was sent to Fas al-3adld as vice-roy (21)#
The prince*s inauguration was accompanied by an appeal to Muhammad ibn
cAbd al-Qadir al-Fasi for his mediation between the prince and officers
of the civic militia (22)# This appeal made no mention of the haratin
• *
fas# and gave the city the option of deciding the terms upon which 
its military service should be given: terms current in the days of 
one or the other of two conquerors, Ahmad al-Dhahabi al-Mansur or 
al-Rashld (23)#
cAli ibn cAbd Allah of Tetuan, the qa*id now regarded as the 
most eminent of Ismacil*s officers (24-) was rumoured, in 1701, nto
have set up for himself11 (25)# It is possible that his loyalty was
retained through his extensive employment by the sultan in his old 
subsidiary role of diplomat# Henceforward this role would eclipse, 
although not eliminate the qa*id*s role as mu.iahid# Europe was
(1^) "TurIuman" p*J26 of the text and 48-9 of the translation cf#
11 Bust an al-Zarif ###“ MS p# 42
V
(20) See Chapter X P* 54
(21) “Tur iuman11 P*_26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf#
“Bustan al-Zarif###** MS loc# cit#     ‘ — ",rM 11 .
(22) uLettres Inedites#,«tl Mo# 15 IsmaCil to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir
al-Faiil ~ Muharram 1113 = a/i/lT01-7/7/1?01 pp* 58-9
(23) ibid# p* 59 cf# Introduction to the “Lettres
Inedit es##,11 p# 38
(24) 1 Ocklev11 p. 55
(25) S*P* 71(15) f# 119 Admiral G# Rooke to William III , Straits of
Gibraltar 8/9/1701 N#S#
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seething towards the war of the Spanish Succession* As a neighbour of 
the Peninsula, the ga^id of Tetuan was, like his master, aware of the 
possible adverse consequences for his own authority of a Bourbon 
union between France and Spain* In 1701, a naval peace with England, 
foreshadowed for a year, was finally patched up (26)* Through CAlI
C wm
ibn Abd Allah, Isma il now proffered a 3anus«-face to Christendom*
The now workaday siege of Ceuta (27) was conducted by the same gatid
who, in negotiations with the English, could make the offer of a
naval base outside Tangier to a Christian power (28)* In no external
relations could IsmaCil afford to be brazen* The year 1702 saw an
embassy from Meknes to Algiers, designed to reassure al-Hajj Mustafa
Dey that no further distress would come to him from the west (29).
Miknasi authority within the south of the empire continued to
slide* The efforts of Isma°il,s loyalist son Hafiz to counter 
c
Muhammad al- Alim in the western High Atlas were a total failure 
and entailed heavy military losses (30)* And, probably during the 
latter months of 1702, a second loyalist son of Isma il*s, Abd al- 
Malik, fled northwards to take sanctuary in Zerhoun* He had been 
ousted from his Dar°a vice-regality by Abu *1-Nasir (31), a second 
dissident brother (32), and in consequence was clearly afraid for 
his life. Muhammad al- Alim grew bolder* Thus far he had limited his
(26) S*P, 71 (15) ff. 73-97 passim
(27) S.I* 2 B France Vol. VI No* XXIV 3-B* Brouillet and P0 Gautier to
Pere Blandinieres. Sale, 20/1/1701 p* 266 
Herein lies the allegation that the siege of Ceuta was currently 
being waged at no cost to the sultan*
(28) S* P. 71 (15) f* 125 Memo* of Admiral G, Rookie, Straits of Gibraltar, 
Date imperfect cf. S.I. 28 France Vol* VI No* XXXVIII
3-B* gatelie to Pontchartrain. Marseille, 3/2/1702 p* 280
(29) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI p* 250 ^Note 2)* Reference to Archives 
Nationales. Affaires £tranqeres B 118 f. 236 Author unknown*
(30) “Relation**.de la Mercvu p. 688
(3^) "Tur iuman" p* 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif***** MS p, 42 The reference gives only the year 
1114 A.H*, But sets the incident anterior to events from the beginning 
of 1703.
(32) "88131100***06 la Mercy11 loc. cit*
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ambitions to territories behind the High Atlas* Now he aped his 
Susi precursor Ahmad ibn Muhriz, in taking steps which, from his 
fatherfs point of view, made his extirpation vital* He crossed the 
mountains and threatened lands within the Atlas arc* In the February 
'of 1703, it was known in Sale that Muhammad*s troops were laying 
siege to both Marrakesh and Safi (33)* At the beginning of March, 
the prince took Marrakesh (3$), allegedly with the support of Hawz
e
peoples (35). In Marrakesh, piety did not prevent brisk action! 
Muhammad had the city governor and notables executed, and their 
houses razed to the ground (36)*
At this point, Muhammad had reached the cultural fault-line 
between "greater Gharb" and "greater Sus"* He was countered by the 
old sultan*s setting Zaydan against him (37), in a duel which meant, 
pragmatically, a defence of Zaydan*s designation as heir. The duel 
and its consequences were to eliminate both prinees as personal foci 
of political interest; after them, no other sons of IsmaCil were 
fully to possess the political ascendancy achieved by either*
The priority was the recapture of Marrakesh and its Hawz into 
the political orbit of Saifs. This was a project into which Isma°il
(33) S.I, 2e France Uol. VI No, XL Fabron. French consular "chancellor"
in Sale, to Pontchartrain, 22/2/1703 p* 288
(34) "Tur iuman" p. 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf,
"Bustan al-Zarif**." MS p* 42 cf, "Relation**.de la Mercy"
* p. 690
(35) Busnot p, 86
(36) "Tur iuman" loc* cit. cf, "Bustan al-Zarxf***" MS loc* cit*
«
(3?) "Tur Iuman" loc. cit* cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc* cit*
cf* S.I. 20 Franee Uol. UI No. XLI Perxllie to Pontchartrain
Sale, 26/4/1703 p. 290
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invested an heavy and apparently escalating concentration of abid
(38)« Over the high summer of 1703, the struggle was indecisive* 
flarrakesh, deprived of its victuals by Muhammad (39) opened its gates 
to Zaydan, only to suffer an hideous sack (40)* This grim civic 
victory did not entail Muhammadfs immediate withdrawal from the 
“Hawzu. He may already have been in contact with the Turks of the 
Regency (41); his subsequent rural defeat of Zaydan (42) co-incided 
with Turkish troop-movements in the region of Tlemsen (43), For a 
brief span, lsmaCTl,s situation was sufficiently alarming for him to 
send to SaSs for master-carpenters to mount the previously ornamental 
cannon of Meknes into firing position (44)* But then the tide turned. 
Zaydan drove Muhammad to retreat into inner Sus. Allegedly Muhammad 
suffered heavy losses in the Glawi pass (45)* These may indicate 
a winter crossing rather than military harassment, as Muhammad*s 
withdrawal seems to have been made in good order* With him went a 
number of high-ranking prisoners, including two notable generals,
(38) S.I. 28 France Uol* V/I No* XLIV Memo* of Perillie, Sale, 8/9/1703
p* 303 cf* al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr. Oustinard p. 161
The latter author cited as his informant “Brahim bou CAbdelli11, 
a petty chieftain from the inner High Atlas dir, whose court 
connections by marriage with leading Udaya had forced him to flee 
Muhammad^ north-bound army, and who was subsequently used by 
Zaydan as a messenger to his mother Ayisha Mubarka in Meknes*
(39) S.I. 26 France Uol. VI No* XLII Pere Blandinieres to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 16/7/1703 p. 294
(40) ^ ibid. loc. cit.
“Tur iumanu_D. 24 of the text and 49 of the translation cf*
uBustan al-Zarif.*.11 MS. p* 42 
•
(41) Ginoux, a French Agadir merchant was, for the following year, to refer 
to links between Muhammad al- Alim and the Algerines as already in 
existence. (S.I* 2 France Vol. VI No. L~# Ginoux to Pontchartrain
Agadir, 20/l/l7D5 p. 324)
(42) S.I. 28 Franee Vol. VI No* XLII Pere Blandinieres to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 16/7/1703 pp. 294-5
(43) S.I^ 28 France Vol. VI No, XLIV Memo* of Perillie. Sale, 8/9/1703
p. 303
(44) ibid. loc* cit.
(45) al—Zarhuni of Tasaft ed,/tr* Oustinard p. 161
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Ali Abu Shafra, commander of the Udaya of Fas al-Oadid (46), and 
the black Qafid Malik (47)# The gad! of Marrakesh was also of the 
company (48)#°AlI Abu Shafra, who maintained a stealthy contact
M q M
with the Udaya queen Ayisha Mubarka, was later put to death by
Muhammad (49)# The other captive magnates threw in their lot with
the dissident* Muhammad was able to re-establish political authority
over inner Sus, but was unable to prevent Zaydan from penetrating
the High Atlas in 1704 (50),
Effectively, Isma ilfs southern frontier now corresponded once
again to the delimitation he had accepted in 1677, when he had left
the Sus and Dar a to Ahmad ibn Muhriz# Thereafter, the sultan was• • 7
willing to await events# In 1704, the astonished Busnot believed 
that IsmaCil was pottering within the eye of a political typhoon;
"Nous avons meme vu avec surprise dans le temps de la 
revolte de Mouley Mahamet, qua tout etoit en trouble dans 
ses principaux Royaumes, qu,on se voyait a la veille d*un 
revolution generale, pendant que lui seul paroissoit 
comme un homme sans affaires, donnant Audience aux 
Etrangers, se plongeant dans les plaisirs de son Serail, 
employant le reste de son temps a presser les travaux 
de ses Enclaves, a donner le dessein dB ses Batimens, etH A
a en ccnduire lui meme a l*execution, comme s*il avoit 
ete quelque particulier qui nfeut eu autre chose a 
faire, que d*entrer dans le detail de son tranquille 
Domestique.*."
But the sultan now had some basis for domestic tranquillity# The 
theatre of conflict between his two most militarily significant 
sons had been removed to the Sus# The geographical distance of their
(46) Busnot pp* 87-8 and "Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p. 29
(47) "Relation de la Mercy***11 p* 691
(48) ibid, p* 692
(49) Busnot p* 90
(50) "Relation de la Mercy#*#1 p. 691
(51) Busnot p. 46
war provided their father with an hiatus during which his authority
could be re-affirmed within thB Atlas arc. Fiscal and admonitory
punishment could now be meted out to regions still within the
sultan*s political reach, Al-Zayyani’s chronicle material records
that, in the aftermath of Muhammad al-cAlim*s retreat into inner
Sus, demands for extraordinarily heavy fiscal contributions were
made of the city of Fes. These demands were associated with the
short vice-regality of the sultan’s son Hafiz, and with the months
that immediately followed it (52). The demands were accompanied by
the public execution of a number of Fasi citizens, at the order of
Hamdun al-Rusi (53) whose brother’s fate seems to have assured his
own loyalty to Meknes* By the standards of Fes, a city in which there
was no living memory of brutality upon the scale of military sack,
the vice-regality of Hafiz was a reign of terror. Echoes of its
stringency percolated through to Mercedarian fathers who never saw
Fes (54). The period features prominently within the Fasi Dewish
chronicle of Samuel ibn SatU ibn Danan. His account naturally
concentrates upon hardship as experienced inside the Fasi millah.
«
But he noted that numbers of Fasi Muslims took an hasty refuge 
within the millah upon hearinq of the accidental death of Hafiz (55).
* r  • *
This massed bolt for cover suggests that the much-squeezed Fasi 
Muslims believed that the sultan would interpret the accident that 
had befallen his son while toying with a pistol, as vengeful design
(52) “Tur iuman11 pp. 25 of the text and 49-50 of the translation cf.
“Bustan al-Zarif...1* MS p. 42 cf. Chronicle of Samuel ibn
SaOl ibn Danan ed./tr* Va.ida Text^no. XXV from “Un recueil dB textes.
“Hesperis*1 Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 153-160
(53) “Tur.iuman11 p. 25 of the text and 50 of the translation cf.
“Bustan al—Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
V  1 " '
(54) “Relation...de la Mercy. . p p .  68B-9
(55) Chronicle of Samuel ibn SaUl ibn Danan ed./tr. Va.ida. Text cited above
pp. 156-7 It seems proper to discount the alternative and gaudy
Mercedarian tale of the vice-roy’s suicide.
(“Relation., .de la Mercy...1 loc. cit. )
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upon the part of the city. However, the vice-roy^ death passed without 
notable repercussions.
By the following year, 1705, the sultan had developed a scheme 
for amassing revenue from Fes that was more sophisticated than brusque 
demand. He "moved into" Fasi trade as previously he had "moved into"
Saletin corsair activity (56), His method was the granting out of 
commercial monopolies to privileged Fasi traders who may be assumed 
to have paid for their privilege. In 1705, a group of Fasi merchants
i
are known to have negotiated with the sultan the grant of an "estancar" 
or monopoly of the wax and leather trade which formed the staple of 
contemporary Moroccan commerce with Europe, The result was a sharp 
rise in the indigenous price of wax and leather products (57),
Consequently the number of European merchants in Morocco dwindled, 
and their trade was re-routed into channels of indigenous commerce 
linked with Cadiz (58). Because it brought about an adverse change 
in the terms of trade encountered by European merchants, this 
monopoly of trade in goods destined for Europe is well known (59),
But it is likely that maritime trade was merely a subsidiary aspect 
of the total Fasi "estancar". At a later period, Windus noted that 
the great pilgrimage caravans were:
"....governed by a Person who farms most of the Wax of 
the Emperor, and for that reason is called the Stankero."(gg)
(56) See Chapter V Pp. 227-8
(5?) S.I, 2° France Uol. VI No. LII Perillie to the Marseille merchant
Boyer. Sale 21/12/1705 pp. 329-330
(58) S.I. 28 France Uol. VI pp, 332-3 Note (3) Memo, of consul Bonnal
Sale, 1712 and letter from consul la Maqdelaine to Pontchartrain
Tetuan, 13/6/1713.
(59) For information upon this and other asgects of European trade^with 
Morocco during the latter half of Isma Ilfs reign, see S.I, 2 France 
Vol. VI pp, 332-3 (Note (3)) and pp. 572-9, for the Euro-centric 
editorial essay "Etienne Pillet. lMvanie de 1716 et la Suppression
du Consulat de Sale".
(60) Windus p, 207
The "Stankero"*s business was said to be "very great" and to involve
a clan of "Brothers" all working together in partnership (61 ). The
c c
clan is identifiable with the Adayyil of Fes* An Adayyil was wax-
farmer in 1716 (62)# And the CAdayyil are known to have been prominent
in Fasi trade and politics during much of the eighteenth century (63).
They had close ties with the Fasi millah (64) as well as the
pilgrimage (65). And they were "sultan*s men"! one member of the clan,
_ C
al-Khayyat Adayyil, would be an early victim of the disturbances 
which followed IsmaCIl*s death (66).
Initiation of the "estancar" policy may be seen as an attempt to 
shore up the sultan,s finances against the outcome of the Susi struggle 
between Muhammad al- Alim and Zaydan# In 1705, Isma il won an extension 
of his political hiatus. Events turned in favour of Zaydan, who was as 
yet maintaining the formalities of filial piety. During the summer, he 
defeated Muhammad in Haha, at the maritime fringe of the High Atlas (67), 
presumably while Muhammad was attempting to defend his control of the
northward gold-route. The battle took an heavy toll of Muhammad*s
Culamaf partisans (68). But Muhammad himself was able to fall back 
upon Tarudant (69). Zaydan sent his father a large party of eminent
(61) Windus p* 207
(62) S.I* 2e France Vol. VI : "Etienne Pillet. ltAvanie de 1716*.."p. 575
(63) "Bustan^al-Zarlf.**" MS pp. 69, 70 and 74 cf,
S*I, 2 France Vol. VI No. XCVII Coutille. Saletin merchant, to
Achard. 24/7/1716 pp. 601-2
(64) Chronicle of Samuel ibn SaOl ibn Danan ed./tr* Va Ida Text no. XXV
from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949)
p. 157
(65) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 69
«
(66) "Tur.iuman" p. 34 of the text and 62 of the translation
(67) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Bustinard p. 162 cf.
"Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 691
(68) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Bustinard loc. cit.
(69) Busnot p. 89
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prisoners, including the qa'1 id Malik and the former qadi of Marrakesh 
(70 ). These provided Isma°Il with the opportunity for a wallow in 
public execution and mutilation (71) that provided a macabre 
advertisement for his authority. At the same time, the sultan seems 
to have been refurbishing the military prop to that authority. In the 
May of 1706 a new demand was made of Fes: that each of its households 
should provide the sultan with a saddle (72). The demand suggests 
that the sultan was attempting to mount a new force of cavalry.
Later in the May of 1706, Tarudant fell to the besieging Zaydan.
Its populace was butchered (73). Muhammad al-CAlim was captured 
and despatched to Meknes as a prisoner. He provided the victim 
within a pageant that was, theatrically speaking, the acme of his 
father's policy of showpiece brutality. In a grisly ceremony outside 
Meknes, the prince's left foot and right hand were lopped off; a 
fortnight later, he died of his wounds (74). This execution was 
perhaps the most widely publicised event of IsmaCil*s reign, and 
brought the sultan and his martyred son into curious eddies of 
notoriety that rippled into eighteenth century French romance (75) 
and twentieth century "Qiblan" folklore (76) alike. Even hardened 
contemporaries seem openly to have regarded the execution as distaste­
ful* Easi Culama*. led by the qadi Bardalla, officiated at Muhammad's
• •
(70) Busnot p. 91 cf. "Relation.**de la Mercy...11 pp. 691-2
(71) Busnot pp. 91—96 cf* "Relation...de la Mercy..." loc. cit.
(72) "Tur.iuman" pp. 26-7 of the text and 50 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif...” MS p. 42
r ” ~ Y
(73) S.P. 71(15) f, 159 Memo, of Bartholomew Verqell. Agadir merchant who 
had fled from Zaydan1s army, London 7/9/1706 cf. "Turiuman" p. 27
of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..."
p. 693
(74) S.P. 71(_15) f* 165 Memo of Bartholomew Uerqell. London, 7/9/1706 cf. 
"Tur.iuman" loc. cit. cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 694
(75) Seran de la Tour; "Histoire de Mouley Mahamet. fils de Moulev Ismael.
rov de Maroc". Geneva, 1749
(76) P. Marty: "L'Emirat des Trarzas" in "Revue du Monde Musulmane"
Vol. XXXVI,(Paris, 1917-18) P* T1
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funeral and, in mourning, suspended classes at the Qarawiyyin 
university for one day (77). Admittedly these tokens of respect 
provided an opportunity for expressing generalised Fasi resentment 
against the sultan with some degree of impunity* But they were 
nevertheless an appropriate tribute to the fallen nschoolmBn,s 
prince1* •
Meanwhile, Zaydan the victor remained within the southern 
empire he had won. He made no formal renunciation of obedience 
to his father. But he seems to have kept the revenues of inner Sus 
to himself (78). He arranged for the repopulation of Tarudant, and 
of the trading post of Agadir, whose people had scattered at his 
first approach (79), Resolutely he refused to send back to his 
father the troops demanded of him in a series of letters which 
proclaimed the urgent military needs of the north and the .jihad (80).
A strange episode occurred over the winter of 1706-7. According 
to information reaching Cadiz, IsmaCil remained immured within his 
palace for a period of nearly two months (81). His non-appearance 
gave rise to widespread disorder and dismay (82), that was not
Q  w
dispelled by Ayisha Mubarka*s public reassurances that the sultan 
lived (83). It is possible that the sultan was merely suffering from
(77) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Bustinard p. 163 cf. Akansus 
quoted al-NasirTs "Kitab al-IstiqsgT. Casablanca text, Vol. VII
pp. 91-2 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 125-6
(78) S.I* 2s Franee Vol. VI No. LXVIII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 401 
“Relation...de la Mercy...11 p. 696
(79) Busnot pp. 113 and 119 cf. “Relation...de la Mercy...1* pp. 696-7 cf. 
S.P. 71 (15) ff, 159-160 Mbitio. of Bartholomew Veroell. London, 7/9/1706
(80) Busnot p. 115
(81) S.I. 20 Franee Vol. VI No. LIX Pere Forton to Pontchartrain. Cadiz
30/1/1707 (p. 368) cf. No. LX Pere Forton to Pontchartrain. Cadiz,
27/2/1707 (pp*369-7Q) cf. No. LXII P^re Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 3/4/1707 (p. 378)
(82) S.I. 2G France Vol. VI No. LXII P^re Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 3/4/1707 loc. cit.
(83) S,I. 28 France Vol. VI No. LX Pere Forton to Pontchartrain.
Cadiz",' 27/2/1707 pp. 369-70o
a serious illness. But, by the April of 1707, when IsmaCil was once 
again to be seen in public in Meknes, it could be widely believed that 
his disappearance from his sujects* view had been a piece of trickery: 
a gambit designed to beguile Zaydan into believing his father dead, 
and consequently, into bringing his troops northwards, to make a bid 
for power within open country (84). However, Zaydan was not to be 
lured away from Tarudant and his jde facto Susi independence.
_ C
Yet Zaydan did not succeed in taking the Dar a. This was a region
which had fallen away from Miknasi control in 1702 (85). Abu *1-Nasir
cthe dissident prince who had then become suzerain of the Dar a, had
c
subsequently allied with Muhammad al- Alim (86). After Muhammad*s
defeat, Abu *1-Nasir fled southwards from the DarCa, allegedly
towards the "Soudan11 (87). The political vacuum he left was filled
by the old sultan his father. An incident from 1707 is evidence for
ca renewal along the Dar a of the long reach of Meknes. In that year 
Mawlay Ahmad ibn Nasir, shaykh of the Nasiriya zawiya of Tamgrout, 
and the paramount Dar i religious leader, was planning his third 
pilgrimage along the southern, oasean route. From the remote distance 
of his zawiya he acceded to Miknasi demands first that he should come 
to Meknes to take leave of the sultan, and then that he should 
postpone his projected journey altogether (88).
(84) 5.1. 28 France Vol. VI No. LXIII Pere Forton to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 8/5/1707 p. 381
(85) See present chapter P. 244
(86) S.I. 28 France Vol. VI No. L. Ginoux. Agadir merchant, to
Pontchartrain 20/l/l?05 p. 323
(87) S.I. 28 France Vol. VI No. LXV Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain,
Cadiz, 29/10/1707 p. 388
(88) A. Berbrugger: "Voyage de Moula Ahmad, depuis la ZaouUa en Nasfr£a 
jusqu*a Tripoli et retour", being translated sections of a rihla 
modelled upon that of al- Ayyashi, and contained in "Voyages clans le 
Sud de l*Algerie et des Etats barbaresques de lf0uest et de ltEst" 
reproduced in "Exploration scientifique de ItAlqerie" Vol. IX 
(Paris, 1856) pp. 168-9
According to Lempriere. it was necessary for magnates and court 
officials to obtain the sultan*s express permission to go on 
pilgrimage, (pp. 344-5)
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In the early autumn of 1707, Zaydan died in Tarudant. Indigenous 
and European reports pass on a variety of predictable allegations as 
to foul play (89). At the sultanfs order, the princefs body was 
brought back northwards through the Tadla for burial within Meknes.
It was escorted by a funeral cortege of several thousand men (90).
These possibly represented a proportion of the troops who had gone 
south with Zaydan in 1703, and who were now, at last, returning to 
the sultanfs command. Effectively Zaydan had two successors; one to 
the status of heir-presumptive, the other to his southern pre­
eminence. A full-brother Ahmad, somewhat pretentiously surnamed 
al-Dhahabi, in deference to the great Ahmad al-Mansur (91), 
succeeded Zaydan immediately as recognised heir (92). This Ahmad 
al-Dhahabi was decidedly undistinguished personally (93), Thus far 
he had been remarkable only for the fomentation of violent scuffles 
around the palace (94). The ease of his advancement underwrites the 
primacy which, in the sultan*s view, invested the sons of cAyisha Mubarka. 
However, IsmaCil did not take the risk of fostering Ahmad militarily
(89) According to contemporary rumour reaching Cadiz in the October of 
1707, the prince had been poisoned. Inside three months, it was to 
be regarded as certain that he had been murdered by his wives.
(S.I. 2e France Vol. VI Was* LXV and LXVII Letters from Pere Busnot 
to Pontchartrain. Cadiz, 29/10/1707 and 15/1/1708 pp. 388 and 396)
Al-Zayyan! alleged that the prince had been murdered by "al-katib 
al-wazir1.1 by whom he may have meant to indicate the man of letters
Hammu al-Wazir al-Ghassani (“Tur.iuman11 p. 27 of the text and 50 of the
translation aRd Chapter V P. 186 (Note (4))
(90) S.I. 2e Franee Vol. VI Wo. LXV Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain. Cadiz
29/10/1707 p. 389
(91) 11 Al-Dhahabi" was the contemporary sobriquet of al-Mansur al-Sa°di. 
("Lettres Inedjtes.. Wo. 15 Isma il to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir
al-Fasl Muharram 1113 = 8/6/1701 - 7/7/l’?01 p. 59)
(92) Del Puerto in his "Mission Historial.. published in 1708, noted
"Muley Hamete Hebi" as Isma il*s most prominent son (Bk. 1 Ch. 10 p. 41).
(93) Braithwaite pp. 1-2
(94) S.I* 2° France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to
Pontchartrain , Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197 cf. Busnot pp. 120-121
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as Zaydan had been fostered. The new heir was sent to govern the 
Tadla, and there act as warden of the route from Salts to Marrakesh (95)
He constructed a major fort within the region (9G). There, as a 
political maroon, he would seem to have stayed for much of the 
remainder of his father’s reign* His Tadla base was near to the site
of ruined Dila*. However, the region seems not to have been re-fused
politically by the proximity of an important CAlawI prince. Zaydan*s 
successor as vice-roy of the Sus was of greater immediate political 
significance than his successor as heir. This southern inheritor 
was the former Dar°i rebel prince, Abu ’l-Nasir, who chose this 
point to slide back from exile into a grateful father’s good graces 
(97). His subsequent four years of filial obedience slurred over
IsmaCilfs fundamentally endemic Susi problem.
Quiescence in the Sus did not entail any renewal of IsmaCil*s 
"Chergi" ambitions. In 1707, following a period of crisis on the 
Tunisian march (98), the see-saw of Algerine military interest had 
tipped once again to the west. Since the Oune of 1707, a Turkish 
force had been laying siege to Spanish Oran (99). Long ago, in 1693,
IsmaCil himself had cast a token shot at this presidio (100). However, 
in 1707, he was reduced to extracting from the conflict around Oran 
the opportunity for making an eirenic and pan-Islamic gesture: he
(95) "Tur.iuman” p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif. MS p. 41--- —
(96) "Tur.iuman” loc. cit. cf. "Bustan al-Zarif...” MS loc. cit._ *
(97) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. LXVII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 15/1/1708 pp. 395-6
(98) S.I. 2e Franee Vol. VI No. LI Pontchartrain to Ginoux. Versailles
25/3/1705 p. 327 cf. E. Plantet: "Correspondence des Devs...”
Vol. II p. 33 Louis XIV to al-Hai.i Mustafa Dev. Fontainebleau,
* ** 17/10/1705
(99) Galindo y de Vera p. 294
(100) ibid. p. 284
sent the Turkish mu.jahidun two hundred quintals of gunpowder (101).
Oran fell to the Turks in the January of 1708 (1Q2) Its surrender 
provoked an oblique demonstration of the degree to which IsmaCil!s own 
waging of the .jihad had become hollow. The sultan subjected his own 
mu.jahid captain CAli ibn °Abd Allah to a token deposition (103) for 
having in thirteen years failed to take Ceuta. This was merely a 
temporary imperial tantrum, directed against an indispensible lieu­
tenant. By the April of 1708, the qa’id was back in office, and in 
possession of the "estancar" of Titwani trade with Europe in wax and 
leather (104). The mu.jahid was thus rewarded for his loyalty to 
Isma°il through difficult years. In relation to Christendom, he was 
now a local tycoon as well as a diplomat. Certain conventions were 
maintained. The qafid continued officially to reside in the "camp 
before Ceuta". There he received alien envoys, Including the Christian 
merchants with whom he traded (105). His blockade of the presidio 
was generally regarded as a facade for his flourishing personal 
interests (106). However, it was punctuated by a regular Friday 
cannonade, for which stones were the customary and effective 
ammunition, and for which the gunpowder was provided by the Titwani 
Jewish community (107), itself closely enmeshed in commercial links
(101) S.I* 2° France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 402
(102) Galindo v de Vera p. 295 cf* "Nashr al-Mathani.. Fes lithograph
p. 107 of the second notation
(103) S.I. 2° Franee Vol. VI No, LXVIII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 403
(104) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI d . 332 (Note 1) Etienne Pillet to
Pere Nolasque Neant , Sale, 4/4/1708
(105) S.I. 2s France Vol. VI No. LXXXIV Bonnal to the Deputes de
Commerce de Marseille. Tetuan, 1/3/1712 p.
("I06) Busnot. in an eyewitness account of Ceuta, noted that: "Quoique le
camp des Maures ne soit qu’a une portee de Fusil de la Place, on
peut dire qu’elle n ’est proprement que bloquee«**et que l*Alcayd 
Ali qui les commands est bien aise dfavoir un pretexte pour 
demeurer sur les Cotes, et se tenir une#porte ouverte aux 
Negotiations qu'il entretient avec les Etrangers," (p. 229)
(107) Busnot pp. 229 and 230
with southern Spain* During the remainder of IsmaCil*s reign there was 
to be only one flare to disturb this ritualised confrontation; and 
this clash would be of Spanish, not "Moorish" initiation.
By 1708, IsmaCil felt sufficiently secure of his authority within 
Sals to re-open an old quarrel with Fes. Rumour of the associated furor 
reached ransom missionaries waiting in Sale for permission to approach 
Meknes. According to the Mercedarian version, it was heard:
"...que le roy de Maroc avoit ote a la ville de Fes les 
privileges dont elle jouissoit de tout terns et la reduisoit 
par la sur la meme pied des autres villes. Ces privileges 
consistoient en partie en ce que les habitans jouissoient 
dfune espece de liberte qui empechoit ce Prince de les 
traiter comma des esclaves..."
and that, in consequence, a deputation of Fasi "talbes" had gone to 
Meknes, and had openly upbraided the sultan for his failure to behave 
as a true "Mussulmin" (109). 8usnotfs version of the tale concentrated 
upon successive imperial demands for financial contributions (110). At 
the nub of the controversy, faintly comprehended within the Mercedarian 
reference to "esclaves", there lay a renewal of the sultanrs insistance 
upon Fasi jurist signatures to his military dlwan or register, the
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daftar al— abid al-mamlukina (111); this carried, as a pragmatic 
corollary, acceptance of the imperial right to recruit slave-soldiers 
from the city of Fes itself* In contrast with the demand of 1697, which 
seems to have erupted from Susi military turmoil (112), the timing of 
this second crisis over the dlwan seems not to correspond with any 
situation in which the sultan was in dire need of troops* However, it
(108) "Relation*..de la Mercy..." p. 714
(109) ibid. pp. 714-15
0*1°) Busnot pp. 130-131
(111) "Tur.iuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zar?f..." MS p. 43 cf. Ulindus p. 217 
«
(112) See Chapter V P. 211
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may have been tacitly understood that, once the dlwan had been 
legally acknowledged, potential slave recruits would be allowed to 
purchase the right to be left alone. The dispute with the jurists 
may thus be seen partly in Busnot's terms, as a dispute involving 
matters fiscal as well as military.
Upon this occasion the sultan was firm, Al-Zayyani1s chronicle 
material records that non-jurors among the lawmen were arrested, and 
that one particular family of civic notables, the Awlad Bissus, was 
singled out for exemplary persecution (113), This was persecution 
only by the standards of Fes and restrained by comparison with 
other episodes from the sultan's previous decade of showpiece 
brutality: the family was robbed of its possessions, and one of 
its leading members, a jurist identified by al~l\iasiri with Abu 
Muhammad °Abd al-Salam Bissus (114) who had two years previously 
been a prominent mourner at Muhammad al-CAlim,s funeral (115), was 
put to public shame in the Miknasi market place. This fate was 
sufficient to secure his compliance with the sultan's demands. He 
was sent back to Fes, personally to arrange for the rounding up of 
haratin fas and their despatching to Meknes (116), It seems likely
ft ft *
(113) "Tur.iuman" p, 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf *
"Bustan al-Zarif,,," MS p, 43
' •
(114) Al-Masiri: "Kitab al-Istiqsa»,»" Casablanca text Vol, VII p, 94
Fumey translation A.M! Vol, IX p. 128
(115) Al—Zarhuni of Tasaft ed,/tr, Bustinard p* 163
(116) uwa wa.i iahahu li-fas li-yuzCi.ia al-haratin li-miknasa. fa-
• •
oadama wa a*ca.iahum fi rabi al-awwal am 1120"
("And he sent him to Fes to round up the haratin for Meknes, He 
came and rounded them up in RabiC I, 11 So ("= 21/5/1708-19/6/17Q8)
("Bustan al-Zarif,,," MS p, 43) On this point the text of the 
"Turiumah" tP• 27 and 51 of the French translation) is confused 
and seems to have been mistranslated by Houdas,
that it was only within later, clerkly tradition that this Bissus
M  Q
faqih was transmuted into a martyr to the shir a , by the allegation 
that he was subsequently murdered by the Rusi governor of Fes (117)*
The rival dynastic tradition that he was murdered by the Fasi
populace (118) seems more credible* For the faqihfs ultimate
complicity with the sultan would seem equivalent to the setting up of
a Fasi diwan al-haratin* This diwan is known to have existed subsequently.
presumably as a register of real or potential civic recruits. A
casual reference to this diwan for the year 1732 (119), makes it
clear that its management was a lucrative post.
So Isma il won in his tussle with Fes over the matter of the 
d!wan. His victory can be seen as ultimately Pyrrhic* For it seems 
to have led to an overall debilitation in Fasi civic life. From this, 
IsmaCilfs own revenues were bound ultimately to suffer. Indigenous 
and European comment upon the period 1708-9 refers to the emigration 
into the Algerine Regency of a number of Fasi citizens (121)• There 
were attempts to prevent this eastward drift. But, as Windus was to 
note, the ravelling of trade with piety in the Fasi pilgrimage 
caravan made a veto upon eastward migration "pretty difficult" (122).
Upon at least one occasion, the caravan route was diverted* In 1710
(117) Al-Nasiri, basing his information upon the rejcort of a local Saletin 
shavkh. Abu °Abd Allah Mahbuba a1-5law! ("Kitab al-Istiqsa*.." 
Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 94-5 cf. fumey translation*A.M. Vol. IX
pp. 129-30)
(118) Akansus, who claimed to have obtained his Information from the sultan 
Sulayman; quoted by al-Hasiri;("Kitab al-Istiqsa*..u Casablanca text
Vol. VII p. 95 cf* Fumey*translation A.M* VolJ IX p. 131)
(119) "Tur.iuman" p* 38 of the text and 71 of the translation
(120) "Tur.iuman" p* 28 of the text and 51 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif*.." MS p* 43 cf. Busnot p. 130 cf*
"Relation**tde la Mercy*.*" p. 715
(121) "Tur.iuman" loc. cit* cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
• *”  ’
(122) Windus p. 209
the al-Nasiri shavkh of Tamgrout, who had at last been permitted to 
proceed to the holy places, returned homewards by the southern route. 
On the way, he met the out-going Fasi caravan at Ain Madi, 
travelling together with pilgrims from Tafilelt (123), It may be 
presumed that would-be pilgrims from the "kingdom of Fes" had been 
ordered to take the desert route that provided an arduous proof of 
genuine zeal, and was less convenient as a cover for straightforward 
emigration* Subsequently the Fasi caravans returned to the aorta 
leading from Fes to Tlemsen, which was in customary use during the 
years preceding Windus’s record of 1721 (124)* Despite their being 
governed by loyal Adayyil, these caravans were the abject of 
intense government suspicion, and of official interference that 
amounted to the application of a partial tourniquet* From the 
standpoint of 1721, Windus noted, with reference to the traders*
"holy pretence of Pilgrimage" that:
"Some Years ago there was an Order to open all the Loads 
that passed, under the Pretence of searching for Jewels, 
which made those concerned in the Trade engage to 
deliver all their Jewels, and pay ten Ducats per Load, 
to save their being searched; but there did not go the 
fourth part of what were used to go before*" ^ 25)
Over several years, IsmaCil*s authority was able to survive in 
juxtaposition with a maimed Fes, and the disaffection of those Fasi 
who were not bound up with the "estancar"* Indeed, given the violence 
of the times, the decade leading up to 1718 can be seen as a "St* 
Martin’s summer" for the "sultan of Meknes", It was a decade studded 
with armed rebellion. But these rebellions were all at the empire*s
(123) "Voyage de MouXa Ahmad*.," ed,/tr, Berbruager p* 315
(124) Windus p, 208
periphery# And they were all overcome, to Ismacil*s advantage.
The period saw war in the Sus between two of Ismi^iLPs sons,
Abu ’1-Nasir and °Abd al-Malik (126). By 1712, this war had ended in
victory for the former, who declared himself independent of his
father (127). However Abu *1-Nasirfs dissidence would lack the time
and scope for development along the lines traced out by Muhammad al™
CAlim. The years 1711-1714 saw a flexing of the sultan*s grip over lands
along the southern perimeter of his empire. In 1711, a Tawati revolt
against the local imperial governor was crushed by an expedition
mounted from Meknes, and commanded by Ghazi Abu Hafra (128), a ga!id
newly risen to court prominence (129), This revolt was followed in
1712, by a mass expedition to Meknes on the part of Tawati notables,
eager to demonstrate their loyalty (130), In the same year, IsmaCil
cwas able to affirm his authority over the Dar a, and have its governor
executed (131), And, when Abu ^-Masir was killed in a localised
"Gjiblan" battle, also in 1712 (132), °Abd al-Malik, his °AlawI
successor in the Sus, made no attempt to bid for his predecessor*s
independent status* Indeed, in 1714, IsmaCil was able successfully 
c
to command Abd al-Malik to pay a filial visit to Meknes, and to 
bring with him his personal military following of C_abTd, for the 
re-inforcement of his father*s central military authority>(133).
(126) Busnot p. 127
(127) "Tur.iuman” p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf.
S.I. 2 Franee Vol. VI No LXXXVI Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 10/7/1712 pp.’ 494-5
(12B) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and Oufrane MS, quoted Martin pp. 79-80
(129) Busnot p. 133
(130) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 81
(131  ^ "Turjuman" p.J27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43 
 2---•— “
0 32) "Tur.iuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
• ' ' r
(133) Al—Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr* Bustinard p. 18
2.6Z
By this stage, IsmaCil®s imperial and paternal authority had a
military power basis that had seen changes since the close of the
sultanfs warrior years. The two major praps of the makhzan were still
the provincial quwwad and the standing guard* But the roles of both
quwwad and guard had undergone development and diversification*
Among the quwwad there were now individuals who were territorial
magnates upon a titanic scale# These men were most usually referred
to by the title of "basha", which was imprecise in its distinction
from qafid, but which apparently denoted a peculiarly sweeping degree
of political or military power* Two highly significant provincial
bearers of this title were firstly the Basha Ahmad of Tetuan, who
C C *”
in 1713 succeeded his father Ali ibn Abd Allah, as governor and
mu.jahid captain (134); and secondly, the Basha CAbd al-Karim, who
is known, by the same year, to have been IsmaCil*s governor in
Marrakesh (135)* The sphere of influence granted to °Ahmad ibn CAli
of Tetuan had, by Windus*s day, apparently engulfed the neighbouring
government of his kinsman Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami of Alcazarquivir,
and could be compared in area with the kingdom of Portugal (136)* 
c *"*Abd al-Karim was, from 1713 onwards, granted an even more extensive 
range for his “free hand": the whole of greater Sus, stretching 
southwards from Marrakesh to the "Qibla" (137)* Such men were locally 
paramount; local sultans* During Isma°il,s latter years, the Basha 
Ahmad was said never to appear in public with an escort of less than 
four to five hundred men (138), and to be as "absolute in his Province
(134) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LXXXVIII Ahmad ibn CAli ibn °Abd Allah 
to Pontchartrain , Tetuan, 28/Ramadan/l125 = 18/10/1713 pp. 512-517
(135) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Bustinard p. 18
(136) Windus p. 67
(137) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr* Bustinard loc. cit.
(138) de la Faye p. 91
as any Monarch whatsoever” (139)* Vet dutifully, if no longer necessarily 
annually, these greatest of all IsmaCilfs magnates made periodic visits 
to Meknes, accompanying the hadava which guaranteed welcome and re- 
confirmation in office (140), It is not surprising that such magnates 
preferred the overlordship of the militarily inert IsmaCil to 
government by any of his more martial sons. Their continued acknowledge- 
ment of Isma il himself was acceptance of an established, stabilising 
authority which, even though palace-based, possessed in its standing 
army a military deterrent to which there was now added a peculiar 
innovation.
By the second decade of the eighteenth century, IsmaCTl*s army
c **included a new and distinct force: this was the body of abid based
at the mahalla or imperial military camp that was set up in the
isolated spot of MashraC al-Raml, at the edge of the Mamora forest
region, near to Sale, According to a complex indigenous tradition
concerning Isma il*s abid. which will be examined hereafter (141),
the sultan maintained troops at Mashra0 al-Raml in increasing tens
of thousands. This indigenous tradition is questionable at many
points. But there is no doubt that the mahalla existed during Isma Il*s
latter years, and that it contained a notably sizeable body of men
(142), Tradition would retroject the establishment of the mahalla
*
into the first decade of Isma il!s reign. But the chronology of the 
camp*s establishment can reliably be pinned inside a much later time- 
span. The mahalla did not exist in 1698, when Dean-Baptiste Estelle
(139) Windus p* 24
(140) °Abd al-Karim of Marrakesh, during the five years he Is known to
have been^in office, went three times to greet the sultan in Meknes 
( al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed,/tr, Justinard pp, 18, 48 and 147)
(141) See JEjj|L1q2U& Part I Pp, 281—3
(142) Oohn Ryadon to Anthony Hatfield. Tetuan, 25/3/1728 N.S,, quoted by 
Braithwaite p, 329 cf, S,P, (71) 17 f, 162 Peter Butler to
consul Russell. Tetuan, 29/7/1728 (Both letters from Titwani merchants 
The latter source wildly computed the complement of the mahalla 
at "sixty thousand, half horse", "
stated that troops from Isma il,s standing army of wnoirstt ware all 
stationed within a day*s muster of Meknes (143)* Reliable references 
to the camp date only from 1714, for which a chronicle note recording 
the execution of four of the camp,s quwwad and seventeen of its °abid 
(144) is illuminated by al-Zarhuni*s note that, during that year, 
the sultan had accidentally been wounded at the camp, during a session 
of la°b al-barud (145)* The foundation of the mahalla must thus be 
set between 1698 and 1714* It is likely to have been an experiment 
of the sultan*s retirement from personal campaigning, following the 
shock of Djidioua, and may have been one aspect of an attempt by 
Isma0!! carefully to cultivate a new elite corps from amid the rag-bag
Q  mm
army of abid that he had gathered in the 1690s*
The isolation of such an elite seems to be associated with the
attachment to a proportion of Isma°!l,s Cabid of the sobriquet
"BwakhirM* Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft knew the slave troops of Mashra0 al
Rami as the Cabid al-Bukhari (146), thus giving these troops the name
by which all of the °Alaw! cab!d became later known* The sobriquet,
quasi-religious in its evocation of the “Sahih" of al-Bukhari, may
• • *
have been coined as a northern counter-blow to the overtones of Susi 
righteousness which invested the venture of Muhammad al-cAlim against 
his father* For it was unknown to contemporary seventeenth century
Q
commentators, and seems to date from the period of Muhammad al- Alim*s 
dissidence* Al-Zarhuni described Muhammad as hearing by letter that
(143) S«I. 28 France Vol* IV No* CXLIV Memo* of 3-B* Estelle* putatively
dating from the October of 1698 p* 692
(144) "Turiuman1* P*^? of the text and 51 of the translation cf*
“Bustan al-Zar!f...B MS p* 43
(145) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr* Bustinard pp* 47-8
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his father was sending a troop of "Bwakhir" against him (147)* And 
Busnot, following a Christian slave’s garbling of indigenous 
nomenclature, described the followers of Zaydan who took Muhammad 
prisoner as "noirs dB I’alcayd Ablebocari, qui sont comma les 
Dragons du Roi, et ses plus braves Soldats" (148)* However, the 
years of the war with Muhammad seem over—troublous to associate 
with the foundation of the camp at Mashra0 al-Raml, which involved 
the concentration of manpower in placid rural isolation# It seems 
most likely that Isma°ri first settled his chosen troops at the 
mahalla during the comparative political lull which followed 1708#
Isma il’s purpose in setting up this isolated military camp may 
wbII have beenythat of creating a gross military deterrent* For MashraC 
al-Raml constituted a static military reserve which counter-balanced 
the dynamic authority of great territorial magnates# And the "Bwakhir11 
were superficially impressive: in the eyes of al-Zarhuni, a rustic 
clerk, the cavaliers of Mashra al-Raml were "fine warriors" (149)*
Yet these warriors from Mashra al-Raml seem only rarely to have been 
actively deployed by their master* As well as a deterrent, they can be 
seen as the "toy soldiers" of the sultan’s dotage, flamboyantly trained 
but only parsimoniously doled out into the field. The deployment of
C h
abid in thousands, that had characterised the period between 1693 
and the fall of Muhammad al- Alim, was no longer the rule* Isma il’s 
last two decades saw territorial magnates and other haraka generals 
being allotted the services of cabid only in cautious hundreds# A 
consequent inexperience of real warfare may explain the poor showing
(147) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed#/tr. Bustinard p* 160
(148) Busnot p* 97
(149) Al-Zarhuni of Tas&ft ed#/tr* Bustinard p# 51
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Q
exhibited by the forces of Mashra al-Raml when they were first set 
into battle as a body, following IsmacTl*s death (150)*
C M  Q
Yet the abid of Mashra al-Raml may not have been simply an
m q m
unwieldy ornament to the makhzan * Isma il was renowned for his 
policy of keeping his dependents physically employed:
"♦••for, says he, if I have a Bag full of Ratts, unless 
I keep that bag stirring, they will eat thBir way 
through.” (151)
Windus, in 1721, was informed that the "large plain of Mamora",
among "many other parts of the country" was "sown by the Emperor's
Negroes to supply his Magazines" (152)* In the light of this
c
information, Mashra al-Raml, set within "fine champaign country"
(153), may be seen as an agricultural extension of the palace 
economy of Meknes, as well as a military base*
The years 1715-1717 were the height of Ismail's "St* Martin's 
summer"* During these years, the sultan can be seen as personally 
secure and aggressive at one remove, as he doled out detachments
CabTd to lieutenants who took the offensive* In the August of 1715, 
the siege of Melilla was briefly renewed, under the command of "Takar", 
qa'id of its hinterland. After the customary fashion of the .jihad* 
a "Batallon de Negros" was added to the qa'id's forces (154). During
Q mm mm mm
the same year, two generals, Abd al-Karim, Basha of Marrakesh, and 
al-Sharif, a dutifully filial full-brother to Muhammad al-cAlim, set 
out upon the two year haraka which was to threaten the Wadi Nafis
(150) S.P* 71 (17) f* 161 Peter Butler to consul Russell. Tetuan, 
29/7/1728 N.S. cf* Braithwaite p. 20,
(151) Windus p. 116
(152) ibid* p. B4
(153) Grey Jackson p* 14
(154) Marques de Olivart: "Relation del Sitio de la villa de MELILLA en 
Africa", being an edition of an anonymous eighteenth century MS, 
published in Madrid in 1909 (pp. 6-7).
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and Glawi regions of the High Atlas as well as the Sus, and which 
provides the dominant skein within al-Zarhuni1s wandering tale of 
“Chleuh** dissidence* In recognition of the magnitude of this 
proposed expedition, the commanders were granted the aid of a 
detachment from Mashra0 al-Raml; but allegedly this detachment 
numbered only around two hundred men (155). 1717 was a notable year 
for “beating the bounds*1. A new and forceful governor, Mahmud al- 
Ghanjawl, was sent to Tuat, to replace its resident qa’id of twenty- 
four years* service. He too had the assistance of a detachment of
Q mm —
abid in the conduct of an heavy-handed perambulation of the Tawati 
oases (156). Also in 1717, the governor of Gujda took an expedition 
through Snassen country that was sufficiently brutal to result in 
the despatch to MBknes of an hundred Snassen heads (157). This 
successful punishment of the Snassen may have led Isma0!! briefly 
to toy once again with the idea of “Chergi" expansion. It is known 
that, early in 1718, all communication between the Maghrib al-Aqsa 
and Algiers was once again forbidden (158)* This could have indicated 
more than a further attempt to prevent the economic assets of the 
region of Fes from dribbling eastwards. For it will be seen that 
the power of Algiers to threaten her western neighbour was on the 
wane*
M0M .
But Isma il’s empire was not to enter any new period of 
expansion* The flourish of success at the periphery of the sultan*s 
domains, which characterised the years 1715-1717, had a tenuous basis
(155) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr* 3ustinard p. 51
(156) Chronicle of “Sidi Bahaia* quoted Martin p. 82
(15?) “Bustan al-Zarif.*.w MS p. 43
1 ' ' "•
(158) S.P. 71 (16) f. 549 Memo, of Anthony HatfiBld. Tetuan, 24/5/1718
within the potentially breakaway regions of the south* Here, grimmer 
years for imperial authority would follow* A crucial turning point 
for Isme^il^ fortunes in the south of his empire came with the death 
of one man*
In the summer of 1718, cAfad al-Karim of Marrakesh died, upon 
Jharaka, near Demnat (159)* Allegedly "the Emperor***seemed so concerned 
that none durst speak further about it" (160)* The concern is 
understandable. Unlike the Hammami of Tetuan. this basha of Marrakesh 
had not been in a position of localised authority long enough for 
the establishment of a sub-dynasty* His death led to the collapse 
of the network of allegiance he had built up within "greater Sus": the 
evaporation of a political power "as if it had never existed" (161)*
Immediately, in 1718, Isme^il sent out to Marrakesh Ghazi Abu 
Hafra (162), an officer noted for his loyalty, and for his court 
proximity to the sultan (163)* The intervention of this officer did 
not prevent fission in the administration of the south, in developments 
which indicate that southern affairs were once more slipping beyond 
thB grasp of Meknes* The new basha never matched up to his political 
predecessor in Marrakesh* He made a bad start by failing to take 
control of Abd al-Karim*s armed following* The core of the forces who 
had been at Demnat fell to an Cabd general, the Basha Musahil (164).
Acting independently of Ghazi Abu Hafra, this general made for "inner 
Sus", apparently with the intention of taking command of the troops of that
(159) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo* of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718; 
and al-Zarhuni of Tasaft Bd*/tr* Bustinard p. 153
The chronology of the former is to be preferred to that of the latter, 
who gives a seasonally equivalent date for the previous year,
(160) S.P* 71 (16) f* 563 Memo* of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718
(161) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr. Bustinard p. 155
(162) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo, of Anthony Hatfield. Tetuan, 11/8/1718
(163) S.P. 71 (16) f* 539 Memo of Anthony Hatfield. Tetuan, 23/4/1718 
cf. Busnot p. 133
(164) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr* Bustinard p. 154
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region* There he uas forestalled by a third party, the galid of
C  (p
Tarudant, an ally and subordinate of the dead Abd al-Karim* This
M  C T*
pa1 id had foiled a local military coup by depriving abid stationed
in "Chleuh" country of arms, horses and even shoes* He kept these
troops in the south, and kept his own governorship independent (165)*
It may have been this southern crisis that drove Isma0!! back
upon an embittered Fes, with a new round of demands* In 1718, the
citizens received two open imperial letters* The first promised
remission of taxation, but the second uas an hectoring demand for
mass citizen military service (166)* Theoretically the demand uas
not extraordinary* The citizens were offered a choice between two
traditional patterns of military services enrolment as ever-ready,
tax-exempt iavsh troops, or conscription into na<iba service, which
was less onerous, but which made demands of the tax-payer (167)*
But this offer must be seen in the context of the long tussle over
the haratin fas* It aroused violent opposition that uas presumably • • — ——
based upon a widespread fear that, in practise, conscription 
would be carried out upon harsh terms* The leader of this opposition 
uas one Ualad al-SahrawI* whose nisba would seem to indicate that he9 i ,...... . ...
uas a man of oasean immigrant origin, and thus highly at risk in 
terms of the policy of impressment by way of the diwan al-haratin« 
as established in 1708* Al-Sahrawi uas put to death by the city 
governor, Abu CAli al-Rusi, for voicing the civic demand that there 
should be face-to-face negotiations with the sultan before any Fasi
(165) Al—Zarhuni of Tasaft ed*/tr« Justinard p* 154
(166) "Tur iuman" pp* 27-8 of the text and 51-2 of the translation cf* 
"Bustan al-Zarif***" PQS p* 43
(167) See Chapter II P. 110
took up arms on his behalf (168)• A period of disorder, studded with 
further murders, followed within the city; and there was a turnabout 
of city governors (169),
The central authority faltered* Isma°Il seems at this point to 
have been incapable of depatching harakat to the far reaches of his 
dominions* In Tuat, 1719 was a year noted for exemptions from taxation
(170)* And the hard governor, Mahmud al-GhanjawI, was replaced in Tuat, 
as makhzan representative, by a son of his predecessor Muhammad al-Safarj 
a governor so innocuously acceptable to the distant oaseans for it to 
be possible to send him out to his posting with an escort of only 
twenty horse (171)*
Wheedling as w b II as bullying entered into the sultan's attempts 
to gain Fasi co-operation* In 1720, IsmaCil issued a command for the 
total architectural restoration of the shrine of Idris the Younger, 
thB building that was the city's spiritual heart* He also arranged 
for the re-ordering of the shrine's Friday ritual (172)* But, in 
attempting to win the Fasi by adorning their city as al-Rashid had 
adorned it fifty years previously, Isma il was making a gesture that 
came too late, and was cancelled out by a punitive demand for a civic 
financial contribution (173) which indirectly forced the city itself 
to foot the bill for the restoration of its shrine* The demand provoked
(168) "Tur iuman” pp* 27-8 of the text and 52 of the translation cf*
"BustSn al-Zarif***” MS p* 43
' '
(169) “Tur iuman11 p* 28 of the text and 52 of the translation cf*
“Bustan al-Zarif***" MS loc* cit*
(170) Martin s documents noted p* 82
(171) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin loc, cit,
(172) "Nashr al-Mathanl***11 quoted al-Nasirls "Kitab al-Istiqsao**11 
Casablanca text Vol* VII p* 98 cf. Fumev translation A*M* Vol. IX
p* 134* ( This note is missing from the Fes lithograph edition of the 
"Nashr al-Mathanl*•*")
(173) "Tur.iuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf,
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p* 44
a new spur to emigration among the wealthier Fasi (174)*
Meanwhile, events within the south of Isma il*s empire proceeded
steadily in the sultan*s disfavour# Ghaz;i Abu Hafra, the basha of
Marrakesh, and Abu cAziz ibn Sadduq, governor of Tarudant, died
within two months of each other (175), most probably in the autumn
of 1720 (176)* In the aftermath of these deaths, inner Sus entered
its third period of dissidence under an cAlawi prince. The prince 
c
uas Abd al-Malik, who had recently been resident in Marrakesh, 
acting dutifully in tandem with the Basha Ghazi* The power vacuum 
induced by the. deaths of the two southern governors presented cAbd 
al-Malik with his opportunity* He shifted his base from Marrakesh 
to the strategically more sheltered Tarudant (177), where he is 
known to have been established, in command of an army, in 1721 (178)*
His move can probably be equated with the setting up of an independent 
military administration. Braithwaite recorded, for 1727, that "Muley 
AbdelmBlBck had for several Years past lived in a state of Independency, 
and...refused to pay his Father the customary Taxes11, being "then 
looked upon to be in a state of rebellion11 (179). The authority he 
built up within the Sus lacks the memory of cultural grace that is
(174) "wa khallat al-roadina. wa lam yubt^ ft ah ad min ahl al—vasar"
("And the city was stabbed to the heart. There did not remain there 
a single member of the prosperous class of its citizenry*")
("Tur.iuman" p. 28 of the text cf * 53 of the translation.)
(175) "Tur.iuman" loc. cit. cf* "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43
(176) The dates given within al-Zayyanl*© texts, as cited above, correspond 
with dates from the autumn of the following year, 1721. However, they
are associated here with information concerning mu.jahid events known from 
external sources to have taken place in the autumn of 1720. And, by the
time of the Stewart embassy of 1721, the "Basha Gauzi" was noted as
"deceased" (Windus p. 155)
(177) "Tur iuman" pp. 28 of the text and 53^4 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43
(178) Windus p. 94
(179) Braithwaite p. 2
associated with the government of Muhammad al-cAlim, and may be 
thought of as distinctively martiali for "Abdelmeleck" was, among 
Ismael's sons:
"...reckoned the best Soldier, but cruel in his Tamper 
and brutal in his actions, and...only esteemed by his
(180)
This third and final loss of the Sus marked the end of Isma0! ! ^
"St. (ylartin*s summer". The sultan was now in his seventies, and in 
his old age would seem to have learned a certain resignation. For 
he maintained diplomatic relations with Abd al-Malik (181), despite 
his loss of Susi revenue. But he would not risk his "Bwakhir" of
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Mashra al-Raml in a Susi war. To Marrakesh, he sent an abd 
general, Hammu ibn Tarifa (182) "who was remarkable for Stratagems"
(183), and might deter cAbd al-Malik from venturing within the 
Atlas arc* But, for his part, cAbd al-Malik made no move to cross 
the mountains. He was rumoured to be patiently awaiting a duel, at 
his father*s death, with his brother Ahmad al-Dhahabl (184).
Isma il's latter-day government suffered a northern disgrace 
which was contemporaneous with the southern amputation of the Sus.
In the autumn of 1720, the regenerated Spain of Felipe V and 
Alberoni injected an angry spasm of life into the calcified confrontation 
around Ceuta. Spanish troops, under the command of the Marques de Lede 
were sent massively to re-inforce the presidio. They made successful 
raids upon "the camp before Ceuta", and upon a fort along the route 
from Ceuta to Tangier. The mulahidun suffered notable losses in men
(180) Ulindus p. 94
(181) Braithwaite p. 2
(182) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 167
(183) Braithwaite p. 20
and in equipment, and the quarters of the Basha Ahmad himself were 
destroyed (185). For the Spaniards, the episode was a firB-cracker.
It failed permanently to raise the siege of Ceuta, whose stylised 
ritual was to be resumed during the years preceding the sultan*s 
death (186). But the attacfc uas of lasting significance for IsmaCil*s 
relations with Christendom. It drove the sultan into making a pact 
with a Christian power: an ironic coda to his pose as a patron of 
the Jihad.
Since the Moroccan embassy to London in 1700, there had been a 
series of intermittently bruised maritime truces between Morocco 
and Great Britain, But these had not involved the betrayal of the 
local religious ban upon the supply of provisions to the infidel (187).
Thus, in 1709, the request of an envoy of Queen Anne that British 
ships should be allowed to revictual in Moroccan ports had been 
refused (188). Subsequent peace negotiations, backing and filling between 
Gibraltar and Tetuan, had been dilatory for many years. A British 
mission to Meknes in 1718 had resulted only in the envoy's loss of 
temper (189), But the Spanish sortie of 1720 ended vacillation.
1721 saw the Stewart embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes. This embassy 
succeeded in drawing up a treaty allowing for complete freedom of trade
(185) "Tur iuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43 cf. C*0. 91 (1) Memo from Col. Kane 
C.-in-C. of the Gibraltar garrison, to Charles Delafave. 8/11/1720
(ff. 49-55)
(186) Braithwaite p. 10
(187) According to Braithwaite*s understanding: "The Law of Mahomet forbids 
the Exporting of Corn, which they strictly observe here, tho the 
Turks and Moors of Tunis. Tripoli and Aloier. dispense with it, for
the sake of the great Profit it brings them in..." (p. 342)
(188) S.I. 2s Franee Vol. VI No. LXXXIII Declaration of the former captive
Francois Filv. on board ship out of Sale, 20/11/1711 p. 485
(189) S.P. 71(16) ff, 571^3 Translation of a letter from Musa ibn Hattar. 
court 3ew, and Isma il's master of customs, to Admiral Bvno.
"the camp before Ceuta", 13/11/1718.
between Morocco and Britain, and for the duty-freB provisioning of 
British ships in Moroccan ports (190).
The disgraced mu 1 ahid. Ahmad of Tetuan, travelled to Meknes in 
company with the embassy party. He was accompanied by all sixteen 
of the kinsmen who held administrative posts within his sphere of 
influence (191). Despite his defeat in battle, and a previous three 
years of absence from Meknes, the basha was subjected to no more 
than a display of verbal violence, and a demand from the sultan 
for an increase in the size of his hadiva (192). However, while
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the pact with the Christians was being ratified, Isma il picked 
out thB basha*s favourite katib for exemplary execution (193). The 
charges were ideological: that the katib , when about his master*s 
business in Gibraltar, had indulged in riotous living in Christian 
company. This execution had a dual significance. As a ritual of 
displacement, it diverted attention and guilt from the agreement 
into which the sultan was currently entering, which set aside 
religious principle, in favour of diplomatic nostalgia for the old 
SaCdI alliance with England (194). More narrowly, the execution was 
an indirect and, it might be hoped, prophylactic punishment of the 
Basha Ahmad for his defeat at Spanish hands.
In the shadow of Ismacil*s recent loss of the Sus, the basha 
of Tetuan himself, as the sultanfs principal northern lieutenant, 
was personally indispensible and inviolate. He was swiftly restored
(190) Treaty of 7/8/1721, reproduced by Windus pp. 230-231 and 236
(191) Windus p. 81
(192) ibid. pp. 90-91 and 200
(193) ibid. pp. 156-8
(194) ”We are upon the same foot of friendship with your Majesty that your
ancestors were with our kinsmen the ShBrifs of Marocco, and Kings 
of the West in their times.** (S.P. 71 (16) f. 624 Translation of 
a letter from Isma il to George I. accompanying the peace treaty 
of 7/8/1721).
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to formal favour* In the spring of 1722, he was granted extensions 
to his government, and the additional "douceur" of an Alawi wife 
attended by forty slaves (195)* During Ismail's final years, the 
basha of Tetuan lived in high style (196), and to aliens epitomised 
active Moroccan government* In his gaudy and bellicose public state, 
as described by an eyewitness from the winter of 1724-5 (197), he 
now outshone his master* For by this date Isma il, who, even in 
his sixties, had been able to leap into the saddle (198), was 
physically become a Tithonuss he was brought into public audience 
in a small open carriage (199).
But it would be unwise to conclude from this physical 
decrepitude that Isma xl, during his last quinquennium, was become 
negligible* This little-known period is likely to have been 
characterised by the anticipation of political opportunity, as 
princes and magnates awaited the sultan's death* But, while he 
lived, the sultan remained the linchpin of government* He was 
not simply a figurehead* His heir-presumptive Ahmad al-DhahabX 
remained a political untouchable (200)*
During these last years, Isma il ruled a contracted domain 
which did not include the Sus* In the year 1724, it was a domain 
ravaged by famine (201), and by southern rebellion (202)* Yet there
(195) S.P. 71 (16) f* 635 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 13/5/1722
(196) UJindus pp* 7-25 passim
(197) de la Fave pp* 90-91 and 240-241
(198) Busnot p* 37
(199) de la Fave p* 150
(200) Consul HatfiBld, who had put forward a plea by way of Miknasi 
courtiers, recorded that he had "proposed to them to intrest 
Muley Hamet in it and do it by his hand and they say it is not 
feazable, for the Emperor would not take it from him, as too
much interposing in his government" (S*P* 71 (16) f* 652 Hatfield 
to Cartaret. Tetuan, 26/8/1722)
(201) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sabi ibn Danan ed*/tr. Va.ida Text no. XXVI 
from "Un recueil de textes***" in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXVI (Paris,
1 9 4 9 )  p p .  1 6 0 - 1 6 2
(202) S.P. 71 (17) f. 16 Hatfield to Newcastle. Tetuan, 18/5/1724
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uas no deliquescence of the central authority. Revenue was still 
clawed into Meknes by the sultan*s lieutenants# Ahmad of Tetuan 
continued to be a loyal visitor to the capital (203)# So did Hammu 
ibn Tarifa, the basha of Marrakesh (204), whose tax raids are known 
to have penetrated High Atlas reaches (205)* Revenue even came in 
from distant Tuat, funnelled to the capital by way of Tafilelt, 
where the °Alawi vice-roy Yusuf remained a loyal son to his father (206)# 
Further, the sultan retained his hold over major economic assets#
The empire*s only concentrated and large-scale armaments industry 
was attached to the MiknasI palace (207)# And the imperial FasI 
“estancar11 continued to flourish, and to infiltrate high governmental 
circles# A magnate as considerable as Hammu ibn Tarifa was willing, 
whan in Meknes, to run a debtroollecting errand for the favoured 
cAdayyil (208)#
In external affairs, the sultan enjoyed a latter-day piece of 
good fortune* Wilting Ottoman power enabled him to recover his 
balance in dealings with the Turks# Early in 1724 there was a Porte 
embassy to Meknes# Hatfield, the British consul in Tetuan was told 
that its aim was to request safe harbourage for any Ottoman vessels 
that might be driven back upon Moroccan ports during a proposed 
Ottoman expedition towards Malta (209)# Isma0!!, who had been 
obsequious towards the Ottoman embassy of 1697 (210), could afford to
(203) de la Fave p# 240
(204) ibid* p. 196
(205) Mzouda MS Bd#/tr# 3# Barque* and quoted in Moray: “Moulay Isma*il et
l*armee de metier” p# 105
(206) Letters from IsmajTl to Yusuf (7/Dhu *l-Qacda/l137 =18 /  7/1725) and
frotn Yusuf to Ismi^il (e/Rabi 11/1138 = 12/12/1725) quoted Martin
pp# 85-6
(207) Windus p# 105 and Braithwaite p# 196
(208) de la Fave p# 196
(209) S#P, 71 (17) f# 7 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret * Tetuan, 12/2/1723 0#S.
(210) See Chapter M Pp. 223-4
be off-hand in his dealings with this later envoy, whom he kept
waiting in Tetuan (211)* The closer Turkish authority in Algiers
seems no longer to have posed any threat to the Maghrib al-Aqsa,
either by sea or by land# By 1726 it had become customary for
Algerine vessels driven into Moroccan ports to be subjected to
fines (212)* Diplomatic protest from Algiers was doomed to failure*
For it could no longer be backed by the naval power deployed so
efficiently against IsmaCil in 1692; and the Algerines were loth to 
c «■
invade Alawi territory without the support of their fleet (213). 
This Algerine debility dissipated the shadow of Djidioua, Ismael's 
greatest military disgrace#
In the March of 1727, after a reign of fifty-five years, "The 
Old Emperor died of a Mortification in the lower part of his Belly, 
in extreme old Age11 (214)# His length of days invited an immediate 
maximisation of his achievements# Thus the contemporary "Chleuh" 
author, al-Zarhunl of Tasaft, was delighted to trace out the 
geographical limits to which, to the best of his knowledge, the 
suzerainty and coinage of this sultan of the "Gharb" had run (216)#
(211) S.P. 71 (17) f# 1 Hatfield to Cartaret. Tetuan, 25/1/1723 O.S.
(212) S*P. 71 (17) f# 68 Hatfield to Charles Delafave* Tetuan, 20/7/1726
(213) "The Algerines talk very bold, yet something reasonable, for
they say that their soldiery must be supported, and now that 
they have lost thBir marine force, they must seek to succour 
them by other methods" (S#P# 71 (17) ff# 68-9 Hatfield to
Delafave. Tetuan, 20/7/1726)
(214) Braithwaite pp* 5 and 4
(215) "II s'etandit jusqu'au pays du Sahara, au cote du Sud, jusqu'au
pays des Almoravides Lemtouna; at jusqu'aux Ghozlan et a leurs 
voisins Arabes de l'Oued Dra', et jusqu'au Touat et a Sijilmassa 
et jusqu'au pays de Figuig, dans l'est##.et jusqu*au pays de 
Bou Semghoun, au pays des dattes, a cinq Stapes duquel est la 
limit© ou 8a monnaie avait cours###"
(Al-Zarhunl of Tasaft ed#/tr* Justinard pp# 167-8)
It was convenient thus to maximise Isma il's government in terms 
of quantity rather than quality# Delineation of the major events of 
Ismail's reign has shown that "Gherg" and Sus, the spheres of the 
sultan's chief territorial ambitions, were also the spheres of his 
most notable ill-success* Further, this delineation has failed to 
show that Isma il was anything of a political strategist as distinct 
from tactician# His government had histrionic style rather than 
vision# He built a palace at Meknes, not a sophisticated state#
And he built up bodies of troops, rather than any "New Model Army"# 
But, in his dealings with Fes, he "tamed the shrew", tying an 
enervated city to his own economic advantage# And his long life
C M
established the Alawi as a dynasty# During the decades of strife 
that followed Isma il's death, only Isma il's sons were, in
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practise, eligible for tha position of sultan# And Isma il's line 
continued.
Consequently, much of the mythopoeia that came to work upon 
the life and timBs of this long-lived ruler was dynastic mythopoeia#
As such, it was tailored to suit the sensibilities of his dsscendents#
AN EPILOGUE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF ISMACIL'S REIGN
Many dubious traditions concerning Isma il's reign can be traced 
to the writings of al-Zayyani* It has been indicated, in the Prologue
c «•
to this work, that the early Alawi period is marginal to the main 
content of al-Zayyani's history (1)# The matter of al-Zayyanl's major 
historical texts is essentially a tale of turbulence followed by 
calm# It is hinged at 1757, the date of the accession of Sayyidi 
Muhammad III which, in the historian's eyes, marked the end of the
h Q w
political disorder consequent upon the death of Isma il, and the
Q M
inauguration of a new period of orderly government# Alawi history 
for the years before 1727 stands uneasily at the head of this matter, 
as introductory material# It is told comparatively briefly, and its 
skeleton of Fes-oriented chronicle material is hung about with a 
cluster of ill-assorted traditions#
Part I: The "Black Army" and "tamhidU
Two important and related traditions associated specifically with 
the reign of IsmaCIl concern, firstly, his fostering of an army of 
Cabid or black slaves, and, secondly, the pacification of his Bmpire: 
a tamhid supposedly underpinned by the construction of a network of 
forts which cabid were customarily set to garrison# Together, cabid 
and tamhid have been seen as aspects of a successful pattern of heavy- 
handed provincial government peculiar to the reign of Ismail (2)#
It has been customary to treat of "the black army" almost by 
analogy with "the buildings of MBknes", as a curiosity to be discussed 
in isolation from the political and military history of Ismail's reign#
(1) See Prologue Pp# 2% and 25-6
(2) For examples of this viewpoint, see Terrasse Vol# II pp* 256-7 and 258, 
and the recent article by Morey: "Moulav Isma'il et l'armee de metier"
This approach was determined by al-Zayyani, who was concerned only to 
tell a tale of Isma0! ! ^  recruitment of an °abid force as an 
entertainment and as a necessary precursor to his main matter* The 
author regarded the abid equivocally* He saw abid as the prime 
agents of disorder during the interregnum which followed Isma il's
0 a ,
death. More than once he explicitly compared Isma il's abid with
the Turkish slave troops of al-Mu°tasim ibn al-Rashid al-°Abbasi (3).
And he constructed a quaint criticism of Isma il's own internal use
of his abid forces: the wish that Isma il's fortresses had all been
ships which could have transported their slave garrisons across the
sea, to a glorious reconquest of Spain (4)« But al-Zayyani seems to
have realised that the cabXd of IsmacIl's day were a force bound up
with the good name of the dynasty, and that it was proper for him
to provide a counter-weight to his own chronicle notes upon the
disputes concerning the imperial right to the proprietorship of
°abid and haratin (5)* For he included within his texts a "received 
' • •
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version" of Isma il's acquisition of his slave army* Both the "Bustan 
al-Zarif...." and the "Tur iuman" contain a variation of this "received 
version" (6). In each case, the material falls into two parts. The 
first part outlines the gathering of a foundation corps of raw recruits;
(3) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 32-3 and 37
(4) "wa hadha *1- adad alladhi .lama a al-sultan isma il min al- abid
• c -
law khada fi '1-bahr li-*l-andalus wa tilka al-aal kanat marakib 
• c . •
bi-hawg al— asakir la-malaka bihi al-andalus kulliha."
("This being the number of black slaves which the sultan IsmacIl collected,
had he plunged across the sea to Spain, and had these forts been ships
for transporting his armies, certainly he would have conquered all of
Spain with it (the .number °F slaves).") ("Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 37)
V "
(5) See Chapter V Pp* 211-221 and Chapter Ml Pp* 257-259
(6) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp* 31-2 and 37 cf. "Tur .lumen" pp* 15-16
of the text and 29—31 of the translation*
the second part describes the training from childhood of the slave
army proper, the offspring of the foundation corps*
It was claimed that Isma il began his reign with an army composed
of free men (7)* However, when in Marrakesh, following its capture
from Ahmad ibn Muhriz in 1677, the sultan is said to have been « •
approached by a Murrakushi talib surnamed cAlIlish, whose father had
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been a katib in Sa di service* Alilish showed the sultan a register 
(daftar) of cabld who had formed part of al-Mansur*s army, and assured 
him that there were many such slaves still to be found within the 
city, and among the tribes of its surrounds* He was promptly charged 
with rounding up this remnant of al-Mansur*s following, for Ismacil,s 
benefit* Imperial letters were sent to regional auwwad requesting co­
operation* And the following year saw the gathering in of every aswad 
within the region (8)* The recruits were registered* If bachelors, they 
were provided with wives, bought slave-girls (ima*) or co-opted serf—
women (hartanivat)* They were then despatched to Meknes, provided 
• •
with arms, and grouped under commanders* Further companies were 
subsequently rounded up from other regions* governors of the major 
towns were ordered to buy up men and women slaves# and recruits were 
brought in from named provinces of the northern and central Maghrib 
al-Aqsa, according to the pattern set within the environs of Marrakesh* 
With two exceptions (9), each regional contingent was in turn sent off 
from Meknes to the rural camp of Mashra al-Raml near to Sale* There
(7) "wa kana vuktabu al-Caskar min al-ahrar" ("And the army was recruited
from amono free men”) ("BustIn al-iaiTf ***" MS p* 31)
(8) "*«*hatta lam vatruk bi-tilka .al-aabaHl kulliha aswad sawa* kana
*
mamluk aw hurr aswad aw hartani" (H***until he left not a single
• 1 i’ V "
black* slave, free or serf, within any of those tribes")
("Bustan al-ZarXf***" MS p. 32)
(9) "Bustan al-Zarif****11 version only* loc cit*
they were said to have been joined by an haratin force gathered by
• •
the sultan upon an expedition he supposedly made to Chinguetti in
1678 (10). According to the figures scattered through the version of
this material set out in the “Bustan al-Zarif...“. the number of
crecruits first sent to Mashra al-Raml totalled ten thousand,
including the haratXn. These, the majority, were set to build their 
•"1 •
own homes, till the earth and beget children (11 )• A minority, the
four thousand recruits from Tamesna and Dukkala, WBre said to have
been retained for immediate military service (12)•
The second section of the narrative concentrates upon the children
c
born in the mahalla at Mashra al-Raml. At the end of a ten-year 
interval, and thereafter annually, successive groups of these children 
are said to have been brought to Meknes for a six—year period of 
training which comprised, for the boys, three years at work on the 
palace buildings (khidma). followed by three years training in the 
use of arms and in horsemanship. Meanwhile, the girls were educated in 
domestic service. At the end of this period came formal mass-weddings 
and registration. There was then renewal of the cycle. The young
C M
abid were grouped in companies under older officers, and despatched 
straight back to Mashra0 al-Raml (13). According to the terms of the 
narrative, many must be supposed to have remained there* For, by the 
end of IsmaCil,s reign, when the number of registered °abid was said 
to have risen to 150,000, half this quota was allegedly stationed at the
(10) “Tur.iuman“ pp. 16-17 of the text and 31-2 of the translation cf. 
“Bustan a l - Z a r i f MS p. 32
(11) “Tur iuman” version, p. 16 of the text and 30 of the translation
(12) “Bustan a l - Z a r i f version, MS p. 32
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mahalla. Of the remainder, twenty-five thousand were in Waih cArus.j
the garrison suburb of Meknes; the others were distributed in forts 
throughout the country.
Al-Zayyani claimed to have taken his information upon Isma0! ! ^
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abid from two sources: a tarlkh or kunnash. attributed to a certain
“al-Hamidi“(l4); and a daftar which had been in the possession of the
katib Sulayman ibn cAbd al—Qadir al-Zarhuni (15). Nothing seems known
of al-Hamidi* In the "Kitab al-Istiasa*..“ his name does not appear,
beinq supplanted bv that of Ismail1 s wazir al-Yahmadi (16). This
' •
substitution should probably be dismissed as a late attempt further 
to authenticate the material* The “Bustan al—Zarif...“ does contain 
biographical notes on the katib al-Zarhuni. These state that he worked 
for thB administrations (dawlatayn) of both al-Rashid and of IsmaCXl, 
and that he died in Tarudant in 1138 A.H. /1725-6 A.D., in possession
m q m
of a roster of Isma il*s entire army, including those troops who 
were centrally based, and those who were dispersed among the forts 
(17). These details are open to question. The “Nashr al-Mathani...“ , 
an earlier work than thB “Bustan al-Zarif...11. contains an obituary 
notice for a katib Abu ^-Rabi0 Sulayman ibn °Abd al-Qadir al- 
Zarhuni, also said to have served both al-Rashid and IsmaCIl. This 
obituary notice is for the year 1098 A.H./1686-7 A.D. (18). As it
(14) ”tarikh“ : “Tur.iuman1* p*_16 of the text and 31 of the translation cf.
11 k u n n a s h “Bustan al-Zarif...“ MS p. 37
1 1 •
(15) “Bustan al-Zarif...*1 MS JLoc* cit.
• — —
(16) Al-Nasiri: “Kitab al-Istiasa...1*. Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 56 cf* 
Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 74
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(17) “wa kana indahu daftar al- asakir kullama *l-sawad al-a zam wafl-
o
mutafarriaun fl aal al-maghrib“
(V*.* and he possessed a register of all military forces, the majority in 
the central cantonment, and the detachments dispersed among the forts of 
the Maghrib11) “Bustan al-2arXf...“ MS loc. cit.
(18) “Nashr al-Mathani...“ ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV
pp. 385—6
is unlikely that there were two katiban of the same name who had served 
both °Alawi brother sultans, al-Zayyani*s attribution of late military 
source material to the katib al—Zarhuni is thus rendered highly suspect#
It is likely that al-Zayyani had two pieces of written material to hand, 
when he composed his matter upon the abid# But both sources arB best 
regarded as of unknown origin# They will be referred to hereafter as 
"al-Hamldi" and “pseudo al-Zarhunl".
The mass of al—Zayyani’s general information upon the gathering and 
training of cabld is likely to have been "al-Hamidl" material. But the 
daftar of the "pseudo al-Zarhuni" was specifically claimed as the source 
for certain statistics associated with this material (19). This daftar 
is likely also to have been the source for a separate skein of data 
within al-Zayyani*s texts: a series of notes purporting to record, in 
rounded hundreds or thousands, the military complement allotted to forts 
allegedly built in association with Ismacil,s programme of tamhid or 
rural pacification. The two bodies of information are linked by a common 
reference to the stocking of two forts at Adekhsan and Dila* with the 
four thousand CabTd from Dukkala and Tamesna (20). All this statistical 
information is opBn to query. Garrison figures of two thousand for 
individual rural forts such as Adekhsan and Dila* seem astonishingly 
inflated when compared with contemporary European notes upon the size 
of Moroccan garrisons. For around 1680, MouStte estimated the palace 
guard of Fas al-0adid at three hundred (21)• And in 1699, the °abid 
garrison of the citadel in New Sale, the present day "Casbah des QudaSas", 
and one of the country’s most notable fortresses, was said by a French 
naval reporter to number around two hundred, to the exclusion of its 
teeming women and children (22).
(19) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 37
• 1
(20) ibid. pp. 32 and 36
(21) MouStte: "Histoire. . p .  186
(22) S.I. 28 France Vol. V No. LXXX Study of Sale, addressed from 
de la Maisonfort to de Combes. Rouen, 28/12/1699 pp. 551-2
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Nor can credit be given to the dates al-Zayyani attached to the 
garrisoning of individual forts. The tales of Isma il*s pacification 
of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, to which these garrison notes are attached, 
will be shown to be highly dubious in themselves* And the garrison 
notes would appear arbitrarily to have been spliced with these tales, 
as part of a literary construction that was not carried out with 
overall care. For these notes clash with the chronology attributed 
to the "al-Hamidi" tale which concentrates upon the build-up of the
Q  M M
force at Mashra al-Raml. According to the "Bustan al-Zarif...1
version of this material, fifteen named forts were stocked with °abid
over the period 168Q-16B8 (23); and the implication covers other forts*
The most conservative calculation, based here upon the "Bustan al-Zarif..."
figures, suggests that the number of °abid thus detailed for garrison
duty approached ten thousand; and the text implies that, a far greater
number of men were actually involved. However, according to the "al-
Hamidi" chronology, the only recruits then available for garrison duty 
c ■—
were the abid of "Tamesna" and Dukkala, destined for two forts only.
For in "al-Hamidi" terms, the main force of °abld was still located 
placidly at the mahalla at MashraC al-Raml, from which the first 
recruitment of ten-year old children was allegedly made only in 1100 A.H./
Q mm
1688-9 A.D. In terms of this chronology, the first body of trained abid
could not have become operational until around 1694*
The schemata of "al-Hamidi" and of "pseudo al-Zarhunl" are both
questionable in the light of external evidence* The "pseudo al-Zarhuni"
cnotes concerning the numbers and deployment of abid all waver in the 
light of evidence that one such note is false* Al-Zayyani would date
C M
the building of Qasba Tadla, and its garrisoning with a thousand abid to 
1688 (24). But MouBtte*s "HistoirB.. p u b l i s h e d  in 1683, recorded the
(23) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 34, 35 and 36
(24) "Tur.iuman" p. 22 of the text and 41 of the translation.
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building of this fort, and its garrisoning with renegade troops, as
/
taking place in 1679, as an incidental to the return lap of the long 
haraka of the plague years (25),
Similarly, the more generalised "al-Hamidi" material upon the
C h
primal ingathering and training of abid is demonstrably weak* a 
medley of traditions in which the memory of genuine circumstances 
seems to hav/e been distorted and interwoven with decorous fiction*
wqm q w
The suggestion that Isma il*s abid were in any way inherited from —
Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sacdi is false* The obvious point that, in 1677, 
genuine survivors from al-Mansur*s period were likely to bB few and 
antique, is relatively unimportant* The major error lies in the 
suggestion that al-Mansur or his Sacdi successors had ever employed 
black slave troops in any quantity* The suggestion would seem to have 
been carelessly extrapolated from memories of the trans-Saharan 
expeditions of al-Mansurfs day* These had indeed led to the import 
of slaves* But the slaves would seem to have been seen as luxury 
commodities, rather than as potential military recruits* An account 
of the tribute caravan with which Dawdar Pasha, the "conquistador1* 
of Songhai, returned to Marrakesh in 1599, set at the end of its 
exotic catalogue;
"great quantitye of Banuches, duarfes and weomen and men 
slaves, besydes fifteen virgins, the Kinges daughters of 
Gago" (2fi)
The composition of al-Mansurfs army, at the end of his reign, is 
well known from both European and indigenous material* An English 
eyewitness who attempted to outline, for the benefit of Dames I, the 
opposition to be expected were he to undertake a "godly and christianlike"
(25) MouBtte: "Histoire*.*" pp, 124-5 
/ \ 1? 6(26) S,I* 1 Analeterre Vol. II No. XLIX Dasper Tomson. Barbary merchant,
to his brother Richard Tomson, Marrakesh,
24/6/1599 p. 146
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bid for the subjection of Morocco, listed among the paid imperial 
"Maganisies" (makhaziniva)i
"Of Ellches, being runnegades, the best solduares, 4000*
Of Andaloustes, being runnegade Moores ptijt of the mountains 
of Granado, 4000* Of Suagostes, that are Moores of the 
Mountaines, 1500* And of Turkes and others, to make up 
them above fortie thousand• ^ 7)
In ethnic range, this summary aligns with al-Ifrani*s version of al- 
FishtalT,s account of al-Mansur*s army on parade (28)* This describes 
an harlequin array, including the indigenous iuvush al-sus , the 
shoraoa or "easterners11, the renegades, the Andalusians and the 
Turks* There is no mention hBre of any force of black troops* And in 
such a context, an example of a literary theme delighting in variety
(29), it is difficult to believe that any major force could have 
been overlooked*
Al-Mansur may have had black slaves close to his person. There
survives a trace-referenca to one Mas°ud ibn Mubarak, the "sahib al* .
saaif" or "master of the personal guard", uhom al-Mansur once designated 
to be commander of the Murrakushi citadel in the eventuality of plague
(30). He was described as a "uasif" (31), and his name is redolent of
■ •
Islamic black slavery* But the saaif he commanded is likely to have 
been a small personal bodyguard (32)* It did not develop into a larger
(27) S.I. 1re Analeterre l/ol* II No. LXXXIII Henry Roberts. Barbary
merchant, to James I. Marrakesh N*D* pp* 224-5
(28) "Nuzhat al-Hadl***" ed*/tr* Houdas pp. 115-118 of the text and
* 195-201 of the translation
(29) See, for examplB, the account of the polychrome Fatimid army of the 
mid eleventh century, on parade at the ceremony of the opening of the 
Nile sluices, as described by the Persian traveller Nasir-i Khusraus 
quoted R* Levy, in "The Social Structure of Islam" (London, 1957)
pp. 445-6
(30) “Nuzhat al-Hadi..." ed,/tr. Houdas p* 184 of the text and 298 of the
* translation
(31) The term uasif may indicate close personal association uith a master. 
Sources for the period frequently note a uasif individually, by his 
personal name, and in the execution of a particular duty*
(32) Dozy*s "Supplement..." (Vol. I p. 663) defines "saqlf" as an intimate 
guard, in derivation from its original sense of "portico"*
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G VSa di Hblack army11* Europeans dominated the forces associated with
Q mm
the rump of the Sa di state* An anonymous English eyewitness of the 
late 1630s described the Murrakushi sultan*s "magazeene" as a 
"pretorian band, not unlike they Oanizaries of the Grand Seignior", 
that was disciplined by "elshes", renegades whose commander was a 
Frenchman (33)*
On the other hand, it has been seen that Cabid were with the 
cAlawI from the outset* The "al-Hamidi" material is incorrect in
* W 0 M
suggesting that Isma il began his reign with a military backing limited 
to free men* Besides his own renegades, he had a black slave force 
inherited from his brother al-Rashid, and led by the commander 
"Bousta" (34)* Even during the first decade of IsmaCil*s reign,
MouBtte could insist upon the military prominence of the sultan*s 
black guards:
"♦•♦ses meilleurs soldats***qui combattent toujours proche 
de sa personne avec des armes a feu; ceux qui rendent de 
meilleurs combats obtiennent les principales charges de 
l*armee ou la gouvernement de quelque place."
But this author gave no evidence that the force of "Noirs" had been
dramatically enlarged during his period of residence within Morocco*
His "Histoire*.*" is devoid of any reference to a country-wide round-up
of negro slaves following Isma il*s 1677 capture of Marrakesh, or to
cthe establishment of an experimental mahalla at Mashra al-Raml*
”
Indeed, MouHtte’s detailed record of the sultan*s activities during 
the plague years 1678-80, has been SBen to point up Isma il*s pre­
occupation widsh self-preservation. Here MouBtte is borne out by 
material from the "al-Fasi" chronicle* Both sources suggest that, amid
(33) S.I* 1re Vol. Ill No. XCIII Anon. Leconfield MS No. 73 pp. 466-7
(34) See Chapter II Pp* 213-214
(35) MouBtte; "Histoire***" p« 176
the havoc of the plague, neither the administration nor the society of 
the flaghrib al-Aqsa was in any fit state for the elaborate experiment 
in social surgery that a widespread levy of slaves would have involved*
It has been seen that Isma il's employment of abid during this crisis 
was not experimental but brutally pragmatic; that they were posted 
with orders to slaughter travellers on the routes leading into Sals 
from the pestilence-ridden north (36)*
The obvious foundation for the first part of the "al-Hamidi11 
material is quite distinct: a memory of the wide-ranging but rough-
0  M
handed quest for new abid recruits that was thrust into operation 
during the mid-1690s, in the aftermath of the disastrous Algerine 
invasion of 1692 (37)* This was the period for which a southern clerk 
named cAlilish was a known governmental figure (38).
G •"
The quest for abid had required jurist justification in the 1690s*
And governmental white-washing of the affair continued* Thus, de Chenier 
was told, in the mid eighteenth century, that Isma il had, chiefly by 
gift or purchase, collected an army of slaves who were sun-worshippers
whom he converted to Islam, and set beneath the auspices of al-Bukhari
(39)* Al-Zayyani's "al-Hamidi" material constitutes a variation in 
cAlawi governmental justification of the great quest* It is comparatively 
robust, acknowledging the rounding up of free negroes and negresses (40)
(36) See Chapter III Pp. 117-118
(37) SBe Chapter V Pp. 193-19?
(38) "Lettres Inedites.».“ No* 6 Ismacil to Muhammad ibn °Abd al-Qadir
al-Fasi. 28/Dhu *l-QaCda/l104 =c31/7/1693, includes the name of 
11 our servant (khadlmna) Muhammad Alllish" p« 45*
The southern origin of this clerk is vouched for by later, embittered 
references to the man, as a Murrakushi "Quisling”, in the text of 
al-Zarhunx of Tasaft ed*/tr* Justinard pp. 16-17 and 149
(39) L-S* de Chenier English translation of 1788 Vol. II pp* 188-190*
(40) ”fa 1ama°u kull ma wafadu hatta lam vub^o. aswad bi 'l-maohrib fT
hadira wa la badiva. wa law kana hurr aswad aw hurra sawda1”
• * * •
("And they gathered in every one they found until there was not a single
black remaining in the city or countryside of the Maghrib* There was not
even a free negro or a free negress”) "Tur Iuman” p. 15 of the text cf*
29 of the translation.
into an imperial service that was de facto slavery* But al-Zayyani,
who was himself associated with the training of pressed recruits in
the days of Muhammad III (41), is unlikely to have been abashed at
the material he was using* In the mid nineteenth century, his material
would be refined further by the scandalised Akansus, who worked out a
loyal and logic-chopping defence of the sultan Isma0!!. This defence
ended with an admission of the facts of co-option, but nevertheless
stressed that the makhzan had kept within the bounds of the law* The
defence was based partly upon silence; the silence of the moral voice
of the shavkh al-Yusi, the most renowned literary sage of Ismacil*s
day. But Akansus claimed also that he had personally examined the
military records of Isma il*s day, and could vouch for the existence
of different categories of '’personnel*' within the muster-rolls of the
°abid forces: those in a state of slavery ("raQaiva”). those in the
free state ("hurriva”). and ‘'those in the middle category” ("wasita 
• •
bavnahuma”)* On the basis of the "al-Hamidi" material, he accounted for 
these distinctions with the suggestion that the "slaves of al-Mansur”, 
although gathered together after scrupulous investigations as to their 
identity, had yet been recognised as a group distinct from those bought 
on the open market for cash; and that consequently, any argument 
concerning the legitimacy of the sultan*s actions should turn upon the 
impressment of free men into the army, rather than upon their enslavement, 
to which, strictly, the sultan had never pretended*
It has been suggested that there were possibly recognised distinctions
t t Q   Q
between men from Isma il*s primal and palace educated guard of abid.
(41) "Tur iuman" pp* 85-6 of the text and 157 of the translation
(42) Akansus quoted al-Nasiris "Kitab al-Istiasa***”. Casablanca text, 
Vol. VII pp. 88-9 cf. Fumev translation aTm . Vol* IX pp* 120-121
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and the men taken, under various circumstances, into the swollen army
of the 1690s (43): that cabid who had been trained as court pages ranked
higher than pressed adults* The "al-Hamidi" material would disguise
such a distinction by suggesting that thB majority of the first,
cpressed generation of abid was never militarily employed, and that 
the creation of a corps of court pages, and of a standing guard in 
Meknes, were clean and secondary developments within Isma0! ! ^  military 
policy* But there was no such two-tier development* In MouStte*s day, 
the sultan*s "Noirs" already fulfilled all the standard military
C *■ C M
roles of Alawi service* There were abid in the standing guard* There 
was a corps of adolescent black pages* And there were negro troops set 
to garrison forts "hors la veue de leur maistre" (44)*
Other details from the "al-Hamidi" material have piecemeal external 
corroboration, suggesting that many aspects of IsmaCilfs deployment and 
training of abid were standard* Throughout Isma il*s reign, the sultanfs 
conduct of mass-weddings on behalf of his military slaves was a topic 
for the prurient delight of alien commentators, especially as it 
frequently entailed compulsory miscegenation for renegade soldiers (45)* 
This was a matter of common policy, with a view to breeding new 
generations of imperial troops* It had no necessary connection with
Q
Mashra al-Raml, which no known contemporary commentator mentions in 
such a context* Similarly, it seems to have been customary throughout 
Isma0! ! ^  reign for the sultan casually to turn his Cabid on to the 
palace building site as masons* Mouette commented that*
(43) See Chapter 1/ Pp. 197-199
(44) MouStte: "Histoire*. p* 176
(45) See, for example, Pidou de St* Olon tr* Motteux p* 128 cf*
"Ocklev" pp. 80-81 cf. Windus p. 138
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"Les travaux et les ateliers en sont remplis, et on les y 
voit charges de fers et de blessures."
These periods of khidma would seem to have been entirely arbitrary* 
According to Windus, the page-boys who had been toiling one day 
with "Earth, Stones or Wood" might the next day appear "gay and under 
Arms" (47)* The suggestion within tha Wal-Hamldl" material that the 
three years of formalised building labour constituted some rugged 
aspect of military training, seems to have been put forward as a 
pathetic attempt to align Isma0! ! ^  force of cabid with those major 
Islamic armies whose recruits had been selected in youth for a period 
of orderly instruction* However, comparison with the education of the
embryonic Almohade "hafiz11 (48), the embryonic Egyptian "mamluk" (49)*
r*—'- •
or the embryonic Ottoman janissary (50),all of whom were educated in 
religion and polite literature as well as the arts of war, serves
only to underline the rough nature of the handling with which the 
c ■■
young abid were "broken in"*
The °abld were undoubtedly held in great indigenous regard 
during IsmacIl*s own day* The sight of the sultan at the head of his 
ten thousand blacks was held out in promise to the embassy party of 
Pidou de St* Qlon, as a finer panoply than France could offer (51)*
But it has been seen that cabld were no match for Turkish-trained 
troops either at al-Mashari° or at Djidioua* And, internally, the 
significance of °abid to the maintenance of Miknasi authority must be
(46) MouBtte: "Histoire***" p. 176
(47) Windus p. 141
(48) Anon: "Al-hulal al-mawshiva***11 tr* Huici# Quoted 3*F*P* Hopkins: 
"Mediaeval Muslim Government in Barbarv" (London, 1958) p* 1Q7
(49) al-Maqrizi: "Khitat***" Vol. II (Cairo, 1906) p* 213, quoted 
R* Levy: "The Social Structure of Islam" p« 450
(50) H* Dernschuam: "Taoebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und 
Kleinaslen" ed* F* Babinger (Munich and Leipsig, 1923) p* 60
(51) S*I* 2s France Vol. IV No# XIII Memo, of 3-B* Estelle* Tetuan,
Ti7B/1693 p.74
evaluated within a wide and evolving general context. There was no 
necessary correlation between the effective might of the central 
power, and the number of °abxd in the sultan’s °askar or standing 
army* It has bBen seen that the sultan Isma il’s years of escalating 
internal authority were the years preceding 1690: years during which
Q m
the imperial corps of abid was compact by comparison with the swollen 
horde gathered in by the great military quest of the mid-1690s*
Isma°il could not take the loyalty of this enlarged °abid army for 
granted* During the war between Muhammad al-cAlim and Zaydan, and its
C "■
aftermath, imperial abid showed themselves as capable of following
a sultan’s son as of following the sultan himself (54)* It was within
this early eighteenth century political context that the mahalla of 
c
Mashra al-Raml came into being* The creation of this mahalla was not,
as the "al-yamidi" material would suggest, a foundation stone to the
creation of a centralised cAlawi standing guard* It was its coping-
stone: a latter-day experiment by which the sultan Isma°il built up
a massive reserve force which counter-balanced the active power of
his sons and magnates (55)* Among the forces which these sons and
magnates could command werB, as during decades past, their own
miniature forces of personal °ab?d (56) a
A set focus upon the massed troops of Mashra0 al-Raml and Meknes,
such as characterises the "al-Hamidi11 material, is ill-assorted• 7
*"*CMwith the view that the key to Isma il’s mastery of his empire was 
the scattered deployment of his cabld* Yet this view, set alongside 
the "al-Hamidi" material^ is also traceable to al-Zayyani, within whose 
stylised schema of Isma^^s reign the sultan’s "tamhid". or "setting
Busnot Chapters III and IV passim (*)
(55) See Chapter VI P. 3
(56) S*I* 2e France Vol* IV No* XIII Memo* of 3-B. Estelle* Tetuan 
11/8/1693 p* 84 cf* Busnot p* 69 cf* Hindus pp* 189-90
(*-) An error in transcription resulted in (52) and (53) being omitted 
from the numerical series of footnotes*
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in order” of his kingdoms is recounted as having been completed after 
twenty-four years of energetic campaigning (57)* The associated tactics 
were summed up in the assertion that Isma il had built forts at all the 
way-stations and garrisoned them with CabXd (58)* Bold claims have 
been made for the consequences of these tacticsi that the forts and 
garrisons were a mechanism for the elimination of a "bilad al-slba” 
or ”country of dissidence” (59), a concept alien to the vocabulary of 
indigenous authors of the period*
It is true that, stylistically, al-Zayyani built up the concept of 
"tamhid” as a goal which Isma0!! achieved, as distinct from an incidental 
chore of military government* Each of the author’s major historical texts 
contains five related passages (60) which provide a bloc of evidence 
upon Isma ilfs pacification of his kingdoms* They are set within the 
narrative of the period 1680-1692, and describe punitive expeditions 
undertaken against rural groupings* Dudged in isolation, these episodes 
would read unramarkably, as evidence of a fairly commonplace bludgeoning 
of countryfolk* Yet within the context of the short account of
(57) "Tur iuman” p* 25 of the text and 46 of the translation*
(58) ”***• tamahhada mulk al-maohrib watl-sus wa’l-sahra1 al-sultan
ismacIl* wa bana iami0 aalcihl bi ’l-manazil kulliha* wa
m * Q
shahanaha bi abidihi*”
, * -C-
("*®*the sultan Isma il set the kingdoms of the Maghrib and the Sus and 
the desert to order* And he built the sum total of his forts at every 
one of its^way-stations* And he stacked them with his black slave troops,11) 
("Tur.iuman" p* 23 of the text cf* 43 of the translation)
(59) The concept of the "bilad al-sXba". or territory beyond effective 
government, is built into the French historiography of Morocco* But
it has almost universally been waived for the latter^ort of Isma il*s 
reign* Terrasse considered it controversial to credit Isma il with the 
abolition of "offensive dissidence" only ( op* cit* Vbl* II p* 264)* More 
recent work, including "A history of the Maghrib” by 3* M* Abun-Nasr 
(London, 1971) p* 231, has returned to the old theme of rigour and sweeping 
success* And Magali Morsy in her "Moulay Ismael et 1 ’armBe de metier” 
concluded that the sultan’s deployment of abid throughout the Maghrib al- 
Aqsa, in an "infrastructure politico-militaire", effectively abolished siba*
(6°) "Turiuman” pp* 18-19, 20, 20-21, 21-22 and 23-25 of the text cf*
34-35, 37-38, 38-39, 41-42 and 43-46 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-2arTf***” MS pp* 34, 35, 36 and 40-41
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Isma il*s reign, the space and detail allotted to these five
expeditions has implied that they were of peculiar significance to
the sultan in themselves, and even that they marked stages in a
systematic policy of disarming the entire rural populace#
The first of these episodes waa a campaign into the "Cherg",
allegedly undertaken by the sultan as a measure for the support of 
c
those Wa qil groupings whom he had ordered to migrate thither from 
the Hawz of Marrakesh (61 )* The four remaining episodes were 
expeditions which allegedly led to the sultan^ mastery of various 
Beraber groupings from the Central Atlas region# Certain motifs 
are common to all five episodes: the punishment of hill-folk by the 
confiscation of their arms and horses, and, as noted previously, 
the building and garrisoning of forts#
The episodes are related in an increasingly discursive manner, 
and given increasing moment# Their culmination was the final Central 
Atlas campaign, dated to 1104 A#H#/1692 A#D# The tale of this 
expedition is sonorous, and related with a wealth of military, 
geographical and anecdotal detail which gives to the campaign the 
appearance of a major politico-military undertaking. Isma3!! was 
said, erroneously, to have prefaced the expedition by appointing three 
sons as vice-roys in Fes Marrakesh and Meknes (62)# Thereafter he supposedly 
led a great and hpavily armed haraka towards the Central Atlas# With 
him there was allegedly a bevy of commanders including, with some 
chronological improbability, the Basha Musahil, a noted Cabd general 
of the last decade of his reign (63). The haraka was said successfully
(61) See Chapter II P. 106
(62) The three sons* names were attached to appropriate vice-regalities#
But Muhriz had been appointed vice-roy of Fes in 1678, Ma*mun 
vice-roy of Marrakesh in 1677, and Zaydan vice-roy of Meknes in
1685 ( MouBtte: “Histoire###11 pp# 108 and 112 and Chapter III P# 140
Note (101))
(63) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr# 3ustinard pp# 153-4 cf#
Braithwaite p# 7 and passim
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to have penetrated high mountain defiles* The vaunted consequence 
was defeat for a triple dissident confederation from the "Babal 
Fazzaz", and the lateral crushing of a fourth grouping, the Garwan, 
at the hands of loyalist Beraber. In trophy, the makhzan forces 
were said to have won ten thousand guns, thirty thousand horses 
and innumerable heads (64)*
This tale of measured brutality has a particular stylistic 
significance which goes beyond its narration as a major military 
undertaking* It would seem to have been written up, most notably 
within the trBustan al-Zarif**.11* as a literary "set-piece", central 
to al-Zayyani*s account of IsmaCIl*s reign* And it was explicitly 
elevated to climacteric status, dividing the sultan*s years of 
energetic campaigning from his years of relaxation (65)* The 
implication of triumph was hammered home by the trenchant assertion 
that, after 1692, weapons and horses remained in the possession of 
only four groupings within Ismacil*s empires the A.yt Yimmus?, loyalist 
Beraber set to guard the "Fazzaz"; the ahl al-rif. designated 
mu iahidun; the °abid; and the Udaya (66)*
The entire body of material to do with pacificatory campaigning
seems to have fused several of al-Zayyani*s more dubious sources of
informations court tradition; the notes of “pseudo al-Zarhuni" upon 
the garrisoning of rural forts; and the folk-memory of the "3abal Fazzaz"^
(64) "TurIuman" pp* 23-25 of the text and 43-45 of the translation cf* 
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS pp* 40-41* A close reproduction_of the 
latter version of this tale is to be found within al-Nasiri*s "Kitab 
al-Istigsa** * ", Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp,79—81 and 86-7 cf* Fumev 
translation A*M* Vol. IX pp 105-9 and 119
(65) The "Bustan al-Zarif***" version of the tale concludes thus;
"wa bi ^-istlla1 calavhim kamala lihi fath al-maohrib* wa lam vubcyx
bihi man vanbidu lihi °iro*lt
("And with their conquest his triumph over the Maghrib was brought to 
fulfilment* There remained within the region no race that strove against 
him*") "Bustan al-Zarif*** MS p* 41
) "Tur iumajn" p* 24 of the text and 46 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS loc* cit*
the Central Atlas region of the author*s ancestry. The result has 
been firstly to suggest that the Central Atlas was of particular 
significance to Isma il; secondly to imply that it was internal 
v/ictory rather than external defeat which brought about the sultan's 
switch from campaigning to palace retirement; and thirdly to insist 
that rural pacification and the disarmament of rural peoples were 
viable goals to whose consummation a date could be set.
The association of four out of the five of the recorded campaigns 
with the Central Atlas is likely to reflect simply the personal 
interest of the author in memories of campaigning carried out within 
the region associated with his own language group. The Central Atlas 
can have had little intrinsic attraction far the makhzan. As a region 
of transhumant pastoralism (67) it is likely to have been sparsely 
populated by comparison with territory such as the inner Sus valley, 
where intensive agriculture prevailed. The northern fringes of the 
Middle Atlas were important to the cities of SaSs, as a near and vital 
source of timber (68); but this trade seems not to have involved the 
more southerly "Fazzaz"# For a sultan based within Sals, the greatest 
significance of the Central Atlas is likely to have been strategic.
Its northern sector contains the upland way from Sals to Tafilelt; 
and the "Jabal Fazzaz" overlooks the direct route from Sals to 
Marrakesh, passing by way of the Tadla. Both routBways were particularly 
danger-prone. For they cut across the lines of transhumance along which
(67) Studies of Central Atlas transhumance include the pre-Protectorate 
essay of W.B* Harris: "The nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco": and
the twentieth century articles by 3. Celerier: "La transhumance dans le 
Moyen Atlas" in "Hespgris" Vol. VII (Paris, 1927) pp. 53-76 #and 
"L'economie montagnarde dans le Moyen Atlas" in "Rb v u b  de geoqraphie 
marocaine" Vol. I Jan. 1939 (pp. 58-67). (Paris)
Many of al-Zayyani*s campaign stories, and in particular an account 
from Muhammad 111*3 day, in which the author displayed his knowledge of 
local movements in the "Fazzaz" region, suggest the long establishment 
within the southern Central Atlas, of a transhumant cycle to rural 
behaviour (See, in particular, the "Turiuman" pp. 79-80 of the text and 
145-6 of the translation cf* "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 109-111)
(68) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 56 cf* MouBttB: "Histoire. . p .  190
groupings of herdsmen would move back and forth, from altitude to 
altitude according to the season.
There seems no need to assumB that any specific ethnically-based 
hostility lay at the root of attacks made against Beraber grpupings 
(69), or that the series of Central Atlas campaigns was major and 
comprehensive, as distinct from minor and typical* Under close 
examination, much of al-Zayyani's pacificatory campaign material 
withers* The skein of notes pertaining to forts supposedly built 
in conjunction with these campaigns has already been suggested to 
be “pseudo al-Zarhuni" material, and unreliable* Further, it seems 
suspicious that no single one of the five pacificatory campaigns 
has any firm place within the "al-Fasi" chronicle material as 
reproduced within later texts* Al-Nasiri attempted neatly to align 
the preliminary campaign into Snassen and Angad country with a well-
(69) The theory that the pacification of the peoples of the Central Atlas 
region was one of Isma Il*s military^priorities has, by way of a 
straightforward reading of al-Zayyani, become an established theme 
within French writing upon his period* The most developed expression 
of this theory is that set out by F. de la Chapelle in his article 
"Le Sultan Moulay Xsma*il et les Berberes Sanhaja du Maroc Central" 
(A*H* Vol. XXVIII Paris, 1931)* This sets the Central Atlas campaigns 
of Isma Il*s reign within a highly questionable historical framework, 
derived in its current form from G* Ma^ais ("Les Arabes en Berberie du 
XI au XIV siecle". Constantihe and Paris, 1914)* This framework 
delineated an age-old pattern of conflict between grand, ill-knit, yet 
ethnically identifiable conglomerations of peoples, acting out their 
racial destiny within the Maghrib upon a vast historical and geographical 
scale* According to this schema, there was an ethnically based enmity 
between the Beraber^of the^Central Atlas, part of the wider "Sanhaja" 
grouping, and Isma il, a Filali sharif of quintessentially Arab stock*
Their tussle could be interpreted as one episode in the struggle between 
the Sanhaja and a series of ethnic rivals for control of the Western 
Maghrib (See also F. de la Chapelie*s "Esauisse de ^Histoire du Sahara 
Occidental" in "Hesoeris" Vol* XI Paris, 1930 p£g_35-95)
This viewpoint ignores the evidence that Isma II and all his successors 
had the support of certain Beraber groupings* Its development seems 
attributable in part to the interpretation in seventeenth century terms of 
certain factors important at the time of the establishment of the 
Protectorate* the weakness of the sultanfs forces in the face of the Zimmur, 
a people claiming Beraber origin, who had come to dominate the routeway 
linking Sals with Rabat; and the difficulties encountered by Lyautey's 
troops in subduing the peoples of the Central Atlas itself. (See, for 
the situation in 1903, R* Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain**." p* 295; and, 
for the difficulties faced by the Protectorate troops, A* Guillaume:
"Les Berberes marocaines et la pacification de iMtlas Central 1912-1933" 
(Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) Passim
known expedition into the further "Cherg" (70). But the identification 
is far from obvious, as the details of the two "Chergi" campaigns 
are vastly different* As for the dates allotted to the four Central 
Atlas campaigns, these are best explained in terms of tortuous 
interpolation into an overall framework of "al-Fasi" annal material.
For al-Zayyani seems here to have attempted to knit together, as 
strands of equal weight, two conflicting series of annals, the one 
metropolitan and the other regional* It is possible that the latter 
series was a record kept within al-Zayyani1s family* As an appendix 
to an account dated to 1688, the author included the note that a 
forefather of his had been co-opted into the sultan*s train (71).
Comparison of the Hegiran dating of the Central Atlas campaigns 
with its Gregorian equivalent, points up weaknesses within the 
"regional" strand to al—Zayyani*s chronology which would not have 
been immediately apparent to a Muslim historian writing years after 
the event. Thus, after recording Isma il*s return to Meknes in 1683, 
following his first Susi campaign against Ahmad ibn Muhriz, al- 
ZayyanPs narrative improbably suggests that, almost immediately, 
the sultan sst out for the Middle Atlas, with the aim of subjecting 
a Beraber grouping, the Idrasin* As thB return from the Sus was 
dated, within FasX material, to Dhu *1-Qacda 1094 (72), the author, 
who apparently wished to have both events stand in the same year, 
was forced to set the beginning of the Idrasin campaign into Dhu *1-
(70) See Chapter III JPp* 127-8 as compared with al-Na§irI in the 
"Kitab al-Istiasa**.". Casablanca text Vol. VII pp* 62-3 cf*
Fumev translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 82-3. Here the author aligns a
campaign account taken from the "Bustan al-Zarif..." (MS p. 34) 
with a date taken from the "Nashr al-Mathani..." (See the French 
Bdition of Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338)
(71) "Bustan al-Zarif..*" MS p. 36
(72) "..Nashr al-Mathani.♦*11 Volume cited above p. 357 cf.
"Tur.Iuman" p. 20 of the text and 37 of the translation.
Hijja 1094* This month, which covered late November to late December 
1683T, was at an unlikely point in the seasonal year for the opening 
of a campaign against hill-folk# And the dating is clearly belied by 
the narrative of the Idrasin campaign itself# This describes an 
expedition begun in summer and maintained until winter by the 
blockading of the Idrasin within high pasture country until famine and 
the decimation of their herds forced them to descend and sue for 
peacB (73)#
A similar problem besets the narrative of the second Central 
Atlas campaign, dated by al-Zayyanl to 1096 A#H#/1685 A#D# The sultan 
is described as, on this occasion having spent almost a year by the 
upper Moulouya, supervising fort-building and blockading peoples of 
the north-eastern Atlas into submission (74)# Yet the English slave 
Phelps recorded that on January 1st* 1685, Isma0!! set out for the 
Sus (75) where, even upon al—Zayyanl*s own reckoning, he must have 
been situated in the following autumn# For he is known to have 
been outside Tarudant when Ahmad ibn Muhriz was found murdered (76).
When grooming his "set-piece” upon the grand final campaign into 
the n3abal Fazzaz”, al-Zayyani seems to have been forced to defer the 
dating he would have preferred* He asserted that the campaign was 
planned in the year 1103 A*H#, but postponed until the beginning of 
the following year by the sultan*s sudden deflection of military 
purpose into a ’‘Chergi11 campaign against the Turks, in the company 
of his son Zaydan (77). This suggestion of a postponement was probably
(73) “Turiuman” p* 20 of the text and 37-8 of the translation cf* 
uBustan al-Zarlf«.*u MS p* 35
(74) "Tur.iuman” p# 20*“1 of the text and 38-9 of the translation cf#
11 Bust an al-Zarrf ***u MS loc* cit*
(75) T. Phelps: MA true account of the captivity#..” pp* 8 and 12
(76) uTuriuman” p# 21 of the text and 39 of the translation cf* 
Chapter III P « 143
(W) ’’Turiuman” p* 23 of the text and 44 of the translation cf* 
“Bustjan al-Zarlf#**” MS p* 40
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based upon the author1s knowledge of "al-Fasi" material* In this 
material it was admitted that, during the latter months of 1103 A.H*, 
which correspond to the high summer of 1692 A#D,, Ismafl^s concerns 
were dominated by a threat from the Algerine Regency that was only 
dissipated finally with the return of an embassy from Algiers at 
the beginning of the following Muslim year (78)* The threat was one 
of the major crises of the reign* As has been seen, it included a 
Turkish invasion, and the battle of al-Masharic, a disastrous defeat 
for cAlaui forces upon homB territory (79)* Al—Zayyani glided over 
the memory of this disgrace* But he made it one quiet concessions 
a forward shift to his tale of the last victory in the "Fazzaz", a 
victory which, according to his own logic, was crucial to IsmaCil*s 
mastering of his own empire* In so doing, he destroyed the credibility 
of his "Fazzaz" campaign narrative* For the early months of 1104 A.H* 
correspond with the autumn of 1692* And it is highly improbable that 
any major campaign into a mountain region would have been undertaken 
so late in the year* Further deferral into the following summer 
campaigning season is unsatisfactory* During the summer of 1693,
Isma il is known to have been occupied with the conduct of a major 
campaign into the "Cherg" (80)*
The most straightforward solution to this problematic chronology 
of pacification is to suggest that al-Zayyani*s record of Isma il*s 
punitive expeditions vastly distorts and inflates events that were of 
relatively minor significance to the makhzan* It seems likely that 
it was only within Beraber folk-memory that the sultan could be thought»
(78) "Nashr al-Mathani***" Fes lithograph Vol. II p. 157 of the first
notation.
(79) See Chapter V Pp. 188-190
(80) See Chapter V Pp. 199-201
in person, and upon successive occasions, to have devoted entire 
years to the sulqjection of mountain groupings# It is possible that 
most of the pacificatory action which al-Zayyanr recorded in isolation 
was actually incidental to expeditions that were geographically and 
politically of a wider scopes "mopping up" campaigns conducted 
laterally while the sultan*s haraka was on the main routeway# Al- 
Rashid apparently conducted such an expedition from the Tadla, while 
first on the road to Marrakesh (81)# And Isma^il directed similar 
forays during the leisurely return lap of his expedition of the 
plague years# While he himself organised the rebuilding of a bridge 
over the Oum er-Rbia, "Serhdny, son bacha, qui avoit un camp volant, 
faisoit souvemt les escarmouches avec las Barbaras" (82)# Al-Nasiri*s 
alignment of nearer and further "Chergi" campaigns in 1680 is thus 
made credible; for the attacks upon Snassen and Angad peoples 
recorded by al-Zayyani can be seen as examples of a routine punishment 
of rural peoples, undertaken on the suitan*s homeward march from an 
ill-fated TilimsanX expedition# Similarly, the three campaigns into 
the Central Atlas which al-Zayyanl dated to the 1680s can all be 
seen as ancillary to the sultan’s two major SusI expeditions of the 
decade# In this light they present no chronological problems# And 
their raids for arms and horses may be seen in context, as the 
snatching of supplementary military equipment#
The final "Fazzaz" campaign of 1692 is less easy to dovetail with 
imperial harakat of wider rangB. But it is possible that the campaign 
was minuscule as seen from Meknes# Isma il himself need not have been 
involved* The cut, and even perhaps the memory of the affair may be
(81) See Chapter II P# 84
(82) MouSttes "Histoire*.." p# 124
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discerned within contemporary European notes upon a genuine Central 
Atlas campaign# In the June of 1691, the qafid Ahmad ibn Haddu al-
Q  *
Attar, who was briefly in court disgrace, was sent, for his own 
punishment, upon a mountain expedition# Two months later, his haraka 
returned, trailing plunder and a party of rustic heretics (83)* His 
campaign would seem to hav/e been of the diminutive cast later noted 
as commonplace in the report of Napoleon^ envoy Burels
"###petites expeditions contre les Bereberes qui occupBnt 
les gorges de 1*Atlas du cote de l*Ests,#.ces expeditions 
sont-elles courtes et peu lointaines; les armees sont 
formBes avec celerite dans les provinces voisines des 
lieux ou il faut opererj et composees en grand partie 
de la population du lieu jointe a une portion de troupes 
de l*Bmpereur#"
The note upon the significance of rural auxiliaries to these "petites
#  mm mm
expeditions'* recalls al-Zayyanifs racy details upon the activities 
of loyalist Beraber during Isma il*s campaigns into the "Fazzaz11#
It must be allowed that, even if minor or lateral, "Chergi" 
and Central Atlas campaigns were pacificatory in a certain 
ephemeral sense# Pro-dynastic sentiment would see "tamhid" in any 
expedition that involved the sultan or his men in scorching a path 
along a major rural thoroughfare# And it has been seen that, to 
contemporary eyes, the protection of wayfarers was the duty of a 
sharlf and a good sultan (85)# Eighteenth century legend credited 
al-Rashid in person with fulfilling the obligations of his birth 
by the protection of a caravan (86)#
This theme of the protection of travellers infiltrated al-
Zayyanl*s own tales of "tamhid"* Thus, in 1680, Isma°il was said to have
(83) 5*1. 28 France Vol. Ill Nos. CXXXIII and CLI Memoranda of 
3-B# Estelle, completed Sale, 24/7/1691 and 2/2/1692 respectively#
(pp# 385 and 448-9)
(84) Burel: "Memoirs Militaire*#." p. 58
(85) See Chapter IV; Pp. 176-7 and 179
(86) See Chapter I P# 55
ordered the construction of forts at intervals of a dayfs journey 
along the pilgrimage route between Sals and Oujda, and to have set 
up shelters for caravanners in association with these forts (87)*
The tale of the 1683 campaign against the Idrasin, whose grazing- 
grounds verged upon Azrou, where the routes from Tafilelt and 
Marrakesh into Sals meet, was clinched by the assertion that the 
region was freed from brigandage along the Sals routeway (88). 
Similarly, the massacre of the Garwan by their loyalist Zimmur 
neighbours, which is set into the "Fazzaz” tale of 1692, was 
supposedly permitted as retribution for the Garwan having endangered 
a section of "the road to the desert" (89).
These last Central Atlas notes of al-Zayyani*s may be taken 
as the sententiousheas; of a "law-and-order" man who believed that, 
even in his own rough country, tough campaigning could have lasting 
results (90). It is indeed true that IsmaCil*s reign was considered 
by contemporaries to be remarkable for its high degree of routeway 
security* But this was, for the most part, security locally 
maintained (91)• And, in the rugged Central Atlas region, this 
security was only intermittent. For the key Tadla coute between 
Fes and Marrakesh, it is impossible to trace any makhzan-induced 
mid-reign climacteric separating routeway lawlessness from routeway 
orderliness. In 1683, ten years before the supposed climacteric of
(87) "wa bl-kull aalca fundua lima bavt al-auful" ("And in each fort 
a shelter to house caravans") "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 34
(88) "fa-istaraha min cavthihim bi-tariq safIs" ("And he was freed
• •
from their depredations along the Sals routeway") "Tur.iuman" p. 20 
of the text cf* 37 of the translation
(89) "Tur.iuman" p. 24 of thB text and 45 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 40-41
(90) See Prolooue P. 26 Note (41)
(91) See Chapter IV : Pp. 177-178
pacification, the party of the French ambassador St. Amans travelled 
peaceably through the Tadla, upon its return journey from the Sus (92). 
Yet, after 1692, this passage was at times difficult. Thus, in 1696, 
it was planned that Zaydan, as vice-roy designate of Marrakesh, should 
travel from Meknes to his post by way of Sale (93). His route implies 
that the Tadla path was considered dangerous. And in 1707, Zaydan*s 
own funeral cortege, which numbered several thousand men, was only 
permitted to pass beneath the "Fazzaz" upon the payment of a bribe 
to local peoples (94).
There is thus reason to doubt the validity of al-Zayyani*s claim
H 0 M
that, by 1692, Isma il had achieved massive and lasting success in 
pacifying the rural populace of his empire. It is particularly 
unlikely that he had deprived the mass of his people of thBir arms 
and mounts. There is a contemporary reference to a disarmed body of 
Isma il's subjects. This refers to the civic population of Sale.
Ulith the exception of the governor, and of a few favoured possessors 
of hunting licences, the men of this town WBre said, in 1699, to be 
armed only with knives (95). But the rural scene is likely to have 
been very different. A passage in Braithwaite*s narrative, from less
m m Q m m
than a year after Isma ilfs death, tells of a rural warrior array as 
seen a few days* journey to the north of Fes (96). The sight was very 
similar to the display made by Barber mu iahidun outside Tangier in the 
days of al-Rashid (97). In both cases, the tribesmen were a mob of
(92) "Journal du Vovaoe de St. Amans" pp. 337-8
(93) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo, of 3-B. Estelle, completed
Sale, 2/4/1696 p. 401
(94) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain , Cadiz,
29/10/1707 p. 389
(95) S.I. 28 France Vol. V. Maisonfort to de Combes. Rouen, 28/12/1699
p. 526
(96) Braithwaite pp. 135-6
(97) Anon: "The Interest of Tangier" appendix to "A Discourse Concerning 
Tangier" (London. 1680) pp. 37-8. Internal evidence suggests that 
the appendix was written in 1664, the year of the death of the Earl 
of Teviot.
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dexterous horsemen, of whom a proportion toted fire-arms* The 
intervening reign of Isma°il would here seem to have made little 
difference to rustic possession of the requisites of battle*
Over the period, Susi men would probably have been better armed 
than men of the "greater Gharb"* In the High Atlas, which was rich 
in the appropriate minerals, the possession of locally manufactured 
muskets and ammunition seems to have been widespread throughout 
Isma il,s reign# The party which, in 1709, skirted the outer reaches 
of the Atlas, in the company of the pilgrim Ahmad al-Nasiri of Tamgrout 
was armed (98). And the text of al-Zarhunl of Tasaft is riddled with 
references to home-made fire-arms and ammunition*
A letter of rebuke, directed at the sultan Isma°il, and attributed 
to the shavkh al-Yusi, has been called in defence of the theory that 
Isma0!! systematically disarmed his subjects# The letter is quoted in 
full in the "Kitab al-Istiasa...". in the context of comments made upon 
it by Akansus (99). Akansus seems to have been arrested by its single 
reference to a population deprived of horses and arms. Al-Zayyani had 
supplied his master-text for Isma il!s period. And, on this point, the 
letter aligned with al-Zayyanifs re-iteratBd motif of "tamhid" : "al-khavl 
wa^-silah". the mounts and weapons surrendered to Isma°il by subject 
peoples. Some literary connection between this letter and al-Zayyani,s 
writing seems possible# But the direction of the derivation is not 
obvious. The letter is anonymous. None of its surviving MSS possesses a 
date (100). The work therefore cannot be said for certain to antedate the 
period of Akansus himself. Its pre-occupation with the related themes of 
the Jihad, coastal defences and Tetuan may be considered suspicious.
(98) "Vovaoe de Moula Ahmad..." ed./tr. Berbruoaer p* 176
(99) Al-NasiriJ "Kitab al-Istiosa..." Casblanca tBxt, Vol. VII pp. 81-86
Fumev translation A.M* Vol. IX pp. 109-119
(100) Beroue; "Al-Yousi..." p. 139
Within the letter they are linked with the period of al-Rashid and 
of Ismacil« But these sultans* names could have been employed as 
filters for the secure expression of alarm aroused by the Spanish 
Moroccan conflict of 1859-60, which had taken place while Akansus 
was writing (101). And, even if genuine, the letter would add little 
to al-Zayyani*s evidence. It is generalised, floridly polite and 
decidedly hectoring (102). Amid a full-scale condemnation of 
oppression and heavy taxation, it suggests that, instead of depriving 
Muslims of their arms and horses, IsmaCil* as sultan, should leave 
these in the possession of the people, or even donate them as an aid 
to the waging of the .jihad. The parallels between this text and the 
more detailed notes on disarmament given by al-Zayyani are limited to 
the simple theme of the sultan1s confiscation of arms and horses.
The Ayt Yusi were among the Beraber confederations who had supposedly 
submitted to the sultan in the aftermath of the campaign dated by 
al-Zayyani to 1685 (103).Barque concluded that the letter was written 
in the aftermath of this campaign, which the sage al-Yusi had seen 
as the epitome of unjust government (104). Far this there is no proof.
The letter makes no mention of the Ayt Yusi, and is geographically 
precise only in insisting that the entire Maghribl coastline from
(101) The "Javsh al—Caramram..." terminates with the year 1282 A.H*/
1865 A.D.
(102) In itself the angry tone of the letter need not indicate that the 
document is spurious, although it may suggest that the work was 
intended for discreet literary perusal only. Berque noted the 
survival of a further letter, allegedly written by al-Yusi to
the sultan IsmaCil, and dated to 1675 ("Al-Yousi..." pp. 58 and 139). 
This second letter was similarly irate in tone, and declared the 
saint*s desire to counter the sultan*s wishes by leaving Fes for 
the peace of the countryside. Its theme, an invective against city 
life, is typically literary, and likely to have been intended simply 
for circulation within a literary "milieu".
(103) "Tur iuman" P*J20 of the text and 38 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 35
(104) Berques "Al-Yousl..." pp. 91-2
cQal iya to Massa should be set on a war footing* Further, it has been 
seen that al-Zayyani1s details concerning the pacificatory campaign 
dated to 1685 are far from reliable (105)* Equally uncertain is the 
seventeenth century alignment of the Ayt YusX* One tradition suggests 
that this population was counted among the loyalist groupings of 
Isma il s day, and was employed by the sultan to guard the Sefrou 
section of the Fes-Tafilelt routeway against attacks from neighbours (106)* 
According to al-Zayyani*s view of utamhidw, disarmament was one 
wing to rural pacification, and fort-building the other* Al-Zayyani 
believed Isma il to have built seventy-six forts spanning his empire 
(107)* And undoubtedly, many forts were built or restored during 
IsmaCil*s long reign* Indeed, al-Zayyani*s boast that the forts 
spanned the region between Oujda and Wadi Nun (108) was an under-
h q w
estimation* At the end of Isma il*s reign, he had a "small Castle'* 
at Cape Blanco (109), somewhat nearer to the Senegal than to Wadi Nun* 
However, the role of this castle in relationship to Meknes is 
impossible to estimate* It is difficult to believe that its garrison 
had close ties with the capital* And it has been suggested already 
that it is impossible to equate the construction of a fort with local
pacification, or with effective government from fleknes (110)*
It is unnecessary to associate fort^building with the sultan*s
C “
superintendence, or with the years prior to 1692* Thus, Abd al-Karim, 
the great basha of Marrakesh, is recorded as having overseen the 
construction of an High Atlas piedmont fort at Amizmiz, on the liJadi
(105) See the present chapter Pp* 299-301
(106) Reisser and Sachelot: "Notice sur le cercle de Sefrou" in "Bulletin
de la Societe de Geooraphie du Maroc" (Paris, Feb. 1918) p. 38
(107) "Tur.iuman" p* 16 of the text and 31 of the translation
(108) ibid* loc* cit.
(109) Braithwaite p* 335
(110) See Chapter IV: Pp* 181-185
Nafis, in the autumn of 1713 (111)* Nor was fort-building peculiar 
to IsmaCilfs reign* It is probable that, as "fort-builder extra­
ordinary" this sultan was conveniently accredited with a number of 
constructions for which his predecessors and successors were responsible*
A modern attempt by de la Chapelle to identify, with the aid of both 
written and oral tradition, the entire array of forts at Ismacil*s 
command, racked up a total of fifty-seven (112)* Of these, a number 
were admitted to be of SaCdi or Dila*i origin* Others post-dated 
Isma il*s reign* Thus, de Chenier, who in 1781 visited one listed 
construction, the beetling fortress of Boulaouane, noted that its
w qm q
major recent restoration had been the work of Isma il*s son, Abd
Allah (113)* Similarly,certain of the listed Tadla forts could have
been of nineteenth century origin* For thBir names were culled from
the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri", attributed to a contemporary of
Isma il, but extant only in a twentieth century manuscript in which,
as its editor admitted, traditions from Ismael's day were confounded
cwith others from the time of the nineteenth century sultan Abd al- 
Rahman (114)*
A deeper understanding of IsmaCil,s precise contribution to fort- 
building in the Maghrib al-Aqsa awaits planned archaeological 
investigation* However, for the purpose of understanding Isma il*s 
government, it may always be necessary to rate Isma il as the architect 
of the Miknasi palace and its grasping economy, as of greater significance 
than Isma il as the master of a chain of rural forts* For fort-garrisons 
were, as MouBtte put it, "hors la veue da leur maistre" (115)*
(111) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr* Justinard pp* 45-6
(112) F. de la Chapelle: "Le Sultan Moulav Isma*il et les Berebsres*.
(Footnotes to pp. 25-8)
(113) de Chenier English translation of 1788 Vol. I pp* 87-9
(114) A translation of the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri" by Lt* Reyniers, 
was set as an appendix to de la Chapellefs article (A.M. Vol,
XXVIII, Paris, 1931) pp. 37-42, and referred to within the articlefs 
text by de la Chapelle as editor (pp* 8 and 37-41)
(115) MouBtte: "Histoire*.*" p* 176
Part H i The shadow of Savvidi Muhammad III
"1 •
At the heart of al-Zayyani1s cAlawi history lay the figure of 
his master Sayyidi Muhammad III, a sultan who delighted in seeing 
himself as political heir to the towering figure of Ahmad al-Mansur
0 mm
al-Sa di* The comparison probably sprang from Muhammad III*s capture 
in 1769 of the Portuguese enclave of Mazagan, an echo of the battle 
of Alcazarquivir which, in 1578, had destroyed a king of Portugal, 
and given al-Mansur his sobriquet* Muhammad III made a conscious 
attempt to imitate al-Mansur in the incidentals of his court behaviour, 
ferreting for details in the “Manahil al-Safa* * . o f  al-Fishtali, 
al-Mansur*s court historian* On pilgrimage near Aghmat in 1784, the 
sultan attempted to draw his bemused entourage into literary exchanges 
based upon the impromptu versification credited to al-Mansur and his 
courtiers on a journey in the same region# Finding his own following 
at a loss to understand the references, Muhammad is said to have had 
the relevant passages of the "Manahil al-Safal**'1 read out to them, in 
order that thsy should be learned by heart (116)*
Al-Zayyani bowed to his master!s predilection* His discussion of
Sayyidi Muhammad III opened symbolically with an account of his being
sent to Marrakesh as vice-roy to his father cAbd Allah* There he pitched
his tent amid the ruins of SaCdI! palaces* Later he restored Marrakesh
as an imperial city and, within it, the mosque which al-Mansur had
built (117)* The erection of Ahmad al-Mansur and Muhammad III into
• • •
twin pinnacles was bound to diminish intervening rulers. The latter
(116) "Bustan al-Zarif..*" MS pp. 117 ff*
T TrT *
(11?) "Tyjr, iuman" pp. 67 and 69_of the text, and 123 and 126 of the 
translation cf* “Bustan al-Zarif*.*11 MS pp* 82 and 83
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SaCdi were swiftly disposed of (118)* And disorderly government was
c *■»
made a backdrop to the riss of the Alawi political founding father, 
al-Sharif, who was said to have gained power in Sijilmasa while the
C C iw
Sa di sultan Abd al-Malik ibn Zaydan led, within Marrakesh, a life 
abandoned to pleasure (119)* However, early CAlawi history was less 
easy for al-Zayyani, as an historian of the cAlawi dynasty, to 
subordinate to his own main matter, to which Muhammad III stood as 
focus* Isma il was a figure whose longevity and achievements made 
him peculiarly difficult to set aside. But the author took care that 
the grandfather did not overshadow the grandson.
Al-Zayyani glorified the reign of IsmaCIl with an antiquary1s 
superficiality, as a period of "curiosities11. Notes relating to 
the sultan*s vast numbers of children and of captives (120) were set 
forth upon the same level as notes upon thB massive palace complex 
of Meknes, upon the cabld and upon the rural forts (121)• The 
repetitious stress was upon quantity and bulk. Taken all together, 
the details endorsed the view that Isma il had been, in his day, a 
fascinating and remarkable figure* But they invoked criteria quite 
separate from those by which Muhammad III would be judged, and so 
could not diminish him* In the matter of the jihad. al-Zayyani may 
have sensed the possibility of competition* In this sphere, Isma il 
could well have been portrayed as exemplary. In al-Zayyani*s day, his
(118) Levi-Proven^al, who had access to a MS of the "Turiuman" containing 
a chapter on the Sa di, noted that it was heavily dominated by
an account of the reign of Aljmad al-Mansur. Only cursory treatment 
was granted to that sultan*s successors.("Les Historians des Chorfa"
p. 176)
(119) "Turiuman" p. 1 of the text and 2 of the translation
(120) "Tur iuman" pp*J28-9 of the text and 54-5 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif**." MS pp. 44-5
(121) "Tur iuman" pp* 13 and 14-15 of the text cf* 25-6 and 28-31 of
the translation cf*
11 Bust an al-Zarif*.*" MS pp. 30 and 31-2
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reign was credited with having seen the capture of four coastal 
enclaves from the Christians: Mamora, Tangier, Laroche and, inaccurately, 
Arzilla (122). This run of success could have enshadowed Muhammad III*s 
single victory over Mazagan, and his policy of commercial alliance 
with Christian powers, among whom Spain, the ancient enemy, was the 
chief (123)* Significantly, al—Zayyani recorded the victories of the 
mu.iahidun during IsmaCil*s reign in curiously brief and prosaic terms. 
Al-NasirX seems later to have gone to some effort towards padding this 
material out in IsmaCilfs honour: his account of the capture of 
Larache contains information taken from five indigenous prose-writers, 
together with further notes from the Spanish historian Castellanos; 
and he crowned the affair by quoting a lengthy praise-poem (124)*
In al~Zayyani*s summing up of IsmaCilfs reign, the period was 
allowed to represent that standard item of folk-memory, the “good 
old daystr: an idyllic period of peace and order, plenty and low prices, 
during which thB peoples of the Maghrib al-Aqsa had; supposedly become 
as dutiful as the Egyptian fallahun (125)# But this collapse into 
nostalgia was spliced with darker FasI material giving laconic notes 
upon disasters dating from Isma il*s final decade: the Spanish victory 
outside Ceuta, and the fiscal belabouring of Fes (126)* Further, the 
author carefully delimitated certain achievements which redounded to 
Isma il’s fame, by pointing out that the idyll germinated its own
(122) "Tur.iuman'1 pp* 19, 20 and 22-3 of the text cf. 35-6, 38 and 42-3
of the translation cf* "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp* 34, 35 and 39-40
- r  1  ' "  m m n r i
(123) For a contemporary summary of Muhammad III*s commercial relations 
with European states sse:de Chenier English translation of 1788
Vol. II pp* 294-301 and 357-372
(124) Al-Nasirl: "Kitab al-Istigsa..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 73-7
FumBV translation, A*M* Vol. IX pp. 97-103
(125) "wa sara ahl al-maqhrib ka-fallahin ahl misr" ("And the people of
the Maghrib took on the demeanour of the peasant populace of Egypt") 
("Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 44)
(126) "Tur.iuman" p*J28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif.*•" loc. cit*
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destruction, and that order was only re-barn in the time of 
Muhammad III. It was stressed that, following Isma0! ! ^  death, his
C **abid became sultan-making masters of thB country, amid disorders 
that brought about their own ruin. It was the achievement of 
Muhammad III effectively to re-found this force, and to restore 
the cAlawr Cabrd to prosperity and order (127). Similarly, it was 
his achievement to put an end to the rural disorder which had burst 
forth in 1727, producing brigand-infested routeways. Among 
insubordinate local peoples, the Beraber in particular were said to 
have lost no time in re-equipping themselves with arms and horses 
(128). And, according to al-Zayyani*s final historical notes:
"Because of them (the Beraber) these circumstances afflicted 
the people of the Maghrib, until God had the mercy to send them 
the reign of Sayyidi Muhammad ibn Abd Allah*..He governed 
them with discernment and firmness."^2g)
The focusing of al-Zayyani*s cAlawI history upon the figure 
of Muhammad III produced a curious retrospective twist to the 
purely dynastic history of Isms^Il’s reign. This was imposed by the 
author*s desire to enhance the court status, during Ismacri*s lifetime, 
of Khunatha bint Bakkar, daughter to a shavkh of the MCafra, a "Qiblan" 
grouping, and mother to Isma0! ! ^  son cAbd Allah, through whom the
« «  Q
(127) "wa lam vudarrik minhum al-sultan savvidl muhammad lamma buvi a
ilia al-galll* wa huwa alladhl iamacahum wa ahvahum bi cadd."
("And very fBw of them (the cabid) remained with the sultan
Sayyidi! Muhammad when he received the oath. It was he who
gathered them together and revitalised their numbers.") “ ZcJlX--
h s  p. S.T
(128) "Tur iuman" p. 30 of the text and 65-7 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 47
(129) "wa sa‘cA ahwal ahl maohrib macahum ila an rahimahum allah
^  4..... - -._ - ' ~
bi-wilavat al-sultan savvidi muhammad ibn abd allah...
fa-sasahum bi-hilmihi wa hazmihi"
   —  — , 1 -  1 —
("Turiumanat al-Kubra...") ed. al-Filali p. 71
direct line of authority continued* Khunatha was linked with 
Muljammad III by more than the simple association of grandmother
Q
with grandson* During Abd Allah’s first period of government, she 
made a dynastically famed pilgrimage to Mecca, in the company of 
Muhammad, who was then as small boy (130)* And whBn cAbd Allah 
suffered the first of several oustings from power, both ha and 
Muhammad his son were granted asylum, for more than two years, 
by the M afra who, as Khunatha*s people, were Abd Allah’s akhwal (131) 
Khunatha is known to have figured in palace politics during 
Ismail’s declining years as a "Concubine***of great Interest"
(132)* But shB was not counted among the sultan’s wives (133)* It 
was for later dynastic tradition, as set forth by al-Zayyani, to 
grant to her union with Ismael an unparalleled significance and 
fanfaronade. It was claimed that, in 1678, Isma0!! had taken an 
expedition into the deep south* On the route, and apparently with 
ease and brevity, he pacified the Sus* He then continued, by way of 
the Dar a, as far as Chinguetti, In the course of this expedition,
bQh m m
Isma il was said to have collected a force of two thousand haratin
• •
to be joined to his new force, supposedly clustering at this date 
c
at Mashra al-Raml, It was also claimed that the sultan received the 
voluntary submission of eight named Arab-speaking groupings
(130) "Nashr al-Mathani«.«" quoted al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istiosa***" 
Casablanca text Uol* VII p. 131 cf* Fumev translation fl.M* Vol* IX 
p* 181 cf. Anon* "Relation de ce qui s’est passe dans le Rovaume 
de Maroc depuis 1727 lusou’en 1737" pp* 215-216
It would seem to be upon this pilgrimage that dynastic 
sycophants have based their insistence upon Khunatha’s reputation for 
piety and learning* For a recent example of such commentary, see 
Lakhdar: "La vie litterairB*.*" pp, 190-192
(131) "Tur iuman" p* 40 of the text and 74 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif»**" MS p. 57
(132) Braithwaite p* 6
(133) An account of the "Disposition of Presents to the Court of Macauines 
by the Hon* Chas Stewart Esq," linked with the 1721 embassy, list's 
the names of four queens and "Lala Chineta" as recipients of gifts 
(S.P. 71 (16) ff, 613-617 Memo*, dated Meknes, 24/7/1721)
from the "Qibla" and desert fringe or "Sahil", including the ncafra, 
the Shabbanat, the Oirar and the Mta • Associated with this mass 
declaration of allegiance was the sultan*s marriage with Khunatha (134) 
This account of a "Qiblan" royal progress is likely to be 
fictional# It has been seen that the penetration of Isma il's 
authority south of the Anti-Atlas is unlikely long to have pre-dated 
1690 (135)# And it is doubtful whether Isma°Il at any point in his 
reign personally led an expedition into the "Qibla"# There seems no 
evidence of such a venture outside of al—Zayyani*s record* And there 
was certainly no expedition along the southern route described by 
al-Zayyani during 1678, a plague year for which the skulking and
a Q M
prophylactic track of Isma il*s movements is known in detail from 
lyIou8ttefs "Histoire". In this year, Isma0!! went no further south- 
westwards than the head of the Bar a# He was far from any "pacification 
of the Sus, which was then under the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz# 
Indeed he would seem, at this date, to have been at pains to avoid 
a southern confrontation with his nephew* For, rather than enter his 
rival*s "sphere of influence", he made his disastrous decision to 
attempt an High Atlas crossing in winter (136)#
The dating of IsmaCil*s union with Khunatha to 1678 is in itself 
suspiciously early# Uindus recorded that, in 1721, the "mother of 
Muley Abdallah"fs own mother was alive and well able to carry messages 
for her daughter (137)# It is possible that the chronology here adopted 
by al-Zayyani was of complimentary significance, designed to link 
Khunatha with the foundation of the corps of Cabid« which in the terms
(134) "Tur.iuman" pp#^16-17 of the text and 31—32 of the translation cf
"Bustan al-Zarif«**“ WS p# 32
•
(135) See Chapter III Pp. 135-155
(136) See Chapter III Pp# 119-120
(137) Windus p. 128
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of al-Zayyani*s "al-Hamidl" material was the re-foundation of the 
army of al-Mansur* It has been seen that Khunatha*s marriage was 
given literary juxtaposition with a trawl for harat!n recruits for
Q mm
Mashra al-Raml# These two thousand haratin. allegedly brought back
* •
from the "Qibla" in 1678, may thus be seen symbolically as a 
contribution from Khunatha: a "dowry" presented to al-Mansur*s 
restored army* Similarly, the setting of Khunatha*s name and people 
at the heart of a mass rallying to Isma il by desert groupings was 
dynastically complimentary at a level other than the obvious* Three 
of these groupings, the Shabbanat, 3irar and Pita0 may be assumed to 
have been regarded by al-Zayyani as the cognate kin of peoples he 
had noted as military followers of Sacdi kings (138)* The tradition 
thus provides yet another grace-note to the implied association 
between Muhammad III and al-Mansur, the greatest of SaCdi rulers*
Q M v
As ancestress to the continuing line of Alawi sultans, Khunatha
seems comparable to the surface text of a palimpsest# Her memory,
within indigenous tradition, all but obliterates the memory of
another and previously significant Saharan woman* For all but the
last decade of Isme^il’s reign, contemporary evidence seems devoid
of reference to Khunatha or to Abd Allah her son# By contrast, there
is a mass of evidence that, from the 1690s until her death in 1715,
cunrivalled prominence as mistress of the palace belonged to Ayisha 
Mubarka, mother to the successive heirs presumptive Zaydan and Ahmad 
al-Dhahabl. This was a woman whom al-Zayyani*s texts acknowledged only 
within the discreet obituary notice of an "umm al-shurafa*" (139)#
(138) In the "Bustan al-Zarif#**" these three names, together with the 
name of the ZirarajJ were listed together with the notp:
"kanu tl-.iund!va ma a al-muluk al-sa°diva" ("They were the troops of 
the Sa di kings") MS p* 30
(139) "Tur.iuman" p# 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf#
"Bustan al-Zarif * * *" MS p# 43
3 1 7
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This displacement of Ayisha Mubarka by Khunatha, in dynastic
tradition, is chiefly significant as an explanation for al-Zayyani*s
glancing and “folklorique" treatment of the origins of Isma0! ! ^
corps of Udaya:, the "parientes" of his “Reyna Negra" cAyisha (140)•
Within the narrative allotted to Isma°il,s period, the “Tur.iuman"
contains only a singls reference to the Udaya* And this is set within
the highly suspect text which states that, from 1692 onwards, horses
and weapons were retained by only four military groupings, of which
the Udaya formed one (141)* To this fleeting note, the “Bustan al-
Zarlf***" adds a bloc of roughly composited information on the entry —
•
m m
of the Udaya into Isma il*s service: an introductory “just-so" story 
of pleasant naivete, which expands into a corpus of inchoate and 
dateless detail*
According to this account, it was after the fall of Marrakesh
m q m
to Isma il, in 1677, that the sultan went hunting one day in the 
Bahira plain to the north of that city* There he met an herdsman 
foraging for his beasts by cutting away at the lotus trees: a man 
with a knife,“Abu ,1-Shafra“* The sultan*s interrogation of this 
herdsman led to the joyous discovery that the man and his “brothers" 
were the sultan*s own personal akhwal* They were of Udaya descent 
(142) but had been driven northwards by drought (jadb) from the 
“Qibla" by way of the Sus, and were currently associated with peoples 
of the "ybwz"* The herdsman*s own particular grouping dwelt with the 
"Hbwz" Shabbanat* After a kindly chiding for not having come previously 
to greet the sultan, the herdsman was urged to bring his chattels into 
Marrakesh* There he was set at the head of a body of cavalry, with
(140) See Chapter 11/: P* 171 Note (64)
(141) “Tur iuman" p* 24 of the text and 46 of the translation cf*
“Bustan al-Zarif*..11 MS p* 41
«
(142) See Appendix B Pp* 338-9
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orders to gather in his scattered kinsmen and conduct them to Meknes,
where they were registered as the sultanfs troops and domiciled next
to the palace at al-Riyad* Subsequently a new body of recruits from
the "Qibla" proper came into Meknes to join their "brothers"* One
detachment from this total force was later set into Pas al-3adid, to
replace a body of Zirara and Shabbanat troops who had been there
under the command of al-Duraydl* At the hpad of these Fasi Udaya
c •there was placed one Muhammad ibn Atta* He was said to be the son
• ••
Q ^  M  mm mm
of Ali Abu Shafra, by whom al-Zayyani may be presumed to have meant 
the original Bahlra herdsman, now become the Udaya commander in al- 
Riyad* After a period of regular alternation, the two generals 
permanently exchanged posts (143)*
This bloc of material, as summarised above, hastily foreshortens 
information that can be teased out over the history of much of Isma il*s 
reign* Its style is quite alien to the treatment which al-Zayyani 
awarded to the Udaya in thB course of his narrative of CAlawi history 
for the years following 1727* Into this later narrative, the activities 
of the Udaya as a military and political pressure group are tightly 
knit* The author*s sketchy account of Udaya origins arouses suspicion*
It is known that the Udaya formed a notable force at the time when al- 
Zayyani was writing* For the year 1808, when Sulayman was sultan,
Burel noted the influence and favour at court enjoyed by the "alcaides" 
of the "Loudaya"* He estimated the corps at eight thousand "etablis 
autours de Fes et servant pres de l*Empereur qui les aims beaucoup"
(144)# It seems unlikely that al-Zayyani would have slid through the 
early history of such a force, merely by oversight*
(143) "Bustan al-Zarif*,*» MS pp. 29-30
*
(144) Burel: "Memoirs Militaire**." pp* 59 and 61
The clue to the author's reticence lies within the suggestion 
that the Udaya were constituted as the akhwal or maternal kin of 
Isma0!! himself (145)* It is true that, in the days of Ahmad al-
mm mQm m
Dhahabi, Isma il's immediate successor, the Udaya were accustomed 
to call themselves “uncles" of the sultan. Braithwaite explained, 
with reference to °Abd al-Malik Abu Shafra, the Udaya commander he 
knew, that his “Stile and Title" of "Uncle" was "a common form, old 
Mulev calling all the Lydyres his Relations" (146)# But, for IsmaCil 
himself, a formal relationship with the Udaya as akhwal is unlikely. 
Even as a courteous fiction, it is improbable that the Udaya were 
constituted as the kinfolk of Ismael's mother. All that is recorded 
of this woman is that she was a slaVB girl: according to al-Zayyani, 
a " iariva" born among the Mcafra (147). In the light of the author's 
interest in stressing the P^afran connections of the °AlawT dynasty, 
the ethnic element within this tradition may well be seen as dubious. 
It is certainly irrelevant. As al—Nasiri later pointed out, servile 
status would have rendered null any of the woman1s associations by 
birth or upbringing (148). Further, it has been seen that there is 
strong European evidence that, in Isma°il's own day, the Udaya were 
regarded collectively as kin, not to the sultan's mother, but to
C W
Ayisha Mubarka, the sultan's wife, and the mother to the heirs 
presumptive of his lifetime (149).
But there was purpose behind al-Zayyanifs suggestion that the
(145) “anturn akhwal" (“You are maternal uncles") are the very words with 
which Isma il was said to have greeted his first Udaya recruits 
(“Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 29)
(146) Braithwaite p. 24
(147) "Jariya min mawludat al-m°afra“ ("A slave-girl of M°afran birth") 
“Tur.iuman" p. 3 of the text cf. 5 of the translation.
(148) Al-NasirX. "Kitab al-Istiasa...". Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 14
Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 19
(149) See Chapter IV I Pp. 170-171
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corps of Udaya originated in the chance meeting between IsmaDil and 
a lost kinsman of his own* It deftly removed any implication of 
illegitimacy from the association current in the author's own 
times between the Udaya, and sultans from the line of cAbd Allah ibn 
Isma il, the prince who emerged from internecine warfare as his father's 
effective successor* Hints at further links between IsmacIlls Udaya 
and the Shabbanat, or the Mcafra, may be construed as weak attempts 
to attach to the Udaya traditions which al-Zayyani associated with
M  Q  a  -
Khunatha* Abd Allah's mother, and Muhammad Ill's ancestress*
Al-Zayyani's bloc of notes upon the Udaya resembles his evidence
C M
concerning the foundation of the corps of abid* It contains a number
of details open t© an individual external verification* But, as a
composite whole, the developed tradition is misleading, and can be
seen to have been warped to provide a dynastically appealing "received
version" of events* Thus the surnames "Abu Shafra" and "ibn cAtta"
• *
were each associated with Udaya generals known to European reporters
(150)* But it is likely that simple word-play upon the first name 
suggested the legend-like motif of the "man-with-a-knife" as the 
first Udaya commander* Similarly, the dating of the foundation of 
the corps of Udaya to 1677 seBms uncannily accurate* It has been 
seen that there was an ingathering of troops from Marrakesh and its 
surrounds, following the city's capture from Ahmad ibn Muhriz (151)•
But this ingathering was not the serendipitous consequence of a placid 
hunting expedition* It was thrust Into operation in the face of a last 
flicker of political menace from Dila'* And it only began the meta­
morphosis of the Udaya from rabble into crack corps* As has been suggested,
(150) Busnot Chapter III passim cf* Braithwaite pp* 23 and 95
(151) See Chapter II Pp* 103 and MouBtte: "Histoire*,." p. 108
the Udaya are likely to have reached political maturity along with 
their "nephew-by-courtesy", Zaydan, the Udaya queen's eldest son (152)# 
Pre-occupation with the priorities of Muhammad III brought more 
than a narrowly dynastic warp to al-Zayyani*s early Alawi history*
The imperial master's interests would seem to have underlain another 
and quite distinct strand to the story: al-Zayyani's intricately 
tailored account of confrontation in the "Cherg" between early
C M
Alawi princes and the forces of Algiers*
The Algerine administration acknowledged the suzerainty of 
distant Constantinople* And rapprochement with the Porte was an 
highlight of Muhammad Ill's foreign policy* During his reign, large 
sums in aid were despatched to the Ottoman sultan* Formally this 
aid had pious motivation: support for the Ottoman .jihad against 
the forces of Catherine the Great's Russia* At another level, the 
gifts constituted an attempt to buy a "free hand" in dealings with 
Algiers* Perhaps, also, the gifts may be seen as a covert bid by 
Muhammad, as the wealthy ruler of a louche domain, at buying 
enhanced dignity in his dealings with the "Grand Signior", the 
most prestigious of Muslim princes (153).
In 1786, al-Zayyani travelled to Constantinople as Muhammad Ill's 
ambassador (154)# He sBems to have been infected with admiration for 
the Ottoman state* Later, in a summary of Cab?d history, he was to 
insert a reference to a proportion of these °Alawi troops as 
"janissaries" ("inkisha'iriva") (155)* He visited Constantinople a
(152) See Chapter IV:. Pp* 109-70 and ff.
(153) For a recent account of Muhammad Ill's relations with the Ottoman 
empire, see R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b*
Abd Allah (1757-1790)" (Granada, 1970) pp* 127-138. See also 
Terrasse Vol. II pp* 295 and 297
(154) "Tur.jumanat al-kubra***" ed* Al-Filali pp* 96-126
(155) "Bustan al-Zarif.**» MS p. 87
1 ■■*■1
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second time, in a private capacity* There he spent a period studying 
th8 Ottoman history to which he gave a significant place within the 
pre-cAlawi chapters of his "Tur.iuman al-Mucrib***" (156)* The 
Ottoman empire was set into this work as the state which crowned the 
history of the Muslim east, parallel, by the author’s implication,
O mm
to Alawi Morocco, whose story culminated his survey of the Muslim 
west*
This sense of honourable demarcation had not always governed
C M
Alawi relations with the Turkish power immediately to their east,
the Algerine Regency* It has been seen that, over the years 1680-1701,
march peoples had suffered a series of raids designed to give the
sultan Isma il*s wavering taxation frontier an Bastwdrd thrust,
c ***and that these raids had precipitated two massive defeats for Alawi 
armies by AlgerinB forces* Within al-Zayyani*s texts, this border 
confrontation is given only skinny acknowledgement, in notes that 
are quite overshadowed by a lengthy preliminary section of narrative.
This tale purports to recount an episode in cAlawi relations with 
the Regency, dating from the pristine days of Muhammad ibn al-Sharif, 
elder brother to al-Rashid and to Ismail*
According to this tale, Muhammad, around the year 1640, went 
voluntarily from his base in Tafilelt into the "Cherg"* There, with 
the aid of "Chergi" Arabs from the Angad plain, he took the town of 
Oujda* Subsequently he used Oujda as a base for operations of a 
remarkable sweep, which ranged from Snassen country, out as far as 
the Saharan posts of Ain Madi, Laghouat and el-Ghasoul, lying two 
hundred miles to the south of Algiers* His depradations provoked a 
"Bey of Mascara" into demanding reinforcements from the capital* The
C M
Dey, Uthman Pasha, sent an heavily armed expedition westwards through
(156) Levi-Provencal: "Les Historiens des Chorfa" pp* 169-170
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country which Muhammad had lain waste* In face of this threat,
Muhammad withdrew to Sijilmasa without joining battle* Later, he 
received a four-man embassy from Algiers, bearing a lengthy letter 
of protest* Muhammadfs first response was fury. But, after counter­
changes in which the envoys explained that their opponent*s conduct 
had been unworthy of a sharTf. the prince*s fury turned to profound 
repentance* Claiming that he had been duped by the "Arab devils" 
("shavatin Carab"). his allies, into serving their nefarious ends, 
he solemnly swore never again to cross the river Tafna into the 
Regency, on an unlawful errand (157).
It is possible to see this tale of Muhammad*s "Chergi” raiding 
as entirely fictitious. It has no place in the earlier writings of 
al-Ifrani, who was well able to detail Muhammad ibn al-Sharif*s 
oasean exploits, his bid for Fes, and his final assault upon his 
brother al-Rashid (158)* Nor was the episode mentioned in the notes 
upon Muhammad given by the early dynastic historian al-°Alawi (159)* 
The talB involves the suggestion of conflict with a "Bey of Mascara" 
at a time when Mascara was not yet the seat of a beylicate, and of
C IM
counter-moves by an " Uthman Day", unknown to Algerine history, in 
which the office of Day did not figure before 1671* In itself the 
tale is bizarre, It echoes the better documented "Chergi” exploits
Q  _  * * * * * * _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 0 _ _
of other Alawi princes, al-Rashid and Zaydan ibn Isma il, but is 
ill-assorted with what is known of the career of Muhammad ibn al- 
Sharif* It implies that, for a period, Muhammad was willing and able
(157) "Tur.iuman" pp*_ 3-5 of the tBXt and 5-9 of the translation cf. 
"Busteih al-Zarif***" MS pp* 10-13
(158) "Nuzhat al-Hadl***" ed./tr. Houdas pp. 299-302 of the text and
495-499 of*the translation cf* "Zill al-4iJarif**." pp* 33-4
* and 37
(159) Al-cAlawi: "fil-Anwar al-Husniva.**" pp. 76-77
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to abandon Tafilelt for a "Chergi11 base, and to adopt an alien 
following of shiraoa , only to return afterwards, peaceably to his 
former political base at Sijilmasa upon the Ziz, This delineation of 
Muhammadfs career would seem to have puzzled al-Nasiri, In his 
"Kitab al-Istigsa..." he transferred the tale of Muhammad*s move 
upon Oujda into the aftermath of that sharif*s 1650 assault upon Fes 
(160)* This re-alignment is unsatisfactory* By 1652, Muhammad ibn 
al-Sharif is known to have been back in Tafilelt, from which he led
an baraka out to Tuat (161).
m~~ —
The inspiration for the entire narrative of Muhammad*s "Chergi"
raiding is likely to have been the long letter of florid rebuke which
al-Zayyani associated with Muhammad, and quoted in full within his
"Bustan al-Zarif..*Kfl62). The letter includes a plethora of proper — ——— — — —— — —
names, detailing peoples and places supposedly associated with the 
marauding of the man to whom it was addressed* A number of well-known 
"Chergi" groupings figure within this context, including the Qanu 
Amir* There also figure the toponyms Ain Madi, Laghouat and al- 
Ghasoul# The high degree of correlation between this body of 
nomenclature and the names set into the saga of Muhammad ibn al- 
Sharif*s "Chergi" adventuring, renders it highly unlikely that the 
letter and its associated narrative were written independently* The 
letter may be seen as the primary document, providing notes from
which the skeleton of the raiding story was constructed* For the
letter is less anachronistic than the narrative* It lacks any 
reference to a "Bey of Mascara". And its note that the Banu Amir
(160) Al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istigsa***" , Casablanca text Vol. VII 
pp* 20-21 cf / FLimey tr a n slat ion A.M. Vol. IX pp. 26-8
(161) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 52-3 
(16&) "Bustan al-Zarif***" MS pp, 10-12
were currently acknowledging infidel suzerainty (163) records 
circumstances true for the seventeenth century, when Oran, at the
m m  Q
edge of Banu Amir country, was a Spanish "presidio1.* It is written
in the name of one Muhammad ibn cAbd Allah, otherwise unknown. And
• 7
it contains no trace of reference to the mysterious "cUthman Dey", 
who may perhaps be dismissed as an eponymous "Ottoman"•
However, the letter raises its own problems. It is not a 
diplomatic missive, but a literary creation, written throughout in
rhymed prose. Its text within the "Bustan al-Zarif..." lacks the date
11 ■ •
with which al-Nasirl later provided it (164). And it is addressed, 
informally, to an unnamed sharif. son of "al-Sharif". This “sharifM 
is likely to have been IsmaCil, as the letter implies that he was 
third of his house (165). It is improbable that he was ever intended 
to receive the letter. It is equally improbable that the letter, in 
its extant form, was written in Algiers. For it contains no 
invective of the type which characterised the "Daftar al-TashrTfat"
(166), and no trace of the contempt with which the CAlawI sovereign 
to the west, an "Arab" chieftain of "miserable black-faced Moors" (167)
(163) "wa zavvanat sawlatuka li-banu Gamirs li-gadat al-nuffar li-
kanaf al-kawafir"
("And your attack has provoked the leaders of the Banu Amir into 
flocking to the protection of the infidel")
("Bustan al-Zarlf.... MS p. 11), 1 ^  i
(164) Al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istiasa... Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 27 cf 
Fumey translation A.M. VolJ IX p. 36* The date given is the 
15/Ra jab/1064 = 1/6/1654
(165) "awwal al-dawlat the^ir; wa tl-thani mugtaf lihi sa*ir$ wa *1-
thalith li-kamal mivar na*ir"
("A. rebel the first of the house; the second a follower in his path 
and the third brings the kindling of war to its fulfilment.11) 
("Bustan al-Zarlf..." MS p. 12)
(166) See Chapter V P. 188
(167) Al-Ha.1.1 Sha°ban Dev to Pontchartrain. Algiers, 25/Muharram/l1D2 = 
29/10/1691, quoted in translation in E. Plantet: "Correspondence 
des Devs..." Vol. I p. 3B0
was customarily regarded in higher Algerine circles* For, while 
criticising the "sharifu. the letter serves also to glorify his 
martial capacity, by suggesting that his exploits had sent a tremor 
through the lives of peoples of the Maghrib al-Awsat, living as far 
to the east as Constantine and the Djerid* And its overall tone is 
sternly moralising rather than strictly hostile* It refers to the 
sharif*s ill-directed courage (shaia°a). and to the machinations 
of the "ahl-sibta". presumably the Spanish CButa garrison* The obvious 
implication is that the sharif would have been better occupied in 
waging the jihad than in raising dust among "Chergi" peoples* A 
possible source for the expression of such opinions would have been 
the Qadiriya community of Tlemsens pro-Ottoman, but equivocally placed 
in the march (168 )* The letter ends with a demand that the sharif leave 
thB environs of Tlemsen (169), and cease from interfering in the 
squabbles of its neighbouring migrant peoples (170)*
It is conceivable that the letter was picked up by al-Zayyani 
during his eighteen months exile spBnt in Tlemsen over the years 1792-3 
It is known that at this period he took a close interest in history, 
and read widely (171 )• He may have associated the document with 
the early days of Muhammad ibn al-Sharif, on the grounds that
(168) See Chapter III P« 126
(169) ”ahi talannab auwah tilimsan* wa la tazahuroaha bi-mihan iumuc
rumat wa la fursan"
(“0 turn aside from the approaches to Tlemsen* Do not press It to 
ordBal with your cohorts of musketeers and cavaliers*")
("Bustan al-Zarif***) MS p* 12
♦  ^T
. . Q m  «, Q Q Q « m
(170) ”inna ishtahat al-a rab ohara ala ba dihim ba da ****wa
vaDimuhum cinda al-duwal ma vacimu al-roakhana al-kuffar”
("For the nomad groupings desire to skirmish amongst themselves*,
and a responsible member of any government treats with them as 
he would treat with the treacheries of the infidel*")
("Bustan al-Zarif***) MS loc. cit.V ' — — *
(171) ”Turlumanat al-Kubra*. *." ed. Al-Filali p* 144
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it was addressed to a “sharif" and not to an acknowledged sultan, 
and afterwards proceeded to utilise it as raw material for the 
construction of a scene-setting prologue to the "Chergi" content 
of his current work* As finally wrought, the tale of Muhammad ibn 
al—Sharif's eastern adventure usefully involved a retrojection of
C M
the period of most significant conflict between the Alawi and 
the forces of the Algerine Turks into the days of a shadowy 
"ur-sultan"* It credited an Alawi prince with far flung raiding 
that enhanced the military honour of the dynasty* But it carefully 
absolved the dynasty from the guilt of aggression by stressing that 
Muhammad had been duped into trespassing within the Regency# The 
blame for his actions was squarely laid with march groupings of 
"Arabs"* Upon this point, the author’s personal bitterness may be 
discerned* Surprise attack by "Chergi" peoples near Qujda in 1792 
had led to his own disgrace and enforced Tilimsani exile (172)#
The most important aspect of thB tale of Muhammad ibn al- 
Sharif’s "Chergi" adventuring, is that it was clinched with the 
establishment of a political maxim governing cAlawi relations with 
the Regency of Algiers: peacB with honour, based upon the mutual 
acceptance of a frontier at the Tafna, the river flowing between 
□ujda and Tlemsen* This aligned with circumstances accepted for 
most of Muhammad Ill’s reign, but left al-Zayyani with thB task of 
explaining away the trespasses of the early CAlawi period. For this 
reason the author’s notes upon the Tafna frontier form a particularly 
distorted vein within his general narrative# Evidence of eastward
C M
transgressions by Alawi armies was customarily slurred over, or 
treated as, in some sense, a pardonable aberration from the norm#
(172) "Tur.iumanat al-Kubra*.*" ed. Al-Filall p* 140
Al-Rashid’s career was easily contained within the schema* It 
was implied that his early "Chergi" adventuring took him only as. 
far as Oujda (173), and that he repeated his brother’s written 
guarantee of acceptance of a Tafna frontier (174). But the "Chergi" 
campaigning of IsmaCil gave rise to a tradition of greater 
convolution, with its individual prologue. Late in the 1670s (175), 
Ismail was said to have invaded the "Cherg". He moved to the south 
of Tlemsen, where he received the massed allegiance of nine named 
Arab groupings* With their support, and the particular encouragement 
of the Banu Amir, Isma il went on as far as the upper Cheliff, 
whBre he was confronted by an heavily armed expeditionary force 
from Algiers* A night of Turkish cannon and mortar fire terrified 
the sultan’s Arab following* Headed by the BanU cAmir, they fled, 
leaving the sultan with the support only of the askar with which he 
had set out. Subsequently he received a letter from the Turks, 
bidding him keep within traditional boundaries* It was accompanied 
by written evidence that his brothers Muhammad and al-Rashid had 
accepted the Tafna frontier# Battle was thus rendered dishonourable 
as well as militarily indiscreet* Isma il made peace and retired*
But never again would he trust the Arabs (176 )*
Elements within this tale recall the earlier narrative of Muhammad’s 
adventures* Here again are the motifs of unwitting trespass, Arab
(173) "Turiuman" p. 7 of the text and 14 of the translation cf#
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p. 22
(174) "Tur.iuman" p. 17 of the text and 32 of the translation cf*
"Bustan al-Zarif**«" MS p. 33
(175) The "Bustan al—Zarif**." (loc* cit*) would date this campaign to 
1089 A.H* and tlie "Turiuman"(loo* cit*) to 1090 A#H* These years 
include the campaigning summers of 1678 and 1679 respectively*
(176) "wa min vaumatidhin lam va’mun fi al-Carab wa lam vathug bihim"
("And from that day_forth, he had neither faith nor confidence in the 
Arabs*") ("Turiuman" p. 17 of the text cf. 33 of the translation)
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duplicity, and the halting of an eastward march by a Turkish letter#
However, this tradition concerning IsmaCil seems in part to be rooted
in the memory of a genuine campaign: Isma0! ! ^  first major "Chergi"
haraka of 1680* As has been seen, RauStte^ account of this expedition 
•
includes notes upon a peaceable meeting between Isma il and Arabic- 
speaking groupings, confrontation with a powerful Turkish force, and 
the cessation of hostilities upon the receipt of a brusque letter 
from Algiers adjuring Isma il to remain within the boundaries 
traditionally accepted by the "rays de Fes" (177)* But within al- 
Zayyani^ narrative, the vapour of plague and famine which surrounded 
the 1680 campaign has been dissipated, and the geographical scope of 
the actual feeble Tilimsani expedition, nobly increased# There has 
also been added to the tale a refrain upon the fickle loyalties of 
"Chergllfc peoples#
The result is a narrative developed to suit the internal logic
c —
of dynastic tradition# It recapitulates the theme of Alawi acceptance 
of a Tafna frontier. It functions as a pointer towards subsequent 
campaign stories# And, as, within al-Zayyani*s texts, it follows upon 
the tale of Isma ilfs supposed expedition into the "Qibla" (178), it 
balances this earlier episode, while stressing the contrast between 
the two ventures# Both harakat were allegedly distinguished by the 
ingathering of a following# But the allegiance of "Qiblan" groupings 
entailed loyal service; a similar declaration of loyalty by shiraga 
from the east was followed by treachery#
It seems that al-Zayyani wished to imply that "Chergi" expeditions 
aimed at the belabouring of eastern traitors were amply justifiable#
He could thus use the theme of punitive campaigning within the eastern 
march as a slBight for containing the memory of incursions beyond the
(177) See Chapter III Pp# 127-128:
(178) See the present s&ctien P# 314-315
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beyond the Tafna# One relevant episode was set into the authorfs 
narrative at the year 1680# It is the first of thB corpus of five 
campaign narratives associated with Isma0! ! ^  "tamhld" or "setting to 
order" of his domains, and it lists rural groupings compelled to 
accept disarmament (179)* According to the nomenclature of the 
"Bustan al—Zarif###"# three out of the four Arabic-speaking groupings 
involved were peoples who had supposedly abandoned IsmaCil by the 
ChBliff in his hour of need, during the previous campaign* Within 
the narrative structure, these ware peoples receiving their just 
deserts for an act of treachery in the field* One of these groupings, 
the Hamiyan, was from beyond the Tafna (180)* This circumstance was 
left unremarked# Similarly, for the year 1682, a year for which 
contemporary European sources rumoured a confrontation in the Tilimsani 
march, between the forces of Isma°il and an army from Algiers (181), al- 
Zayyani’s narrative suggested that Isma il*s eastward move had been 
directed solely against the Banu CAmir (182), the arch-traitors of the
• m Q
first "Chergi" campaign# The Banu Amir were inhabitants of "Oranie", well 
beyond the Tafna* But the author avoided any implication that Ismail's 
supposed attack upon their territory had precipitated any Turkish 
counter-move* His tale of a subsequent Turkish invasion of Snassen 
country was linked solely with the machinations of Ahmad ibn Muhriz (1B3)#
Traditions concerning the confrontation between the forces of
* 1*
Isma il and the forces of the Regency over the decade 1691-1701, were
(179) "Turiuman" pp.^18 of the text and 34-5 of the translation cf# 
"Bustan al-Zarlf###" MS p. 34
(180) Al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istiqsa***" Casablanca text Vol# VII p* 21 
ef* Fumey translation A.M. Vol* IX p# 27
(181) Sea Chapter III Pp* 135-6
(182) "TurIuman" p* 19 of the text and 36 of the translation cf#
"Bustan al-Zarif# • . MS loc* cit#
(183) "Turiuman" loc# cit# cf* "Bustan al-Zarlf*##" MS loc. cit.
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too strong for al-Zayyani to ignore# The period was marked off by 
events associated with the two major °Alaw! defeats at al-Mashari°
C M
and at Djidioua* And the entire decade was scarred by Alawi raids 
upon Algerine territory (184)# The author was compelled to present 
both aggression and defeat in an acceptable fashion# To this end, his 
major narrative device was carefully to set the figure of Zaydan 
rather than the figure of Isma0!! at the centre of the "Chergi" 
disorders# Within al-Zayyan!fs writings, in which memory of Isma^Tl’s 
design for an "Udaya succession" was obliterated, Zaydan was 
dynastically a marginal figure, without the pre-eminence that is 
vouched for by European sources contemporary with IsmaCil*s middle 
years. He was said to have been the boldest cavalier among Isma°il,s 
sons ("afras awladihi") (185)♦ But there is no record of his ever 
having been heir presumptive. Tradition reserved the distinction of 
"waliy cahd" in his father’s lifetime for Ahmad al-Dhahabi (186).
Zaydan was therefore conveniently well-suited to the role of unruly 
son, a maverick for whose deeds his father could not necessarily be 
held responsible.
The foundation for this line of approach is likely to haVB been 
a genuine tradition concerning Zaydan*s leadership of his father*s 
troops within the "Cherg" over the years 1691-2; a leadership which 
had culminated in the debacle at al-Mashari0 • It has been seen that
al-Zayyan! discreetly left this first defeat unspoken of# A blurred
precis of the entire encounter survives, limpet-like at the edge of 
the author’s great set-piece of internal pacifications thB final
(184) See Chapter V passim#
(185) "Turiuman" p. 23 of the text and 44 of the translation
(186) ibid. p# 25 of the text and 47 of the translation
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campaign into the "Dabal Fazzaz" (187)* The precis simply records 
Zaydan’s leadership of the campaign, and Ismacil*s supposedly short­
term swerve aside from his campaign against Beraber groupings, into 
joining his son in making peace with the Turks* Any literary trace 
of the invasion by Algerine forces was neatly erased by the suggestion 
that peace had been made at the frontier town of Oujda (188)*
Within al-Zayyani*s texts, subsequent cAlawi ravaging of the 
"Cherg" survives only within a record which shaped events into a 
narrow but acceptable drama* The role of Zaydan was madB crucial and 
vigorous* In 1694, when it was probable that the troops under Zaydan*s 
command wehfc no further than Taza (189), the prince was said to have 
raided the Turks of Tlemssn, and to have brought back booty (190),
On this occasion, his father’s fundamental goodwill towards Algiers 
and Constantinople was vouched for by an immediately subsequent note 
within the narrative* This described IsmacIl*s reception of an 
embassy from the Porte, and his swift compliance with its demands 
that he should make pBace with Algiers (191)* It has been seen that 
the embassy was a genuine occurence, but that IsmacTl*s regard for 
the peace it had brought was short lived* Grim raiding of Tilimsani 
march peoples was soon resumed from the west* But within al-Zayyani*s 
texts the tedious pattern of this raiding was transmuted* Zaydan was 
made entirely to blame for the renewed rupture of relations with the 
Algerine Regency* In 1699-1700, as the sultan doled out vice-regalities, 
Zaydan was said to have been allotted the "Gherg"* Thereafter, in what
(187) See the present section, Part I Pp* 295-6
(188) "Tur iuman'1 p* 24 of the text and 44 of the translation
(189) See Chapter 11 P* 203
(190) "Turiuman" p* 25 of the text and 47 of the translation
"Bustan al-Zarif***" MS p, 41
(191) "Turiuman" loc* cit* cf* "Bustan al-Zarif*»." MS
cf * 
loc* cit*
ssems to have been a colourful misremembering of his raid of 1691 
(192), Zaydan was alleged to have cut a swathe through Algerine 
territory. The incursion was put forward as the crime of a bold young 
warrior: successful, and carrying a touch Df bravura. It was claimed 
that the prince had expelled the Turkish garrison from Tlemsen, and 
had raided the palace of the Bey of Mascara (193): both achievements 
are apparently unknown to contemporary comment, and may be assumed to 
be fiction. Within this context, no trace survives of Ismacil*s 
personal involvement, at this date, in raiding beyond the Tafna. 
Al-Zayyani carefully dissociated the sultan from the raiding, by 
insisting that Isma il respected the peace he had made with the 
Turks, and disapproved of his sonfs actions, to the point of 
depriving him of command (194).
Nevertheless, in terms of this narrative, the transgression of 
the son was to be visited upon the father* The encounter of 1701 was 
made the outcome of the previous yearfs raiding. The plundered Bey was 
said to be with the army that came from Algiers to punish Isma°il. 
Battle, and, by implication, defeat, were upon this occasion admitted 
(195). Either, however, the author was unaware of the battle site or 
he suppressed it. The simple insertion of the toponym Djidioua would 
have shattered his carefully moulded version of relations between 
Isma il and the Turks, with the bald demonstration that Isma il had
(192) See Chapter M P . 188 and the "Daftar al-Tashrifat" p. 502 of
the text and 506 of the modern French translation.
O 93) "Turiuman” p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif-...” MS pp. 41-2
(194) "falamma balaoha dhalika al-sultan ikhtaza calavhi wa cazalahu
—  •
li-11-sulh alladhi kana baynahu wa bavna al-turk”
• • —
("And when this reached the sultan he was furious with him (Zaydan),
and deprived him of command, because of the peace that there was 
between him and the Turks")
("Turiuman" pp. 25-6 cf. 48 of the translation.)
(195) "Turiuman" p. 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarlf...» MS p. 42
See also Chapter 1/ P ♦ 236
provoked h.is oun undoing by an undisguisable invasion of the Regency. 
For Djidioua lies half way along the road between the Tafna and 
Algiers*
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APPENDIX A
THE TERN HARTANl/HARATIN
• • V'"1"1 *
It is impassible ta use the term hartani (pi* haratln) with
•  • ' • '  •
sociological precision, as its connotations are part racial and
part economic* It is a term particularly characteristic of oasean
society in the western Sahara and its fringes* Here it denotes the
sedentary serf-cultivator who tends the palm grave of a migratory
master* To date, thars has been no serious full-scale study of
the hartani in this context*
Oasean serf-cultivators arB known to have existed as early
as the time of Leo Africanus (1)* For centuries they have been
regularly distinguished both from free men and from slaves* Thus,
according to a chronicle edited by A-G-P* Martin, the death-roll
of a seventeenth century Tawati famine affecting the settlement
of Makhra was enumerated in categories of "harratines” and
,Tnegresu (2)* Such serfs remained "haratin" even if they left
V •
the land* In the context of a 1719 civic "brouhaha” in Timbuktu,
the dependents of oasean shurafa* who had settled within this
city were carefully referred to as haratin. as distinct from
• •
°abld proper (3)*
Outside of the oases, haratin seem bBst regarded as the
% •
"coloureds” of north-west Africa* They are today frequently of 
a bronzed or mulatto appearance, and have been seen by the 
ethnologically romantic as the remnant of an ancient and
(1) Leo ed* Ramusio ff* 73-4
(2) al-Tawatl quoted Martin p* 54
(3) "Tadhkirat al-Nisyan.**” pp* 29-30 of the text and 47-8 of
the translation.
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aboriginal bronze race# Such speculation has been passed on, with
qualified approval, within certain of the passing notices to
which discussion of the haratin has been so far confined (4)#
• •
However, these people are more likely to represent a stock
resulting from centuries of miscegenation within settlements
strung along the major slave-trading routes# In the nineteenth
century they were noted as being particularly typical of the
DarCa valley (5) where, in the early sixteenth century, Leo
had noted that slaves were a particularly prominent section of
thB population (6)#
Within the Atlas arc, the term hartani may# in certain contexts,
• •
have been used to denote "freedman". In his annotated reproduction
of al-Zayyani1s account of thB setting up of the Cabid army,
al-Nasiri, as part of his defence of IsmaPil's recruitment
policy, defined hartani as “Catiqtt, or ‘'emancipated slave1* (7)#
V  ~ v
As root of the term, he gave the etymologically impossible 
“al-hurr al-thani“. or “second class freeman11# But this was a 
prim and blinkered interpretation of the total connotation of 
the word# De Foucauld, an author who was al-Nasiri1s contemporary, 
passed on a significant if grubby little gibe:
"Parle-t-on mariage?" dit un proverbs, "l*Arabe demands:
*est-elle de bonne maison?*; le Chleuh, ,est-elle 
riche?*; le Hartani, ‘est-elle blanche?*"#
For the period covered by the thesis, the weakness of a lawyer*s
(4) See, for example, the relevant passages within R# Wauny's 
"Tableau Geooraohique de 1*Quest Africain au Woven Age" 
pp# 444-5, and within ‘*Le Sahara Francais" Vol. II of R#
Capot^Rey*s "L*Afriaue Blanche Francaise"(Paris. 1953) pp. 169-72
(5) de Foucauld p* 88
(6) Leo ed* Ramusio f# 73
(7) Al-Na§iris "Kitab al-Istiasa«**“ Casablanca text Vol* VII p# 58 cf# 
Fumey translation A#N# Vol* IX p# 77
(8) de Foucauld loc* cit*
limitation of the term to thB meaning "freedman'1 is illuminated
by the contemptuous term "red-hide" ("ahmar al-.iild") employed,
as a synonym for hartani within the sultan Ismail’s own chancery 
• 1 V
(9). The connotation "freedman" may also be undermined by the 
fragment of a register possessed by M. G-S. Colin (10)* This 
document, which covers a section of rural "dabali" society,
regularly employs haratin as a synonym for wusfan; "slaves"*
* • " _1 " V  r
There is no clarification here of thB precise meaning of
haratin * But the meaning "freedmen" would seem to be eliminated. 
• •
(9) See Chapter V Pp. 216-217
(10) See Chapter V P. 196 (Note (51))
APPENDIX B«
THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONNOTATIONS OF ,UDAYA>
The name "Udaya" is distinctively Saharan, but, for tha 
period covered by the thesis, cannot be attached with precision 
to any narrow ethnic grouping or limited region.
In the sixteenth century "Udaya" seems to have had "Qiblan", 
that is, western Saharan connotations. The name was employed by 
Portuguese authorities of the early sixteenth century to denote 
both the desert hinterland of the stretch of coast facing Arguin 
island (1), and tha Arabic-speaking section of the inhabitants of 
this region (2). Leo, from the same period, listed the "Vodei" 
as a sub-fraction of the "Mahchil" Arabs, a grouping "di numero 
quasi infinito" inhabiting the desert between liJadan and Ualata (3). 
These were peoples who could be reached by way of the Dar a 
valley. A rebellious nephew of Ahmad al-Mansur al-5acdi, Dawud 
ibn Abd al-Mu’min. is said to have fled southwards along this 
route "to lead a nomadic life among the Udaya Arabs of the south" (4).
However, by the early nineteenth century, the name seems to 
have been subjected to a shift inland. On a map drawn at this date 
by Grey Oackson, once British consul in Mogador, to illustrate 
trading connections between Morocco and Timbuktu* the term 
"Ludaya Arabs" was set sprawling across a region sited between 
"Tuat Encampment". and the similarly vast region of the "Mograffra 
Arabs" (Mcafra?), set to the west of the "Ludaya", and within the
(1) "Lodea": Valentim Fernandes Alania: "Descripcam..." ed./tr.
P. de Cenival and Th. Monod (Paris, 1938 pp. 58-72)
(2) "Ludea"s D. Pacheco Pereira: "Esmeralda de Situ Orbis" ed. A.E.
da Silva Dias (Lisbon, 1905) p. 77
(3) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 4
mm Q  m  Q  M
(4) "wa istaoarra bihi al-rahl fi arab al-udava min arab al-.ianub"
Al-Ifranl: "Nuzhat^l-H&dl..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 85 of the text
cf* 150-151 of the translation.
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hinterland of Cape Sojador* This map must be admitted to contain 
gross errors* Grey dackeon belonged to the school which believed 
thB Niger to be the Upper White Nile, and all his information for 
regions beyond the Atlas camB at second hand* Bufe for Saharan, 
as distinct from West African geography, the draftsman's major 
points of reference seem to align relatively well with points along 
the coastline, which here provides an approximately accurate 
frame to the whole (5).
(5) Grey Packson Map facing page 283*
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pp# 458-478, as an appendix to the article of H* de Castries:
"La Conquete du Soudan par el-Mansour (1591)"#
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Anon: "A brief relation of some latter occurrents in the stats and 
kinadom of Morocco" Leconfield MS No* 73 from Petworth 
House, printed in S*I* 1 Anoleterre Vol* III pp* 461- 
489, and putatively dated by the editor to 1638#
Anon: (initialled S*L.) "A letter from a gentleman of the Lord 
Ambassador HOWARD'S Retinue" (London* 1670) Listed In the 
B*M. catalogue under the heading "Tanoier". No* 1046 d* 25
Anon: "Relation de M* le G** " ou "Lettre escrite en reoonse de 
diverses questions curieuses sur les Parties de l'Affriaue 
ou r&ane aulourd'huv Mulev Arxid* rov de Tafilete" (Paris *
1670)* Reprinted within 5*1* 1ra France Vol* III pp* 691- 
740, under the title used within the thesis "Relation de 
Thomas le Gendre".
Anon: "A Discourse touching TANGER in a LETTER to a person of 
quality* to which is added 'The Interest of Tangier' bv 
another hand" (London* 1680) Listed in the B,M* catalogue 
under the heading "Tanoier". No# 583 c# 37
Anon: "The last Account from Fez* in a Letter from onB of the Embassy 
to a Person of Honour in London* containing a Relation of 
Colonel Kirk's Reception at Meauinez* by the Etnperour. with 
several passages in Relation to the Affairs of Tangier*
(London, N.D*; (1681?) Listed in the B.M* catalogue under the 
heading “Tangier"* No* 583 i 3/8
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Anon: "Voyage de Monsieur le baron de St. flmant. caoitaine de 
uaisseau. ambassadeur du Rov Tr&s-Chretian vers le Roy 
de Maroc. par un officier de marine." (Lyons. 1698)
Extracts reprinted within S.I. 2° France Vol. II 
pp. 312-338, undBr the title used within the thesis:
"Journal du Voyage de St. Amans.11
Anon: "Relation de cs aui sfest passe dans les trois vovaoes
que les relioleux de l^rdre de Nostre-Dame de la Plercv 
ont faits dans les fctats du Rov de Raroc pour la 
redemption des captifs en 1704. 1708 et 1712. par un das 
Peres Deputbz pour la Redemption, de la congregation de 
Paris, du mSme ordre." (Paris, 1724) Edited and reprinted 
(with deletions) within S.I. 2e France Vol. VI pp. 613- 
812, under the title: "Relation de la Merci". Short title 
within the thesis: "Relation...de la MBrcy"
Anon: "Relation del sitio de la villa de MELILLA en Africa".
being an edition of an anonymous eighteenth century MS 
published by the Marques de Olivart in Madrid in 1909*
Anon: "Relation de cs aui s*est passe dans le rovaume de Maroc 
depuis l*annCe 1727 iusau^n 1737" (Paris. 1724). A work 
frequently attributed to one "Adrien-Maurice de Mairault".
Anon: "Tadhkirat al-nisyan fi akhbar muluk al-sudan" edited and 
translated by 0* Houdas and E. Benoist as "Tedzkiret en- 
nisian fl akhbar molouk es-Soudan (Paris: edition, 1899; 
translation, 1901). Short title within the thesis:
"Tadhkirat al-Niavan..."
Anon: "Al-hulal al-bahlva" part translated by E* Coufourier as
"Chronique de la vie de Moulay El-Hasan" in A.M. Vol. VIII 
(Paris, 1906) pp. 330-395
ibn AbX Zarc: "Al-anis al-mutrib b! rawd al-oirtas fi akhbar
muluk al-maohrib wa tarlkh madTnat fas", edited by 
C-3. Tornberg as "Annales reoum Mauritaniae"
(Uppsala, 1843) and translated by A* Beaumier as 
"Histoire des souverains du Maghreb et annales de la 
ville de Fes" (Paris. 1860). Short title within the 
thesis: "...Rawd al-Oirtas..."
al-cAlawX: "Al-anwar al-husniva" edited by A. al-Filali (Rabat, 
Imprimerie Royale, 1966)
Akansus: "Al—lavsh al-°aramram al-khumas? fi dawlat awlad mawlana 
all al-siiilmasl*.1 Lithographed in Fes. 1918
"E* Aubin" (pseud): "Le Maroc dtauiourdthui" (Paris, 1904)
al-CAyyashi; see Berbrugger
al-Bakri : "Kitab al~masalik wa !l-mamalik". Extract edited and
translated as "Description de l,Afrioue Saptentrionale 
par Abou c0be£d el-Bekri" by W* MacQuckin de Slans.
(Second edition, Paris, 1965)
ibn Battuta: "Rihla". Extracts translated and edited as "Extraits
** * tir&s' des Vovaoes d*ibn Battuta." by R. Mauny, V. Monteil, 
A. Djendidi, S. Robert and*3.*0evisse (Dakar, 1966)
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A\. Berbrugger: Extracts from the "Rihlatavn" of al- Ayyashi, and
of Mawlay Ahmad al-Na^irT of Tamgrout, translated as 
‘‘Voyages dans le Sud de l*Algerie et des Itats 
barbaresques de l*Ouest et de l^st" (“Exploration 
scientifique de 1*Algeria” Vol. IX (Paris* 1856)
Short titles within thB thesis: al— AyyashX ed,/tr 
Berbruooer: Moula Ahmad ed./tr. Berbruooer*
3* Braithwaite: "The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of 
Morocco upon the'death of thB late Emperor Muley 
Ishmael" (London. 1729)
F* Brooks: "Barbarian cruelty, beino a true history of the distressed 
condition of the Christian Captives under the tyranny 
of Mulev Ismail. Emperor oT~^oroccol> (London* 1693)
Short title within the thesis: "Barbarian Cruelty"
A* Burel: "Memoirb Milltaire sur V Empire de Maroc. presents a 
Sa Maleste Imperials et Rovale le 5 iuin 1810. redioe 
en avril 1B105 Edited by 3# cjaill^ ' as "La Mission du 
Caoitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808"(Paris,' 19537 " ' "
Short title within the thesis: "Memoire Militaire..."
0* Busnot: "Histoire du reone de Moulev Ismael" (Rouen, 1714)
Hi de Castries and continuators: "Les Sources Inedites de 1*Histoire
chi Maroc" '"(Paris. from 1905 and in 
progress) The following volumes 
within the series are footnoted 
within the thesis:^
Premiere Serie (Dynastie Saadienne) Pavs-Bas Vol* I (1906)
Pavs-Bas Vol. V (1920)
France Vol. Ill (1911)
Anoleterre Vol* II (1925) 
Anoleterre Vol* III (1936)
France Vol. I (1922)
France Vol* II (1924)
France Vol. Ill (1927)
France Vol. IV (1931)
France Vol. V (1953)
France Vol.
Deuxieme Serie (Dynastie Filalienne)
.re
VI
,8
(1960)
Short reference within the thesis: S.I.1 orS*I*2  together with
volume number and details upon the 
particular document cited.
L-S* de Chenier: "Recherches historiaues sur les Maures et histoire 
de ltempire de Maroc"(Paris. 1787) translated as 
"The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" Two 
volumes,(London, 1788). References within the thesis 
are to the English translation.
F.3.M. de San Duan Del Puerto: "Mission Historial de Marruecos"
(Seville, 1708) Short title within the 
thesis: Del Puerto
Hi Dernschwam: "Taaebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und 
Kleinasien" edited bv F. BabinQer (Munich and 
Leipsig, 1923)
L-^ l» Desfontaines: PIS edited by M* Dureau de la Plalle as "Fragmens
d*un Voyage dans les Regences de Tunis et d*Alger 
fait de 1783 a 1786" in "Voyages dans les 
Regences de Tunis et d^laer" (Paris.' ‘1838)
M. El-Fasi (ed.): "Lettres Inedites de Ploulay Ismael** in "Hesoeris-
Tamuda11 Special Edition, (Rabat, 1962) pp* 31-86
3. de la Fayes "Relation en forme de journal du voiage pour la
redemption des ca'ptifs*' aux^^'oiau'mes de l^roc^ et 
c^Aloer pendant les annees 1723. 1724 et 1725"
(Paris,1726)
V* Fernandes Alemas PIS edited and translated by P* de Cenival and
Th* Monad as "La ,Qescripcamt de Valentim 
Fernandes11 (Paris, 1938)
Ch-E* dB Foucauld: "Reconnaissance au Maroc 1883-1884" (Paris, 1888)
R. Frejus: "Relation d*un voyaoe fait dans la Mauritania, en 
Affriaue. par 1b sieur Roland Frejus de la ville 
de Marseille, par ordre de Sa Maieste. en l^nnl^e 
1666. vers le roy de Tafilete. Mulev Arxid. pour 
ll6tablissement du commerce danstoute l*6tendue 
du royaume de Fas: et da toutBS ses autres 
conouestes11 (Paris. 1670) edited and reprinted 
within S.I. 2 France Vol* I pp* 118-188 
Short title within the thesis: Frejus*
al-GhassanX: "Bihlat al-uiazir fT *ftikak al-aslr" translated by 
H* Sauvaire as "Vovaae en Espaone d *un ambassadeur 
marocain (1690-1691 )**
H4-0. de Grammont: "Correspondence des Consuls d*Alger" in "Revue 
Africaine11 Volumes XXXI (Paris, 1887) pp*
164-212, 295-319, 341-349, 436-477 and 
XXXII (Paris, 1888) pp* 52-80
W* Harris: "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco" in "The 
Geographical Oournal" (London, 189?) pp* 638-645
IdrlsI: Extract from the "Nuzhat al-Mushtaa***” edited and translated 
by EL* Dozy and M-3* de Goeje as "Description de lMfriaue et 
de 1*5308006 par Edrisi" (Leyden, 1866)
al-IfranX: "Zill al-warif fi mafakhir mawlana isma0?! ibn al-sharlf”
\Rabat, Imprimerie Royals, 1962)"sho'rttitSa^within The
thesiss "Zill al-uarif«.«"
al-Ifranl: "Nuzhat al-hadi bi-akhbar muluk al-aarn al-hadi" edited 
and translated by 0* Houdas as "Nozhet el-fiadi: 
histoire de la dynastie saadienne au Maroc (1511- 
1670)"* (Paris, edition, 1888; translation 1889)
Short title within the thesis: "Nuzhat al-Hadl**.11 
ed./tr# Houdas* •
3* Grey-3ackson: "An account of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1809)
F. 3ustinard: see al-2arhuni
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ibn Khalduns "Muoaddima" edited and translated by de Slane as 
" Les Proleoomenes d’ibn Khaldoun" Three volumes 
(Paris, 1863-8)
Le Gsndre: see Anons "Relation de M* le G** »
lil* Lempriere: "ff tour from Gibraltar to Tangier* Sallee. Moaodore*
Santa Cruz. Tarudant and thence over mount Atlas to 
Morocco11 (London. 1791) Short title within the thesis: 
nA tour from Gibraltar* * *'*
0* Lenzs "Timbuktu1* translated by Lehautcourt as "Timbouctou: Voyage 
au Maroc. au Sahara et au Soudan"* Two volumes 
(Paris, 1886).
Leo Africanus (Hasan ibn Muhammad al—Uazzanr al—Fasi ) MS edited 
by Giovanni Battista Ramusio as "Della descrittione 
dell1Africa et dalle cose notabili che auivi sono 
per Giovan Lioni Africano1* and included in the 
editor’s "Della navigation! et viaooi" Third edition, 
(Venice, 1563) Volume I ff* 1-95 inclusive•
Short title within the thesis: Leo ed* Ramusio*
French translation as "Description de I’Afriaue par 
Jean Leon l’Africain" inaugurated by A* Epaulard and 
completed, with annotations, by Th* Monod, H* Lhote 
and R* Mauny. Two volumes (Paris, 1956).
L* del Marmol Carvajals "Descripcion oeneral de Africa" Three volumes,
(Granada and Malaga, 1573 and 1599)
Translated .by N* Perrot d’Ablancourt as 
"De l’Afriaue" Three volumes, (Paris, 1667).
R* Mauduit: 11 Le Makhzen Marocain" in "Bulletin du ComitB de l’Afriaue 
Francaise" ("Renseionements Coloniaux") Paris, 1903
pp* 293-304
£** MouBtte: "Histoire des conauestes de Moulev Archv. connu sous 
le nom de rov de Tafilet. et de Moulev IsmaBl ou 
Semein. son frSre et son successeur a present regnant. 
tous deux rois de Fez, de Maroc. de Tafilet. de S u b  etc* 
contenant une description de ces rovaumes. des loix. des 
coustumes et des moeurs des habitants, avec une carte du 
pals. & laauelle on a loint les plans des orincipales 
villes et forterBssBs du rovaume de Fez, dessinees sur 
les lleux par le sieur G. MouBtte. aui v a demeurB" 
caotif pendant onze annees" (Paris. 1693), edited and 
reprinted within S*I. 2 France Vol. II pp* 1-201 
Short title within the thesis: MouBtte: "Histoire*.*"
G* MouBtte: "Relation de la caotivite du Sieur MouBtte dans les 
Rovaumes de Fez et de Maroc" (Paris. 1683) Short 
title within the thesis: MouBtte: "Relation***"
Muljammad the katib: "Daftar al-Tashrlfat" Extracts edited and reproduced
together with two French translations in S.I* 2 
France Vol* III pp* 499-513
al-Nasiri of Tamgrout: see Berbrugger
al-Nasiri al-S lawl: "Kitab al-istiasa li-akhbar duwal al-maahrib 
* al-aosa" Four Volumes (Cairo* 1894). Second
Bditifen, as used within this thesis: nine 
volumes (Casablanca, 1956)*
Volume four of the Cairo text was translated 
by E* Fumey as "Chronioue de la dvnastie 
alaouie du Maroe" and published in A*M# Vols*
XX and X (Paris, 1906 and 1907)
Volume two of the Cairo text, covering the 
Almohade and Marlnid periods, was translated 
by I* Hamet and published In A.M. Vols*
XXXIX and XXXIII (Paris, 1927 and 1934)
S* Ockley: "An account of south-west Barbery" (London, 1713)
Short title within the thesis: "Ockley"
D# Pacheco Pereira: "Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis" edited by A*E* da
Silva Dias (Lisbon, 1905)
"T* Pellow": "The History of the long Captivity and Adventures of 
Thomas Pellow in South Barbarv" written by Himself 
(London, N.D*) For the deficiencies of this work as 
a "primary source", see Prologue Pp*
"T* Pellow": the work cited above, edited by R* Brown as "The
Adventures of Thomas Pellow of Penrvn. Mariner i 
three and twenty years In captivity among the Moors" 
(London, 1890)
5* Pepys: "Journal at Tangier" included within J* Smith’s edition 
of "The Life* Journals and Correspondence of Samuel 
Pepys Esq* F.R.S. " (London. 1841) Vol. Ipp.'''325-465
T* Phelps: "A true account of thB captivity of Thomas Phelps"
(London, 1685)
F* Pidou de St* Olon: "L’estat present de I’empire de Maroc"
(Paris, 'l694)* Translated by P* Motteiux as 
"The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" 
(London, 1695)* References within the thesis 
are to the English translation of Motteux.
E* Plantet (ed*): "Correspondence des devs d’Aloer avec la Cour
de France (1579-1883)" Two volumes (Paris. 1889)
al-Qadiri: "Nashr al-mathanX li-ahl al-oarn al-hadX cashr wa ’1-thanX." 
Lithographed in two volumes (Fes, 1892-3}
The first of these volumes was translated and published in 
two parts, as "Nachr al-Mathani de Mouhammad al-Qadirl"
Part X, translated by A* Graulle and M-P* Maillard, was 
published as A.M* Vol* XXI (Paris, 1913)* Part II, 
translated by E. Michaux-Bellaire, was published as A*M* 
Vol* XXIV (Paris, 1917)*
Short title within the thesis "Nashr al-Mathani..." 
together with details of the volume cited*
G-BV Ramusio: see Leo Africanus
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{£. Rohlfs: "Reise durch Marokko" (Bremen, 1868)* Extract translated 
by de Tonnac as "Le Tafilelt dfapres Gerhardt Rohlfs" 
in "Bulletin du Coroitfe de l*Afriaue Francaise"
("Renselopements Coioniaux") for August. 1910 pp* 243-257
Sa dya ibn Oanans see Vajda
Samuel ibn Sabi ibn Danan: see Vajda
"Sidi Bahaia" (Flawlay tjaahlm ibn Ahmad): ses A-G-P* Martin
T* Shaw: "Travels and Observations relatino to several parts of 
Barbarv and the Levant" (Oxford* 1738)
G. Vajda: "Un recueil de textes historiques judeo-marocaines".
Texts No. XXI to XXVI in "Hesperis" Vols. XXXV (Paris, 1948) pp. 
352-8 and XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 139-162
3. Hindus: "A journey to Meouinez. the residence of the present
Emperor- of Fes and Morocco* on the occasion of Commodore 
Stewart*s embassy thither for the redemption of the 
British Captives in 1721" (London. 1721)
Short title within the thesis: "A iournev to Meouinez..."
al-Zarhuni: "Rihlat al-wafid fi akhbar hi 1rat al-walid" translated 
an5 annotated bv Col. F. Justinard as "La Rihla du 
marabout de Tasaft" (Paris^ 1940). Short reference 
within the thesis: al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr*
Justinard.
al-Zayyani: "Al-tur luman alHnucrib can duwal al-mashria wa^-maohrib" 
Thirteenth and final chapter edited and translated by D.
Houdas as "Le Maroc de 1631 a 1812" (Paris,_1886). The 
references within the thesis to the "Tur iuman" are to 
this abbreviated Houdas edition*
al-Zayyani: "Al-turlumanat al-kubra allatT iamacat akhbar al-macmur
barran wa bahran" edited nbl \  al-Filali as "Al-tur iumlnat 
al kubra fi akhbar al-ma mur barran wa bahran."
(Casablanca, 1967) Short title within the thesis:
"Turiuroanat al-Kubra.. ."
Two extracts from this work have been translated and 
reproduced within A.M. Vol. VI (Paris, 1906):- 
E» Coufourier: "Description aeooraphiaue du Maroc d*
Az-Zyanv" pp. 436-456
G. Salmon: "Liste de villes marocaines" pp. 457-460
Unpublished works:
Manuscripts:
Anon: MS in the possession of M* G~S. Colin (See Chapter V P. 1*16 CNote 51))
al-Zayyani: "Al-bustan al-zarlf fr dawlat awlad mawlav call al- 
sharif" MS No. D. 1571 in the possession of the 
archive of the Bibliotheque Generals in Rabat*
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Archives of the Public Record Office in London
Files footnoted within the text of the thesis*—
State Papers (S#P#) No* 71 (Barbary States)
(3) and (4)2 Consular correspondence with Algiers, 1685-1712
(13) to (17) inclusive* Consular and miscellaneous correspondence
referring to Morocco, 1637-1733
Colonial Office Papers (C#0.) No# 91 (Gibraltar)
(1) Miscellany of eighteenth century Gibraltar papers
B# Secondary Sources
These have been subdivided# The aim has been to keep thB list brief# 
However, to those sources footnoted within the text of the thesis, 
there have been added certain general works which helped to mould 
the background against which the thesis took shape# These additional 
works include two gaudy “lives” of Mawlay Isma il, the works of 
Blunt and of “Maxange-Defontin"# Their content is ripe with “copy” 
suitable for exclusion from any considered study of their hero*s 
period#
Published Books
I*S. Allouche and A# Regragui* “Catalogue des MSS Arabes de Rabatft
Two volumes, (Paris' 1954, and Rabat, 
1958)# This catalogue notes additions 
to the library from the year 1921 
onwards, and was designed to supplement 
the earlier catalogue of E# Levi- 
Provencgal (q#v#)
I# Bauer y Landauers “Apuntes oara una biblioorafia de Marruecos”
(Madrid, N.D.)
v 63# Berque* “Al-Youai* problemes de la culturB marocaine au XVII 
si^cle” (Paris'* 1958)
P# Berthiers “Les anciennes sucreries du Maroc et leurs reseaux
hydrauliQues* un Xp^olje de lMiistoire de la canne a 
sucre” (Rabat >196sT Two volumes', .........
W. Blunt* “Black Sunrises the life and times of Mulai Ismail«
Emoeror of Morocco 1646-1727” (London. 1951)
E.UJ. Bovills “The Golden Trade of the Moors” (London, 1958)
3# Brignon, A# Amine, B« Boutaleb, G# Martinet, B# Rosenberger and
M* Terrasses “Histoire du Maroc** (Casablanca, 1967)
R# Capot-Rey* “Le Sahara Francais“ being Vol. II of “L,AfriaUB Blanche 
Francaise” (Paris, 1953)
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M.P. Castellanos* "Aoostolado Serafico en Marruecos” Vol* I
(Madrid and Santlago, 1896)" (Vol• II was never
written.)
M.P. Castellanos* "Historia de Marruecos" Third edition (Tangier, 1898)
G.N. Clarkes “lifer and Society in the Seventeenth Century” (London, 1958)
A* Cours "L^tablissement des dynasties des Cherifs au Maroc et leur 
rivalitS avec les Turos de la R^oence d^AlQer 1509-1830.”
(Paris, 1904) Volume XXIX in the series “Publications de 
l^cole des Lettres dtAloer,”
The tone of Cour's work is redolent of a period when an 
independent Morocco was formally to be considered a threat 
to French Algeria. And the work itself is riddled with 
errors* Nevertheless, it ^s a piece of some interest. It 
provides the sole attempt, to date, at a study of relations 
between the Maghrib al-Aqsa and the Maghrib al-Awsat over 
its chosen period. And, for the reign of Isma II, it has 
the strength of an appreciation of this sultan's interest 
and involvement in the "Cherg”, an interest which standard 
histories, concentrating upon Morocco in isolation, have 
virtually obliterated*
0. Dapper: s b s Ogilby
M* Dawud* "Tarlkh Titwan” Volumes I-II (Tetuan, 1959)
These volumes preface the author*s major interest, tha 
Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-1860
M. Delafoase* "Haut-Seneoal-Nioer (Soudan francais)” Vol. I 
(Paris, 1912)
A. Delcourts ”La France et les itablissements francais au Senegal 
entre 1713 et 1763” (Dakar, 1952)
3. Despois and R.Raynal* ” Geooraohie de l'Africiue du Nord-Ouest”
(Paris, 1967)
G. Fishers "Barbarv Legends tifar. Trade and Piracy in North Africa 
1415-1830” (London. 1957)
The title of this work is over-comprehensive. The book 
is, in affections and content, heavily biased towards 
the Ottoman Regencies, and Algiers in particular. It is 
virtually devoid of information upon Morocco during the 
period.
L. Galindo y de Vera* "Historic, vicisitudes v polftica tradicional
de Espana respecto de sus posesiones sn las 
costas de Africa” (Madrid, 1884)
E* Gellners "Saints of the Atlas” (London, 1969)
E. Gellner and C. Micaud (editors)* "Arabs and Barbers” (London, 1972)
H-0, de Grammont* "Histoire djAloer sous la domination turoue
(1515-1830)” (Paris. 1887)
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A* Guillaume: "Les Berberes marocaines et la pacification de I1Atlas 
Central (1912-1933)» (Paris.~1946~)
M* Hajji: "Al-zauiva al-dile^iva ua dauruha al-dini ua *l-cilmi
tua ^i-siygTsI"^  Rabat. 1964)_Short title uithin the 
thesis: "Al-Zauiva al-Dilatjva* **"
3*F. P* Hopkins: “Mediaeval Muslim Government in Barbarv until the 
sixth century of the Hiira" (London. 1958)
Ch*-A* 3ulien: "Histoire de ltAfriauB du Word. Tunisie-AlQerie-
Flaroo* de la conau&te arabe a 1B3DW (Paris, 1952)
Second edition of Vol* II of the author*s earlier 
"Histoire de ltAfrioue du Word", as revised by R*
Le Tourneau*
H* Kameni "The War of Succession in Spain" (London* 1969)
Hi Koehler: "Lflalise chretienne du Maroc et la Mission Francisoaine 
1221—1790" (Paris* 1954)
/ cM, Lakhdar: "La vie litteraire au Maroc sous la dvnastie Alaujjde
(1075-1311 ~ 1664—18941“ (Rabat, 1971)
E* Laoust: "Mots et choses berberes" (Paris, 1920)
A* Laroui: "Lthistoire du Maohreb: un essai de svnthese" (Paris, 1970)
o g
R* Lebel: "Le Maroc et les Bcrivains anglais aux XVI * XVII « at 
XVIII” silcles" (Paris. 1927)
R* Le Tourneau: "Fes avant le Protectorat: etude economioue et 
socia3edtune villa de 1*Occident Musulman"
(Casablanca, 1948)
E, Levi-Provencal: "Les manuscrits arabes de Rabat" (Paris, 1921)
It is to this work that the catalogue of Allouche 
and Regragui (q*v#) was designed to form a supplement*
E* Levi-Provencal: "Les historians des Chorfa: essai sur la litterature
historioue et biooraphioue au Maroc du XVI au 
XX si&cle" (Paris, 1922) Short title uiithin the 
thesis: "Lbs historiens des Chorfa"*
R* Levy: "The Social Structure of Islam" (London, 1957)
R, Lourido Diaz: "Ensavo historioorafico sobre el sultanato de 
si'di Muhammad b« wAbd Allah" (Granada* 1957)
R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b* cAbd Allah (1757- 
1790)" (Granada, 1970)
V* Magalhaes-Godinho: "L*economie de 1*empire Portuoais aux XV8 et
XVI sj&cles" (Paris, 1969)
350
G# Marcais: "Les Arabes an Berbsrie du XX^ au XIV0 slecis"
(Constantine and Paris, 1913)
A-G-P* Martin: "Quatre siecles d*histoire marocaine (1504-1912): 
au Sahara de 1504-1902 - au Maroc de 1894-1912"
(Paris, 1924) See the Prologue to the thesis (P* 30 Note 50) 
for the relationship of this work to the author*s 
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